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SECRECY FROM WHOM? CLASSIFICATION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

Secrecy in government is fundamentally incongruous with the ideal of a democratic society. When secrecy extends beyond the bounds that are consensually recognized as necessary to the national well-being—such as protection of personal privacy, trade secrets, and certain limited areas of defense and intelligence—serious abuses can and do result.

Some of these abuses eventually become well known when they violate explicit national policies or laws, as in the Iran-Contra scandal. But other, even more pernicious, problems are hardly recognized at all. These are systemic practices which effectively seal off important government activities from public awareness and even from Congressional oversight. Such practices are largely embodied in the classification system which governs the control of information deemed vital to national security.

An overhaul of the whole “information security” infrastructure is long overdue and could lead to a more efficient, more accountable, and more democratic system of government. The political climate following the close of the Cold War era should finally make such an overhaul possible.

What does the end of the Cold War mean for secrecy in America? Most essentially, it means that the organizing principles and operating assumptions that underlie the government secrecy system are no longer valid. The system is still fully in place, but its rationale has shifted dramatically, if not evaporated altogether, as the potential threat to the U.S. has changed from superpower confrontation to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts.

The Evolution of Governmental Secrecy

Secrecy in American government is nothing new. It goes back to the founding of the Republic and even before. For example, the 1775 Articles of War prohibited American soldiers from unauthorized correspondence with the enemy. But it was with the beginning of the Cold War that official secrecy began to reach significantly beyond military information to become an institutionalized part of the U.S. bureaucracy.

In September 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10290, which for the first time established a security classification system that encompassed civilian as well as

In this issue of the *Public Interest Report* FAS examines the current state of the classification system and considers some options for restructuring it in light of post-Cold War realities. Even in this new political era, the effort to move the entrenched secrecy bureaucracy is a challenging undertaking. Your comments, as well as your own ideas on how to revise the secrecy system, would be welcomed.

This issue was prepared by Senior Research Analyst Steven Aftergood, who directs the FAS Project on Secrecy and Government and began last year began publishing a newsletter, the *Secrecy & Government Bulletin*, which is available for a \$20 subscription fee. Free samples are also available on request.

military agencies. It authorized any executive branch agency to classify information, and it defined the utterly vague standard for classified information as “official information the safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security.”

Although President Eisenhower limited the number of agencies authorized to classify information and clarified the standards for classification, the implementation of the secrecy procedures quickly revealed serious problems that still remain unresolved.

By 1956, an official Committee on Classified Information appointed by the Secretary of Defense found that overclassification (along with unauthorized disclosures) was a “major shortcoming” of the system.

“... Overclassification,” said the Committee, “has reached serious proportions. The result is not only that the system fails to supply to the public information which its proper operation would supply, but the system has become so overloaded that proper protection of information which should be protected has suffered.”

The classification system, which continues to be based on a Presidential Executive Order rather than statute, has been revised several times by succeeding Presidents. Until the 1980s, the scope of information subject to classification narrowed as the criteria tightened, all to the effect that a

peak in commitment to openness was reached during the Carter Administration.

Carter's Executive Order 12065 appears positively enlightened when compared to the classification systems that preceded and followed it. For example, the Carter criteria required that information could be classified only if its disclosure could cause "identifiable" damage to national security; mandated a "balancing test," by which even otherwise classified information would be disclosed if there were a substantial public interest in doing so; directed systematic declassification of documents throughout the Executive Branch within 20 years; and generally required that declassification "shall be given emphasis comparable to that afforded classification."

All of these evolutionary steps towards a more reasonable information security policy were undone by President Reagan. Reagan's 1982 Executive Order 12356, which remains in effect today, eliminated the requirement that information be classified only in the face of "identifiable" damage to national security; eliminated the balancing test; eliminated systematic declassification review by Executive Branch agencies, dictating that only the National Archives should conduct such review, and for documents thirty years old rather than twenty.

As a consequence, the system by which government information becomes available to the public is in profound disarray. Overclassification remains rampant. Classification procedures are abused as a mechanism for avoiding public or Congressional oversight. There is an ever-increasing backlog of historical documentation that remains beyond the public reach. As the distinction between genuinely sensitive information and merely politically-sensitive information has eroded, the classification system has fallen into contempt even within the government.

According to one State Department official, the classification system is "out of whack." But "it's not going to fix itself," since "most security officials have a vested interest in the status quo. They're not going to streamline themselves out of a job."

Meanwhile, the major threat to national security that was used to justify the institutionalization of government secrecy has collapsed with the end of the Cold War. In order to restore some degree of propriety to government information policy, the system must be redesigned from the ground up to meet the challenges of a new day.

The Goal: Revamp the Classification System and Establish the Presumption of Open Government

Secrecy has been a part of American government for so long that we tend to accept it as natural and appropriate. The very idea of doing away with the classification system, or substantially altering it, seems outrageous or irresponsible. But it's not.

As far back as 1970, a Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy, composed of eminent (and politically conservative) scientists including Edward Teller, reported to the Secretary of Defense the following observation:

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DEFINITIONS

Following are definitions of commonly used terms, as defined by the Department of Defense (based on DoD 5220.22-M):

- **Classification:** The determination that information requires protection in the interest of national security against unauthorized disclosure.
- **Confidential:** The lowest of the three official classification categories. Confidential is that information the unauthorized disclosure of which "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security."
- **Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information:** Information revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermonuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munitions, or test device.
- **For Official Use Only:** Information that is not classified pursuant to Executive Order but which may be withheld from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.
- **Industrial Security:** That portion of information security which is concerned with the protection of classified information in the hands of U.S. industry.
- **Intelligence:** The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information, which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of foreign operations, and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.
- **National Security Information:** Any information that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 12356 or any predecessor order to require protection against unauthorized disclosure and is so designated. The classifications Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential are used to designate such information and it is referred to as "classified information."
- **Need-to-Know:** A determination made by the possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient has a requirement for access to, knowledge of, or possession of the classified information in order to perform tasks or services essential to the fulfillment of a classified contract or program approved by a user agency.
- **Restricted Data:** All data or information concerning (i) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (ii) the production of special nuclear material; or (iii) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, not including data declassified or removed from this category (known as "formerly restricted data").
- **Secret:** Information the unauthorized disclosure of which "reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security." Along with Confidential and Top Secret, one of the three official classification categories.
- **Sensitive Compartmented Information:** Intelligence information that requires special controls for restricted handling within compartmented channels.
- **Special Access Program:** A program which is established to control access to classified information above and beyond the need-to-know limitations normally required for Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential information.
- **Top Secret:** The highest level of the three official classification categories. Top Secret information is that information the unauthorized disclosure of which "reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security." ■

"More might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt—unilaterally, if necessary—a policy of complete openness in all areas of information. . . ."

The Defense Science Board did add the caveat that ". . . in spite of the great advantages that might accrue from such a policy, it is not a practical proposal at the present time. . . ." Today, however, with the collapse of the dominant threat to U.S. national security, the time for "complete openness in all areas of information" has finally arrived.

Objections immediately spring to mind. What about nuclear weapons design information? What about sensitive

diplomatic initiatives?

Notwithstanding that openness should be the rule and secrecy the exception, most people would agree that there is a place for certain limited exceptions to the rule. Morton Halperin of the Center for National Security Studies has identified four narrow categories of national security information that might properly be exempt from public disclosure, at least for a certain period of time:

(1) details of advanced weapons system design and operational characteristics

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NOW MORE THAN EVER

President Richard Nixon, of all people, eloquently described the failings of the government classification system when he introduced his own Executive Order on classification in 1972:

“Unfortunately, the system of classification which has evolved in the United States has failed to meet the standards of an open and democratic society, allowing too many papers to be classified for too long a time. The controls which have been imposed on classification authority have proved unworkable, and classification has frequently served to conceal bureaucratic mistakes or to prevent embarrassment to officials and administrations.

“Once locked away in Government files, these papers have accumulated in enormous quantities and have become hidden from public exposure for years, for decades—even for generations. . . .

“The many abuses of the security system can no longer be tolerated. Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that when information which properly belongs to the public is systematically withheld by those in power, the people soon become ignorant of their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them, and—eventually—incapable of determining their own destinies.” ■

- (2) details of plans for military operations
- (3) details of ongoing diplomatic negotiations, and
- (4) intelligence methods, including codes, technology, and identity of spies.

As discussed below, the current classification system has become inflated and bureaucratized far beyond what these reasonable exceptions would require. There are secret intelligence agencies, a vast secret budget, secret historical documents, secret environmental impact statements, and on and on.

Even if this extensive preoccupation with classification were not problematic in principle, it has become intolerable merely on the basis of inefficiency and cost. The Department of Defense recently estimated, for example, that the cost of protecting classified information in industry reached an astounding \$13.8 billion in 1989 alone.

What follows are four interim steps that would eliminate many of the flaws in current government information policy and help establish a more rational and cost-effective system.

Interim Step 1: Reduce Classification at the Source

The critical step in achieving a policy based on the presumption of openness is to drastically curtail the production of new classified documents. Before dealing with the residue of the past, the continuing flow of classified materials should be stanching.

This will require elaborating new classification criteria, along the lines of the limited topics noted above, that can be logically traced to identifiable national security threats. In contrast, the presumption of the present system is a technologically advanced superpower adversary intent on global domination. The challenges posed by the Third World and other current threats are qualitatively and quantitatively different, and far more limited in scope and magnitude. This reality must be reflected in changes to the classification system.

Beyond new criteria, one way to reduce classification at the source is to sharply reduce the number of individuals who are authorized to classify information. There are currently about 6,500 such individuals throughout government. A reduction of perhaps 90% in the number of classification authorities would go a long way in imposing discipline on the classified process. Additional benefits would be lower costs to the government and improved protection for information that, if disclosed, could actually pose a threat to national security.

Interim Step 2: Eliminate the Confidential Classification

Once a new standard has been established, it will be necessary to undo the abuses of the past. Declassification review and process is a costly and time-consuming undertaking. It would be tempting to simply open up the secret files and release all of the innumerable secret documents of the past decades.

But a more modest step might be a more realistic beginning, that is, simply to deactivate the confidential classification category, the lowest of the three official classifications. All documents currently classified “Confidential” should be made publicly available without a painstaking declassification review.

Eliminating the “Confidential” category has the political advantage of having already been proposed by the Senate Intelligence Committee in December 1985:

“The Committee has found that the classification system is unduly complicated and that it breeds cynicism and confusion in those who create and use classified information. The Committee believes that a streamlined system, in which the Confidential classification is eliminated and all [classified] information is either Secret or the equivalent of Sensitive Compartmented Information, would be much more workable despite the major changes and initial costs that this would entail.”

Remarkably, the proposal to eliminate the “Confidential” category dates back to June 1957, when the Commission on Government Security (known as the “Wright Commission”) criticized the overuse of this label and recommended its immediate termination.

A logical follow-on measure would be the establishment of a “drop dead date,” which would systematically cancel all classification levels for all documents (again with certain exceptions such as nuclear weapons design data, etc.) once the documents have reached a certain age.

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WHAT'S SECRET? A FEW EXAMPLES

There are vast realms of government activity that are insulated from public awareness and often from Congressional oversight. In most cases, national security considerations that led to prohibitions against public disclosure in these areas have long since vanished. Yet the prohibitions and the bureaucracies that implement them persist.

To see the absurdity of most applications of government secrecy, it is usually sufficient to ask the question: Whom is this being kept secret from?

Intelligence Budget

There are over a dozen intelligence agencies located throughout the government, of which the Central Intelligence Agency is only one. The total budget for these agencies is secret because, the CIA says, intelligence sources and methods would be revealed if the budget total were disclosed. But this strains credulity, since merely indicating a budget figure would reveal nothing to compromise intelligence sources and methods.

Disclosure of the total intelligence budget, commonly estimated to be about \$30 billion per year, could not possibly jeopardize the lives of American agents or sensitive technologies. It would only force more Americans to ask whether the intelligence agencies have performed well enough to justify their enormous annual budgets.

Intelligence Product

Not only is the amount of money spent on intelligence a secret, but almost the entire output of the massive intelligence bureaucracy is also secret. Most of its product is provided to just a handful of individuals in the Executive Branch, and an even smaller number in Congress.

Although intelligence analysis is often a fundamental driver of national policy, it is exempt by virtue of its secrecy from independent review and critique. Partially as a result, there have been serious lapses in quality, and major failures on the largest issues of our time.

A predominantly open intelligence program could be vigorously evaluated from many points of view, yielding a higher quality, more reliable product. Furthermore, an immense amount of intelligence data and analysis has been compiled in crucial policy areas, such as environmental monitoring, yet remains inaccessible to public knowledge or debate.

The "Black" Budget

Approximately 15% of the Defense Department budget for weapons acquisition is classified. The way this money is spent is secret not only from the public, but even from the overwhelming majority of members of Congress.

Secret Historical Documents

A secret history of the twentieth century is another legacy of the Cold War. Innumerable documents remain locked away from historians, scholars and members of the public. The current controversy over the withholding of government documents concerning the assassination of President Kennedy misses the point that such secrecy is systematic and pervasive.

How old is the oldest classified document? In response to our inquiry, the National Archives found that the oldest military document in their files that is still classified is dated April 15, 1917. The document, designated WCD-9944-X-1, concerns U.S. troop movements in Europe during World War I.

If its "Confidential" classification were to be taken seriously, one would have to infer that disclosure of the document "reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security." Such an inference, if words like "national security" have any meaning, is patently absurd.

Secret Environmental Impact Statements

Few people are aware that the government can and does withhold environmental impact reports from the public. No matter how potentially dangerous a proposed project may be, information about its hazards may be kept secret.

For example, environmental documentation concerning a proposed nuclear rocket ground test facility in Nevada is classified. In fact, until recently the mere existence of the Defense Department program on nuclear rocket propulsion was considered classified as part of the "black budget" (*see above*).

The record of nuclear rocket ground testing in the 1960s provides ample evidence that the environmental effects of such activities can be significant, yet the potential impacts of the current program remain secret. Why? Who is being protected? Those who know the information, or those who cannot know it?

Classification Guides

What are the criteria by which information is determined to be classified? That's classified too.

The classification system is based on the assertion that information must be withheld if its disclosure could cause "damage to the national security." This standard is so elastic that it permits classification of almost anything, subject to the classifier's discretion, including the sorts of information noted above.

In most cases, classification guides are exempt from disclosure. In this way, the classification process itself is largely shielded from public scrutiny and debate. ■

Interim Step 3: Eliminate the Special Access Classification System

Another important interim step would be to eliminate the so-called special access classification system, which involves a degree of secrecy even beyond that of the three official classification categories.

All the official categories—Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret—entail a “need to know” requirement. In other words, a potential recipient of the classified information must not only have an appropriate level of clearance, but he or she must also have an identifiable “need to know” the particular information in question.

But the special access classification system places even stricter limitations on who may receive information. In many cases, even the very existence of a special access program is considered classified information. Hence the commonly used, unofficial term “black program.”

Special access has consistently presented such a temptation to fraud and abuse that in 1991 the House Armed Services Committee concluded that it “is now adversely affecting the national security it is intended to support.”

To take one recent example, special access was implicated in the collapse of the A-12 naval aircraft program, with the resulting loss to taxpayers of several billions of dollars. The House Committee observed that “special access restrictions on the A-12 program and the lack of appropriately cleared auditors . . . prevented the program from receiving adequate management control and oversight . . .” leading to its ultimate cancellation.

The Senate Armed Services Committee reported that “over time, the vast expansion in the number of special access programs . . . [has] led to serious negative consequences. These have included: failures of internal management (e.g. the A-12 aircraft program); shielding programs from congressional oversight (e.g. through the use of “umbrella” programs to mask the true number of programs and program details); and refusal to provide access necessary for proper oversight.”

Nobody really knows how many special access programs there are, due to poor or misleading reporting and inadequate auditing. But in 1985 testimony, the General Accounting Office indicated that at that time, there were “about 5,000 or 6,000” special access contracts active.

The special access system effectively serves to undermine the most minimal level of independent oversight and accountability. *Aviation Week* (7/29/91, p. 11) reported that “approximately 80% of highly classified defense programs buried in the ‘black world’ are there primarily to avoid oversight, according to an aerospace industry executive. Most are ‘pet projects’ that would not survive if subjected to ‘white world’ scrutiny.”

Similarly, according to *Aerospace Daily* (8/12/91), the A-12 naval aircraft and the Tacit Rainbow missile, “both of which were crippled by inadequate oversight because of their Special Access Required classification, are just two of many ‘monsters in the Pentagon’s closet’ that will surface in the next few years. . . . For every black program that worked well—like the F-117 stealth fighter—there are two that are completely twisted.”

A study by staff members of the House Armed Services Committee in 1990 revealed that only five to ten percent of all special access programs are actually reviewed in depth by Congress. This is partially due to a shortage of cleared staff members, as well as false or inadequate reporting by the Executive Branch. And, of course, the prospect of avoiding Congressional oversight serves as a further incentive for the Executive Branch to place even more programs in the special access category.

The special access classification system is now, as the House Armed Services Committee put it, adversely affecting the national security. It should be abolished.

Interim Step 4: Give Declassification Increased Emphasis

Users of the Freedom of Information Act know that, notwithstanding the statutory response time of ten days, FOIA requests generally take months and frequently years to elicit a substantive response, if any. While FOIA offices are often understaffed, the biggest bottleneck is the declassification review process. Declassification is not a priority in any Executive Branch agency.

President Carter’s short-lived classification policy dictated that “declassification of classified information shall be given emphasis comparable to that accorded classification.” Before this requirement could have much effect, President Reagan deleted it. The explanation, according to Steven Garfinkel of the Information Security Oversight Office, is that it was “unnecessary.”

But today, ten years later, even Garfinkel laments the explosion of classified documents awaiting declassification review. He was asked by the *Philadelphia Inquirer* just how many classified documents there are. His response:

“A mountain . . . tens of millions or hundreds of millions or billions. We’ve got to do something or that mountain’s going to build up more. What are we going to do? Wave a magic wand and declassify it? Burn it?”

Garfinkel says that the Executive Branch is now looking at possible options for improving the declassification process.

One improvement, as discussed above, would be to deactivate the Confidential classification and significantly reduce the burden of declassification review.

But in addition, the declassification process must be given much greater emphasis. If new funding for declassification is not available, then Congress should require that at least 50% of the funds now devoted to information security in each agency be directed to declassification.

Openness Is An Essential Element of Democracy

The end of the Cold War has eliminated the nominal justifications for leaving the huge apparatus of government secrecy in place. The fissure between our professed principles and our current practices presents us with a space for action to finally achieve a government information policy based on the presumption of openness, and to begin to undo the gross excesses of the Cold War era. In a democracy, after all, it is the public that has the ultimate “need to know.” □

The 1970 Seitz Report: A Call for Reform Ahead of Its Time

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy issued a remarkable report on July 1, 1970 that included recommendations for radical reform of the classification system. The report, which led to no discernable policy changes, is still pertinent twenty years later, both for its incisiveness and its authorship. The Task Force members notably included Dr. Edward Teller, along with Task Force chairman Dr. Frederick Seitz. Excerpts from the report are presented below.

General Comments

1. The Task Force considered the matter of classification from several viewpoints; however, it focused its main attention on the classification of scientific and technical information.

2. The Task Force noted that it is unlikely that classified information will remain secure for periods as long as five years, and it is more reasonable to assume that it will become known by others in periods as short as one year through independent discovery, clandestine disclosure or other means.

3. The Task Force noted that the classification of information has both negative as well as positive aspects. On the negative side, in addition to the dollar costs of operating under conditions of classification and of maintaining our information security system, classification establishes barriers between nations, creates areas of uncertainty in the public mind on policy issues, and impedes the flow of useful information within our own country as well as abroad.

4. The Task Force noted that more might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt—unilaterally, if necessary—a policy of complete openness in all areas of information, but agreed that in spite of the great advantages that might accrue from such a policy, it is not a practical proposal at the present time. . . .

Recommendations

1. **Selectivity in Classifying.** In overhauling our classification guides the advantages that might accrue from inhibiting the acquisition of the information by a competitor or potential enemy through classification should be balanced against the the advantages of possibly speeding development in the U.S. through not classifying the information.

2. **Time Limit on Classification.** Whenever a document is classified, a time limit should be set for its automatic declassification. This time limit should be adapted to the specific topic involved. As a general guideline, one may set a period between one and five years for complete declassification. (Note, however, the exemptions stated below for certain types of information.) This time limit should be extended only if clear

evidence is presented that changed circumstances make such an extension necessary.

3. **Declassification of Material Now Classified.** All material now classified should be reviewed as soon as possible after the adoption of the new policy; we hope this might be accomplished in as short a time as two years. The review should either declassify the document or set an appropriate date for its declassification. . . .

* * * * *

. . . Security has a limited effectiveness. One may guess that tightly controlled information will remain secret, on the average, for perhaps five years. But on vital information, one should not rely on effective secrecy for more than one year. The Task Force believes that classification may sometimes be more effective in withholding information from our friends than from potential enemies. It further emphasizes that never in the past has it been possible to keep secret the truly important discoveries, such as the discovery that an atomic bomb can be made or that hypersonic flight is possible.

* * * * *

. . . We believe that overclassification has contributed to the credibility gap that evidently exists between the government and an influential segment of the population. A democratic society requires knowledge of the facts in order to assess its government's actions. An orderly process of disclosure would contributed to informed discussions of issues.

When an otherwise open society attempts to use classification as a protective device, it may in the long run increase the difficulties of communications within its own structure so that commensurate gains are not obtained. Experience shows that, given time, a sophisticated, determined and unscrupulous adversary can usually penetrate the secrecy barriers of an open society. The Soviet Union very rapidly gained knowledge of our war-time work on nuclear weapons in spite of the very high level of classification assigned to it. The barriers are apt to be far more effective against restrained friends or against incompetents, and neither pose serious threats.

Beyond such general matters, the Task Force noted that there are frequent disclosures of classified information by public officials, the news media and quasi-technical journals. While the reliability and credibility of such information frequently may be in doubt, the magnitude of leaks indicates that, at present, our society has limited respect for current practices and laws relating to secrecy. It would be prudent to modify the present system to one that can be both respected and enforced.

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... With respect to technical information, it is understandable that our society would turn to secrecy in an attempt to optimize the advantage to national security that may be gained from new discoveries or innovations associated with science and engineering. However, it must be recognized, first, that certain kinds of technical information are easily discovered independently, or regenerated, once a reasonably sophisticated group decides it is worthwhile to do so. In spite of very elaborate and costly measures taken independently by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to preserve technical secrecy, neither the United Kingdom nor China was long delayed in developing hydrogen weapons. Also, classification of technical information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration. There are many cases in which the declassification of technical information within our system probably had a beneficial effect and its classification has had a deleterious one:

(1) The U.S. lead in microwave electronics and in computer technology was uniformly and greatly raised after the decision in 1946 to release the results of wartime research in these fields.

(2) Research and development on the peaceful uses of nuclear reactors accelerated remarkably within our country, as well as internationally, once a decision was made in the mid-1950s to declassify the field.

(3) It is highly questionable whether transistor technology would have developed as successfully as it has in the past 20 years had it not been the object of essentially open research. ■

FAS PROJECT UPDATES

US-CIS Cooperative Project: This major FAS project directed by Frank von Hippel held its Fourth International Workshop sponsored jointly with the Natural Resources Defense Council February 26 and 27 in Washington. The workshop, focusing on Nuclear Weapon Elimination and Nonproliferation, attracted 18 participants from nations in the Commonwealth of Independent States and more than 30 U.S. participants and observers. Previous joint FAS/NRDC workshops were held in April 1990, October 1991 and December 1991, the first two in Washington and the third in Kiev.

Space Policy Project: This multi-faceted project has lately addressed issues raised by administrative changes at NASA, structure of the Space Station Freedom program, the call by the Bush Administration for cooperation between CIS nations and the U.S. on the Strategic Defense Initiative and the proliferation of advanced fighter aircraft. The project staff has prepared a number of articles, studies and papers for future publication and presentation to international conferences.

Project on Conventional Arms Transfers: An in-depth report on this project will appear in a forthcoming issue. Ann Walsh joined the FAS staff in January as a Research Assistant to work on arms sales issues and assist the **FAS Working Group on BWC Verification**, which met recently to draft a report on its visits to high-containment laboratories in the U.S. □

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