

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

SHINING
PATH

Volume 45, No. 4

July/August 1992

PERU: DESPERATELY ILL AND CONFRONTING A MAOIST MAFIA

A determined, resilient, and Machiavellian terrorist group, Sendero Luminoso, has advanced its revolution against a demoralized Peru to the point where the international community is faced with a long-term emergency.

Sendero is not just another Latin American revolutionary movement that will, eventually, be defeated or one with which our hemisphere could, eventually, deal. Instead, it is a Maoist revolution based on Chinese political techniques that Sendero's leader learned during China's cultural revolution—techniques Sendero has improved on and modifies skillfully as circumstances in Peru change.

Sendero Unlikely To Be Defeated In Short Term

Hard to track, even insurgency specialists have continually underestimated Sendero for the last dozen years of its violent phase. Its Marxist indoctrination of young people, its extraordinary patience, and its capacity for cruel Mafia-style intimidation makes its sudden defeat unlikely.

Nor will it deal. It refuses all dialogue. Recently, it began a rapidly spreading phase of infiltration of popular organizations in urban shantytowns, a strategy that complements its longstanding activities in rural areas.

Some people can hardly believe that a few thousand terrorists, no matter how disciplined, and even if backed by many sympathizers, could take over a country of 22 million people.

But Sendero's intermediate goal is not to take over the State of Peru, but to destroy it by disrupting it. In today's world, this is not that hard. Indeed, to destroy a modern state is much easier than to seize it. What happens, for example, when a repeatedly sabotaged electrical or water supply moves from rationing to cutoffs?

The Ultimate Goal: Another Hermit Kingdom

Peru is already a very sick country, in decline for decades, with disposable government revenues continually shrinking, its major entrepreneurs now poised to flee, its impoverished population exhausted, its bureaucracy and army corrupted, and its capital, holding one-third of the country's population, an easy target for harassment.

In the process of destroying the State of Peru, the Shining Path intends to provoke the Government into bloody repression that will, say Sendero spokesmen, "irrigate its revolution" and cost one million lives.

And after destroying the state, Sendero means to rebuild on the razed ground a Maoist Hermit Kingdom, along the lines of an agrarian North Korea. Reconstruction on the basis of a permanent cultural revolution can be

FAS Interest in Peru

Everything FAS might want in the Andean region of Latin America—scientific progress, economic development, human rights and democracy, an end to drug trafficking and a lowering of defense budgets—is threatened by the progress in Peru of a Maoist revolutionary group, Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path.

Accordingly, in late May, FAS sent its President and Michael Smith, a Peruvian specialist, to Peru to see what, if anything, FAS could add to the spectrum of debate over this issue.

Smith, an American sociologist who lived for 17 years in Peru and reported from Lima to a number of publications, has begun editing an FAS newsletter, *The Sendero File*, the first issue of which went recently to 200 specialists and writers. Similar to FAS's *Arms Sales Monitor* and *Secrecy & Government Bulletin*, it will draw attention, in America and the world generally, to the dangers to millions of people, and to FAS goals, of a Sendero takeover of Peru. ■

expected to cost millions of lives more as Chairman Guzmán, the self-proclaimed Fourth Sword of Marxism, tries to move the society backwards in time—away from the outside world that already feeds one out of every four Peruvians.

Given the movement's vigilant contempt for the "revisionism" of all other Marxist states (even including North Korea) and its isolation from any friendly states, Sendero leaders might for decades prevent ideological relaxation. Peru could be a long time returning to civilization.

An alternative possibility is that Sendero's revolutionary movement might prove too incompetent and/or too ideological to run a government. In this case, Peru could move toward complete collapse, at enormous further cost, as did another similar Maoist off-shoot of China's cultural revolution, Pol Pot's Cambodia.

These costs outweigh the human rights outrages of Peruvian society, as an atomic bomb outweighs a conventional bomb. And because Sendero deliberately seeks to provoke far worse military repression, the movement also represents the greatest threat to Peruvian democracy. Also, Sendero successes mean losses in the drug war. For the Shining Path, drug sales are a kind of "twofer"—it gets the

(continued on next page)

revenue, and its capitalist adversary in America gets its moral fiber undermined.

Accordingly, none ought argue, as some do, that if Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori does not, or cannot, meet specific standards, that we can or should "write off" Peru. Instead, there ought to be, here and abroad, an ideologically diverse coalition on which to base a sustained effort to save Peru from Sendero, even if despite itself.

The international human rights community and many others ought to be against what Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson has called a real possibility of a "third holocaust" in our time, after that of Hitler and Pol Pot.

And all those who love freedom, here and abroad, should recognize that Sendero's doctrine explicitly represents itself as a Marxist center of world revolution. Its ambitions, and sophisticated methods for overwhelming the defenses of a state's body politic, might make it a kind of political AIDS virus in more than a few unstable Third World states.

What About Fujimori?

At present a democratically elected President, Alberto Fujimori, maintains a Ross Perot-like popularity as an outsider who moves decisively against a corrupt and ineffective Government. Peruvian voters turned to him in 1990 in a kind of desperation that normal democratic procedures were not working.

As an ethnic Japanese and a successful businessman, Fujimori seemed to represent efficiency. And his stubbornness and outspokenness—even when it produced impulsive decisions—seemed to provide hope. Politically, he came out of nowhere, with little in the way of advisers, to win a runoff election. He campaigned, then and now, against the Congress.

For his first act, he adopted the strict economic program of an opponent against whom he had campaigned and, to stop the Peruvian inflation, put the economy and the poor through an economic wringer. This the international financial community considered highly responsible. It was to be the basis for readmittance of Peru into the good graces of the aid-giving community.

Unfortunately, for his second act, he ordered a coup that made him, at least temporarily, a dictator. These actions against Congress and the Judiciary were wildly popular in Peru. But the other American states, some fearing the tradition of coups in their own countries, used their influence to cut off aid and threaten sanctions. Under their pressure, President Fujimori agreed to a Constitutional rewrite.

Dealing With The Auto-Coup President

The world must, however, do more than pressure Fujimori to maintain democratic procedures; it must work with him to adopt workable tactics that avoid, in particular, playing into the hands of the Maoist Sendero Luminoso. He could well be the last chance for Peru.

(continued on next page)

FAS

Chairman: *ROBERT M. SOLOW
Vice Chairman: RICHARD L. GARWIN
President: JEREMY J. STONE
Secretary: ANN DRUYAN
Treasurer: CARL KAYSEN

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), founded October 31, 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) is the oldest organization in the world devoted to ending the nuclear arms race.

Democratically organized, FAS is currently composed of 3,500 natural and social scientists and engineers interested in problems of science and society.

FAS's four and a half decades of work as a conscience of the scientific community has attracted the support of the distinguished Sponsors listed below.

SPONSORS (partial list)

*Sidney Altman (Biology)
*Philip W. Anderson (Physics)
*Christian B. Anfinsen (Biochemistry)
*Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics)
*Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry)
*David Baltimore (Biochemistry)
Paul Becson (Medicine)
Lipman Bers (Mathematics)
*Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
*Konrad Bloch (Chemistry)
*Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat)
Anne Pitts Carter (Economics)
*Owen Chamberlain (Physics)
Abram Chayes (Law)
Morris Cohen (Engineering)
Mildred Cohn (Biochemistry)
*Leon N. Cooper (Physics)
Paul B. Cornely (Medicine)
Carl Djerassi (Organic Chem.)
*Renato Dulbecco (Microbiology)
John T. Edsall (Biology)
Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology)
George Field (Astrophysics)
*Val L. Fitch (Physics)
Jerome D. Frank (Psychology)
*D. Carleton Gajdusek (Medicine)
John Kenneth Galbraith (Economics)
Richard L. Garwin (Physics)
*Walter Gilbert (Biochemistry)
Edward L. Ginzton (Engineering)
*Donald Glaser (Physics-Biology)
*Sheidon L. Glashow (Physics)
Marvin L. Goldberger (Physics)
*Dudley R. Herschbach (Chem. Physics)
*Alfred D. Hershey (Biology)
William A. Higinbotham
Rold Hoffmann (Chemistry)
John P. Holdren (Energy/Arms Con.)
*Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry)
*Jerome Karle (Physical Chemistry)
*H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry)
*Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry)
*Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
*Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics)
*Leon Lederman (Physics)
*Wassily W. Leontief (Economics)
*William N. Lipscomb (Chemistry)

*Nobel Laureate

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

Barry M. Casper (Physics)
Stephen F. Cohen (Pol. Science)
Denis Hayes (Engineering)
Gerald J. Holton (Physics)
Thomas L. Neff (Physics)
George W. Rathjens (Pol. Science)

Barbara Rosenberg (Biochemistry)
Arthur H. Rosenfeld (Physics)
Martin J. Sherwin (History)
Lawrence Scheinman (Law-Pol. Science)
J. David Singer (Pol. Science)
Valerie Thomas (Physics)

Ex Officio: John P. Holdren, Matthew S. Meselson

FAS FUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501 (c)(3) tax-deductible research and education arm of FAS.

Frank von Hippel, Chairman
Moshe Alafi
Ann Druyan
William A. Higinbotham
Proctor W. Houghton
Jessica T. Mathews
Jeremy J. Stone, President

Matthew S. Meselson
Roselyn R. Schwartz
Martin Stone
Martin S. Thaler
Alan M. Thorndike
Robert Weinberg

The *FAS Public Interest Report* (USPS 188-100) is published bi-monthly at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1992 by the Federation of American Scientists.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FAS, Public Interest Rep., 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.



Peasants retrieve the body of a leader assassinated by Sendero in the Central Sierra.

Peru is, after all, critically ill and getting weaker. Its economy is addicted to cocaine from which one-quarter of its dollars come. Its society has suffered from the sabotage of Sendero for a dozen years. Eighty per cent of its 22 million citizens are unemployed or underemployed, more than half live in extreme poverty, and a third of its children suffer from malnutrition.

Corruption and oppression are traditional. The Executive Branch, Judiciary and Congress have been taking bribes for centuries. Its body-politic suffers from racial strains of four hundred years of white oppression of its Indian population. And there is not now, nor ever has been, much in the way of leadership.

Could Peru be nursed back to health if given sufficient help? No one can be sure.

Cocaine, Corruption and Cultural Revolution

The three C's of Peru's dilemma—its cocaine, corruption and Maoist cultural revolution—are all inevitably interrelated. But cocaine and corruption, very closely linked, would seem the most intractable. Cocaine revenues corrupt the government in general, and the army in particular, and provide the insurgency with as much as \$80 million each year.

Since Peru also provides 60 percent of the world's cocaine, U.S. Congressmen demand to know when the Upper Huallaga Valley, where it is grown, will be "secured" by the Peruvian Army. (The U.S. Executive Branch calls this question "unanswerable.") Unfortunately, cocaine

seems too easily grown and processed for supply side strategies to work. (Even our Government's goal is only to "inflict significant damage" on the trafficking organizations.)

And whether or not eradication would serve U.S. interests, it certainly would not work as the initial phase of a successful recovery strategy for Peru. On the contrary, the more coca growers are thrown out of work, the more disgruntled Maoists will be grown in their place. And the more the Peruvian economy will be impoverished.

By contrast, it may be possible to contain the Sendero revolution before making corruption and cocaine disappear from the Peruvian environment.

For example, if techniques were developed to locate and arrest top Sendero leaders, who live in safe houses in Lima and in its shantytowns, the revolution might be much set back. And, conceivably, its character might be changed in subtle but important ways. Appropriate general strategies for dealing with Sendero are understood. But they require implementation. These strategies are: begin healing critical economic and social wounds of Peru and avoid brutalizing the population.


Maoist, But In A Different Time And Setting

Unlike Chairman Mao's revolution—which benefited from the fact that the population had been stirred up by the 1939 Japanese invasion of China—the revolution of Shining Path uses force, coercion and terror to keep its movement growing. Thus, it does more than bomb banks and

(continued on next page)



Contrasts of Lima:
A shantytown leader in her home
and the Miraflores Hotel where FAS stayed



airports but attempts, by deliberate systematic killing, to create vacuums of leadership. Nor does it restrict its killings to the leaders of villages it wants to suborn and the outsiders who try to help the villagers. It goes on to make hideous mutilated examples of those who try to defect from its control. Like the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, it seizes upon teenagers for a lasting indoctrination in its ideology.

Its use of carefully targeted violence certainly is effectively intimidating, but it is also a weak part of its strategy. In the absence of comparable Governmental abuses—if the government can avoid being either destroyed or provoked—this violence would, in time, unify the population against it. This is why Shining Path's leader, Chairman Guzmán, openly incites Governmental counter terror. This, he supposes, will wash out the anger against his own tactics and attract and maintain the outraged converts Shining Path needs.

Accordingly, a necessary and sufficient condition for Peru to survive this insurgency is to design and implement a "hearts and minds" strategy that permits and encourages the population to side with the State. And such a strategy would, perforce, help the economy progress and hold the society together.

Putting in place such a strategy may well require oversight and help from foreign experts on insurgencies. And, certainly, it will require more money than just refunding the Peruvian debt. But it has been done in limited areas and what has to be done is known. (Especially important, nothing that needs to be done, or could be done, involves "another Vietnam"—Peru does not need foreign troops.)

Democracy Is Not The Issue

Many casual observers of Peru, in America, assume that the issue in Peru is democracy. But Peru has never had a real democracy. Over and above corruption, its Congress can go a year without passing a law. Its members of Congress do not represent fixed constituencies in districts or states to which they are responsible. And over 50 percent of the members have held their positions for more than 25 years. Even opponents of Fujimori's auto-coup do not want to return to the status quo ante!

The basic problem in Peru is that the Government does not really govern and, above all, it does not provide justice which the Peruvians want badly.

In addition, Peru needs to be rescued from the mercantile system of rules and regulations that prevent most Peruvians from participating in the legal economy—problems so long ago resolved in America, Britain and France that the significance of these barriers to economic mobility in Peru are not recognized by our leaders.

The enormous organizational skills of native Peruvians that made the Inca civilization possible are either going to be harnessed to Peruvian progress or committed to devastation and/or revolution. Peru left to fester can only lead to much greater costs later. And, so, the world has little choice but to help. □

—Jeremy J. Stone



The first home for many who come from the countryside to Lima is a squatters' settlement.

FAS VISITS LIMA: LISTEN AND LEARN TIME

The Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) may already be in a commanding position to pursue its goal of bloody revolution in Peru. According to persuasive analyses by Rand Corporation's Gordon H. McCormick, large portions of the central and southern Sierra have fallen effectively under Sendero control, and efforts to envelop Lima, in which one third of Peru's population now lives, are intensifying.

In the capital, a clandestine "metropolitan committee" recruits members, works through front groups, tries to infiltrate the leadership of already existing groups, and sets off bombs in front of police stations and banks.

Sendero's goal, McCormick writes, is not a "takeover," but the "creation of the conditions for political disintegration" in which the regime would "collapse under its own weight." Already, the Shining Path could threaten Lima's lines of communication. There is but one main road from the capital into the interior— through which come provisions. Like the coastal roads, it is easily blocked by man-made avalanches. McCormick believes that the Shining Path is holding this major tactic of harassment in reserve for an offensive reminiscent of that organized by the North Vietnamese at "Tet."

The one bright light McCormick has seen for Peru is that since urban guerrilla warfare is inherently more difficult than rural operations, the Shining Path would encounter formidable odds against success in Lima.

Listening in Lima

Just before our plane lands in Lima, a woman seat mate, a civil judge in Peru, asserts that what the country needs is a "strong hand." Over and over during this FAS visit to Peru (the first since 1986) we hear the same sentiment—one as popular there as the anti-Congressional attitude is in the U.S.

The first evening, at dinner with a half-dozen wealthy industrialists, we have a host who obviously supports a "dirty war." He says that, in Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, the authorities "all got away with shooting on sight, but here the Sendero just grow" and farmers are hiring Israelis to defend them.

Colleagues of some of the dinner guests left the country after receiving letters of intimidation from Sendero. It is, accordingly, important to "have a low profile" to avoid such letters. Basic conditions are *not* improving. One guest says "I don't see how Sendero will be stopped." And they all agree that one reason they do not know what foreigners might do to help is that they do not know what to do, themselves.

Recently, a large bomb was set off in Lima and, even in their protected suburban homes, these industrialists had felt it. It was the third incident in one week. Some of them have guns; others do not.

A wife says "The trouble is that we are waiting for Fujii (President Fujimori) to do something, but we are doing nothing." Another guest asks, rhetorically, "Why are we not out there supporting Fujii?"

In one revealing anecdote told at dinner, a group of miners went to the Army Chief of Staff for help in getting protection. After they wept on his shoulder, the Chief of Staff began weeping on theirs.

"What do I do when my soldiers return saying they have been asked to fire on their brothers and when my officers have to be hidden because their families will be threatened for their actions?"

A few days after the dinner party, a CARE director says that the ability of the Peruvians to organize themselves, in a centuries old tradition, explains much of why there has been no explosion thus far. 'Because of the pressures of

terrorism and impoverishment, they have learned to depend upon themselves.

And a former Minister of Industrial Development says that the problem is "We have the championship of incompetence of government here." For example, he says, thirty years ago, Peru had double the standard of living of Colombia but now Colombia has triple that of Peru. During those 30 years, Colombia had much more terrorism and although Peru has more tourist options, Colombia has more tourism. "Peru has never had a leadership class, only a dominant class."

—J.J.S

Editor's Note: What follows condenses a series of interviews FAS conducted in Lima during the week of May 18. While only portions of the conversations appear in quotation marks, all views reported here are those of the interviewees.

Tapia: Sendero's Surprising Success

According to Carlos Tapia of CEPRODEP, a non-governmental development organization, the conventional thinking that Sendero would be less effective in an urban setting has regrettably not proved correct. Tapia began to learn, to his great surprise, eight months ago that Sendero was having success in the capital.

What Sendero does, he says, is this: It puts up seemingly unaffiliated candidates for election. They take popular, radical positions that cannot be satisfied by the Government. Although the best informed observers can tell which candidates are Sendero members, most of the voters cannot. People who publicly accuse such candidates as being 'Sendero' may later end up dead. Once elected, the candidates are difficult to remove.

In Tapia's opinion Sendero is growing "by leaps and bounds" and the Government is losing the struggle in the shantytowns.

In at least one of them, the shantytown leadership actually collaborated in listing residents it considered 'Sendero' and passed the list along to the Government. This action was dangerous because Sendero has infiltrated the national police and the Army and finds out quickly what is going on. Such consensual acts can only be accomplished safely if the entire spectrum of the left in the community feels sufficiently supportive of the Government. Tapia said that in this connection, Fujimori's coup "blew this unity to smithereens." (But it did not help Sendero directly because Fujimori is so popular.)

"The situation in the shantytowns has become so tense that only those groups that cooperate with the police and the Army can get the protection they need to paint over the slogans of Sendero or participate in the assemblies of organizations," some of which are heavily infiltrated by, or controlled by, Sendero. Since the police sometimes cooperate with Sendero, people tend to trust only a special unit called Dircote (Counter-terrorist Directorate). But Tapia senses that the military is getting more sophisticated.

Asked where this is heading, he replied "We have al-

ways underestimated Sendero. If things continue as they are, Sendero would probably not sit in the Palace, but the country would blow itself to pieces."

Speaking of a Lima shantytown, Villa El Salvador, where 350,000 people live, he said:


"We never thought Sendero could achieve a foothold there. Traditionally, Sendero worked with the most recent arrivals from the countryside and those with the most backward skills. Villa El Salvador was a model for the new democratic left and had won international praise for its grassroots organization." But Sendero has now won, in elections, the control of the three most important organizations there—the small businessman's association; the Federation of Women, which controls milk distribution and soup kitchens, and the Cuaves, the communal assembly of delegates.

Tapia recommends "Build from the bottom up. We need a pilot project to organize a committee for pacification and development. It could begin by providing titles to property for the shantytown inhabitants, security plans for local officials, political and substantive education, and so forth."


The programs Tapia proposes would cost only about one dollar per inhabitant. So, while not much money is involved, some is. For the shantytown of Villa El Salvador, for example, the cost would be about \$350,000.

He estimated that Sendero controls two to three percent of the national territory outside Lima and one percent of the population. But it creates a vacuum in eight to nine percent of national territory where five percent of Peruvians live. Thus, Sendero now affects the daily life of at least six percent of the people.

In the Central Sierra—Huancayo and Ayacucho, the Army has been able to implement a successful campaign with rondas, poorly armed civil defense committees. With 12,000 weapons, mostly shotguns, for 80,000 to 100,000 committee members, there is only one firearm for every seven or eight persons.



Carlos Tapia, Specialist on Sendero



Abel Salinas calls for new anti-Sendero strategies.

In areas where Sendero has been atrociously bloody, the rondas have won. But the Shining Path has learned from its mistakes and no longer operates everywhere in the same excessive mode. In areas where it is pursuing higher priorities with other tactics, the committees are not successful. And in some places, rondas are not possible because drugs and money are the controlling factors.

Tapia said that the APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance led by former President García) is the strongest party in some places, particularly in the north. "To counter Sendero, the Army would have to enter into a contract with APRA as we did in Villa El Salvador," he said.

"We were working toward a common strategy and we had the support of Army General Luiz Perez Documet, Commander of the Special Forces Unit." For the same thing to happen in the mountains, Tapia said it would require the cooperation of García.

Salinas: Dealing With Sendero

"What we lack," said Abel Salinas, a former Minister of the Interior under García, is a "serious approach to Sendero."

"Sendero has always had the initiative. We have to understand the scope of their ideology, their written works and their strategy. In particular, for them, time does not seem to matter."

As an example, Salinas pointed out that Sendero has developed hit squads. "But we have not developed a strategy for countering them. We may have the most intelligence but they are the most audacious and daring. Thus far, we have shown ourselves incapable of developing a method that will satisfy the public."

"Because they have the initiative," Salinas said, "Sendero is leading us around by the nose. We have not been able to sit down and think through our proposals and, instead, we improvise. The sum of our errors has created a mystique about Sendero. Sadly, we begin many things with good intentions but with little constancy—like fireworks."

According to Salinas, the sense of injustice of the popu-



Enrique Obando sees changes in Army operations.

lation is very great. The people fear that, if they go to a police post, they will be mistreated. "Sendero gives them dignity but the Government takes it away. We have to return to the people their dignity."

When Salinas entered the Ministry of the Interior, the recording of intelligence was done by memory and handwritten entries in schoolboy notebooks. That practice, coupled with the annual rotations of personnel, meant that they effectively had no intelligence at all.

In 1985, the kidnapping of businessmen by common criminals was a major public concern, he recounted. British experts, whose posts were underwritten by some businessmen, were brought in, and within a year and a half there were no further problems. But later, other departments in the Government tried to "cut up" the anti-kidnapping group for bureaucratic reasons.

"Forming specialized units in the police is not an easy task, and my president, Alan García, never allowed a long range plan because he wanted short-term success."

Obando: Losing Ground is Not Defeat

Enrique Obando of the Peruvian Center for International Studies (CEPEI) believes that, in the long run, the Army can adjust to more sophisticated strategies. "Intelligence is better, partly because competing agencies have been merged. But it is a slow process. They retire at 58 and there is constant turnover."

Army behavior in rural areas depends upon the commanders and the origins of the troops, he said. Troops from the coast consider highland peasants "subhuman." But the peasants know the territory and the people, and can function well at the high altitudes. Some commanders decide, accordingly, to use local peasant troops, even though they can be infiltrated. But there is no policy to use peasants for military operations in the highlands.

Obando believes that the Shining Path is beginning to lose the peasantry. According to his estimate, there are 200,000 peasants, mostly in the South, now armed against Sendero. Ironically, it was the Shining Path that convinced

them to arm themselves, partly through conscription of young men and partly as a result of Sendero policy that prevented peasants from selling in the market.

This coalition of peasants and former conscripts can more easily afford losses than Sendero, which Obando said cannot easily replace indoctrinated members. But although he thinks Sendero is losing ground politically, "it does not necessarily mean that its military is weakening."

In Obando's view, the extreme left parties have abandoned the idea that the Government is as bad as Sendero. So in the cities, as well as in the rural areas, "Sendero is defeating itself." But the problem he sees is that the Army does not want to coordinate with organizations that are not under its control. In particular, it is reluctant to give out weapons.

Army officers hold one of three opinions. Some, mainly those who are involved in intelligence, agree with Obando. A second opinion, mostly favored by the top generals, is that Sendero is defeated and is just a drug-trafficking, politically expedient organization interested in money. A third group, especially veterans of the struggle against Sendero, plan to leave Peru in four or five years.

Because the commanders are changed each year, and because they dictate the policy of the Army, it is hard to know what view is prevailing at any moment. Even so, the generals are immobilized by human rights fears, Obando said, and often their telephone calls "go right up to the top, to the President," asking what to do. By the time the decision is made, the Sendero column has moved on.

Obando believes that the existing Government understands that one must pay for the war, something the previous one did not. First, while the military cannot fight the war without money, they desperately need economic help for a social program to complement their military action. Of the military budget of \$950 million, only \$75 million is being allocated to anti-subversive activities—in Obando's estimation, "about twice" what Sendero gets from its drug trafficking.

Second, the civilian and military need dialogue. This is especially true with regard to urban rondas. As an example of the lack of dialogue, Obando pointed to the practice by Congress of changing laws without consulting the military.

Millones: How Sendero Operates and Recruits

"If the Sendero took over tomorrow, they would only last a few months because they are incompetent—they would have no clue of what to do," said Luis Millones, an anthropologist who taught at the University of Ayacucho with Guzmán.

"Kim Il Sung at least had Soviet help, but the Sendero have very few leaders with very young subordinates with very specialized instructions for bringing chaos to the society."

According to Millones, Guzmán (a.k.a. Chairman Gonzalo) has always talked to the young—people 10 to 20 years younger than he.

Guzmán's indoctrination sessions fostered division of children from adults. Indeed, they separated children from their families and still use very young children as "look-



School children are a target of Sendero recruitment.

outs." Imposing on peasant communities a command by men in their early twenties, Sendero has violated Andean veneration of age.

Millones recounted that when Guzmán was dean of the University of Ayacucho, the students rejected him because he was so dogmatic and authoritarian, deciding everything himself. "His movement believes 'everyone who is not with us is against us.'"

"People who join the movement must give up their individuality and past identification. They write their autobiographies renouncing their previous lives and afterwards ignore even their parents if they run across them."

Asked would the international community come to Peru's aid, Millones looked back at history: "In 1821," he said, "Peru got its independence on the basis of an international force from Argentina, Chile, Venezuela and Colombia. So it could happen again."

Youle: The Fujimori Coup

John Youle, vice president of Southern Peru Copper Corporation—the largest foreign investor in Peru, said that Fujimori expected the coup to be applauded because enormous areas are effectively controlled by Sendero—maybe as much territory as by the Government. He described Fujimori as "the original demagogue with hard right tactics to be used against the hard left."

Government repression will bring with it a loss of democracy, which means a loss of legitimacy, loss of foreign support and eventual loss of internal support, he said.

If Sendero takes over, Youle believes they will, without question, kill the whites and upper middle class, people who probably have no bullets to save themselves. And he agreed that the result would probably be like North Korea: a hermit kingdom, agrarian but not anti-technological, plotting world revolution and claiming world prestige.

"A dirty war will not work here, because the intelligence is not good, and what they have they blow too soon, so eager are they to get results. Torture is not productive."

The contest between Sendero and the Government reminds Youle of "two drunks trying to kill each other with baseball bats." Sendero, in particular, is playing without modern weapons or communications.

Youle, who was the DCM at the U.S. embassy in Lima during the mid-1980s, said people do not turn in Sendero because they think the system is corrupt. "Indeed," he added, "the system is so rotten from top to bottom, that even the police has been implicated in bank robberies.

Peru needs a "body transplant," he said. "Peruvians are very accommodating, not very intelligent and very poor businessmen." Ninety percent of the roads, bridges and electrical networks are in bad shape. Though Ecuador is poorer in natural resources than Peru, Youle thinks it has done better.

"Here, Velasco destroyed the past and left nothing in its place. He succeeded only in uprooting the people. The agricultural infrastructure has failed and does not even come close to feeding itself, much less the country."


Torrado: What Do The Peruvians Think?

Polls of popular support taken indirectly, show that 10 to 12 percent in favor of Sendero, said Manuel Torrado of DATUM, a public opinion research agency.

"But the coup provides hope for Peru. It jolted the conscience of the country and persuaded the traditional parties that they needed to change. A corrupt and out-of-date regime has come to its end."

Fujimori's popularity, which rose 15 percent—to 79 percent—after his autocoup, is based on rejection of the system. Eighty percent of the population is working outside the system—the other twenty percent voted for Mario Vargas Llosa.

Torrado believes that the colonial tradition is still strong in Peru. "People say 'If Pizarro came to Peru again, he would probably be able to conquer it.'" For example, the Peruvian attitude that all good things and all evils come from abroad is, he thinks, partly why the people chose a Japanese as President.



The Palace of Justice



Manuel Torrado, Opinion Researcher

Asked what kind of Government would be best for Peru, he replied "That is the \$64,000 question. You need a system that corresponds to reality. Parliament was inoperative with two chambers and 240 members. Probably we need a new system—and it should be something like a king. After all, Beláunde was a viceroy, Garcíá was a high priest and Fujimori is a samurai—all theocratic figures."

Torrado said Fujimori's coup was preannounced. As early as last December the President was attacking the Congress in accordance with advice being given him. "Peru has gone from heterodox economics to orthodox economics but retains heterodox politics." In Torrado's opinion, Peru is still a country in the making. "It has no natural unity. The Sierra has millions still living in feudalism, while the coastal people try to imitate the outside world with consumerism."

He said nobody believes that hard work will permit you to get ahead. "It is a country without values, a country that respects dollars above everything else. Peru could not survive a total victory in the war on drugs. The \$1 billion it gets from drugs is 25 percent of its exports."

The problem is that the ruling class has turned its back on the real problems. The generals do not want to take charge because of the economic problems and internal problems and the reaction it would trigger from the U.S. But if popular support for Fujimori declines and there is no other option, because international assistance is not forthcoming, then the generals would have no other choice.

"There is, after all, a lot of admiration for authoritarian systems in Peru. The people are looking for a savior, and a kind of Hitler could arise."

He thinks that San Román, "even though he is not perfect," would make a better President than Fujimori, because the cholos [Indians in urban areas] have to take power someday.

Fortunately, he said, Sendero is Peruvian and, accordingly, inefficient also. But the real cost of Sendero is enormous if one calculates the energy costs due to sabotage of the power grid and the security costs of more guards and paying guerrilla "war taxes." Twenty percent of industrial costs is now for security.

Eguiguren: An Intimidated Judicial System

"Fujimori is right when he says that the judicial system is corrupt, but it is too early to determine whether the new judges he has promoted will be an improvement," said Francisco Eguiguren Praeli, Deputy Director of the Andean Commission of Jurists.

In particular, judges "find drug cases preferable to cases involving terrorists since these are safer and more financially promising." The Government, having lost confidence in the judges, is trying to reduce the options they have.

With regard to intimidation, Eguiguren thinks even the proposed solution of administering justice through judges whose identity is hidden poses problems. "Some critics will speculate that the judge might be a policeman. And even the lottery used to pick specific judges for specific cases gives rise to lapses in security. After all, chauffeurs and security guards all know what is happening and they can be members of Sendero or paid for information."

He said that under the new terrorism laws approved by fiat, the primary responsibility for monitoring human rights is shifting from the prosecution to the police, who try to reduce contact between prosecutors and detainees. The police torture everyone. People often recant their confessions. But the police now better recognize the difference between terrorists and "left-leaning" citizens.

Judges who are threatened by Sendero "have a number of outs." "In the first place," Eguiguren said, "it is not easy to prove that someone is a terrorist. So a judge has to decide." (Peruvian law has not called for juries in this century.)

"It is easy for the judge to announce that the case is unproven. In the alternative, he can just delay the case, which means the terrorist remains in jail, but with no definite sentence. But, added Eguiguren, since the newspapers are campaigning for "guilty," any judge who announces that a defendant is innocent will be called "corrupt."

While many judges have been killed in the rural areas, only one has been murdered in Lima thus far and "that was done by the MRTA terrorist group which is distinct from Sendero."

Chipoco: Will Human Rights Work in Peru?

Carlos Chipoco, a human rights lawyer, asserted that a human rights strategy is the only strategy that has not yet been tried. It represents, he said, the only no-cost way to give the population something—in other words to "empower them" with human dignity and a feeling of citizenship.


The Army may say that human rights has "held it back"



Francisco Eguiguren monitors the courts.

but, in fact, they have never tried to respect human rights. Police torture is endemic for criminals as well as for insurgents. Standard forms of torture include suffocation, threat of drowning, use of electrical devices, hanging by the arms and beating with hoses.

When judges are faced with a defendant who recants his confession in court, charging torture, the judge must decide what to do. "Under the new anti-terrorist law, lawyers will be able to defend only one terrorist at a time which means," explained Chipoco. "There will not be enough lawyers to go around." The real purpose of the law was to prevent a Sendero front group, the "Association of Democratic Lawyers," from using its well developed legal skills to defend large numbers of Sendero defendants.



Carlos Chipoco, Human Rights Advocate

San Román: Post-Coup President

San Román, the former Vice President named President by the Congress after the auto-coup, said Sendero owes its influence to the neglect of the people by the Government.

"Most people do not know whether it is better to live under democracy or a dictatorship. In some areas, they are looking for a messiah. Our people have a civic ignorance; they follow those who speak pretty. The Indians are timid, insecure, almost like a man without personality—permanently distrustful and abused for 500 years. We have to create a change, and not with words but with acts.

"Our best investment is in education—to form the level of professionalism that we will need."

Asked if Fujimori wants to become a messiah, San Román replied "Absolutely," and called Fujimori "enigmatic." He thinks that both Fujimori and Guzmán are presidents outside the law. And he said that, for Sendero, we "need a complete change in strategy."

An Anonymous Diplomat: The Drug Industry

"With regard to drugs, nothing works: not crop eradication, not crop substitution, not paying farmers not to grow, not intercepting the flights. It has to be stopped in America," said a diplomat who wished to remain anonymous.

Pointing out that Sendero has lately been using one large bomb against a single police station target rather than as before detonating 40 small bombs simultaneously at 40 banks, he mused "Maybe they are short of personnel."

According to this observer, the places where Sendero is strongest can usually be traced back to either a very bad landlord or bad actions by the government.

"Peru is expensive and if you don't take bribes, you don't eat," he said. "Corruption is almost an economic necessity."

Peru, he believes, could have been the next Chile: it has resources, good climate and a well-educated population. "But it has had a series of disastrous governments. The rot started with Velasco and continued."

Fujimori, he said, is not able to compromise and "doesn't want to settle for half a loaf."


Vega Alvear: Senator and Industrialist

"We are in a very complicated transitional period," said Miguel Vega Alvear, a Senator for Vargas Llosa's Liberty Movement. He listed some of the problems: terrorism, drugs, poverty and massive unemployment.

"To resolve all of these requires an integrated position against Sendero. And we need to reform the state, which currently serves only its own purposes. Most communities have no light, half of our schools have no roofs, and 2 million children have no schools at all."

Vega Alvear believes Peru needs to promote investment to get ahead and should not have a model of development that is different from that of its neighbors, because, "unlike South Korea or Singapore, we cannot isolate ourselves from our neighbors."

He said that Fujimori's rewriting of the Constitution has little to do with promoting investment and is, "really, a



Miguel Vega Alvear calls for link with neighbors.

smoke screen for personal ambition. In fact, Fujimori wants an authoritarian government with a strong executive like Pinochet or Mussolini. Unfortunately such approaches will not work in our country and will just lead to more violence and more division."

As to how much time is left, Vega Alvear said it is impossible to tell. "Peru could last for a long time or be lost tomorrow."

Sendero, he said, began to change in 1985. When people began protecting themselves against the bank robberies and extortion of the past, Sendero moved to coca and joint ventures with narcoterrorists. "In doing so, they lost their credibility."

In Alvear's assessment, Fujimori is a unique person, not Japanese, but individualistic and little interested in teamwork. "Surprise is his main mode of operation, and his worst human defect is that he lies.

"He thinks he is divinely inspired to save Peru. He told the Japanese Diet that he would return as President in the year 2005—which implies either a rewritten Constitution or a second election after a vacancy.

According to Vega Alvear, Fujimori is neither greedy nor personally rich. He lived on graduate scholarships during his university days. "Now," said Alvear, "it is his wife, a businesswoman who buys houses, remodels them and resells at a profit, bringing their income up to a middle class level."

This situation for Fujimori, said Vega Alvear, is not all to the good. "He is more dangerous because he is not interested in personal wealth. He is Machiavellian."

Vega Alvear believes Fujimori has three economic options: \$2 billion from Japan, although he got only \$25 million; print more money, but this would produce inflation again; or let Peru live off cocaine. (Currently, the

GNP is \$42 billion, the Government budget is \$6 billion of which 20 percent is deficit spending.)

“So,” said Vega Alvear, “if he loses international support, he would need \$1.2 billion to fund the deficit. The danger is that he might use the drug money to fill the gap.”

For his part, Vega Alvear thinks that Peru should develop a link between the Pacific and Atlantic—across Brazil—that would be used when, as expected, political problems crop up in Panama after the Canal is returned. □

—J.J.S.



Peasants on the front line against Sendero

Photo by TAPOSP/Info

FEDERATION NOTES

Council Election Results

Robert M. Solow has become Chairman of the FAS Council, and Richard L. Garwin has been elected Vice Chairman in recent balloting by the membership.

On the National Council, Gerald J. Holton, Thomas L. Neff and Lawrence Scheinman will take places vacated by Alex DeVolpi, David Hafemeister and Jessica Tuchman Matthews. (See the masthead on page 2 of this issue for a complete Council listing.)

Solow, who has served four years as Vice Chairman under out-going Chairman Andrew Sessler, is a professor of economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a long-time sponsor of FAS and a Nobel prizewinner in economics.

Garwin, also a sponsor, is IBM Fellow at the Thomas J. Watson Research Center and adjunct professor at both Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government and Columbia University's Department of Physics. Among the many awards he has received is the FAS Public Service Award in 1972.

Holton is Mallinckrodt Professor of physics at Harvard; Neff is Senior Member of the Center of International Studies at MIT; and Scheinman is professor of international law and relations at Cornell and also serves as Associate Director of the university's Peace Studies Program.

Staff Additions

June graduates Daniel Revelle and Tiffany Tyler have joined FAS as project interns. Tyler, who has a B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University, is working with the Space Policy project. Revelle, who received a B.A. in physics from Carleton College, is assisting the Arms Transfer Project and the Zero Ballistic Missile initiative.

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300

307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

Return Postage Guaranteed

July/August 1992, Volume 45, No. 4

Second Class Postage
Paid at
Washington, D.C.

- I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1992.
 I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.
 Enclosed is my check for 1992 calendar year dues.

- \$25 Member \$75 Supporting \$150 Patron \$1000 Life \$12.50 Student/Retired

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:

- FAS Public Interest Report—\$25 for calendar year.

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____ Zip _____

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE _____