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Second
Visit To
Cambodia

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PHNOM PENH: MAIN BULWARK AGAINST KHMER ROUGE STILL THERE

With indescribable relief, a visitor can report that, at the end of January, Phnom Penh was unbelievably serene and peaceful. And the seven-hour drive from Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh City to the Cambodian capital seems safer than spending equal time on 14th Street of this nation's capital.

The Cambodian parliament met with minimal security as Khmer families strolled along the river, the women having their pictures taken in lacy dresses in pastel colors.

Of the seven guns seen in Phnom Penh in nine days, two were guarding the Vietnamese Embassy and one was guarding a government minister's house. The six bombs reported in the West as having exploded in the capital were so tiny, like large fire-crackers, and so furtively deployed, that no casualties had resulted; the population actually thought them self-inflicted to justify the nine pm curfew.

In Hanoi, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach confided that the military of both Hanoi and Phnom Penh had expected, after the Vietnamese withdrawal, to lose 30% of Cambodia. Thus far, they had lost only 10%.

Half a year ago, Cambodian ambassadors whispered, "If we can get through dry season, we will be all right." With the dry season half over, there is, today, not the slightest doubt the State will survive to the rains.

A coordinated effort by the three resistance factions to attack, simultaneously, Battambang, Siem Reap, and Siso-phon and, thus, to secure a triangular "liberated zone" is said by Phnom Penh to have failed at the outset. In Bangkok, the

Khmer Rouge is said to plan to conquer Battambang by the end of the dry season. But its totally false claims to have destroyed that city would seem to presage a future failure.

As Hun Sen explained last month, "their numbers do not permit a general offensive" and the situation, all things considered, "is not bad at all;" we have "come to know our strength and the other side's strength" and we have not, as Prince Sihanouk predicted at Paris, been "blown away like a piece of paper." Indeed, he said, they have captured no provincial towns even along the border.

Thai observers say that the Thai prime minister has not been able to gradually constrict the Thai pipeline carrying the Chinese aid for the Khmer Rouge as Phnom Penh had hoped and expected he would.

Nonetheless, some trends favor Hun Sen:

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Second FAS Visit to Cambodia

FAS sent its president, Jeremy J. Stone, to visit Cambodia in the last week of January, as a continuing part of its campaign to prevent a second Khmer Rouge takeover and to end the civil war, and most of this newsletter resulted from that visit.

This FAS campaign has, already, played a major part in the decision of the Administration not to pursue the program of overt "lethal" aid for Prince Sihanouk, championed in 1989 by Congressman Stephen Solarz. And it has led to the disclosure in the *New York Times* of November 16 of the full extent of US covert assistance to Sihanouk and Son Sann.

This FAS Report contains an interview with Hun Sen (p. 3); an important analysis of the illegality of the covert funding of the war (p. 4-5); an interview with former Cambodian Prime Minister In Tam (p. 6) who was touring Cambodia when FAS was; an interview with the University of Georgia trained economist who runs Hun Sen's economy and an anonymous interview with a Western observer (p. 7). A document from the Cambodian Defense ministry giving its view of the cooperation between the various resistance factions appears on pages 7-8. We reprint a Stone op-ed from the *Washington Post*, on page 10, calling for a cutoff of funding for the war.

Page 12 contains an important statement on China policy on which member comment is invited as it is on these Khmer Rouge-related issues.



Hun Sen with American rifle captured from Khmer Rouge

Continued from first page

•The Sihanoukist forces have proven even more inept on the battlefield than expected and, as a result, have been forced to work militarily ever more closely with the Khmer Rouge—and even to admit it. A fatal move. Now outraged world opinion—and a US law against our aid being used even “indirectly” to help the Khmer Rouge—will eventually come to the rescue of the main bulwark against the return of the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen.

•And when and if Congress stops secretly funding the civil war in Cambodia, the world spotlight will focus on naked Thai-Chinese logistic cooperation and force its halt. At this point, the Khmer Rouge loss will be just a matter of time. And even if the Khmer Rouge do better than expected militarily, they will only hurt their cause politically, as a responsive world public opinion pressures relevant governments to react.

•But would Sihanouk ever return anyway—without some undemocratic way to keep the unelectable Khmer Rouge with him as political balance to the Hun Sen forces now in place? This question is raised, among other things, by his incredible willingness to accept as live-in bodyguard Chhorn Hay. This is the same Khmer Rouge who monitored his activities while he was under house arrest for three years in Phnom Penh. Doubling as a spy, this man dares to interrogate callers.

Prince Fears Assassination?

The Prince has often said that if he ever returned to Phnom Penh without the Khmer Rouge, they would kill him. For this prince, security seems to lie in pre-emptive surrender.

•The Son Sann faction of the “non-communist resistance,” in contrast to the Sihanouk forces, has done better than expected militarily. But as a republican, rather than royalist, faction, it fears contact with the Khmer Rouge more than Sihanouk. It would seem likely to be the first resistance faction to break with the Khmer Rouge coalition and to negotiate with Hun Sen.

Will a peaceful solution intervene? Or, after the latest flurry of interest in a UN administration peaks, will the corner be turned when exasperated states recognize Hun Sen's government—defecting in small groups, for mutual protection, from the ostracizing coalition?

Both Phnom Penh and Hanoi clearly want the talks to work out and they make, and plan, more concessions than a visitor would tolerate. In Phnom Penh, they even hint that one should not attack the Prince too much, lest it become impossible for him to come back. They would, if they could, let him win elections or let his party serve in undeserved coalitions, just to get him back and to “forgive and forget.”

But there is a limit to what they can do to bring back a man who may no longer have the will or the nerve to do it. And there is a limit to what the public can be persuaded to tolerate. Since the Paris peace talks, when he went down the line with the Khmer Rouge, the Cambodian urban population, at least, seems to have grown sick of Sihanouk for the same reasons the word Khmer Rouge, and the memories it evokes, makes them physically ill.

Even a god-king can get away with only so much. —JJS □

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HUN SEN: US SEEMS INTENT ON HELPING KHMER ROUGE BY WEAKENING PHNOM PENH

Excerpts from a January 25 interview with Hun Sen:

"Our economic law has borne its fruit. Accordingly, our population is not encouraged to follow the ripples of change in Eastern Europe. I have often been asked about the effect of Eastern Europe on Cambodia. My answer is 'no' because the way things are going here is ahead of Eastern Europe.

"We have changed completely from communal kitchens. We just try what works. Our change did not come with Gorbachev's perestroika but earlier.

"The Cambodian people wanted such a change. Many think we are part of the Eastern bloc because we get assistance from that bloc. But here we make our own hat. Shoes here are made according to our feet and not feet made according to the shoes.

"A reporter asked if we had not switched from a Vietnamese model to a Thai model. But this is not correct. From the beginning, we had no model. And, also, we are not following the model of Thailand.


"Many US citizens, after they come here, have expressed their support. And, recently, Secretary Muskie came here. Once visitors arrive, they see a big difference from what they expected. It would be good if we could have more visits."

Question: What about the military cooperation of the resistance?

"On the Thai-Cambodian border, they have distinguished three different fronts. My Lai to Pailin is where the Khmer Rouge dominate but with participation from Sihanoukists and Son Sannists. From Poipet to Thmar Puok to Banteay Chmar, the region is under Son Sann but also has Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk forces. From Phnom Srok to Sisophon, Prince Sihanouk controls the region but here also there are Khmer Rouge and Son Sannists.

"So during the 1st offensive, they used Son Sann but with some assistance from Sihanouk and Khmer Rouge.

"When Pol Potists launched against Pailin, Son Sann launched his forces against Sisophon and Sihanouk against Phnom Srok. This was called the common offensive against



Cambodian parliament meets

Pailin.

"But at each battlefield, they have good coordination among themselves. Recently, they reached agreement to have a joint military command."

Do they have a tripartite military command? "Yes, especially where they have their forces all together. Where there are only two forces, these work together."

Do they share weapons? "On quite a few battlefields, they had to share the fighting, so they divide up the objective. This matter is no secret to the secret agents of the United States. Because the US has satellites to watch and walkie talkies to listen in.

"One of the battlefields, that of Phnom Srok, we had destroyed more than 300 of Sihanouk's army. When we had encircled them, at Phnom Srok, the commander of the Sihanouk division that was encircled called for help. The Sihanouk commander was cooperating with Din Del of the KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge commander in question to whom he appealed was Ta Sou, the Khmer Rouge commander of Division 519.

"Just a few days ago, there were joint attacks in Siem Reap. Mostly the Pol Potists dominate but Sihanouk forces complained that they had liberated the Varin district. Then just a few days ago, the Khmer Rouge said they had liberated Varin. In fact, however, they did jointly attack Varin but they did not take it.

"On cooperation with weapons, where the Khmer Rouge help out Sihanouk, they have to use Sihanouk's weapons. In Siem Reap, my commander showed me two M-18 rifles that fire not only bullets but also grenades. Asked where these came from, my commanders said they were captured from Pol Pot's forces. Pol Pot also has M-84 anti-tank weapons made in West Germany. Right now, the sharing of weapons between the three factions has become a way of life.

"But because they divide up the battlefields, when they

Continued on next page

Resistance Frightening the Population

"Despite good civic action work by the civilian KPNLF [the non-communist resistance force led by former Prime Minister Son Sann], and concern among KPNLF officers, the growing indiscipline of the non-communist troops is clearly frightening the general population.

'The KPNLF soldiers are causing trouble,' said Kout Pok, a 73-year old KPNLF adviser. 'Stealing and raping is still a problem when what people want is peace and liberty.'

"... some KPNLF and ANS [Prince Sihanouk's army] officers are privately deeply worried about the troops' indiscipline, which could make the non-communist forces look to a suffering civilian population little better than what went before."

—James Pringle, Bangkok Post, Feb. 12, 1990

Continued from last page

need to ask for help, they must pay for the help with ammunition. And the Pol Potists don't want the M-16 but rather want the M-18 or the M-84 in reward."

It looks like the Government will survive the dry season.

"From a general perspective, we have come to know our strength and the other side's strength. After the withdrawal, there was a clear shift on the battlefield. We have less support, obviously, since the withdrawal of the Vietnamese and they have more support.

"We have to examine the ambitions and the possibilities of the enemy. Their approach was to overthrow us in a short time. So, at the Paris Peace Conference, Sihanouk said we'd be blown away like a piece of paper.

"There was a round of meetings at Paris about how to defeat us. We have to look into the situation from the point of view of the general situation.

"Their offensive was close to the border—the best place for them. There it was easy to infiltrate, and easy to pass along commands.

"They started the offensive four days after the Vietnamese withdrawal. But we have to recall that the Vietnamese did little since July. And the rainy season gave us logistic problems. But, considering this, the situation is not bad at all. Stepped up fighting was inevitable and we knew where they would hit us.

"They do not represent a threat to us. No provincial towns along the border have been taken. We also have noticed that they have many problems.

"First, their numbers do not allow a general offensive along the entire length of the front. And they lack the popular support to send soldiers deep inside Cambodia.

"The cruelty of the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces is little different from that of Pol Pot. People are running away from Sihanouk and Son Sann forces as well as from Pol Pot. They kill all the animals and there are widespread rapes. Near the battlefields, the peasants send their daughters to Hun Sen authorities for protection.

"In the Phnom Prat district, the peasants killed a commander of the Sihanouk forces. We criticized the lynching but the population is on the spot and wanted to do it. Among the reasons, besides the rapes, was the fact that they take peasants hostage.

"With regard to the supplies of food and ammunition, they don't have enough for the general offensive. And the deeper they go, the harder it is for them. They do not have, yet, the support base. And they can't take provinces near Phnom Penh so as to dominate the scene.

"But we don't want to continue the war. We want a settlement.

"The US should re-examine its position on Cambodia. The US should reexamine its assistance to Sihanouk and Son Sann. The US had three objectives:

"Vietnamese withdrawal of its forces.

"Prevention of the return of Pol Pot.

"The right of self-determination.

"But, in fact, the US seems to be encouraging the return of Pol Pot by weakening Phnom Penh." □

UNLAWFUL FUNDING OF THE CAMBODIAN WAR

It is now unmistakably clear that US funding of the Cambodian civil war is unlawful—and on two quite separate grounds.

Beginning in 1985, Congress, in its inimitable fashion, passed two pieces of contradictory legislation. It began funding Prince Sihanouk with "non-lethal" aid—which meant not only humanitarian, but also military aid, so long as weapons were not sent by us directly. (These were provided by Singapore.)

At the same time, it passed legislation saying that no funds could be expended if they had the "effect of promoting, sustaining, or augmenting, directly or indirectly" the capacity of the Khmer Rouge to conduct military operations.

Already in 1982, Prince Sihanouk had been forced into a political and diplomatic coalition with the Khmer Rouge. They were sharing the seat at the UN as the "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea" (CGDK). And they were fighting against a common enemy—the Hun Sen government based in Phnom Penh. Obviously, from a logical



Princess Lyda Sisowath, cousin of Prince Sihanouk, supports Hun Sen.

Unified Military Strategy Admitted by Sihanouk General

"Sisophon will become ours soon. I am very confident because our three forces will fight side by side to capture it."

—General Kruoch Yeum, commander of the National Sihanoukist Army (ANS), 3rd region, quoted in Bangkok's *The Nation*, January 22, 1990

Khmer Rouge Control Sihanouk

“ . . . the Khmer Rouge is in charge of administration for Prince Sihanouk. In Beijing, at the United Nations, or anywhere else, Khmer Rouge officials have almost completely taken over control from Prince Sihanouk's staff, especially when it concerns international relations.”

—*Kraisak Choonhaven, son of Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Choonhaven and a member of the prime minister's team of advisers, in Khao Phiset, Jan. 28, 1990*

point of view, any help to the Sihanouk forces was also help “indirectly” to the Khmer Rouge. But this was just overlooked.

Instead, it was quietly understood that the notion of “indirect” assistance would apply to military “coordination and cooperation” between the factions. Thus, last year, in its Committee Report discussing this prohibition, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs said, “The committee urges the President to secure firm and reliable assurances from the leadership of non-communist forces in Cambodia that they will not use US assistance in cooperation or coordination with the Khmer Rouge or to benefit the Khmer Rouge in any way”

It would be, today, quite impossible for the President to get such assurances. Prince Sihanouk has advised the New York Times that he is more and more coordinating his military activity with the Khmer Rouge. Reuters has confirmed this on the ground. The Times has carried interviews with Prime Minister Hun Sen noting that his government is capturing Khmer Rouge with American weapons. The Washington Post reports cooperation on “tactical support, intelligence-sharing and artillery support during battlefield operations.” And a report from the Cambodian Defense ministry prepared on January 30 gives details on the cooperation between the resistance factions: their dividing up the territo-



Pol Pot's elder brother, living in Phnom Penh, says his brother's early years were quite normal.

ry, their helping one another, their paying each other for cooperation, and so on. Indeed, on January 22, General Kruoch Yeum, Commander of Sihanouk's forces in the 3rd region said, “Sisophon will become ours soon. I am very confident because our three forces [ed. note: including Son Sann's KPNLF also] will fight side by side to capture it.”

And it is not only the House Foreign Affairs committee that believes these activities are prohibited. Last October 12, when Congressman Bill Richardson (D—New Mexico) offered an amendment prohibiting aid to Prince Sihanouk if his forces engaged in “joint military operations” with the Khmer Rouge, the chairman of the House Intelligence committee, Anthony C. Beilenson (D—California) persuaded Mr. Richardson to withdraw the amendment by assuring him that such activities were already precluded by the legislation described above. And this is the same intelligence committee which, as the Times has reported, from sources friendly to the funding, is “heavily involved in monitoring the spending.”

Indeed, the issue has become so sensitive that, sometime between January 15 and January 30, the US government sent cables to its ambassadors in China and Thailand asking them to warn Prince Sihanouk and Prince Ranariddh of the dangerous consequences of close association with the Khmer Rouge.

Genocide Convention In Force

But it is not only a law against “indirect” support of the Khmer Rouge which has Prince Sihanouk in a bind. The US has ratified the Genocide Convention and made it part of domestic law. The Convention requires the Government to punish those guilty of genocide—which the Khmer Rouge certainly are and which, thus far, the Department of State has refused to admit. It requires the Government to “prevent” genocide which the Khmer Rouge are certainly planning: they have made no secret of what they plan, for example, to do to ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia—killing them and driving them out as they did before, which is, under the Genocide Convention, an act of genocide.

Above all, the Genocide Convention prohibits “complicity” in genocide. And we are backing the Khmer Rouge's ally, and the president of their state, Prince Sihanouk.

The United States has no legal obligation, by contrast, to bring democracy to Cambodia. And there is nothing in the Genocide Convention that says backing genocidal murderers is alright if the goal is free elections and the hope is that these elections will cause the murderers to give up and go away. On the contrary, the law, in general, is clear that persons are responsible for the likely consequences of their acts. And the likely consequences of continuing to support military activities against the Hun Sen government is a Khmer Rouge victory.

Accordingly, the State department, and its Assistant Secretariat for East Asia, which backs the present policy, is acting unlawfully and immorally in continuing to support Prince Sihanouk and, indirectly, the Khmer Rouge.

Only Congress can stop this. And this is what Congress should be working on now. —JJS □

IN TAM: A CREDIBLE VOICE IN PHNOM PENH

For Americans, perhaps the most credible Khmer political figure alive today is former Prime Minister In Tam of the Lon Nol government of Cambodia. Indeed, In Tam actually ran for president in the early 1970s and was defeated, he believes only by election fraud. This Lon Nol government is the one that overthrew Prince Sihanouk and did so, it is widely believed, with the assistance of the US Central Intelligence Agency.

Under these political circumstances, anything which In Tam says that is good about the present Cambodian government of Hun Sen is hard to dismiss. On January 26, 1990, speaking in Phnom Penh after spending a total of three months in Cambodia, he provided this visitor with an interview that is remarkably sympathetic to that embattled regime.

Asked what he liked about this government, he began by saying, "I respect its politics of reconciliation and its standing against the return of the Khmer Rouge."

But what about its economic system? "It's very liberal." *Was it better for the poor and for children than the Lon Nol government he knew?* "Yes, it is. But Lon Nol controlled only the cities during those revolutionary times and could not do much."

What about corruption? "Here there is not corruption at the top, only at the middle and bottom because this regime is very young and the leadership is very young."

"If we compare with all factors, this government is better than Lon Nol because this government started with nothing and so had a 'fresh start,' albeit with no assets to start with."

Was there any way in which the Lon Nol government was better? "It had more highly qualified people and more technicians."

How did the Hun Sen government compare with Prince Sihanouk? "It is hard to compare because, at that time, there was no war and the government had greater means. Sihanouk did, as this government does, concern himself with health and sanitation questions but not as much. So it depends upon what you like. I want freedom and there was more freedom in the Sihanouk period. But perhaps if the present war were stopped there would be more freedom here also. People's life here is very free but the Government is like an umbrella because of the war. The Government fears infiltration of the enemy and so they limit freedom. In the Sihanouk period there was very little control but now, due to fear of the enemy, there is more."

Was there democracy in the Sihanouk period? Was not the one free election Sihanouk held, in 1966, chaotic and corrupt as Sihanouk himself has written? "I stood for election in 1966. I never took money. And there were other good men elected such as Hu Nim, Hu Yuon and Khieu Samphan."

[Ed note: Incredibly, In Tam has come up with exactly the three names mentioned by Sihanouk in his book "My War with the CIA." Sihanouk condemned the 1966 election, which he himself had organized, as an absurd result of his being forced to permit a real election. He reported that, of 96 men elected, only three had been "worth a damn." He went

on to mention precisely these three men mentioned by In Tam. And all three of these men were forced, a year after the election, to run to the jungle lest Sihanouk's secret police kill them for their liberal critiques of him—So much for the greater freedom in the Sihanouk period! In the jungle they formed the Khmer Rouge—then much less radical. In the end, the Pol Pot faction caused the death of Hu Nim and Hu Yuon and turned Khieu Samphan into the "parrot" spokesman of Pol Pot which he remains today.]

Well, in those days, Sihanouk preferred to appoint only one candidate rather than to hold elections. "Exactly."

What was the political structure of the Khmer Rouge in the 1970-75 period when they were preparing to take over? "There were three internal factions. A pro-Chinese faction led by Pol Pot, a faction leaning toward the Vietnamese and the Soviets led by So Phim (chief of the Eastern Zone) and a Khmer communist group led by Hun Nim. It is the second group, of Eastern Zone communists, who are running the present government."

Do you know anything bad about them or their activities during this period? "No, Hun Sen was very young then, like my son, and came from my same native village. They love Hun Sen there, in Kompong Chong. But he was 17 when he joined and was in the lower ranks."

What about Chea Sim, who ranks above Hun Sen in the present government as president of the Assembly? "The old people know him and they love him. He was Buddhist and raised and trained to do good things."

What about the president of the State Council, Heng Samrin, who ranks number one? "I never heard of him before. But now, he is very docile. He also loves Buddhism."

Do you realize how important these remarks are in Washington? [Ed note: where people like Congressman Solarz insist that these officials have hands "dripping in blood" for being former Khmer Rouge.] "You should understand that this regime is very new and very fresh and needs many things."

Do you love Prince Sihanouk? "I used to. But I quit his movement in 1984 after he had joined with the Khmer Rouge."

Are there any people of quality around Sihanouk today? "No."

So what would you like to see happen? "I would like to see Sihanouk playing the role played by a Thai king. Indeed, if Sihanouk had not abdicated as king to become prince, he would have played this role and it would have been better if he had."

"I want to write to President Bush. I like America but I see that the US policy is going in the opposite direction. It has condemned a generation here. You have left a whole generation that don't speak English or French, for example, and this will eventually affect foreign relations."

"It is time for the Americans to abandon this policy. Listen to the Voice of America, for example. The US has helped small resistance factions while condemning the larger part of the Cambodian people." □



Former Prime Minister In Tam with Stone

INTERVIEW IN PHNOM PENH

A close Western observer of the Cambodian government had this to say in a Phnom Penh interview in January:

"There is a groundswell building up and drifting toward Hun Sen. He is a man of good common sense and sees through peoples' intentions. He also can see through diplomatic formulas and knows the Khmer Rouge and their propaganda also. Hun Sen's liberalism predates perestroika. And the Vietnamese cannot say that Hun Sen is their man. Indeed, no one of Vietnamese origin is in the Government—while ethnic Thai, Lao and Chinese are involved and all these groups were smaller minorities in Cambodia than were the ethnic Vietnamese.

"When Hun Sen became foreign minister he knew nothing even of the UN and behaved with extreme modesty. The notion that there is corruption here because of the renting of a few villas is absurd, a joke.

"The Government's leading figures work smoothly together and have, obviously, shaken down over the years they have known each other. Within the country, Chea Sim has good support. He takes a low profile. He is very humble and even worries, at diplomatic receptions, whether his driver, waiting outside, has had food—something one does not normally see in Asia.

"When Hun Sen goes into villages, there is no protection for him and there are no advance men. His cooperation with people is quite intense.

"The Hun Sen group thinks in terms of parliamentary elections in which a plurality in each district would determine the winning candidate. Thereafter, a majority in the Assembly would elect a prime minister and run the Government. But Sihanouk seems to think of returning only in the context of a presidential election. Sihanouk wants a presidency that has no check of executive, legislative or judicial power.

"Hun Sen has been criticized for putting too much faith in Chatchai.

"Hun Sen has abolished the death penalty, given rights to minorities and made Buddhism the state religion. He has put communism on the back burner, saying that 'Communism has little to show for the last 100 years and we must go back to our roots.' There is a big revival of religion in Cambodia.

"This year is very crucial for Hun Sen." □

A US-TRAINED DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IS IN CHARGE OF THE ECONOMY

Deputy Prime Minister Kung Sam Ol attended the University of Georgia in the early 1960s as an agricultural economist. During the Pol Pot period of 1975-1978, he pretended that he could not read or write and so survived. After the war was over, he found himself in the far northwest, near the Thai border, and could have escaped to the West and an easier life. Instead, he chose to return and is now working "heart and soul" to try to hold the country together.

He said the Government's approach was to "try to use all our resources" and to run a "free market economy that will go by itself." The goal was to ensure that everyone had food to eat, to raise the standard of living, and to be like other countries.


Visitors could see that there was "no waiting in line whether for meat or cigarettes or anything else," proving that the market was free. Some handicrafts or cottage enterprises are government-run if they are security-related or need government inputs.

The economy, he said, was "based on agriculture and everything must be developed from agriculture." The goal was to be "self-sufficient" and the country was close to that now. Cambodia needed water, irrigation. It produced fruit, rubber, some cash crops and cattle livestock. The cash crops included soybean and black pepper.

For the task of developing industry, more energy was needed. They had cement, glass, jute and wood factories. They were planning joint ventures with Japan and the Soviet Union, with Singapore (a hotel), with Thailand and with Malaysia. France was investing also.

According to the investment law, money could be brought into the country and profits withdrawn or reinvested without tax. Taxation would begin once the enterprise shows profit.

Unlike the Sihanouk period, the parliament debated economic policy a great deal. Corruption was 2% to 3% compared to 100% in the Sihanouk period. In the Sihanouk and Lon Nol period, the officials sent their money abroad—but not now. □



Kung Sam Ol: American-trained economist runs the Hun Sen economy

ACTIVITIES

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

On February 6, 1990, the House of Representatives passed, by a vote of 413 to 0, HCR 254, introduced by Congressman Stephen Solarz and supported by the Administration. This resolution called for a "United Nations-supervised interim administration for Cambodia."

The resolution was drafted in such a way as to "split the difference" between the Khmer Rouge coalition with Prince Sihanouk (CGDK), which it correctly reported as favoring a "quadripartite" interim coalition government before elections, and the Hun Sen government which it inaccurately reported had insisted on "continuing itself in power" during the pre-election phase.

In fact, the Hun Sen government—which Solarz insists on calling "The People's Republic of Kampuchea" instead of its new official name, "The State of Cambodia"—has agreed to transferring national sovereignty to a Supreme National Council during the pre-election period.

Atkins Notes Danger

In a very thin debate over the issue, Congressman Chester G. Atkins (D—Mass.) permitted himself only to hint at the danger in these resolutions for comprehensive agreements:

"There is also, I would warn, the chance that one or more of the members of the Security Council will prove implacable—tying the negotiations into knots to forestall international recognition of a Hun Sen regime that might surprise us all and endure. We must be vigilant; we must ensure that the negotiations—though understandably difficult—show fruitfulness and purpose, and are not simply a stalling tactic to allow the Khmer Rouge to achieve on the battlefield what they cannot achieve at the negotiation table."

And Congressman Jim Leach (R—Iowa), ranking member of Solarz's subcommittee, noted that the UN initiative is a "high-risk policy." In particular, he said the policy:

"... involves utilization of peacekeeping forces of the United Nations for which the United States under international treaty is in arrears. We thus have a doubly awkward circumstance: (a) this policy will entail, if it is successful, a call upon this body to provide significant new unbudgeted fiscal resources and, (b) the policy involves support for an international institution that we are almost 2 years in arrears in general funding, and almost as much in peace-keeping obligations." □

[Congressional Record, Feb. 6, 1990, H247-53]

CAMBODIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY PROVIDES FAS WITH ANALYSIS

Origin of this document: *On Tuesday, January 30, 1990, State of Cambodia Defense Minister Tie Banh briefed FAS President Jeremy J. Stone on the defense situation. Stone then asked General Tea Banh for a memorandum containing the points he had mentioned in the briefing bearing on cooperation between the resistance factions.*

I—The Overall Strategy: In conformity with their get-together in August 1989 in Khao Larn village, Surin province Thailand, close to the Cambodian border, the three factions of the so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea raised their strategy that after the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops they will operate with each other to "totally free" the country. But Pol Pot insisted that if any political settlement to the issue is reached or if they lose the election they will be carrying on their guerrilla war against the State of Cambodia under the slogan "using the countryside to encircle the city."

Towards this end, the three factions have divided their zones of influence as follows:

- 1) The Khmer Rouges are in charge of the western part of the country in particular in Battambang province,
- 2) The Son Sann's faction is responsible of the North western part of the country in particular Sisophon,
- 3) The Sihanouk's faction is in charge of the region from Samrong till Siemreap.


The three factions were unanimous to advance two thirds of their strength deeper inside the country while one third has to attack the defence line.

II—The Tactics: 1) Collaboration: While attacking on the important strongholds, they normally divide their forces into many groups to fight for one same stronghold or for many strongholds at the same time. For example, the attack on Pailin: The main forces were Pol Pot's. But there was participation of Sihanouk's and Son Sann's too, totalling 1,500 to 2,000 men.

During the attack on Banteay Meanchey province, the strength of the three factions was estimated to 45000 men including two Pol Pot divisions, Division 450 and Division 519, that mean 7 regiments of 1,900 men, 4 regiments of Moulinaka of 500 men and Sereika was composed of the zones of military operation Nos. 3, 5, 6 and the special zone of military operation belonging to the general headquarters, with 2,100 troops. During the fighting in Phnom Srok we have captured 272 Sihanouk's men and two Pol Pot's men of Division 519. These two men have informed us that Sihanouk was responsible for their food supplies.

With regards to the attack in Varin district on January 17, 1990, Sihanouk paid 2,000 Bahts for each men of the Khmer Rouge, while requesting them for help. In the evening of January 16, 1990, Ranaridh declared that his troops had seized the district. But the Khmer Rouge announced the same thing. However a few days after, we have retaken our lost position.

Another case of attack was in Nimit commune of Sereiso-phoan district. Sihanouk has paid 3,000 US dollars to Divi-



Defense Minister Tie Banh briefing FAS

sion 450 of Khmer Rouge while demanding them to do him this favour. Some Sereika troops also participated in the attack.

2) Armaments: The armaments made in China were used by the Sihanouk's and Son Sann's troops such as H 12, artileries of 130mm and 122mm, mortars of 100mm and AKs.

On the contrary, some modern arms made in Western countries and supplied to Sereika and Sihanouk factions are also fell into the Pol Potists' hands. As a matter of fact, during our mopping up on the 785 Pol Pot Division in the Southern part of Kampong Thom province, we have seized one Gustav M84 anti tank arms made in Sweden.

Footnote: Wherever they arrived in, the enemies from all factions began to burn houses, ill-treat villagers, rape girls and ladies, ill-treat the monks kill whoever refused to observe their orders. □

US Warning Throws Sihanouk into Deep Depression

When the State department cabled its ambassadors in Beijing and Bangkok to warn Norodom Sihanouk and Norodom Ranarridh that their close alliance with the Khmer Rouge might have harmful consequences, they did not expect the results. Prince Sihanouk promptly resigned several positions in the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) saying, in a letter to his son:

"I am in the midst of a terrible depression which has forced me to go into political and diplomatic retirement while waiting for the return of my morale, which is at a low point due to injustices, accusations, slander, etc . . . heaped on me by several newspapers, politicians, etc . . . from France, the United States, Australia, etc . . ."

He went on to say, "My true friends number two: the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of North Korea." ■

Vietnamese Army Out of Cambodia?

On October 6, 1989, following the September 26 withdrawal of Vietnamese units from Cambodia, a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officer, John J. Sloan, gave a briefing in which he made these judgments:

"First, from a strategic standpoint, we can safely say that the Vietnamese Army has, in fact, withdrawn from Cambodia. By this, I mean that—even if some individual troops remain—Vietnam no longer has organized military units in Cambodia capable of carrying out combat operations.

"Secondly, Vietnam apparently will continue to station some military advisers in Phnom Penh and with major People's Republic of Kampuchea—or PRK—military units. Hanoi also has indicated that it will continue to provide military aid to the PRK as long as other countries support the resistance forces.

"Thirdly, it is safe to assume that Vietnam has established a secret intelligence network in Cambodia to monitor security conditions there.

"Finally, many thousands of Vietnamese settlers remain in Cambodia, but it is not clear how much control Hanoi has over these people."

The Defense department's Rear Admiral Timothy W. Wright, director of the East Asia and the Pacific region, agreed, saying that the Vietnamese withdrawal "essentially eliminates the possibility that Vietnamese forces could alter the balance of forces on the ground." Admiral Wright expressed concern about other Vietnamese "assets" such as the possibility of "special force units" or "intelligence teams" being left, but did not dispute the fact of the Vietnamese main force withdrawal.

As this newsletter was going to press, on February 23, news reports suggested that an angry Vietnamese government had been asked by Hun Sen in October to send back 3,000 Vietnamese soldiers to guard two northwestern cities. If, in fact, Phnom Penh is unable to defend itself against the Khmer Rouge without Vietnamese help, it seems all the more reason to cut off Western funding for the war. ■



Phnom Penh outside Assembly building

WHY NOT JUST STOP FUNDING THE CIVIL WAR?

In "Cambodia's Best Chance" (Washington Post, February 6), Congressman Solarz nowhere informs the reader that the civil war he seeks to halt could be dramatically undermined by unilateral American action. The US is providing crucial, albeit secret, financial, intellectual, and strategic support to Prince Sihanouk and thus, ipso facto, is providing indirect support to Sihanouk's main ally, the genocidal Khmer Rouge, still led by Pol Pot. Why not cut it out?

As a member of the House Intelligence committee, Mr. Solarz knows all this. But he is not struggling to end the civil war per se—or he would long ago have been working to cut off America's decade-long support to Prince Sihanouk. On the contrary, what he has been doing for years is to struggle to have the civil war end in a certain way: with Prince Sihanouk in power and the Hun Sen government out of power and, above all, with the issue decided by free elections. With these goals in mind, he has long been a supporter of US involvement in the civil war, rather than an opponent, until his goals are assured.

Accordingly, today, he champions the Australian proposal in which all parties to the war design a comprehensive and complete solution including having the UN administer Cambodia while elections are organized.

There is another road and, ironically, it too leads to UN supervised free elections also, and to the same chances for Sihanouk—but with much less fanfare. And it has one unarguable advantage. It would leave America with clean hands.

Congress could cut off the \$24 million secret funding for military activities of the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces and withdraw the help of our intelligence agents who provide satellite photos and telephone intercepts. It could halt US participation in the secret Bangkok-based Cambodian Working Group that controls the Sihanouk and Son Sann forces.

A related US government announcement that America would no longer fund the war would have enormous moral impact. And it would, in particular, leave the Chinese and, more important, their Thai conduit for weapons, naked to world opinion.

Then with US support to those elements in Thailand, which include the prime minister, who want to stop fueling the war, China's pipeline to the Khmer Rouge could be plugged. The Khmer Rouge's defeat would then be a matter of time.

As a recent visit made clear, Hun Sen controls 90% of the Cambodian territory and has broad popular support against the Khmer Rouge—and even, I believe, would outpoll Prince Sihanouk if he continues to work with the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen's State of Cambodia (Congressman Solarz apparently refuses to accept its name change from People's Republic of Kampuchea) is now in a seemingly permanent military stalemate mediated by geography and logistics.

And even were this judgement overly optimistic, Khmer Rouge advances now would only arouse more world opposition to them and more help would flow to Hun Sen.

In any case, nothing in a direct US approach to halting the war, by refusing to fund it, would prevent the free, and UN supervised, elections we seek. On the contrary, the Hun Sen

government is committed to just such elections and, for various reasons, actually welcomes them. And the US has, obviously, the political and economic power to see that this commitment is maintained. It has, after all, right now an economic embargo on tiny Cambodia. Why continue the war?

Policy makers are sheltering in the speculation that the Khmer Rouge may be stronger than they have been shown to be so far (a "fact of life") and that the Hun Sen government, by contrast, could be weaker (a "house of cards"). Accordingly, they argue that a US "recognition" of Hun Sen—a code word for the US halting its direct and indirect support to Hun Sen's three opponents—might lead the Khmer Rouge to desperate attacks that could not be contained.

Their method, they imply, will effectively swindle the Khmer Rouge into elections that the Khmer Rouge cannot win. But, obviously, the Khmer Rouge know much more about Cambodian politics than the West and the swindles are very likely to run in the other direction.

Indeed, in August, 1989 in Khao Larn, Thailand, the three factions of the resistance got together to plan the strategic offensive they would launch four days after the Vietnamese Army was forced out. At this meeting, the Khmer Rouge leadership said that if they lost the election—which they certainly will—they would fight on.

Why Wait to Oppose Them?

So why not try to stop them now? It is argued, in response, that protective aid for Phnom Penh will flood in only after the free election in question and only to the newly legitimized government. But, with the policy reversal recommended here, such aid could flood in now. Recently, the Hun Sen government sent a delegation to 30 different nations seeking recognition; each one said it was waiting to see what the US or the French were going to do. Our action would thus have enormous impact.

Mr. Solarz's argument that it is "inconceivable" that our government would provide such aid is irrelevant, even if it were true (which it is not)—because others will provide it whether we do or not, once recognition is assured. In fact, the UN proposal he champions would cost between \$500,000,000 and \$1,000,000,000. All those, world-wide, who would have to fund such UN involvement will find it easier just to give Phnom Penh as much support as it could possibly absorb!

In the end, however, one need not oppose the effort being made to secure unanimity on what is now called "enhanced UN involvement"—with one proviso. This negotiating effort should not interfere with attempts to halt immediately all aspects of the war that can be halted.

Negotiations should not become, as disarmament talks often have, an excuse for continuing that which the talks were aimed to prevent.

America must face up to the fact that America could, by itself, pull a critical prop out from under this war. This should be Congress's first priority—stop US funding of the war. □

**POETIC ADVICE
TO VIETNAM**

At the suggestion of the President of Vietnam's National Center for Scientific Research, Nguyen Van Hieu, Stone returned to Hanoi after visiting Cambodia to meet with Prime Minister Do Muoi (and spent another hour with Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach).

Hanoi being in the Orient, Stone decided to incorporate his main two pieces of diplomatic advice in the form of a poem and demanded the services of a Vietnamese poet translator, Nguyen Gia Lap, who labored for five hours to translate it before the scheduled meeting with the Prime Minister.

The poem, larded with a certain amount of soft soap, encourages the Vietnamese to do the kow-tow to two superpowers whom they have recently defeated in war or, should that be more than they can bear, to just relax all rules—which is to say to speed up their policy of Doi Moi—and to get rich in the Western free enterprise fashion.

The Vietnamese asked for the right to print it and circulate it to the Central Committee. This shows, once more, that the medium is the message; it turned out that Ho Chi Minh gave his advice the the Vietnamese each Tet in the form of a poem.

Heal Hearts or Relax Rules

The Vietnamese
A great nation

Trapped
In a small country

Size attracts invaders
Vietnamese dare to resist

They win wars
Lose friends
Wonder why

In ancient times
They apologize
For their courage

Today they are
Too proud
To lie

Not just one
But two
Allied Super Powers
Are resentful

Ungrateful says one
Too clever says the other

China will change
Before Vietnam

America will not
Find the defeated
Ask their help

Psychological Jujitsu
Is not weakness
Ask your ancestors

Why not practice
What you preach?

Will not prosperity
Come faster
From saving face?

What Emperor sulks
In New Jersey?

What advisors
Return from China?

What President saw
The famous victory?

In America
Who lost limbs?

Only those who lost
Care who won

Who else can forgive?

With oriental care
Design a ceremony
Heal the hearts

But the personality of a nation
is its fate

Do as you will
Perhaps you cannot
Will as you will

The price of pride
is patience

There is another road
To both prosperity and peace

Relax rules
Of all kinds

Get rich
Win friends

All at once
Only Vietnam
Can decide

In any case
Your future
Is great

—Jeremy J. Stone

**Phnom Penh
Beating the Intellectual Embargo**

“For 10 years American nongovernmental organizations ranging from the liberal American Friends Service Committee to the conservative World Vision were frustrated by the refusal of much of the West to acknowledge the internal transformation of Cambodia under Hun Sen. In the case of the United States, American officials made a determined effort to keep the reality of Cambodia hidden as much as possible from the American people. Congressional staff members and prominent Americans were discouraged from traveling to Cambodia on the grounds that it would undermine the US policy of isolating Phnom Penh. American travel agents were forbidden to organize tours there. Prominent Cambodians and Vietnamese were regularly denied visas to come to the United States. In the past few years, however, the character and accomplishments of the Cambodian government have become increasingly visible to visiting journalists and political figures. Foreign visitors and resident aid workers have commented favorably on the ability and stature of Cambodian officials, particularly Prime Minister Hun Sen, who is also the nation’s foreign minister.”

—“Ending the Cambodian Stalemate” by John McAuliff and Mary Byrne McDonnell, in *World Policy Journal*, January, 1990

BOYCOTTING CHINA: A LETTER TO LI PENG

The following letter was sent to Premier Li Peng of the People's Republic of China on February 9, 1990—

Dear Mr. Premier:

We came to know the People's Republic of China in 1972 when we met with Premier Chou En Lai and came to love him and your country. We are truly saddened now to see how far the People's Republic of China has drifted from the goals and ideals of Premier Chou.

He, for example, would not now be supporting the Khmer Rouge, in our opinion. As you, yourself, were quoted as saying in New Zealand, there is no question of supporting the Khmer Rouge once the Vietnamese military have withdrawn from Cambodia which, obviously, they have. Yet China continues to assist the Khmer Rouge with weapons and military advice and even to insist that the other factions of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann cooperate with Pol Pot in their military strategy.

As a consequence, the entire world is coming to see Chinese foreign policy as basically amoral—willing to work even with the genocidal allies of the Gang of Four in order to hurt China's felt enemies in Hanoi. We have protested this action by announcing that we would not attend the receptions at your embassy here in Washington so long as this support continues.

Now we see that China is restricting severely the travel to America of its students and their training here. This was the very goal of our visit to China in 1972 to organize scientific exchange. Accordingly it is hard for us to see this exchange so severely hampered after it has been so successful. When the attached picture of myself and your father by adoption, Premier Chou, was taken, I was urging him to send these students to the United States.

Under these circumstances, it is impossible for me visit China in April for a scheduled meeting with your scientists on

disarmament. Frankly speaking, I cannot bear to visit a China I love so much in a time when its government seems to us to be mistreating the Chinese people so much.

When I met Premier Deng Xiaopeng in the United States, I took the liberty of telling him that I considered him "the second liberator of China" and he was pleased. But now I see the situation quite differently and feel that he no longer merits this compliment.

Please understand that our Federation and I do want to see improved relations between our two countries and want to engage in scientific exchange, disarmament talks and many other dialogues on science and society issues. But the restraints being placed on Chinese science and Chinese people are making this increasingly impossible. We beg you to help put China back on this path which, we felt, was set by Premier Chou.

Respectfully,

Jeremy J. Stone

President, Federation of American Scientists



CIA Agrees that Continued Fighting Helps Khmer Rouge

"Without a diplomatic settlement that constrains the Khmer Rouge and strengthens the non-communists, the prospect is for sustained fighting that will likely diminish the chances for the installation of a transitional regime that could lead to a democratically elected Cambodian government."

—Central Intelligence Agency testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the US Senate on January 23, 1990

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