International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs

By Stephanie S. Loranger

Since 1989 the Union of Concerned Scientists has organized an annual symposium on Science and World Affairs. The goals of the series are to cultivate arms control and international security analysts in countries lacking a strong tradition of public interest science and to establish an international community of researchers with similar interests and backgrounds. The 15th annual symposium was held this summer in Moscow, Russia; Ivan Oelrich and Stephanie Loranger from FAS were invited to participate.

Representatives from eleven nations attended, including scientists from Russia, China, Pakistan, Germany and Iran. Each participant gave a seminar on a current research project or interest. Topics of the seminars ranged from nuclear energy and non-proliferation, to missile defense, the weaponization of space, and biological weapons. Dr. Oelrich’s talk on Gas Centrifuges, Uranium Enrichment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards was very well received as was his introduction to nuclear nonproliferation. Dr. Loranger participated in the morning session on biological weapons; her talk, (Security and the Biological Research Community), focused on the role the biological research community must play to prevent the exploitation of biotechnology for the creation biological weapons.

Overall the meeting focused on nuclear non-proliferation. The morning session on biological weapons generated a great deal of discussion, making it clear that much more time could be devoted to the subject.

This experience provided the impetus for an FAS proposal to organize a parallel summer symposium on biosecurity. The series has been conceived as an annual international symposium of bioscientists and biosecurity professionals to address the new threats associated with advances in biological research and to work together in developing pragmatic solutions to manage these threats. The goals of the symposia would be to: develop and expand the international community working on biological weapons issues; provide resources to young scientists working on biosecurity; and encourage more interaction and networking among scientists working in different countries on biological weapons and international security issues.

With first-hand knowledge, bioscientists are the most qualified to devise pragmatic strategies for modifying research methods to enhance security without stifling inquiry and discovery. The nuclear security paradigm is no substitute for the expertise of bioscientists since the distinction between peaceful and military research is not as clear-cut in biology as it is in nuclear physics. Open bioscientific knowledge, not engineered devices, is at the heart of the problem. It is our hope that this series of summer symposia will encourage young bioscientists to become engaged in formulating biosecurity policy in the international community.

Author’s note: Dr. Stephanie Loranger is the Biology Issues Director at FAS.