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ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT SETS BACK DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

On Sunday, September 7—the day after the trip reported upon below ended—a major effort to assassinate President Augusto Pinochet took place and failed. The attempt killed or wounded about 15 presidential guards, destroyed several cars and used weapons of the same type which the Chileans complained had been sent into Chile by the Cubans.

In response General Pinochet reimposed the State of Siege, arrested 20 people identified with the political opposition (but not in any way suspects in the assassination attempt), closed six Chilean magazines considered critical of, or in opposition to, the Government, and announced “Now the war is going to begin from our side, and we are going to be tough, and all those people involved in human rights and the other things are going to be expelled from the country or locked up.”

This is the current mood with which the “democratic transition” in Chile must cope. What follows

below is a broad survey of opinion in Chile taken the week before the assassination attempt by FAS Director Jeremy J. Stone and including interviews with: political leaders; the Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army; strategists, peace-researchers and directors of think-tanks; economists; poor, middle-class and wealthy citizens; and including also even a visit to the headquarters of the greatly feared CNI secret police where captured guerilla weapons were on display.

The domestic situation in Chile, and the attitude of its Government toward its neighbors, are important parts of the issue of war and peace in the Hemisphere, and in the world generally. FAS is considering a number of constructive projects in this area; one in which members might participate is discussed on page 20 and involves scholarly pen-pal communications with a Chilean counterpart so as to provide not only scholarly exchange but also some sense of security for the Chilean counterpart.

WHEN WILL CHILE FIND ITS WAY BACK TO DEMOCRATIC RULE?

The April FAS PIR had shown, in reporting on an FAS trip to Peru, that the high-defense-spending South American nations were Argentina, Peru, Chile and Ecuador. And they were locked in a (generally self-contained) regional network of defense apprehensions.

Argentina and Peru, however, had moved out of military rule into democratic control of their armed forces. Chile, by contrast, had been ruled by General Augusto Pinochet since the 1973 military overthrow of the government of Salvador Allende—the first democratically elected Marxist government in Latin America. For thirteen years, Chile had been under the complete and absolute control of General Pinochet who rules through a junta, and by controlling and deploying the military officers of the Army.

General Pinochet's coup had been widely supported by the population. It anticipated civil war between the left wing of Allende's supporters (that wanted to arm for the felt-to-be-inevitable armed confrontation with “bourgeois power”) and the Army, which saw a political movement gaining power that was ambivalent about sticking to democratic processes. The worsening economic situation added to the population's natural preference for order over freedom. In the end, the Chilean Congress invited a coup, and warned the Armed Services against being used by Allende in cabinet positions by saying:

“It is a fact that the present government, from the beginning, has attempted to seize total power, with the evident purpose of subjecting everyone to the most rigorous eco-

nomie and political controls, and of achieving by this means the installation of a totalitarian rule absolutely opposed to the system of representative democracy that the constitution upholds.”

The statement went on to say that the security forces “should not participate in the government in order to support the policy of a sectarian minority, but in order to re-establish the rule of the constitution and the law.”

The population received, however, more than it had bargained for. The Army quickly secured the situation against military threats to national sovereignty—though not against the sporadic bomb or isolated terroristic act. But, thereupon, General Pinochet had shown he wanted to rewrite Chilean democracy itself. He stayed in power long



The President's palace where Salvador Allende died during the coup.

after resistance ceased. Several years later, he prepared a Constitution that would perpetuate a kind of periodically reelected Presidential dictatorship. (See pg. 6).

Any ideas for regional reductions in military expenditures, therefore, had to take into account not only the usual strategic, social, political, cultural, and psychological factors but also the special problem of relating democratic neighbors to a nation that is a pariah. Chile, which had been a democracy for almost 150 years, has a population 80% of which is currently urging a return to democracy.


The Pinochet Government also has a terrible human rights record. In the first few years after 1973, more than 600 people disappeared as the Army and police rounded up those involved in advocating armed uprisings. Much torture was documented and was continuing.

In order to understand the security problems of Chile and the human rights problems, FAS undertook to find out as much as possible about the political and economic conditions inside the country as well. What follows, is basically a trip report; material in square brackets represents editorial comments gleaned from library material compiled after the trip. (The sequence of a few interviews has been changed to permit the report to cover one subject at a time.)

The Trip to Chile

The political counselor at the Chilean Embassy had been cordial and had produced the names of some persons who would, if asked, receive me. But there was in Chile, he said, a general reluctance to grant interviews based on a stream of visitors whose subsequent reports were totally negative. True, Chile had, he opined, some problems with human rights and with its democratic transition, but surely, there were some things done by the Pinochet Government that were positive.

Chile had, in particular he felt, a good record with its immediate neighbors, having resolved the dispute with Argentina over the Beagle Channel (with the Pope's intercession), having entered into dialogue over military problems with its northern neighbor, Peru, and having offered Bolivia the direct link to the sea through Chilean territory which it had long wished (this had been vetoed, however, by Peru under the terms of an old treaty). Chile, he felt,



The stadium where people disappeared after the coup.

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was doing a good job of dealing with poor women and children.

But such constraints as the 1976 Kennedy amendment precluding any spare military parts to Chile had forced Chile into a domestic arms industry and led it to spend a lot maintaining old weapons.

A call on the State Department produced the comforting statement, embedded in their report on human rights, that Americans who had been arrested had not been tortured after they had been successful in securing a visit in their prison from a representative of the U.S. Embassy in Santiago. The home telephone number of their human rights officer was thoughtfully offered. Since Thursday, September 4, was to be a peak day of demonstration, my visit was not recommended.

A few weeks before, a young Chilean whose mother was exiled in America had returned to his native land and, during a demonstration, had been fatally burned by Army troops using gasoline from a Molotov cocktail that he, or demonstrators near him, had been carrying. This had produced such a furor in America that it was imperiling U.S. approval of a critical World Bank loan of \$400 million—one of the few remaining links over which the U.S. had concrete leverage. As the trip began, the Chilean Government was asking for a delay in the vote so as to let the furor die down.

Saturday, August 30: Flight to Chile

At the airport, a neighbor, hearing that I was going to Chile, volunteered that he had been the lawyer for Michael Vernon Townley, the American who, while working for the Chilean secret service, had assassinated Orlando Letelier, once Allende's Ambassador to Washington. Townley, he said, had cut a deal and was living under an assumed name in America as part of its informant protection program! (See page 17.)

A book read in flight, warmly sympathetic to Allende (*We Must Make Haste Slowly* by David J. Morris), admitted that, in order to deal with its pressures and problems, the Allende Government "had to weave in and out of the legal framework, now skirting anarchy, now embracing force, now moving so rapidly that the Constitution was casually ignored." Young socialists were talking of making the revolution "irreversible." Worker control of factories was not working and 95% of labor union leaders thought the workers were incapable of running a factory. As expropriations multiplied, Morris conceded that "state power was absent and a sort of anarchy ruled." "But anarchy," he said, "as political theorists understand well, is not chaos." If this was what the committed left was admitting about the Allende period, one could hardly imagine what the Right was saying.

Another book, brilliantly precise and balanced, was prepared by Ambassador Nathaniel Davis (*The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*). Some unusual points it made effectively were these:

The Soviets, and the Soviet Communist party, did not, in Allende's first year, want Chile to become "another

Cuba," and the initial reaction in Moscow to the military coup in 1973 was that Allende had fallen prey to the excesses of the ultra-leftist radicals. (On the other hand, a wing of the socialist party, led by Carlos Altamirano Orrego, had been to the left of the Communist party and had made such inflammatory statements—e.g. urging the arming of the workers—that Allende had been reported to say: "Altamirano is sabotaging me." But Allende was "ever reluctant to repress even the most unruly extremists of the left.")

Nixon's and Kissinger's antipathy toward even an elected Marxist regime in Chile had led to much more than covert efforts to influence the election itself (where Allende won by a one-third plurality) but also to encouragement to the Chilean opposition to kill the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army for his adherence to non-intervention by the military. And this murder was done—albeit not with the exact weapons supplied by the United States.

President Pinochet, then Commander-in-Chief of the Army, had to be pushed by the Chilean Navy, among others, to join the coup, which he did late in the process.

Allende had committed suicide at the last minute, after an eloquent and courageous final statement, but the socialist movement had gone to considerable lengths to rewrite history so as to portray him as having been shot by the military, which it was felt would enhance his martyrdom in Latin American terms.

Sunday, August 31

The flight to Chile left Washington at 6:30 p.m. and arrived about 10:00 a.m. Sunday—in time for lunch in the countryside with Augusto Varas and his family. Enrique Hermosilla, who had agreed to be my interpreter and guide, joined us. Varas may well be the best known, and most productive, political sociologist in Latin America in the field of defense.



Augusto Varas



Enrique Hermosilla, interpreter and guide

That day I also met with other members of the middle class working in accounting, medicine, dentistry, nursing and small business. Combined with conversations held on the plane with a scientist and with an importer, I got the following impressions:

The main problems for the middle class were getting and holding steady jobs. Freedom to criticize on the job was often limited to jokes, and supervisors were often quite arrogant because they knew, under the military Government, that they could fire doctors or dentists working for the state without difficulty. Intellectuals wanted a change soon toward democracy (maybe 80% of the population agreed), and they were oppressed by the feeling that the rules of the game, under the military, could change abruptly. Instead of bills incorporating changes taking six months to become law, now in a few hours a new rule would be promulgated and enforced in the very next day—on driving cars, or procedures at work, etc.

People were talking about politics only to their close friends and there was a general disillusionment about politics. Only the Communist Party had preserved its appeal intact, as a result of the military oppression on which it fed. Accountants felt that cheating on income taxes was commonplace, since people felt it was necessary to survive. The universities were being destroyed and, since they controlled the hospitals, these were being destroyed as well. There was no way to communicate with the administrators because they had little education in the field or were military officers who brooked no disagreement and retaliated against "troublemakers."

What had the Government done that was good? There was more access to education, a raising of health standards—which had suffered when the economy declined—and they had prevented an attack by the Argentineans. Kindergartens were emphasized, and once-a-day feeding of the poor children was now provided. There was more housing for poor people.

Scientific Pen Pals

One idea arose from these conversations concerning the scientific community, which suffers from brain drain and a feeling of isolation. An organization needs to list American scientists, with their specialties, who were willing to correspond with Chileans, so as to make it possible to create pen-pal relationships with Chilean scientists of a similar discipline. See pg. 20. FAS will do this.

All agreed that the Government has been losing momentum since 1981, when economic difficulties ensued. All agreed that Pinochet was creating more communists than he destroyed. Dialogue had been replaced by monologue. And those people who had been abused or tortured simply could not contemplate dialogue with anyone anymore.

Monday, September 1—Defense Issues

On Monday, we received a very professional survey of defense issues facing Chile—from a point of view that reflects that of the Chilean military—from 32-year-old Professor Miguel Navarro. Navarro, who works as a lawyer for the Chilean Air Force, is at the same time Professor of Defense Area Studies at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Chile. He invited some U.S. defense attaches and reviewed the situation for over two hours.

Navarro is ambitious and, quite evidently, a candidate for defense minister when and if a conservative government wants a minister who can control the military through expertise. He has a degree in defense studies from Kings College, England and speaks English very well. Intellectually, and in his position in Chilean society, he resembles a combination of our James P. Woolsey and the late Herman Kahn. Personable and alert, he knows who is where and who is hoping for what.

Asked whether Chile was safer with democracies in the adjoining countries, he said that, "civilians were more cautious in the use of force but they might be less experi-



Professor Miguel Navarro

Navarro's Lecture Excerpted and Paraphrased

In the late 1870s, Chile had "asserted our strategic superiority" over Bolivia and Peru in the War of the Pacific. Unfortunately, preoccupied with that northern problem, Chile had traded Patagonia to the Argentines in return for the Magellan strait to avoid war with Argentina. Some in Chile felt that if the Argentines had joined in the war, we would have settled that also!

But after World War II, Peru—which had, unlike Chile, declared war on the Axis powers—was eligible for Lend-Lease and got aircraft. Argentina, which had been even more sympathetic to the Axis than Chile, was able to buy aircraft without help by selling meat and wheat. Chile was left behind until 1947 when the Rio Pact made everyone eligible for U.S. aid.

In the late 1950s, there was trouble with Argentina over the Beagle channel at a time when Chile, having let its forces run down, was unable to do other than negotiate.

As U.S. influence waned in Latin America in the mid-1960s, due to the Vietnamese War, an arms race began. Peru ordered 12 Mirage fighters from France, and Brazil and Argentina followed suit. Chile began ordering planes from Britain.

In 1973, after the military government took over, Chile was able to buy some military hardware from the Ford Administration, but the Carter Administration's attitude changed, and with it the attitude of the European Economic Community. Peru, under a military government, was buying weapons in quantity and from the Russians. Argentina and Brazil were strengthening their internal military industry. And Peru seemed to be planning to take back provinces won by Chile in the 1879 War of the Pacific.

Accordingly, Chile went to the black market for weapons, where it had to pay very inflated prices, especially after 1976 when the Kennedy Amendment prevented the U.S. from selling any spare parts. After the Thatcher Government came to power, some spare parts were available there, and the French Government was willing to sell some military equipment.

When the Argentineans attacked the British over the Falklands, Chile had only 12 hours' warning of the attack and did not know its target: The Falklands

or Chile in the Beagle Channel area. Tension declined with the shift to a civilian government in Argentina, and since 1984, Chile had been in a period of detente there. The democratization in Bolivia has been helpful also, as it has been in Peru, but the Peruvian Government is not so clearly in control of its military.

So what is the new strategic situation? Geopolitics plays a more important role in Latin America than in any other part of the world. The agreement between Brazil and Argentina, since democratization, has ended a long struggle between them and signals an era in which they will try to advance their own goals jointly against others. For example, Argentina has decided to move its capital south, which means they are strengthening Patagonia and this means they want someday to break through southern Chile. (Astonished at this interpretation, I asked whether Navarro would interpret the creation of Brasilia—which was publicly trumpeted as a method of "moving Brazil" to its interior—as designed to break through Peru to reach the Pacific Ocean. But, he seemed to think this was geopolitically plausible also.)

There was, he admitted, no evidence from Argentina that it is moving its capital for this reason. The speculation was attributed by Navarro to Ricardo Riesco at Catholic University in Chile.

The zone of peace, (a nuclear-free zone) which Brazil has announced for the South Atlantic, may create a vacuum in the South Atlantic and can be interpreted as a sign that Brazil has abdicated in that area. Chile may agree, partly to reassert somehow its role as an Atlantic power.

But the U.S.-Soviet geopolitical struggle is drifting south. The Soviets are now in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, and they fish off the Chilean coast. Next they will want a permanent naval presence. The long-range nuclear submarine Typhoon, which the U.S. thinks is designed for the northern oceans around the Soviet Union from whence its long-range missiles can hit the U.S., may well be designed for the area off Ecuador and around the Galapagos Islands. The Southern Cone is going to be much more important in future geopolitics.

enced, and that the geopolitical aims of the countries would be unchanged. Moreover, in Argentina, they were not so much reducing the power of the military as modernizing it and making it more efficient. Their three-stage military reorganization would be ready by 1989, and Alfonsin himself had said that they would be more powerful than ever in the 1990s. So we see Alfonsin as making them more efficient. And both Brazil and Argentina are going

for nuclear submarines which, in the naval confrontations which are so important between Chile and Argentina, could tip the balance."

"In Peru, the military have immense power despite the civilian Government; they let Garcia take power." Asked about Garcia's proposal to preclude spending of hard currency for new weapons by either Chile or Peru, he thought that the two forces would have to be equalized first; after

The Pinochet Constitution

The underlying purpose of the Constitution, passed by a "yes or no" plebiscite in 1980, was to destroy any possibility of a repetition of what happened during the Allende period by creating a very weak democracy "protected" by a giant chief executive. It contains more than 60 pages, single spaced, and about 150 articles.

Under the Constitution, it is illegal to "advocate . . . a concept of society . . . of a totalitarian character or based on class warfare" and anyone doing so is banned, for ten years, from public life or specified educational, political or labor activities. This bans the Communist Party and any part of the Socialist party that would advocate, as some of the socialists did during the Allende period, armed uprisings, dictatorships of the proletariat, etc.

The Constitution chills public debate by holding the leaders of the communications networks (editors, directors, administrators) jointly responsible for indemnifications if any "false deed or action is imputed unjustifiably" to an individual or family in a way that causes harm or "discredit."

In an effort to purify the debate, it contains such provisions as: "The position of a trade union leader will be incompatible with militancy in a political party"—much less with leadership of it.

For emergency purposes, the President may announce periods of "constitutional exception" such as a state of "siege" or a state of "emergency" or "catastrophe." In the most far-reaching emergency, that of siege, the Congress must act within 10 days to prevent the seige, which goes into effect at once in any case.

Members of the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, may request information from the Government, but only if that one-third of the body agrees to ask for it.

Important aspects of the Constitution cannot be amended without the agreement of the President. And Deputies who advocate a proposal which is "declared openly contrary to the Political Constitution of the

State" can lose their positions, as can any other Deputy who might, as presiding officer, permit the voting on such a proposal. Accordingly, amending the Constitution to make amending it easier would be quite impossible.

Only the President can initiate bills on taxes, can create new public services or eliminate them, can contract important loans, effect pensions, or control collective bargaining, etc.

In particular, the National Congress may "only accept, reduce or reject"—but not increase—the salaries, loans, benefits, etc. proposed by the President.

About 29 articles cover the transition period from 1980, when the Constitution was adopted, until 1989, when a democratic transition is to take place. During those nine years, the duties of Parliament are being filled by the Junta—the leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Director General of the Armed Police (with a stand-in for the Army Commander who would otherwise be General Pinochet). Before 1989, the Junta is to propose a single candidate, who could be General Pinochet or someone else, and the Nation is to vote "yes" or "no" on that person. If "no", then after another year, a real election would behold.

One transitory provision permits General Pinochet, unlike other later Presidents, to leave the Nation during the last 90 days of his term of office (or to leave the Nation for more than 30 days during his term). This is relevant to his seeking safe-haven elsewhere, as did Marcos.

During the transition period, the Constitution may be amended by the Junta, but to become effective, these amendments "should be approved by means of a plebiscite convoked by the President of the Republic." This may leave some room for amendments to be made as part of the bargaining process between the Government and the political opposition before 1989.

While, normally, Presidents can only be elected for one eight-year term, the Constitution permits General Pinochet to be re-elected indefinitely.

all, Chile had 9 ships and Peru 15. "Chile needed parity, and perhaps even superiority, since it always assumed that it would face three enemies simultaneously: Peru, Argentina and Bolivia."

He did feel that it would be logical for Peru and Chile to confront Argentina and Brazil (now geopolitically allied), and he admitted that it would be easier to do so under a democratic regime. But he felt that the democratic transition in Chile might hurt the Chilean armed forces at just the time when Argentina was reaching a peak in strength. The problem of civilian retribution against the armed forces also could be a problem. He advocated an orderly transition, and a number of remarks indicated support for amnesty for the military, lest the democratic transition

simply not come about.

Over dinner, he explained some of the complexities of the civilian-military interaction. "Some of the military were not happy with the provision in the Constitution that substituted a "yes" or "no" plebiscite in 1989 for the free elections that would occur in later elections. After all, if the Junta candidate failed to be elected, the services would have to be a "shield" between the public and themselves for the intervening year before the then-mandated free elections. They preferred to have free elections the first time around. And what would be the strength anyway of an election with only one candidate—people might not take the election seriously. The military might prefer to trade free elections for guarantees for itself. Pinochet himself

might do better against another candidate than in a yes or no vote!"

Asked whether torture could be stopped, we discussed the ins and outs of it. He thought that, in particular, the human rights situation could get worse, and there could be death squads in Chile, as there were in Argentina—if things got out of control and the right wing decided to attack the opposition preemptively. He said that a poll from a group of liberal sociologists had shown that only 2% of the population was concerned with human rights abuses.

Chile was now engaged in an arms industry of cheap, reliable and unsophisticated weapons being sold to both sides of the Iran-Iraq war. [Reports had Chile selling 13 20-ton containers of cluster bombs in February].

Three startling things emerged from this conversation.

None of the military will speak to any of the democratic opposition, so that dialogue is about at the level of an occupied country. Even at foreign embassies, the military shake hands and then withdraw because of their reluctance to exchange views. This came up again and again in later discussions.

The dialogue between Argentina and Chile is no less constricted. For example, Professor Navarro, who is an Air Force employee as well as a professor, could, but should not, travel to Argentina lest he be arrested and a spy case manufactured.

Secrecy in Latin America is so fantastic that there are 53 different legal crimes that could be considered espionage. Everything is secret. Indeed, Navarro and Varas were participating in a public forum the next week on military issues which would be, he thought, the first such public meeting in 100 years.

Army Chief of Staff Major General Alejandro Medina Lois

President Pinochet has retained the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Army; under him, the Army is run by General Medina, who received me the next morning in his office for about 70 minutes along with his deputy, Air Force Brigadier Jorge Massa, and a colonel who was an aide for analytic intelligence.



Major General Alejandro Medina Lois, Chief of Staff of the Army



Grape Orchard with supporting wires—a new important export

General Medina was relaxed, friendly and personable. He made a point of inviting my guide, Enrique Hermosilla, into the room (which I declined lest there be an argument and Hermosilla get something negative added to his name in Army files). [The housekeeper of the vice president of the Chilean Human Rights commission Maximo Pacheco had been kidnapped and interrogated about the meetings which Pacheco had had earlier with Senator Edward Kennedy in January.] Medina's English is good, and he is reputed to be one of the most intelligent Chilean generals and friendly to the United States.

I asked why the generals would not talk to the political opposition. He said that it was, first, to maintain their professional level and, second, to support the Government. In the first place, they were all working double time from 0700 to 2100 hours, and, accordingly, had little time to socialize. Moreover, a natural constraint results from the opposition proclaiming that they do not want the military government to continue. How could they, at the same time, talk to the armed forces!

It was not regulations, he said, but doctrine that precluded dialogue. Military personnel working in political positions in the Government *could* talk to political figures if they needed to. At embassies, which was the main place the meetings took place, it was not very pleasant; e.g., the military would sing the last four lines of the national anthem (which extol the military) but the opposition would not, and would even interrupt by clapping. General Massa said the problem was similar to the fact that the military made a policy of not discussing religion or politics and did not "deliberate." [Evidently, President Pinochet finds it safer to forestall dialogue between his officers and his opposition lest they find common ground or break up in their unity.]

General Medina offered to explain the "inner thinking" of the Armed Forces. The socialists, the Christian democrats and others had doctrines that were basically international; while they were patriotic and would certainly respond to an obvious threat, only the military services really had Chilean interests at heart completely.

Chile wanted to be peaceful and to maintain what they had. The final objective of the Soviet Union was world domination and the third world was acting as if it were part of Russia. The non-aligned were aligned. Castro had come about because some American groups thought Batista was not as good as he could be.

He agreed that the Army could prevent Communists from taking power. The worst problem it had now was terrorism and, for example, the recent weapons from Cuba.

In 1973, the entire country had asked the Armed Forces to stop Allende. And once in power, the military had decided to change the institutions and to write our own constitution. General Massa observed that Chile had 40 political parties, and some wanted to go South and some North, with each trying to undermine the others. (See page 13.)

The solution, General Medina said, was a "protected democracy," in which there would be a barrier between social leaders and the political parties. Thus strikes would be permitted, for example, for economic reasons but not for political ones. The political parties were to be kept clean and pure. (The generals showed me, with amusement and distaste, a magazine in which President Pinochet's picture had been printed with fangs—I did not catch the journal name but this is the kind of thing for which, I would bet, the magazine staff suffered reprisals dearly, especially after the Monday assassination attempt.)

Asked why the Army was so cruel to the citizens, General Medina said there was "no evidence of excesses" and that some soldiers may have been tried. [In fact, in 13 years, no military person has been convicted of such excesses, despite 600 persons having disappeared in the 1973-76 period and many hundreds of cases of torture reported up to the present.]

Asked why the regulations against excesses had not been published, he said that newspapers were not obliged to print the rules against lying—but obviously they had rules. Asked whether he was satisfied that the Army, over which he presided as Chief of Staff, was obeying the regulations, he said firmly that he was, although there could always be blunders. He noted that the Army was not responsible for interrogations of political suspects.

Taxi drivers and others confirmed that the Army "only" beats suspects, often with rubber hoses so as to avoid showing marks, and that it is the CNI, the secret police, who use electricity and other means to torture people. They point out, however, that it is Army, Navy and Air Force officers that make up the CNI so that, from their point of view, it is a distinction without a difference. This scheme of protecting the Army's reputation by turning over the political interrogations to a new security force is, as FAS advisors tell us, standard operating procedure in Latin America. The torture can be severe. [According to opposition radio reports, relatives reported seven students arrested by the CNI, were "given electric shocks, were totally disoriented, not knowing the day or time it was, did not react to external stimuli and some of them did not even

recognize their parents."] [The Inter-American Human Rights Commission said on October 4 that the Chilean Government had used practically the totality of known methods for the physical elimination of dissidents.]

Tuesday: The Democratic Political Opposition—Left, Center and Right

THE LEFT: Heraldo Munoz directs a small center called PROSPEL (Program of Analysis of Foreign Policy in Latin America) with about six people and a budget of \$35,000, funded by the Ford Foundation and other academic sources. He had earlier contributed an excellent article on Chile's foreign relations to the new book "Military Rule in Chile" (edited by J.S. and Arturo Valenzuela). His conclusion here was that, despite the doubling of the Chilean Army, its political isolation had meant a lessening of Chilean security.

Munoz tried heroically to explain to FAS the various wings of the socialist party. Altamirano, who had earlier led the revolutionary left wing of the socialist party, was now very critical of what he had done. [Meanwhile, the Communist party, which had earlier been cautious, was now for seizing power by any means, encouraged presumably by the Nicaraguan success and the loss of hope for any other less violent means under President Pinochet.]

The Socialist Party, of which Munoz is an official, seemed chagrined. He said, "The whole country acted like fools. The socialists had never really understood Allende, and when we thought we were ahead of him, he was in fact ahead of us. We tried for revolutionary changes without a majority, and everyone was ready to take up arms. Allende was a man ahead of his time."

"Chile needed," he felt, "a deep transformation to overcome the three-thirds malaise" [Chile has a left, center and right of about equal size and very stable]. He felt, as did General Medina, that they were all taking turns trying to



Heraldo Munoz V.

do it all by themselves. He said, "Socialists no longer want socio-economic transformation distanced from political stability."

Lunch With Genaro Arriagada Herrera of Radios Cooperativa

THE CENTER: Mr. Arriagada is an activist, and sometime official, of the Christian Democratic Party, which is to say of the political center, as well as a defense analyst and the Chairman of the Board of the Radios Cooperativa, an opposition radio station which was the most important radio station in the country. He received us at lunch in a handsome suburban dwelling, with his wife complaining that he had abruptly cancelled a dinner for ten persons that evening.

He felt that Chile had a very strong military power and a very strong political opposition and that neither had been able to suppress the other. There had been a stalemate for the last three years. If the situation continued, the democratic opposition would become weaker and the anti-democratic opposition stronger.

While the Government had seized the buildings, it had not captured the people. They were proud that a number of small think-tanks had grown up to house political and social scientists outside the universities. The support for these institutes came from the Ford Foundation and some foundations in Europe.

Like Munoz, he commented that Chilean politicians had not realized that "we had to have some basic agreements on fundamentals to survive." People in Chile confused politics with the theater. They are always "taking the Winter Palace." The Latin American culture encouraged intolerance, and compromise was a dirty word. "You have a good point" seemed to Latin Americans to be a sign of cowardice.

He felt that the charges of Cuban arms entering the country were probably true, and the Western ambassadors, he said, agreed. (Later I was to see these arms.)


The Pope was arriving in April 1987, and on his departure on April 15, he felt the people would start thinking about the coming election in 1989; now they were just



Andres Allamand Zavala

planning for the Pope's visit. He felt the issue in any national strike should be "free elections."

He seemed to accept the fact that an American general had told the military that Pinochet had no value anymore and that the U.S. would send a plane for him if necessary. (This rumor started when the Communist insurgents kidnapped a Colonel who, they said, had documents on him confirming this; the Colonel was released later unharmed.)



Street emptied temporarily while police search for bomb under 3rd car on right.

The Right Wing: Andres Allamand Zavala

THE RIGHT: Andres Allamand is handsome, charming, fluent in English, quick-witted and a natural leader. A lawyer, he devotes 90% of his time to his work as head of the National Union Party, permitted to do so by his partners. The party was founded in 1983 and is one of two that has replaced the older National Party that had represented the right. It wants a market economy, free periodic elections, and civil and human rights.

Allamand felt that the coup was backed by a "huge percentage of people" at a time when the democratic system had absolutely collapsed. If FAS wanted reductions in defense expenditures, it would have a better chance with a democratic administration since the military had a "different attitude toward their tools." He was for integration in Latin America based on political and economic interests.

The trouble was that, in Latin America, everyone wanted gains relative to the other party and did not have an attitude of expecting less now and gaining more later. In fact, he said candidly, everyone was influenced by the belief that, at bottom, they could establish a better relationship than the others with The United States. Unfortunately, the U.S. had no policy toward Latin America.

He had helped draft the National Accord in which the political parties came together to call for free elections and other common positions. From his point of view, the main demands should be simple: free and open elections and amendment of the Constitution to provide a way of amending it further.

What, I asked, would the opposition give in return? They would, he said, agree not to overthrow the regime before 1989. I suggested that this was not going to be enough, since they had no chance of overthrowing the Government—what about amnesty? This, he felt, was a pragmatic point left open.

Dinner With Allende's Minister Sergio Bitar

Sergio Bitar was Allende's Minister of Mining and, after the coup, was imprisoned with other high officials in Dawson's Island—about as far south as you could get in Chile and close to the Antarctic. There they had been forced into hard labor which, in a few cases, had led to the death of the prisoners.

We discussed his experiences, and the problems the democratic opposition had in creating a dialogue with the Pinochet Government. Among the suggestions that arose from the conversation were these: that retired military figures should be found who were willing to advise the political parties; that geopolitical reasons should be generated to justify the democratic transition—heaven knows, there are plenty of them if, as the opposition thinks, Chile is weaker in isolation than it would be after a transition; that the opposition has to think more about amnesty procedures, about which the military are petrified; that a unilateral dialogue should be begun, in view of the fact that the military read everything said about them (for them, this is military intelligence and permissible); that neighboring governments should provide assurances that they would not exploit any weaknesses arising from a democratic transition; and so on.



Sergio Bitar C.


Frederick Willoughby: Pinochet Spokesman

The next day, we spoke to Frederick Willoughby, who had been the spokesman for the Pinochet Government from 1973 until 1976 when he suffered kidney failure and retired, to undergo dialysis. Some years later, informed that he could have a kidney transplant if he could get to Washington within 20 hours, he found, by chance, a plane leaving within 45 minutes and made it by two hours. His current approach to life is a reflection of that miraculous event, and we had an interesting discussion.

Six months after the coup, he said, the Government had pledged to return to normal institutionalism within the shortest possible time. This was imagined to be 1980 for planning purposes. But, through the dynamics of power, power became institutionalized.

Willoughby had offered himself as a political candidate for President in a letter to the Junta. It seemed that this was done to emphasize the point that others might want to run

besides President Pinochet in the 1989 plebiscite. The Junta may have used the letter to persuade General Pinochet to begin to campaign for office later rather than earlier, lest he induce many such letters to the Junta—or something like that. In other words, his letter had internal meaning within that narrow space of political maneuver between the Junta and the President.



F. Willoughby-Macdonald M.

Quotations From President Pinochet

“Chile has been the only nation that has managed to extricate itself from the claws of Soviet communism, and this is the reason for the no-quarters struggle and the vicious campaign of lies that has been launched against the country. . . .”

“. . . taking advantage of the weakness inherent in absolute democracy, communism pragmatically adapts itself to the circumstances, thus infiltrating the institutions in order to destroy them from the inside.”

“. . . considering the extreme situation the country was facing, the Armed Forces had the unavoidable duty of introducing profound modifications, which, in addition to ensuring freedom, would prevent a repetition of the Marxist adventure.”

“I also view with some concern how some people who struggled against the Marxist government, who called for the intervention of the armed and police forces on 11 September 1973 are now showing an ambiguous and treasonous attitude.”

“The Government attaches special importance to our relations with the United States.”

Asked about the National Accord supported by 11 political parties, President Pinochet said: “First of all, there are no political parties here. [Officially all political parties have been banned but they exist unofficially.] There are 11 citizens who signed an agreement. . . . The politicians are like chameleons. They change according to circumstances. Since they failed in a dialogue, they are now coming with the agreement. If they fail with the agreement, they will come tomorrow with a mass meeting or something else. I repeat that these are ploys of the politicians.”

Wednesday: Two Think Tanks—Right and Left

In 1980, a Center for Public Studies (CEP) was created with a conservative Nobel prize winner in economics, Friedrich A. Hayek, as its honorary Chairman. Funded by Chilean companies and international foundations, it runs seminars on current issues and publishes a high-quality journal, "Estudios Publicos."

The Executive Director of the CEP is Arturo Fontaine Talavera. Professor Fontaine is articulate and politically sophisticated and resembles a young American academic conservative.

Fontaine thought the Pinochet Government Constitution was expecting too much change in Chilean society. Having studied American politics, the military would like to reproduce two parties with little differences. The Constitution was a reaction to communism, and its clauses are designed to weaken and destroy it. Unfortunately, he said, this anti-communist strategy won't work. But, he was asked, with half the electorate never having voted in an election, perhaps a castrated democracy might be accepted. He said it would not because there is, here, a "deep cultural drive to democracy." He was for a rapid transition to democracy.

Since this was a conservative think tank, it seemed a good place to ask again what the Pinochet Government had done that was positive. He felt Pinochet was leaving behind an electorate that was less fractious, with people trusting each other more, young people especially, and with people valuing democracy more.

Over the last 13 years, technical skills had much improved and the repression of political activity had forced much energy into academic work which had, accordingly, improved. The exiles had come back with better judgment and more experience. But maybe, he said, we have lost the ability to organize politically, assemblies and such.

The free enterprise economy had forced companies to be much more sophisticated in their management and the economy itself had been diversified with new exports so that it was less dependent on copper. The lowering of tariffs had made certain consumer goods far more available and this had removed certain status symbols from their status as status symbols which helped social mobility.

He thought Pinochet could not win with a free press, with TV, in the planned plebiscite. [The whole plebiscite notion may, therefore, be counterproductive for Pinochet since, if he lost in it, he would not feel, probably, comfort-



Arturo Fontaine Talavera

The Character of President Pinochet

From sources in the United States and in Chile, the following composite interview can be put forward:

Earlier Pinochet was a very cautious man—so cautious that for many years his trademark was dark glasses that hid his eyes and a slack, hanging jaw that hid expressions around the mouth. He depends very much on his own character and will. Now, surrounded by people who owe him obedience, he first lost the capacity to hear, and later to tolerate, dissent. This is a common form of authoritarian personality.

In intellect, he is rather more shrewd than intelligent, with a great capacity for histrionics. He can drop a tear or get furious or tender and, when the door closes, just go back to work.

He was considered to be the number one soldier, very precise with maps, geography and geopolitics—good at criticizing wars and with some training in law. His I.Q. is average, but he is strong-willed and courageous and cold.

How could he order killed someone like General Carlos Prats who was, after all, his superior, and who was assassinated in Argentina after fleeing the country during the coup? Probably his head of DINA, at that time Manuel Contreras, came in and said something like: "What are we to do about Prats and people like that who are causing us such troubles abroad?" In such a case, President Pinochet might shrug and say something like: "Who is head of intelligence, you or me?" [During the crisis that occurred some years later over the Letelier killing, Pinochet did say: "The intelligence services serve the government. An unpleasant situation affecting them is their problem. Not mine."] But see page 17 for a different view of his involvement.

Some believe that Pinochet may have already sounded out other countries, without success, to find one to move to if necessary. They think that America offering him a sanctuary could be useful in promoting a peaceful transition. Pinochet himself, if given an out, might well want to go down in history as one who left behind an anti-communist legacy rather than having the whole country go up in flames. His own safety, and amnesty for his generals, in that order, is, sources say, probably his priority.

able in running again. The Government has been taking polls every three months since 1973 and will likely know in advance whether he could win.]

Fontaine closed by reminding us that Americans had not been through anything like what they had been through and were going through. Much commentary had the implied assumption that the situation could be solved easily and much commentary was patronizing.

FLASCO

The Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences (FLASCO) is a loose confederation of think-tanks of social scientists with headquarters in Costa Rica and offices in Chile, Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, Argentina and Bolivia. At one time a U.N. affiliate, the Chilean Government had, after the coup, withdrawn its support and, even, tried to get the organization expelled from the country, which failed. Now the Catholic Church sponsors it. The Chilean branch spends about \$500,000 a year, mostly from Northern Hemisphere foundations, and has about 40 workers.

The head of its defense program, Augusto Varas, was also the creator of a Chilean Peace Research Association called ACHIP. His office-mate and colleague, Carlos Portales C. is the current secretary-general of ACHIP. They have some dialogue with researchers in the military but not much.

They work in a pleasant suburban building on such topics as how to avoid being integrated into the East-West conflict; how to define a new security relationship in Latin America; how to tackle the problem of reducing militarization and maintaining civilian control of armed forces; and so on. Portales created the idea of a Zone of Peace, now adopted by Brazil. They obviously are quite good at peace research—a kind of political science that is done in America quite poorly.

Over dinner, Carlos Portales said that this was a very separated schizophrenic society, with the military and the opposition seeing the same facts in quite different ways. The President was incapable of understanding what was going on in the country, and the Government could not see itself as others saw it. The way that the President had managed and controlled the armed forces was the most interesting thing. The Army stays out of politics even when in political positions. The officers simply reported to Pinochet, who had executive powers.

The President was now trying to increase his popularity. If he receives foreign aid, it would give him more room for his campaign in 1989.



Carlos Portales C.

Thursday: The Demonstration

Thursday was the day that had been set for a national protest; a few bombs had gone off the night before, but not an unusual amount. A driver was retained to drive around the city and we set out for the poorest areas, where the demonstrators normally emerge from the shanty-towns to cause disruption.

Soldiers with combat face paint were in evidence; the face paint was to give the soldiers the assurance that they would not be recognized by the demonstrators, so as to prevent later retaliation. [Pinochet said, on May 22, that it was "because their pictures are taken and published in the little opposition magazines, and the poor soldiers suffer because of this."]

Immediately after we went down one road, burning tires appeared behind us. At one such intersection, we pick up a Miguelito. These are nails bent in such a way that, when thrown to the street, they will automatically assume a position that threatens tires. While the driver went off to get the tire replaced, we watched a squad of soldiers defending a house. Around them, young children, six to ten years old, played soldier with toy weapons. Suddenly sling-shot-propelled stones were heard landing and the soldiers readied their weapons. The sling-shots are banned because, when used, they can fire more than 100 meters.



Burning tire blocks road

We decide to ride back through the central square in time to see the noon demonstrations. At street corners students are shouting slogans and running to another corner when the army or police arrive. A cloud of tear gas can be seen. A few people, with press identification, are wearing tear gas masks, which can be bought for ten dollars. Two members of the security force are running with a demonstrator between them and hustling him into the police van. As he reaches the back, unprotesting, one policeman suddenly slugs him hard in the head. The demonstrator drops below the level of sight. The policeman is pointing a finger at him and then pulls him up again. Before I can see if he hits him again, my car has moved on. This violence appears to be standard operating behavior, and if the captured person has a weapon, he is beaten severely.

THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM OF CHILE FROM LEFT WING TO RIGHT WING†

Political Parties signing the National Accord (AN)*

MDP = Popular Democratic Movement¹

MIR PCCh PS-Alemeyda
FPMR

MAPU IC PS-Mandujano

AD = Democratic Alliance Coalition²

PS-Briones PR PDC PSD RP PL PN MUN
PS-Nunez NU

1. **MDP = Popular Democratic Movement**
(15-20% of the electorate)

MIR = Movement of the Revolutionary Left (pro-Cuban, favors armed revolution)

PCCh = Communist Party of Chile (firmly pro-Soviet)
FPMR = Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (armed guerilla organization born in 1983 under PCCh)
PS-Alemeyda = left wing of Socialist Party (leaders are in the German Democratic Republic)

Parties to the Immediate Left of the Democratic Alliance

MAPU = Movement For United Popular Action
(Socialist Party with two different wings)
IC = Christian Left
PS-Mandujano = Socialist Party of Mandujano

2. **AD = Democratic Alliance Coalition**
(40-50% of the electorate)

PS-Briones = Socialist Party of Briones
PS-Nunez = Socialist Party of Nunez
PR = Radical Party
PDC = Christian Democratic Party (largest party of Chile)
PSD = Social Democratic Party (anti-Marxist breakaway of the Radical Party)
RP = Republican Party (former supporters of Pinochet, formed in the early 1980s)
PL = Liberal Party

Parties to the Immediate Right of the Democratic Alliance

PN = National Party
MUN = National United Movement
(conservative party opposing Pinochet)
NU = National Union Party


*AN = National Accord is a proclamation calling for free elections and a return to Democracy. Its signers, (70-75% of the electorate) include the Democratic Alliance Coalition.

†Sixteen Chilean political parties (and one armed guerilla movement) are placed here on a 14-point "spectrum" from left-wing to right-wing (in three cases groups occupy a similar point on the continuum and as placed below one another. There is no scale.

Foreign Ministry Gives FAS a Tour of the Demonstration

During an earlier meeting at the Foreign Ministry, a Chilean Ambassador had offered to show me the Thursday demonstrations in an afternoon drive in a Foreign Ministry car. During the tour with the Ambassador, things were very quiet, much quieter in fact than he had expected, although helicopters were in evidence acting in coordination with ground forces. The buses were running, which was unusual, and it was clear that the demonstration was fizzling.

During the tour, the Ambassador defended the Pinochet



Student protesting by clapping

Government in a full court press. The missing, he said, had never really existed but were associated with false identity cards issued during the Allende administration. The complaints about torture were politically motivated, and if the complainants were willing to talk to the press, why were they not willing to take the issue to court? [In fact, over 200 people have been courageous enough to take their torture cases to court, but no one has been convicted of torture in 13 years.] The Vicariate, which I would visit tomorrow, was, he said, highly unreliable because communists worked there.

The Ambassador questioned whether the American Townley, who had admittedly been a civilian employee of DINA, had really been truthful in confessing to murder (and attributing the assassination of Letelier to his having received instructions from DINA). If he had been guilty, he argued, why would he return to the U.S? [See pg. 17 for a summary of the complicated affair; Townley was definitely guilty.]

The Ambassador asserted that it was a violation of the rules of the World Bank for the United States to use political considerations, such as human rights, in determining its vote and promised to send me the relevant regulations. [But when they arrived, the regulations said only that "the Bank and its officers" shall not interfere in the political affairs of states; this does not preclude nations on the board of the Bank from voting as they please for any reason they want, under long-standing interpretations.]

Dinner With a Supporter of Senator Helms

The person with whom I was supposed to be dining decided not to drive downtown to my hotel because of the danger of bombs exploding as part of either the demonstration or related police activities. So I decided to walk around and see what was happening and to try to strike up a conversation. All seemed calm. A 64-year-old retired gentleman offered to show me his apartment and give me dinner.

He had inherited an apartment building from his father, furnished with lovely antiques but now somewhat run down, as the family ran into economic difficulties. Both Mr. P. and his son, a salesman of centrifuge equipment, were firm supporters of the Government. They felt everything had been calm since the coup. The coup really did not deserve to be called a coup, they felt, since it had been so much requested by the people and the Congress. The only person who understood Chile was Senator Helms—"He spoke truth, only truth." They knew about, and rejected as vague, the charge that Helms or an aide had disclosed secrets to Chile. (The father of Mr. P's son-in-law had different political views, so they did not discuss politics much.) I walked home after dinner, after seeing Mr. P's elaborate train set.

Friday: Human Rights

Our scheduled meeting with the executive director of the Vicariate—where the Catholic Church tries to protect human rights—was canceled because, the night before, a police guard assigned by a court to protect him had been attacked and wounded by unknown persons. This was right wing terrorism masquerading, on a day of protest, as left wing terrorism or a truly remarkable coincidence.

The head of the Vicariate, Mons. Santiago Tapia Carvajal, received us. Undoubtedly, he said, the Church effort, since 1976, to defend human rights was considered as a "partisan action" in certain circles and criticized. But the Vicariate was defending life, "guided by the work and example of Christ."

Asked who was torturing and terrorizing, he said:

"What we know, in many cases, is that torture has been



Mons. Santiago Tapia Carvajal



Gustavo Villalobos Sepulveda

done in secret places which are supposed to belong to the secret police. Information regarding torture has been decreasing in the last three years. But there are groups we don't know that kidnap people, mistreat them, and then release them. We believe these cases arise from groups that act autonomously from the Government with the tacit approval of those that should be respecting human rights."

[According to Amnesty International, the "clandestine forces" emerged in 1983 and have intimidated hundreds of political, human rights and community activists. They present themselves as independent squads with nationalistic names but, according to Amnesty International, "both their methods and the degree of impunity with which they operate indicate that the security forces are involved."]

[Why would such groups exist? A clue may lie in remarks made by Pinochet on July 30. According to Radio Chilena the President admitted that he could not take stronger measures against terrorism because he felt inhibited by international pressure, although, he said, in other countries said to be democratic, assassinations and killings are perpetrated. These remarks were made to a group of women and young people at a meeting organized by the Directorate of Civilian Organizations. Obviously, with or without instructions, security forces would take this as a hint to do clandestinely what the President was announcing he would like to do but could not do publicly.]

[President Pinochet had also said, on March 18, ". . . we are different from the Americans . . . we are Latins and they are Anglo-Saxons. We are governed by Roman laws and they are governed by the Magna Charta . . . we depended upon the Spanish king and they were a colony." It all sounds like a different conception of how the rulers should treat the ruled—but one that is forced to mask itself to respond to international pressures.]

Monsignor Tapia said the kidnappings have been "less than last year" and the problems of internal exile have been decreasing a lot. Asked why, Monsignor Tapia said: "Maybe to give a better impression, a cleaner face."

A Courageous Lawyer: Gustavo Villalobos Sepulveda

The Vicariate's lawyer, Mr. Villalobos, had just emerged from 90 days in jail after being indicted for having sent a wounded man from the Vicaria to a hospital without having immediately reported it to the police; the man had represented himself as an innocent bystander of a shootout but the affair, it was later learned, involved the killing of a policeman.

Contrary to what I had heard from critics, the Vicariate does not defend the rights of anyone who it thinks, much less knows, was involved in terrorist acts. In the first six months of 1986 it found 39 cases of torture—defined as violence in places of detention with grave results—exerted to get information. It has 156 cases of unnecessary violence while detaining people in the streets.

It carries on its rolls 636 cases of disappearances but virtually all are in the 73-76 period and none since December, 1984. [On the 6th of August, the head of the National Intelligence Center (CNI), General Humberto Gordon, announced that a student leader who had disappeared four days before had been found dead and said he had been found on a beach—this sort of thing suggests a death under torture.] There was in this period no internal exiling (but the courts are using other methods, we learned elsewhere). There were 3,411 people detained, compared to 1,394 in the same period in 1985. There were 551 individual arrests, and 2,860 collective arrests, in the first six months of 1985. Those collectively arrested are usually released the same day or the next morning and almost always within 5 days. When the person is involved in terrorism, he can be held 20 days before being indicted.

Villalobos said that it had never been proved that there actually were private right-wing terrorist groups apart from the Government. The only time that such a group was identified concretely was when one member of such a group died from a bomb he was using himself, and he was a lieutenant in the intelligence forces of the Army.



Dr. Juan Luis Gonzalez Reyes

Villalobos emphasized, as did a human rights worker that evening, that the human rights data change by Government "will" and that the repressive structure is, of course, still in place. The Judicial branch is failing to fulfill its responsibility, Villalobos said, and so the people have no protection. Indeed, lawyers defending them are rather routinely countersued by the Government—as, for example, when a defense lawyer is accused of offending the honor of the Armed Forces by saying that the Army burned his client.

[Honor, in Latin America, is invoked as if the era of dueling were still with us. The Constitution contains a provision removing a citizen's citizenship for "crimes against the honor of the State." On July 29, Juan Pable Cardenas, director of Analisis, was arrested in connection with a criminal lawsuit for libeling Pinochet—the cover of his magazine had said "Pinochet Alone." On February 16, Fernando Paulsen, editor of Analisis was indicted for offending the police (Carabineros) for a cover story headlined "Murders."]

[Meanwhile, the Catholic Church and the Chilean Human Rights Commission have estimated that 160,000 people have left the country under the regime and 3,678 are formally exiled.]

Dr. Juan Luis Gonzalez Reyes: AAAS Award Winner

The President of the Medical College of Chile, Dr. Gonzalez, recently received the award of the American Association for the Advancement of Science for his work on human rights. Gonzalez was also President of the National Civic Assembly (ANC)—a group of social, trade union and labor opposition organizations practicing civil disobedience in support of democratization; it is supported by political parties on both the right and the left. [He has also been head of the Federation of Chilean Professional Associations.]

He, like Villalobos, had just emerged from jail—actually they had been in prison together, although on different charges. Gonzalez had been in jail for conspiracy against the Government and subversion. As President of the ANC, he had helped organize a July 2-3 general strike. He had been in jail for 40 days after his indictment and was out on \$250 bail. His lawyer would argue that Gonzalez had only conspired to organize the strike—not actually organized the strike—and Gonzalez would probably get a suspended sentence. [Gonzalez had said, publicly, at the time of the strike: "The success of this first day of strike gives us renewed strength for our peaceful struggle and for the civil disobedience of the dictatorship."] Dr. Gonzalez, an ear, nose and throat specialist, had just been re-elected President of the College for a second term by 75% of a medical society of 14,000 members.

Gonzalez had been working to prevent doctors from being involved in torture. Increasingly, they are being asked to monitor torture to ensure that it does not inadvertently kill the tortured. He was pleased to report that the Medical College had accumulated, with difficulty, enough information to expel four doctors. The torturers use chlor-

apromazine [a powerful tranquilizer] as a kind of truth serum, as well as electricity and psychological methods. Under these conditions, people tell everything they know and, often, much more fantastic, impossible, things.

That evening, a human rights specialist confirmed that, after 1976, the torturers became more professional and more interested in information and less liable to kill the person. Only a low percentage of those arrested are actually charged with anything.

[On Monday September 8, after the assassination attempt, the arrests included Dr. Pedro Castillo, who was President of a Chilean commission against the use of torture.]

The Secret Police and the Cuban Arms

On Friday afternoon, I was invited to join a briefing by the CNI leadership of a three-star American General, John L. Ballantyne, Chairman of the Inter-American Defense Board, who was going to be shown evidence of the enormous cache of arms which the Chileans had uncovered and which they said had been supplied by a Cuban trawler and transferred to Chile by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front—the military arm of the Communist Party.


The weapons were shown. They seemed to be drawn from about 200,000 American M-16 rifles that were lost in Vietnam when America withdrew. Ammunition has been specifically made for the M-16s in Eastern Europe. Serial numbers had been drilled out to help hide their identification but some had arabic symbols put on them. Later discussion with intelligence officers of the Chilean Army indicated that all evidence thus far implicated Cuba—but not the Soviet Union directly. One of the captured Front guerrillas had actually stood on the Cuban trawler during the transfer so there was no question about whose trawler it was.

Since the Front works for a party that has a headquarters in Moscow, one would expect that the Soviet Union would at least know about the operation.

Was the whole thing faked? It certainly did not seem so. The Chilean military was unmistakably pleased with itself and received the congratulations of General Ballantyne with blushing pleasure. Their admission that they had no direct evidence of Soviet involvement, and the amount of detail provided credibility. One strange aspect took place earlier when the Minister of Defense thanked the U.S. Government for its help, only to have the U.S. Embassy announce that no help had been provided. (Was the help at an intelligence level that was denied for that reason or was the thank-you given in an effort to provide false credibility?)

In any case, Castro, during his visit to Allende in Santiago in November, 1971, constantly emphasized that “no social system ever resigned itself to disappearing from the face of the earth of its own free will” and hinted that the workers should be armed. When the coup appeared imminent, he sent a message to Allende advising him:

“... don't ever forget the extraordinary strength of the Chilean working class and the firm support it has always



Captured weapons held at CNI Headquarters being examined by Inter-American Defense Board Chairman General Ballantyne (kneeling).

given you in difficult moments. In response to your call when the revolution is in danger, it can block those who are organizing a coup, maintain the support of the fence-sitters, impose its conditions and decide the fate of Chile once and for all if the need arises.”

The Chilean military was afraid that the weapons would be used in a kind of “Tet” offensive. Quickly distributed in Santiago and then used at once, they could give the impression that Chile was in flames and, while they could not defeat the Army, they might lead to the overthrow of Pinochet. A few M-16s were found around the city but the demonstration was, as shown above, quiet.

Fundamentals of Economic Situation Explained

An economist in an international organization based in Chile said that, during the lending boom in Latin America, the Brazilians used the monies well, the Mexicans used half of it well and the Chileans squandered it on consumption goods. But if these countries started growing again, they could even increase their indebtedness, since their ratio of public debt to Gross Domestic Product was below that of, for example, the U.S.

As to who was at fault, the Reagan Administration accused the Latin American countries of mismanagement, and the latter accused the former of inducing high inflation and high interest rates. Both accusations had some truth. The free enterprise (“Chicago School”) adopted by the Pinochet Government had not really been the major element of the Chilean difficulties.


LETELIER'S MURDER & THE CHILEAN SECRET SERVICE

The identification of Michael Townley as a suspect in the murder of Orlando Letelier led to the dismissal of the head of the Chilean secret service (DINA), its reorganization as the CNI, and a halt to the attacks on prominent Chileans exiles abroad. It was a watershed event in internal Chilean politics. It reveals a great deal about how Chile was operating in the 1970's and may provide important insights into how it is operating now. The book *Labyrinth* (Viking Press, 1982, by Taylor Branch and Eugene M. Propper), from which the remainder of this section is drawn, is a fascinating report by the prosecutor of the case (Propper).


According to this account, Townley was, although immature and naive, technically skillful with bomb materials and electronics, which skills he put to the service of a "white terror" group, *Patria y Libertad*, that was trying to overthrow Allende. During this period, besides making bombs for the group, he was even able to intercept radio messages between President Allende and his bodyguards.

Recruited into DINA when it was first formed after the successful coup, he turned out to be responsible, not only for Letelier's death, but also for the two other famous attacks on Chilean exiles—on Bernardo Leighton (former Vice President of Chile, wounded in Italy in 1975 by a group instigated by Townley) and on General Carlos Prats (killed by a bomb made by Townley in Argentina in 1974). Chilean officers who contacted Propper "maintained that President Pinochet approved the Prats murder in advance, at the instigation of DINA chief Manuel Contreras, and that this fratricidal act helped ensnarl the Chilean government in a web of blackmail and corruption that still plagues the armed forces".

General Contreras, a ruthless and shadowy figure, was trying to formalize and institutionalize an Operation Condor—a "nascent program of cooperation among the military intelligence services of some Latin countries for the brutal purpose of locating and eliminating one another's fugitive terrorists and exiled dissidents". At that time, DINA exercised "an electric power in Chile, similar to that of the Gestapo at the height of the Third Reich". Short, slightly paunchy, he was extremely well dressed.



Guards at President's palace



Quadrangle inside Catholic University

He boasted of having eliminated MIR and similar revolutionary left groups: "They were all penetrated or destroyed", he told an American official. But it was an axiom of General Contreras that the moderate reformers were "Kerenskys of Chile" and that the Marxists would follow, within seven years, any civilian rule that the centrist Christian Democrats might bring about.

He anticipated war with the leftist generals in control of Peru and, later, war with Argentina. Townley was charged with coming up with a secret weapon that could kill large masses of people in the border area near Peru and/or guard Argentine mountain passes; his response was to learn how to make the nerve gas Sarin. He even took a small perfume bottle of it to the U.S. to use as a possible assassination tool against Letelier although he well knew that if the bottle broke, everyone on the plane would die.

Contreras ordered Townley to arrange for anti-Castro Cubans to kill Letelier, but the Cubans wanted to be sure that the Chileans were implicated as well. As a consequence, a bomb was decided upon, and Townley was required to install his bomb under the Letelier car before leaving town—after which the Cuban exiles detonated it with radio signals.

Through enormously hard and skilled work by the FBI and the prosecutors, and much luck, suspicion centered on Townley who was an American employee of DINA in Santiago. The U.S. request to extradite Townley precipitated a major political scandal that forced Contreras' resignation—indeed his successor, General Odlanier Mena, said that Contreras had been fired by President Pinochet.

Townley was then expelled by Chile during a period so tense that rumors suggested General Contreras, theoretically out of power, might nevertheless send troops to rescue him; earlier Mena's men were looking for Townley while Contreras' men were helping him hide.

Although the U.S. Government was successful in getting Townley extradited, it did not have a strong enough case to convict him. By happenstance, the Cuban accomplices were arrested at just that time, and Townley was persuaded

ed, inaccurately as it turned out, that if he did not turn state's evidence with some kind of deal with the prosecutors, the Cubans might, and he would be left holding the bag.

Townley persuaded General Hector Orozco, the Chilean special military prosecutor, to fly to the United States to release him from his DINA secrecy oath. And then he agreed to a ten-year maximum sentence, told everything he knew, and testified against the Cubans. After serving two years, he received a new identity under a U.S. witness protection program. The Cubans received life sentences but a new trial was ordered on a technicality, and in the new trial, they were found not guilty.


On the Chilean side, the U.S. tried to extradite not only Contreras but Jose Fernandez, who had been sent originally with Townley on the Letelier mission and who turned out to be President Pinochet's own chief of telecommunications. Contreras sent his lawyers to the U.S. Embassy with a threat to reveal damaging information about the CIA and the United States. (According to Townley, Contreras had at least one bank account opened to receive funds from the CIA.) Bombs exploded in front of the homes of two Chilean judges assigned to decide on the extradition request, and finally, extradition was denied on October 1, 1979.

In the end, Townley had no remorse about Letelier, saying, "He was a soldier, and I was a soldier."

And President Pinochet, on June 22, 1978, during a diplomatic reception in his home, told American Ambassador Landau:

"You and your government can meddle in Chilean affairs and bring back political parties. Maybe you can. And if you do, you will cause another bloody revolution. People will die. You might be able to do that. You might be able to cause more grief to the people of Chile. But I am warning you that I will not allow it."

Pointing to the Chinese Ambassador across the room, he said: "Do you see him? Well, I can go to him. Believe me, Chile can turn to China. We are not married to the United States. I could even turn to the Soviet Union. They would help." Asked by Landau if this was serious, General Pinochet said: "Absolutely, I would do it to protect my country. The Soviet Union will always intervene against American interests. It is unfortunate that you Americans always fail to comprehend this."



Truck watering trees

MILITARY VIEWS

On March 7, retired General Roberto Viaux, a far right classmate of General Pinochet, who had sought an earlier coup, wrote him and said "I think you have fooled around long enough with the future of Chile and the prestige of the Armed Forces. . . . Abandon your powers for the benefit of Chile, while there is still time." In an interview, General Viaux said he thought the National Accord could be a source of unity between civilians and the Armed Forces and that "union brings strength."

On December 5, General Fernando Matthei, Air Force Commander-in-Chief, said that the Chilean people "will freely decide the political destiny of the country in 1989"; this was just a few hours before General Pinochet said that his administration would continue beyond 1989. However General Matthei said, on January 29, "There will be no dialogue behind Pinochet's back."

Admiral Jose Toribio Merino Castro, Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, who initiated the 1973 coup and pressed Pinochet to join in, is fond of saying "We came together and we will leave together."

This may be a reference to the fact that the third Junta member who participated in the coup, General Gustavo Leigh Guzman, was thrown out of his office by soldiers and forced to sign a resignation in 1976 at President Pinochet's orders. While this act confirmed Pinochet's absolute control, it forced him, at the same time, as a balancing maneuver, to construct a Council of State below the Junta which has some limited powers. General Leigh is now in political opposition.

Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal, Minister of Defense, told the graduating class at the National Academy for Political and Strategic Studies that "it is the ideas, not the individuals, that will project themselves beyond 1989."

There is considerable evidence, circumstantial and other, to believe that the highest Chilean officers would like to see President Pinochet step down so long as they could be protected by his successor from retribution for acts committed. But today they would rather "hang together" than "hang separately."

The journal Analisis said on November 12, 1985 that political circles had explained President Pinochet's alleged effort to place a political adviser, General Sinclair, in the position of Deputy Head of the Army as showing "the scarcity of Pinochet's unconditional generals is incredible." Analisis said it was a "well-known secret" that the Navy and Air Force have promised to support Pinochet until 1989 but prefer a change then; Pinochet's alleged plan is for a modification of the constitution to generate direct, open presidential elections in 1989. [On Monday, September 8, a day after the attempt on Pinochet's life, a journalist from this magazine, Jose Carrasco Tapia, was dragged from his home by armed men, during a curfew, and killed.]

SOME CONCLUSIONS

There appears to have been a large majority of Chileans that wanted the Armed Forces to overthrow the Government of Salvador Allende. But there appears to be an even larger majority that would like to see General Pinochet retire and be replaced through free elections.

Those who want violent overthrow of the Government cannot defeat the Army and probably never will. In any case, the Armed Forces do not need to be in control of the Government to protect Chilean society from the far left. There is therefore no reason for them to oppose free elections.

But the Government would be far better off if Pinochet would not run as a candidate in 1989 because his presence is encouraging the terrorism that he wants to put down. It is also holding Chile in international isolation, which undermines its security and hurts its prospects for economic aid.

Above all, a democratically elected Government could start to unravel the spiral of violence and help the country begin to pull itself together. The military effort to eradicate the terrorists has, obviously, failed. Its effort to reshape the face of Chilean democracy will, sooner or later, fail also. The Constitution gives far too little power to anyone but the President to be accepted by a society as democratic as that of Chile. So, eventually, the Constitution will have to be amended, and hence a viable process by which it can be amended will have to be found.

The most self-defeating aspect of the trap in which the Armed Forces have found themselves is the doctrine that precludes their discussing issues with the political opposition. This absence of dialogue creates a dangerous vacuum between the democratic forces that will eventually take over and the military who will have to, at some point, come to terms.

In Chile, persons holding revolutionary communist ideas and persons determined to eradicate those holding such ideas are locked in a struggle that is destroying the fabric of Chilean society and preparing the ground for ever more violence in the future. The Chilean military are redoubling their efforts as they lose sight of their goals. The society is now calm enough to be returned to civilian control, and the military should continue their efforts to defend Chilean society from the Defense Ministry. □

—Jeremy J. Stone

A Visit to the Poor

In the worst shanty-town, we got a briefing and a tour from the elected leader—the General Secretary of the encampment.

He said the worst things were the lack of running water, the lack of bathrooms and the muddy conditions in winter. People had only 18 square meters to live in, and when there had been 4,180 families, it was very difficult. The Government was trying to reduce the number, however, by developing other areas. It would put in roads and infrastructure and bathrooms and leave it to the owners to build their own houses. In this way, they had reduced the number in the encampment to 1,480. When 20 or so slots become available in some new development, the encampment meets and asks the residents who wants to live there and they democratically decide who should go. The WPA projects at \$25 per month are very unstable. As a leader, he is getting \$40, but it is still not enough. The crime situation has improved lately, and they do not get involved in demonstrations because they have problems of their own.

The overcrowding presents social problems, and the medical care comes from a student there who is studying to be a doctor and who knows first aid. We inspected a shack in which four people lived and saw the brutally simple conditions: two beds, with people lying in them drinking tea, a table and bureau and a stove attached to a power line. The shack had only one room, with corrugated roof that was just cardboard impregnated with oil—and that was borrowed, we were told, from someone else.

On the way back, we gave a lift to an asthmatic who was going to the doctor to try to get a new inhalant. He said they cost \$5, and when a fellow asthmatic gave him that amount, he burst into tears.



Shanty-town leader



Inside a shanty-town hut

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