The Future of Nuclear Power:

An interdisciplinary MIT study co-chaired by Dr. John Deutch and Dr. Ernest J. Moniz

Abridged study by John Deutch and Ernest J. Moniz

This report was released in July of this year and provided a comprehensive analysis of nuclear power related issues, covering economics, safety, and waste management as well as public attitudes toward nuclear power and proliferation concerns. For the purposes of the PIR readership, the report was excerpted to focus on the nonproliferation aspects of the study. An unabridged version of the text is available online at http://web.mit.edu/nuclearpower/.

The generation of electricity from fossil fuels, notably natural gas and coal, is a major and growing contributor to the emission of carbon dioxide – a greenhouse gas that contributes significantly to global warming. We share the scientific consensus that these emissions must be reduced and believe that the U.S. will eventually join with other nations in the effort to do so.

At least for the next few decades, there are only a few realistic options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation: increase efficiency in electricity generation and use; expand use of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal; capture carbon dioxide emissions at fossil-fueled (especially coal) electric generating plants and permanently sequester the carbon; and increase use of nuclear power.

In our view, it is likely that we shall need all of these options and accordingly it would be a mistake at this time to exclude any of these four options from an overall carbon emissions management strategy. Rather we seek to explore and evaluate actions that could be taken to maintain nuclear power as one of the significant options for meeting future world energy needs at low cost and in an environmentally acceptable manner.

The limited prospects for nuclear power today are attributable, ultimately, to four unresolved problems:

• Costs: In deregulated markets, nuclear power is not now cost competitive with coal and natural gas.

• Safety: nuclear power has perceived adverse safety, environmental, and health effects, heightened by the 1979 Three Mile Island and 1986 Chernobyl reactor accidents, but also by accidents at fuel cycle facilities in the United States, Russia, and Japan.

  There is also growing concern about the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials and the security of nuclear facilities from terrorist attack;

• Proliferation: nuclear power entails potential security risks, notably the possible misuse of commercial or associated nuclear facilities and operations to acquire technology or materials as a precursor to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability.

• Waste: nuclear power has unresolved challenges in long-term management of radioactive wastes. The United States and other countries have yet to implement final disposition of spent fuel or high level radioactive waste streams created at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Global Growth Scenario

To preserve the nuclear option for the future requires overcoming the four challenges described above — costs, safety, proliferation, and wastes. These challenges will escalate if a significant number of new nuclear generating plants are built in a growing number of countries. The effort to overcome these challenges, however, is justified only if nuclear power can potentially contribute significantly to reducing global warming, which entails major expansion of nuclear power. In effect, preserving the nuclear option for the future means planning for growth, as well as for a future in which nuclear energy is a competitive, safer, and more secure source of power.

Our study postulates a global growth scenario that by mid-century would see 1000 to 1500 reactors of 1000 megawatt-electric (MWe) capacity each deployed worldwide, compared to a capacity equivalent to 366 such reactors now in service. Nuclear power expansion on this scale requires U.S. leadership, continued commitment by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a renewal of European activity, and wider deployment of nuclear power around the world. An illustrative deployment of 1000 reactors, each 1000 MWe in size, under this scenario is given in following table.

	Global Growth Scenario     Nuclear Electricity Market Share Region Projected 2050 GWe Capacity 2000 2050 Total World 1,000 17% 19% Developed world 623 23% 29%    U.S. 300        Europe & Canada 210        Developed East Asia 115       FSU 50 16% 23% Developing World 325 2% 11%    China, India, Pakistan 200        Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico 75        Other Developing Countries 50     Projected capacity comes from the global electricity demand scenario in Appendix 2, which entails growth in globao electricity consumption from 13.6 to 38.7 trillion kWhrs from 200 to 2050 (2.1% annual growth). The market share in 2050 is predicated on 85% capacity factorfor nuclear power reactors. Note that China, India, and Pakistan are nuclear weapons capable states. Other developing countries includes as leading contributors Iran, South Africa, Egypt, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam.

Economics

A major expansion of nuclear power on the scale of this global growth scenario will require government actions that improve the economic viability of nuclear power.

The carbon-free nature of nuclear power argues for government action to encourage maintenance of the nuclear option, particularly in light of the regulatory uncertainties facing the use of nuclear power and the unwillingness of investors to bear the risk of introducing a new generation of nuclear facilities with their high capital costs. We recommend that the government provide a modest subsidy for a small set of "first mover" commercial nuclear plants to demonstrate cost and regulatory feasibility in the form of a production tax credit.

We propose a tax credit of up to $200 per kWe of the construction cost of up to 10 "first mover" plants. This benefit might be paid out at about 1.7 cents per kWe-hr, over the first year and a half of full-power plant operation. We prefer the production tax credit mechanism because it offers the greatest incentive for projects to be completed and because it can be extended to other carbon free electricity technologies, for example renewablesⁱ, and coal with carbon capture and sequestration.

Nonproliferation

In addition to economic concerns, the challenges posed by proliferation risks must also be addressed. The expansion of nuclear power should not proceed under the global growth scenario described above, or any other, unless the risk of proliferation from operation of the commercial fuel cycle is made acceptably small. We must prevent the acquisition of weapons-usable material, either by diversion (in the case of plutonium) or by misuse of fuel cycle facilities (including related facilities, such as research reactors or hot cells) and control, to the extent possible, the knowhow about how to produce and process either HEU (enrichment technology) or plutonium.

This proliferation concern has led, over the last half century, to an elaborate set of international institutions and agreements, none of which have proved entirely satisfactory. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is the foundation of the control regime, since it embodies the renunciation of nuclear weapons by all signatories except for the declared nuclear weapons states – the P-5 (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China) — and a commitment to collaborate on developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, nonsignatories India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and signatories, such as South Africa and North Korea, have admitted to making nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has responsibility for verifying NPT compliance with respect to fuel cycle facilities through its negotiated safeguards agreements with NPT signatories. The IAEA’s safeguard efforts, however, are seriously constrained by the scope of their authorities (as evidenced in Iraq, Iran, and North Korea during the last decade), by their allocation of resources, and by the growing divergence between responsibilities and funding.

A variety of multilateral agreements, such as the Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines for export control, aim to restrict the spread of proliferation enabling nuclear and dual-use technology. European centrifuge enrichment technology, however, is known to have contributed to weapons development elsewhere, and the US and Russia have a continuing dispute over transfer of Russian fuel cycle technologies to Iran (an NPT signatory)ⁱⁱ. The safeguards regime has not failed to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons, but its shortcomings raise significant questions about a global growth scenario that envisions a major increase in the scale and geographical distribution of nuclear power.

In addition to the risk of nuclear weapons capability spreading to other nations, the threat of acquisition of a crude nuclear explosive by a sub-national group has arisen in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Terrorist or organized crime groups are not expected to be able to produce nuclear weapons material themselves; the concern is their direct acquisition of nuclear materials by theft or through a state sponsor. This places the spotlight on the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle as currently practiced in several countries, since the fuel cycle produces during conventional operation nuclear material that is easily made usable for a weapon. It is useful to set a scale for the proliferation risk that has emerged from nuclear power operation to date. Spent fuel discharged from power reactors worldwide contains well over 1000 tonnes of plutonium. While the plutonium is protected by the intense radioactivity of the spent fuel, the PUREX chemical process most commonly used to separate the plutonium with high purity, is well known and described in the open literature. With modest nuclear infrastructure, any nation could carry out the separation at the scale needed to acquire material for several weapons. Further, the MOX fuel cycle has led to an accumulation of about 200 tonnes of separated plutonium in several European countries, Russia and Japan. This is equivalent to 25,000 weapons using the IAEA definition of 8 kg/weapon. Separated plutonium is especially attractive for theft or diversion and is fairly easily convertible to weapons use, including by those sub-national groups that have significant technical and financial resources.

The nonproliferation issues arising from the global growth scenario are brought into sharp focus by examining a plausible scenario for the deployment of 1000 GWe nuclear capacity. An important characteristic of this scenario is that much of the deployment would be expected in industrialized countries that either already have nuclear weapons, thus making materials security against theft the principal issue, or are viewed today as minimal proliferation risks. The concern about these nations’ ability to provide security for nuclear material is especially elevated for Russia, whose economic difficulties have limited its effort to adopt strong material security measures; the concern applies to materials from both the weapons program and the fuel cycle, which have significant inventories of separated Pu. Moreover geopolitical change, for example, in East Asia, could change the interests of some nations in acquiring nuclear capability. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have advanced nuclear technology infrastructures and over several decades might adjust to the emergence of China as both a nuclear weapons state and a regionally dominant economic force by seeking nuclear capability. North Korea provides a further complication to this dynamic.

The developing world might plausibly account for about a third of deployed nuclear power in the mid-century scenario. An appreciable part of this will likely be in China and India, which already have nuclear weapons and dedicated stockpile facilities and thus are not viewed as the highest risks for fuel cycle diversion. Nevertheless, dramatic growth of nuclear power in the sub-continent could be a pathway for nuclear arsenal expansion in India and Pakistan. The security of their nuclear enterprises remains of concern.

On the other hand, a number of other nations with relatively little nuclear infrastructure today, such as the Southeast Asian countries Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand are also likely candidates for nuclear power in the global growth scenario. Iran is actively pursuing nuclear power, with Russian assistance, even though it has vast unexploited reserves of natural gas and could clearly meet its electricity needs more economically and rapidly by using this domestic resource. The United States in particular has argued that this indicates Iranian interest in acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, even though Iran is an NPT signatory and has a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in place. Recent revelation of the spread of clandestine centrifuge enrichment and heavy water technology exacerbates this concern^iv.

The rapid global spread of industrial capacity (such as chemicals, robotic manufacturing) and of new technologies (such as advanced materials, computerbased design and simulation tools, medical isotope separation) will increasingly facilitate proliferation in developing countries that have nuclear weapons ambitions. A fuel cycle infrastructure makes easier both the activity itself and the disguising of this activity. Indeed, even an extensive nuclear fuel cycle RD&D program and associated facilities could open up significant proliferation pathways well before commercial deployment of new technologies.

In order to manage the proliferation pathways opened up by the spread of fuel cycle infrastructure, we suggest the following changes to the NPT. The underlying basis of the NPT/Atoms for Peace framework and treaty structure is to permit all countries to have access to nuclear electricity production benefits and to support nuclear technologies, while implementing IAEA safeguards agreements to avoid the proliferation risk of supporting fuel cycle facilities (both enrichment and reprocessing) that can produce weapons-usable material. We suggest a new approach that centers on classifying states as "privileged" of nuclear reactors or as "fuel cycle states." Declared "privileged states" would operate nuclear reactors according to their internal economic decisions about nuclear power versus alternatives, with international support for reactor construction, operational training and technical assistance, lifetime fresh fuel, and removal of spent fuel. Privileged states would not be eligible for fuel cycle assistance (enrichment, fuel fabrication, reprocessing). On the other hand, the "fuel cycle states" would be subject to a new level of safeguards and security requirements, along the line of those recommended above. Both groups of states would be subject to the Additional Protocol with respect to undeclared facilities. Such an arrangement is a technology- and risk-based approach in the spirit of Article IV of the NPT, offering considerable benefits for those who restrict their nuclear activities while benefiting from nuclear power^v.

We conclude that the current non-proliferation regime must be strengthened by both technical and institutional measures with particular attention to the connection between fuel cycle technology and safeguardability.

Fuel Cycle Choices

The specific technical and institutional measures called for will depend upon the fuel cycle technologies that account for growth in the global growth scenario. We have considered several representative fuel cycles: light water reactors and more advanced thermal reactors and associated fuel forms, operated in an open, once-through fuel cycle; closed cycle with Pu recycling in the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle; and closed fuel cycles based on fast reactors and actinide burning (See Box).

The priority concern is accounting and control of weapon-usable material during normal operation and detection/prevention of process modification or diversion to produce or acquire such material^vii.

	The three representative nuclear fuel cycle deployments examined in this study: Conventional thermal reactors operating in a "once through" mode, in which discharged spent fuel is sent directly to disposal; Thermal reactors with reprocessing in a "closed" fuel cycle, which means that waste products are separated from unused fissionable material that is re-cycled as fuel into reactors. This includes the fuel cycle currently used in some countries in which plutonium is separated from spent fuel, fabricated into a mixed plutonium and uranium oxide fuel, and recycled to reactors for one pass. This fuel cycle is known as Plutonium Recycle Mixed Oxide, or PUREX/MOX. Fast reactorsvi with reprocessing in a balanced "closed" fuel cycle, which means thermal reactors operated world-wide in "once-through" mode and a balanced number of fast reactors that destroy the actinides separated from thermal reactor spent fuel. The fast reactors, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication facilities would be co-located in secure nuclear energy "parks" in industrial countries.

The open fuel cycles seek to avoid the proliferation risk of separated plutonium by requiring that the highly radioactive spent fuel be accounted for until final disposition. This defines the baseline for adequate proliferation resistance, assuming that spent fuel is emplaced in a geological repository less than a century or so following irradiation (i.e., before the self protection barrier is lowered excessively). However, the open fuel cycle typically requires enriched uranium fuel, so the spread of enrichment technology remains a concern.

The advanced closed fuel cycles that keep the plutonium associated with some fission products and/or minor actinides also avoid "directly usable" weapons material in normal operation, since there is a chemical separation barrier analogous to that which exists with spent fuel. Nevertheless, closed fuel cycles need strong process safeguards against misuse or diversion. However, the development and eventual deployment of closed fuel cycles in non-nuclear weapons states is a particular risk both from the viewpoint of detecting misuse of fuel cycle facilities, and spreading practical know-how in actinide science and engineering.

Proliferation concerns contributed significantly to our conclusion that the open, once-through fuel cycle best meets the global growth scenario objectives, since no fissile material easily usable in a nuclear weapon appears during normal operation, and the "back end" does not have plutonium separation facilities. Enrichment facilities that could be employed for HEU production represent a risk. A variety of measures can minimize the risk: strengthened IAEA technical means to monitor material flows and assays at declared facilities; reliable supply of fresh fuel (and perhaps return of spent fuel) from a relatively small set of suppliers under appropriate safeguards; implementation of IAEA prerogatives with respect to undeclared facilities (the "Additional Protocol"); strengthened export controls on enrichment technologies and associated dual-use technologies; and utilization of national intelligence means and appropriate information sharing with respect to clandestine facility construction and operation.

This is a demanding agenda, both diplomatically and in its resource needs, and calls for active effort on the part of the U.S. and other leading nuclear countries. With such an effort, the level of proliferation risk inherent in the possible expansion to 1000 GWe nuclear power by mid-century appears to us to be manageable. It is clear that international RD&D on closed fuel cycles will continue and indeed grow over the next years, with or without U.S. participation. We believe that such work should be restricted by proliferation considerations to those fuel cycles that do not produce "direct use" nuclear materials in their operation.

Today, the international discussions are carried out by those principally interested in developing advanced technologies, without the needed level of engagement from those whose primary responsibility is nonproliferation. The U.S. could play a crucial role in shaping these discussions properly before major efforts are underway.

In this context, the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle is a major issue. It is the current candidate, because of experience, for near-term deployment in nations determined to pursue closed fuel cycles. However, it should be stressed that the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle is not on the "technology pathway" to the advanced fuel cycles discussed earlier (typically, the advanced fuel cycles will involve different separations technology, fuel form, and reactor). The U.S. should work with France, Britain, Russia, Japan, and others to constrain more widespread deployment of this fuel cycle, while recognizing that development of more proliferation-resistant closed fuel cycle technologies is widely viewed as a legitimate aspiration for the distant future.

In summary, the global growth scenario built primarily upon the once-through thermal reactor fuel cycle would sustain an acceptable level of proliferation resistance if combined with strong safeguards and security measures and timely implementation of long term geological isolation. The PUREX/MOX fuel cycle produces separated plutonium and, given the absence of compelling reasons for its pursuit, should be strongly discouraged in the growth scenario on nonproliferation grounds. Advanced fuel cycles may achieve a reasonable degree of proliferation resistance, but their development needs constant and careful evaluation so as to minimize risk. The somewhat frayed nonproliferation regime will require serious reexamination and strengthening to face the challenge of the global growth scenario, recognizing that fuel cycle associated proliferation would greatly reduce the attraction of expanded nuclear power as an option for addressing global energy and environmental challenges.

Authors’ note: Dr. John Deutch is Institute Professor of Chemistry at MIT and Dr. Ernest J. Moniz is a Professor of Physics and the Director of Energy Studies at the Laboratory for Energy and the Environment at MIT.

1. Wind currently enjoys a 1.7 cents per kWe-hr tax credit for ten years.
2. ince the publication of this report, further developments in Iran have occurred. The IAEA is currently investigating Iran for illicit manufacture of weapons grade highly enriched uranium in violation of its obligations as an NPT signatory.
3. DOE’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia, Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board report, January 2001;"Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Material", M. Bunn, M. Wier, and J. Holdren, Nuclear Threat Initiative report, March 2003.
4. See note ii.
5. Many of these elements (fresh fuel supply, spent fuel return, reactor construction assistance, Additional Protocol) have been discussed intensively over several years between the United States and Russia as a means of resolving differences with respect to Russian-Iran nuclear cooperation.
6. A fast reactor more readily breeds fissionable isotopes potential fuel-because it utilizes higher energy neutrons that in turn create more neutrons when absorbed by fertile elements, e.g. fissile Pu239 is bred from neutron absorption of U238 followed by beta (electron) emission from the nucleus.
7. E. Arthur, et. al.,"Uranium enrichment technologies: workshop materials," Los Alamos Report — LA-CP-03-0233, (December, 2002).