Preventing Nuclear Proliferation in Latin America: The Treaty of Tlatelolco

By Sarah Chankin-Gould

Editor’s Note: Sarah Chankin-Gould represented FAS as an Observer at the XVIII Regular Session of the General Conference of OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) in Havana.

In 1967, before the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and at the height of the Cold War, the states of Latin America signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, creating the world’s first regional Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Today, Latin America is off the radar screen of much of the arms control community, and nuclear proliferation in the hemisphere is not regarded as a significant threat. Yet rather than detracting from the importance of the Tlatelolco regime, this should serve as a reminder of what the Treaty has accomplished.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco has contributed to the development of non-proliferation norms in the region. It was signed only five years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, at which time Cuba remained committed to maintaining the option of nuclear weapons as long as its conflict with the US persisted. In addition, Argentina and Brazil were engrossed in their own race for nuclear arms during the 1970s and 80s. Today, following Cuba’s 2002 ratification, all 33 states in the region have signed and ratified the Treaty.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco

The Treaty commits States Parties to use nuclear power for peaceful means. The parties are required to prohibit and prevent the testing, use, manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, deployment and possession of nuclear weapons in their territory. To ensure its effectiveness, the Treaty includes two Additional Protocols committing states with responsibility for territories in the region (France, Holland, the UK and US), and the major nuclear powers (China, France, Russia, UK, and US) to maintaining the NWFZ.

The Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean – OPANAL – serves as a secretariat for the Treaty regime. A five-member elected Council meets every two months, with states serving four-year terms. In addition, a General Conference of all Member States is convened every two years. The Agency is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Treaty and fulfilling the mandates of the Council and General Conference, including writing reports and maintaining contact with relevant states and international organizations. OPANAL and its Member States have shown a commitment to promoting nuclear non-proliferation both in their own NWFZ and around the world.

The XVIII OPANAL General Conference

The XVIII General Conference of OPANAL was the first conference since the treaty entered into force for all states, and its location in Havana highlighted this fact. Significant topics addressed at the Conference, included: the transport of radioactive materials; a conference of all Nuclear Weapons Free Zones; the role of nuclear states; and the dilemma posed by possible US transport of nuclear weapons in the hemisphere. Each of these is discussed below.

Transport of Radioactive Materials

The threat of radioactive contamination of the marine environment and the related problem of transportation of radioactive materials has been a major issue on the agenda of OPANAL since 1987. The idea of creating a protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco addressing this issue has been presented at various General Conferences. However, it is the position of many States Parties that such a protocol would go beyond the reach and spirit of a treaty that focuses on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Despite the disagreement regarding the best venue for addressing the issue of transport, OPANAL has attempted to create opportunities for continued dialogue on the topic. States Parties have been encouraged to submit information and opinions on technical and legal methods of preventing radioactive contamination of the marine environment within the Treaty of Tlatelolco zone of application. In addition, OPANAL has opened avenues of communication with the IAEA and IMO (International Maritime Organization) on the subject. Discussion of this issue continued at the XVIII General Conference and the corresponding resolution encouraged continuation of similar measures. Clearly the problem of transport will remain a contentious and difficult matter.

Conference of NWFZs

OPANAL and its member states have spearheaded a proposal for an international conference of the parties of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones around the world. Such a conference would allow states and regions to share their experiences and help each other strengthen their NWFZs.

The process of developing broadbased international support for a conference is a lengthy and difficult one, and OPANAL and its Member States have made significant progress toward that goal. OPANAL has established contacts with the relevant authorities of other NWFZs and UN agencies. At the April 2002 Non-Aligned Movement meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, the Chilean delegation promoted a conference that received majority approval. In addition, during this year’s United Nations General Assembly, Mexico submitted a draft resolution proposing such a conference. The resolution was eventually withdrawn because of weak support, but even its introduction was significant. The submission of a resolution is often a first, important step toward building consensus.

At the 2003 General Conference, OPANAL member states reaffirmed their commitment to achieving an international conference of NWFZs and to fostering increased communication among them, in Resolution 466 "Strengthening of OPANAL."

Role of Nuclear States

Another key issue for OPANAL has been the role of the NPT-recognized nuclear weapons states in the Treaty regime. While not parties to the Treaty itself, the NPT ratification of Additional Protocol II commits them not to contribute to a violation of the Treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. All five states submitted "unilateral declarations" qualifying their ratification of the Protocol. Since the end of the Cold War, OPANAL has called into question the necessity of such declarations, pointing out that the purported reason for the declarations – self defense – is already guaranteed in the UN Charter. They are concerned that by retaining the option of nuclear force, the declarations undermine the Treaty.

The Chinese declaration is the least controversial because it states clearly that China will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against the Latin American NWFZ. The French declaration asserts that its ratification of the protocol is understood not to be an obstacle to the right of self defense. This statement leaves room for the use of nuclear weapons in self defense, even against non-nuclear powers. Finally, the declarations of Russia, the UK, and US are related to the self-defense but have even broader applications. All three countries reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American states in the event that those states commit acts of aggression with the support of a nuclear-weapons state.

In 2003, the Secretariat of OPANAL sent notes to the foreign ministers of all five countries requesting that they review and consider withdrawing or modifying their declarations. During the XVIII General Conference, China, France, the UK and Russia indicated that they are studying the request, and reiterated their continued support of the Latin American NWFZ. The US made no statement.

US transport of nuclear weapons

During the Conference, several representatives – particularly those from Venezuela and from the Puerto Rican NGOs present – expressed concern about possible US violations of the spirit or letter of the Treaty. These parties are concerned that the US may have ships with nuclear weapons that travel through the territorial waters of Puerto Rico and make stops at the bases there, and at US military bases throughout the hemisphere. Although some OPANAL members claim that this is a violation of US obligations under the Treaty, the situation is unclear. In fact, US understandings at the time of ratification stated that the Protocols did not affect the right to grant or deny transport or transit privileges regardless of cargo, and did not affect the freedom of the seas or passage through territorial waters. Nonetheless, OPANAL members remain concerned that such actions by the US would undermine the integrity of the Treaty.

Conclusions

The creation of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone including 33 countries is no small feat, and speaks for the normative power of the Treaty. Over the past 36 years OPANAL has seen the transformation of a region from one with several grave emerging nuclear threats to a truly Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The XVIII OPANAL General Conference recognized that complete ratification did not mean that OPANAL’s work is finished either regionally or globally. Within the hemisphere, OPANAL is grappling with issues of transport of radioactive materials, the role of nuclear weapons states, and possible US violations of the Treaty. Externally, they want to create an international conference. This is an ambitious project; yet, in 1967 the creation of a NWFZ in Latin America was itself highly ambitious, and much has been accomplished since then.

Author’s note: Sarah Chankin-Gould is a Scoville Peace Fellow with the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at FAS.