

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

Volume 40, No. 5

May 1987

THE QUESTION GORBACHEV POSES: WHAT DO WE WANT?

The West is beginning now to see the necessity of taking Gorbachev seriously. And what he is saying would, if pursued, remake the Soviet Union, end the arms race and cold war and reshape international politics. A good part of this report records what he has been saying.

Americans have a reflex reaction to Russian statements: "Can we believe them?" Gorbachev's statements, however, often have an inherent credibility. When he criticizes the state of the Soviet economy, morale, or bureaucratic system, he is obviously not doing so to confuse the West. These are statements directed at his own system and they are unpopular with all those who have been trained to reject criticism of their society. (A number of U.S. experts on the Soviet Union doubt that Gorbachev can "last" more than a few years if he continues talking and acting as he is.)

When Gorbachev takes the initiative in calling for verification, he is committing himself and his system to responding favorably to overtures for intrusion inspection. Indeed, it is increasingly evident that inspection is going to cause problems not only for the East,

but also for the West. The Soviet Union has come to understand that a symmetrical agreement is possible on a workable basis.

When he admits there is "asymmetry" in the armed forces of the two sides and says "We are in favor of removing the disparity which arose in some elements but not through their increase by the side which stayed behind but by reducing their numbers on the side which has a superiority in them," he is committing himself to reductions in conventional arms from Eastern Europe.

Above all, it is unmistakably credible that Gorbachev wants arms control and detente as a precondition to his campaign to remold the Soviet Union. This is, therefore, the West's opportunity to reach the long-awaited post-war settlement.

Unfortunately, this possibility is so new and unexpected, and the cold war has been going on for so long, that no serious thinking has taken place in the West as to what acceptable terms might be for reconciliation with the Soviet Union. We have no idea what these might be. This is a problem on which we must all focus.



Gorbachev at the February, 1987 Moscow Forum. Third head to his left is former Ambassador Dobrynin. The fifth (partly obscured) is Academician E.P. Velikhov. (Picture courtesy of FAS Council Member, Thomas Cochran)

GORBACHEV ON SOVIET SHORTCOMINGS

Prior to Gorbachev, the Soviet Union was a society of maximum pretention. Now a Soviet leader tells his society "criticism is a bitter pill, but illness makes it an essential one."

He warns them that "to throttle criticism is tantamount to putting a halt to forward movement and to harming restructuring."

He admits that "... at some point the country began to lose momentum, difficulties and unresolved problems started to pile up, and there appeared elements of stagnation . . ."

He complains about "a conservative outlook, inertia, a tendency to brush aside all that did not fit into conventional patterns."

He talks of day-to-day practical activity being "supplanted with decree-making, a show of efficiency and mountains of paperwork."

He refers to "large, unjustified bonuses and fringe benefits," to "figure-padding for profit" and to "parasitic sentiments" and the "mentality of wage leveling." All of this, he said, "hit those workers who could and wanted to work better, while making life easier for the lazy ones."

He tells them of "disregard for laws, report-padding, bribe-taking and encouragement of toadyism and adulation" which had a "deleterious effect on the moral atmosphere in society."

Real concern for people was supplanted by "political flirtation—the mass distribution of awards, titles and prizes."

He attacks the party membership by saying that in many years there was "no strong barrier put up to stop dishonest, pushing, self-seeking people who were intent on benefitting from their Party membership."

Thus a society which was forever boasting about having already created a "new Soviet man" is now being told that it cannot hope to succeed economically "without decisively changing public consciousness and remolding mentality, thinking and moods."

—JJS

WHAT IS RESTRUCTURING?

"The final aim of restructuring is to insure a better life for Soviet people, to introduce higher types of social organization and justice.

The main paths of progress in this direction have been fixed. It is the development of all forms of representative and direct democracy, a universal extension of autonomy, increase in the role of work teams, soviet and social organizations, consolidation of the legal and economic guarantees of the rights of a person, legality, public information and people's control."

—Mikhail S. Gorbachev in Prague, April 10, 1987

FAS

Chairman: MATTHEW S. MESELSON
Vice Chairman: ANDREW M. SESSLER
Secretary: GEORGE A. SILVER
Treasurer: ROBERT M. SOLOW
Director: JEREMY J. STONE

The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 24 members. FAS was first organized in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than forty years.

SPONSORS

*Philip W. Anderson (Physics) *William N. Lipscomb (Chemistry)
*Christian B. Anfinsen (Biochemistry) *S.E. Luria (Biology)
*Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics) Roy Meninger (Psychiatry)
*Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry) Robert Merton (Sociology)
*David Baltimore (Biochemistry) Matthew S. Meselson (Biochemistry)
Leona Baumgartner (Pub. Health) Neal E. Miller (Psychology)
Paul Beeson (Medicine) Philip Morrison (Physics)
Lipman Bers (Mathematics) *Daniel Nathans (Biochemistry)
*Hans A. Bethe (Physics) Frankin A. Neva (Medicine)
*Konrad Bloch (Chemistry) *Marshall Nirenberg (Biochemistry)
*Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat) Robert N. Noyce (Indus. Exec.)
Anne Pitts Carter (Economics) *Severo Ochoa (Biochemistry)
*Owen Chamberlain (Physics) Charles E. Osgood (Psychology)
Abram Chayes (Law) *Lino Pauling (Chemistry)
Morris Cohen (Engineering) *Arno A. Penzias (Astronomy)
Mildred Cohn (Biochemistry) Gerard Piel (Sci Publisher)
*Leon N. Cooper (Physics) Charles C. Price (Chemistry)
Paul B. Corneley (Medicine) Mark Ptashne (Molecular Biology)
*Andre Cournand (Medicine) *Edward M. Purcell (Physics)
Carl Dierassi (Organic Chem.) George Rathjens (Political Science)
*Renato Dulbecco (Microbiology) *Burton Richter (Physics)
John T. Edsall (Biology) David Riesman, Jr. (Sociology)
Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology) Walter Orr Roberts (Solar Astron.)
*Val L. Fitch (Physics) *J. Robert Schrieffer (Physics)
Jerome D. Frank (Psychology) *Julian Schwinger (Physics)
John Kenneth Galbraith (Economics) *Glenn T. Seaborg (Chemistry)
Richard L. Garwin (Physics) Stanley K. Sheinbaum (Economics)
*Walter Gilbert (Biochemistry) *Herbert A. Simon (Psychology)
Edward L. Ginzton (Engineering) Alice Kimball Smith (History)
*Donald Glaser (Physics-Biology) Cyril S. Smith (Metallurgy)
*Sheldon L. Glashow (Physics) *Henry Taube (Chemistry)
Marvin L. Goldberger (Physics) *Howard M. Temin (Microbiology)
Walter W. Heller (Economics) *James Tobin (Economics)
*Dudley Robert Herschbach (Chemical Physics) *Charles H. Townes (Physics)
*Alfred D. Hershey (Biology) Frank von Hippel (Physics)
*George Wald (Biology)
John P. Holdren (Energy/Arms Con.) Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)
*Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry) Victor F. Weisskopf (Physics)
Carl Kaysen (Economics) Jerome B. Wiesner (Engineering)
*H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry) Robert R. Wilson (Physics)
*Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry) C.S. Wu (Physics)
*Polykarp Kusch (Physics) Alfred Yankauer (Medicine)
*Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics) Herbert F. York (Physics)
*Wassily W. Leontief (Economics)

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

Bruce Blair (Policy Analysis) Barbara G. Levi (Physics)
Rosemary Chalk (Pol. Science) Francis E. Low (Physics)
Thomas B. Cochran (Physics) Jessica Tuchman Mathews (Biochemistry)
E. William Colglazier (Physics) Christopher E. Paine (Def. Policy)
Hugh E. DeWitt (Physics) Victor Rabinowitch (World Dev.)
John Harte (Energy) Arthur H. Rosenfeld (Physics)
William A. Higinbotham (Physics) Carl E. Sagan (Astronomy)
Gerald Holton (Physics) Andrew M. Sessler (Physics)
Jerry F. Hough (Pol. Science) George Stanford (Physics)
Robert W. Kates (Geography) Lynn Sykes (Geophysics)
Carl Kaysen (Economics) Archie L. Wood (Defense Policy)
Henry C. Kelly (Technology Policy)

Ex Officio: John P. Holdren, Frank von Hippel

*Nobel Laureate

FAS FUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501 (c)(3) tax-deductible research and education arm of FAS.

| | |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Frank von Hippel, Chairman | Stanley K. Sheinbaum |
| Moshe Alafi | Jeremy J. Stone (ex officio) |
| David Armstrong | Martin Stone |
| David Baltimore | Martin S. Thaler |
| Proctor W. Houghton | Alan M. Thorndike |
| Matthew S. Meselson (ex officio) | Herbert F. York |
| Rosalyn R. Schwartz | |

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1986 by the Federation of American Scientists.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FAS, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

WHAT IS GORBACHEV ACTUALLY SAYING?

General-Secretary Gorbachev has, if nothing else, produced a kind of schizophrenia among American editorial writers.

On April 3, for example, a *New York Times* editorial entitled "Amazing Energy From Russia" asserted how "exciting" Gorbachev has made his country. It talked of new publishing reforms that give Russian newspaper editors the right to decide to print readable speeches, and new hopes among dissidents and refuseniks.

Meanwhile, a *Washington Post* editorial writer was emphasizing that Gorbachev was a "Leninist still" and that there was "not a democratic bone visible in Gorbachev's body."

The *Post* is certainly wrong. Mikhail Gorbachev is waging a real struggle to permit elections in which there is more than one candidate and reasonable access to the nominating process. And this is the essence of that representative democracy of which we are forever, and rightfully, boasting. In his February 15 speech to the media, he urged socialist democracy:

"The main idea of the January plenum, from the point of view of resolving all our problems, is the development of democracy: to develop democracy in the economy, in politics and in the party itself, but on a socialist basis."

In Latvia, he encouraged a proposal that the new approaches to elections be tried out "not just in one town or rural soviet" but on a Latvian Republic basis.

An Elected Central Committee?

He definitely has in mind not only local elections but said there is a "need to think" of amending the procedure for electing secretaries of district, area, city, regional and territorial party committees and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics. He said that the Politburo felt that "future democratization should apply to the formation of the central leading bodies of the Party," i.e., to the Central Committee itself. In April, the Soviet Government announced that a choice of candidates would be offered on a trial basis in local governmental elections in June.

THIS SURE SOUNDS PROMISING

"... our foreign policy today stems directly from our domestic policy to a larger extent than ever before. We say honestly for all to hear: we need a lasting peace to concentrate on the development of our society and to tackle the tasks of improving the lives of the Soviet people."

—March 30, 1987 speech to Margaret Thatcher,
Prime Minister of Great Britain

"... (we) are prepared for a decisive scaling down of the military confrontation of the two blocs in a zone stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals."

—March 30, 1987 speech to Mrs. Thatcher

And why does he want this? Normally, one would consider it politically counterproductive and dangerous to encourage democracy, i.e., people speaking up and participating, while trying to work major changes in that society. Previous Russian leaders just announced what it was they wanted done—and it was hard enough then to get changes made.

One major motivation is that his efforts to restructure the Soviet economy and get it moving again require democracy and the attendant liberation of popular energies.

"If we are to put restructuring properly in motion, if this is not to turn into a campaign and fizzle out in a couple of years, or even sooner, we must do what matters: involve the people who play the main role in restructuring . . . It is the people who know everything. The people, therefore, can see in time all that hinders restructuring and is threatening our new policy . . . There is no other way than to open all doors for the broad democratization of all spheres of the life of Soviet society. That, comrades, is the whole political design." Or again:

Boosting Popular Initiative

"We will be able to boost people's initiative and creativity effectively if our democratic institutions have a strong and real influence on the state of things . . ."

All this would seem to qualify Gorbachev as having a "democratic bone" in his body.

It is true that a main emphasis in his arguments turns on the economic efficiency of democracy. But he does not ignore the spiritual and intellectual element. He asserts that "a house can be put in order only by a person who feels that he owns this house." And he quotes Lenin's, "stand on the question of the maximum democracy of the socialist system under which people feel that they are their own masters and creators."

Needless to say, there is some emphasis here on "feel" and on "maximum" and on not overturning the socialist system—which would, of course, read Gorbachev out of the system he is trying to control. But this is still a major advance for a Soviet people whose constituent elements were ruled by kings rather than constitutions.

Here is Gorbachev explaining democracy to people that have never had it: "We think that electiveness, far from undermining, enhances the authority of the leader." Here is Gorbachev explaining:

"Socialist democracy has nothing in common with permissiveness, irresponsibility, and anarchy. Real democracy serves every person. It protects his political and social rights and simultaneously serves every collective and the whole of society, upholding their interests."

He went on to say that democratization was needed "to ensure that legality grows stronger, that justice triumphs in our society and that a moral atmosphere in which man can freely live and fruitfully work is asserted in it."

This man who was said not to have a democratic bone in his body actually told his Central Committee that "We need democracy like air."
—Jeremy J. Stone

MEDVEDEV "ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY"

What does General Secretary Gorbachev mean when he refers to "socialist democracy?" No better reference exists than Roy Medvedev's On Socialist Democracy, (Knopf Publishers, 1975) which, reread in the light of the General Secretary's speeches excerpted in this newsletter, shows an astonishing parallelism.

Roy Medvedev, a dissident author in Moscow, joined the Communist Party in 1956 after the denunciation of Stalin. When he completed his book on Stalin in 1968, however, it was too advanced for the period; it has never been published in the Soviet Union. He was thrown out of the Party for protesting the publication of a pro-Stalin article. Roy Medvedev is the twin brother of London-based biologist, Zhores Medvedev.

Medvedev Saw the Need for Reform

"An enormous contradiction now exists in our society: rapid scientific, technical and economic progress is being blocked by an excessively centralized bureaucratic system. The structure is too unwieldy even to formulate the right questions at the right time, leaving extremely important problems with no solution."

As does Gorbachev, he saw that the "chief problem underlying everything else is the extremely complicated one of how to bring about a far-reaching democratization of our social and political life."

Was This Possible in a Marxist and Leninist Context?

"It is absolutely not true that Marxism and socialism are incompatible with democracy. Yet we must acknowledge that the works of neither Marx and Engels nor Lenin adequately deal with the complex problems involved. Thus there is a real gap in our theory which should be filled as rapidly as possible."

From a theoretical point of view, the first problem is that Lenin, at least in his revolutionary capacity, was not in favor of democracy. He once wrote, ". . . to demand from the proletariat that in the final life-and-death struggle with capital they piously observe the rules of political democracy . . . is the same as asking a man defending his life against a group of thugs that he observe the artificial and conventional rules of wrestling established but not observed by his enemies."

But Lenin also wrote that, "The victory of socialism is impossible without the realization of democracy."

As both Gorbachev and Medvedev are acutely aware, their audience is, as Medvedev put it, "accustomed to speak about bourgeois democracy with disdain as something incomplete, illusory, false, designed for effect, etc." Soviet agitprop has, over the years of counterattacking the attractive aspects of Western democracy, tended to smear the notion.

Medvedev's solution is a new Soviet man. Because technology requires people to be "as well educated and informed as possible," he argues, the "fully developed individual has become the most important condition for an all-round material advance."

His list of what his "party-democrats" would want is startlingly close to what Gorbachev has called for—even in degree: he calls for "censorship to be replaced by a more flexible form of party supervision over the printed word," "worker's self-management," an "element of contest" in the procedure for elections to the Soviets; "firmer adherence to the basic principles of peaceful coexistence," a "determined struggle against bureaucracy" and a long list of greater freedoms such as, speech, press, assembly, science, scholarship, the arts, and dissidents.

In 1973, Medvedev said such Party-democrats were "at present" almost completely unrepresented at the highest organs of the party but that they had the potential of very widespread support in the seventies. He seems only to have been ten years off.

—JJS

SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY—A LA MEDVEDEV

"Socialist democracy is simultaneously a goal and a means. Democracy is essential as a value in itself. To be able to express one's thoughts and convictions freely without fear of persecution or repression is a vital aspect of a free socialist way of life. Without freedom to receive and impart information, without freedom of movement and residence, without freedom of creativity in science and the arts, and without many other democratic freedoms, a true socialist society is impossible. Democracy—with all government activity open to public scrutiny as its most important element—is also necessary as a means of ridding our society of bureaucracy and corruption. It offers firm protection against a relapse into arbitrary lawlessness. As we read in the samizdat article, it is only democratization that:

'can restore dynamism and creativity to our ideological life (the social sciences, art, and propaganda) by putting an end to the bureaucratic, ritualistic, dogmatic, hypocritical and vapid style at present so widespread. A policy of democratization will eliminate the gap between the party-state apparatus and the intelligentsia, and mutual misunderstanding will give way to close cooperation. Democratization will evoke a surge of enthusiasm comparable to that of the twenties. The best intellectual ability of the country will be mobilized to solve its economic and social problems.' "

—On Socialist Democracy

INF AGREEMENT: WHAT PRICE VERIFICATION?

The U.S. draft INF treaty, recently tabled in Geneva, lays out verification provisions that would be by far the most intrusive in arms control history. While the Soviets have agreed, in principle, to on-site verification, it remains questionable whether they will agree to the full range of procedures U.S. officials have in mind. Yet, given the stance that the Reagan Administration has taken previously on Soviet noncompliance and verification, it will be willing to back down on very few of its demands.

In addition, many in the Administration see negotiations over INF as a prelude to impending battles with the Soviets over verification of any limits on strategic offensive and defensive forces. They are reluctant to make any concessions on INF that might carry over to these other forums and anxious to set a precedent of as intrusive a verification regime as possible.

The basic elements of the U.S. verification package include:

- 1) Non-interference with national technical means of verification, including a ban on missile test encryption;
- 2) Designated deployment and operating areas for the 100 remaining INF warheads and their associated equipment;
- 3) A comprehensive exchange of data on treaty-related systems;
- 4) Specialized procedures, including on-site inspection for monitoring the dismantling and destruction of INF systems and, subsequently, to ensure continued compliance with treaty limits.

These procedures would include: the "permanent monitoring of certain critical U.S. and Soviet facilities for the production, final assembly, repair and storage of treaty-limited systems; short-notice inspections of other 'declared' U.S. and Soviet facilities; and provisions for other short-notice inspections at U.S. and Soviet facilities in the event of compliance concerns."

Some less intrusive measures being proposed, such as extensive data exchanges, can facilitate verification beyond National Technical Means and build synergism with our other monitoring mechanisms. For example, in deciding whether to provide the U.S. with false or inadequate data on where various components of the SS-20 are produced, the Soviet Union would have to consider that it could never really be certain what information the U.S. had or didn't have about SS-20 production.

But the most intrusive measures being discussed may generate false confidence and still be inadequate. Because our ability to verify numbers of SS-20s already produced is far from precise, the U.S. could send many inspectors to search for hidden stockpiles and still not be certain that it had found all possible hiding places. SRINF systems would be even more difficult because our knowledge of SS-12 and SS-23 production is less complete.

THE INF AGREEMENT: A SWEETHEART DEAL

At Reykjavik: Soviets agree to dismantle 800% more intermediate-range missile warheads than the U.S. while permitting the British and French to retain their intermediate-range missiles.

U.S.: 108 Pershing II & 208 ground-launched cruise missiles = 316 warheads.

USSR: 1224 SS-20 warheads and reloads + 112 SS-4 warheads = 2,560 warheads.

At Moscow: Pressed about the shorter (medium) range SS-12 and SS-23 missiles, the Soviets agree to remove all 140 from Eastern Europe and Western USSR even though the U.S. has nothing in this and would be required to do nothing in return.

Some on-site inspections—during the destruction of missiles and launchers, for example—may be necessary to increase confidence in monitoring compliance. But before the U.S. presses for on-site inspections of missile production and short-notice visits to suspicious facilities, it should also consider the possible consequences if Soviet inspectors are permitted access to "suspect" U.S. and NATO production facilities.

For example, the U.S. is initiating production of the highly secret Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM). The Soviets might demand periodic visits to facilities they claimed to suspect of clandestine GLCM production but which were actually producing ACMs. In fact, the ACM is manufactured by the same company, General Dynamics, that makes the GLCM, and reportedly in the same general location.

An objective assessment of verification requirements must take into account the relative benefits and risks associated with any proposed provision. For even if all Soviet INF missiles were to suddenly reappear within a single day—a complete and impossible failure of U.S. monitoring capabilities—the overall strategic balance would not be affected. We would still retain thousands of nuclear weapons with which to deter the Soviets.

In answering the question "How much verification is enough?" we must realize that there is a price to be paid for demanding more and more intrusive verification measures from the Soviets, in that we must then agree to closer inspection of ourselves.

Unreasonable criteria have been proposed that may be detrimental to our own security interests and will undoubtedly be used by some to obstruct an agreement. Ultimately, verification could be the weight that brings the whole house of cards tumbling down. —Thomas K. Longstreth

WITHIN AMBIVALENT CONGRESS: ASSERTIVE HOUSE, RELUCTANT SENATE

Senator J.W. Fulbright once observed "that it has not been a lack of available power which has undermined Congressional authority in foreign affairs but a lack of willingness to assert authority, make decisions, and accept responsibility for their consequences." This has certainly been the case with regard to Congressional influence in arms control during most of the Reagan Administration. While a few members of Congress have struggled to preserve arms control over the last six years, Congress as a whole has largely accepted Presidential rhetoric about a commitment to arms control.

Last August, however, the House began to show signs that it would no longer sit idly by and watch while the President scrapped treaties, refused to even discuss Soviet initiatives, and threatened to undermine the basis of deterrence which has existed for the last fifteen years. In one week, it took the unprecedented step of passing all five major arms control amendments to the Defense Authorization Bill. Under intense pressure from the President on the eve of his Reykjavik meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, the House leadership subsequently agreed to his request that it drop these amendments from the bill so as not to "tie his hands" in Iceland.

Action in the House

Having seen what the President did at Reykjavik with his hands "untied," this year the House seems to be picking up where it left off in August, attempting to reassert the authority to which Senator Fulbright referred. With the help of a firmly committed leadership, it recently passed an appropriations bill which includes the provisions on SALT II and nuclear testing that were dropped just before Reykjavik. In a historic vote last month, the House Armed Services Committee approved an amendment to the FY88 Defense Authorization Bill requiring the Administration to adhere to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. When the bill comes to the floor, amendments are likely to be offered which would reduce SDI funding and continue the moratorium on ASAT testing.

In order to refute Senator Fulbright's claim, however, House members will have to overcome their inherent tendency to defer to the President whenever there is the possibility of an upcoming summit. They will have to recognize that Congress must put pressure on President Reagan if there is to be any hope of arms control progress involving more than just INF. Even those within the Administration understand the effect that Congress can have: the *New York Times* has reported that "some Administration officials believe the negotiation of new testing limits could be a way to fend off Congressional critics."

Nevertheless, even if the House is able to stand up to the President, it appears that the Senate will continue to play the role of "Patsy Senate." In a little-noted speech on the Senate floor last October, Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR) pleaded with his Democratic colleagues, "You are the loyal opposition. Take a stand. The real issue is whether

we are going to turn this nuclear juggernaut back." Yet despite the Democrats having assumed control of the Senate, they have not answered Senator Hatfield's call.

With the exception of long-time arms control advocates, Senate members still seem reluctant to follow the lead of their counterparts in the House. Rather than trying to pass binding arms control legislation, the Senate prefers to spend its time on non-controversial resolutions expressing "full support for the commitment by the President to achieve . . . nuclear arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union." In spite of the outrageousness of the Administration's attempt to redefine the ABM Treaty, there is talk in the Senate of providing more SDI funding than would otherwise be the case in exchange for a commitment by the President to adhere to the traditional interpretation of the treaty. In the final analysis, it appears that the Senate is still afraid of the President when it comes to arms control.

Why the Reluctance?

Why is there so much reluctance in Congress to oppose President Reagan? Obviously, Republican members recognize that they depend on many of the same voters who elected the President and cannot run the risk of alienating this constituency. As for the Democrats, they have always feared the power which the President's popularity gives him to take his case to the American people. He can simply blame the Democrats for undermining his negotiating ability and endangering U.S. security.

This goes to the heart of Senator Fulbright's lament and is as old as party politics. Members of the party which does not occupy the White House, be they Democrats or Republicans, realize that if they support the President and he is successful, he will get the credit; if they oppose him and he fails, they will be the scapegoats. They therefore take a position somewhere in between. They oppose him only to the point at which they must accept some responsibility. After all, with the next election always right around the corner, responsibility is a frightening concept. —Bradley M. Cohen



Senator Mark Hatfield (R-OR)

PREVENTING A PAKISTANI-INDIAN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: HALTING PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS-USABLE MATERIAL

Pakistan has, or will soon have, all the components including weapon-grade uranium, to make a nuclear device. In reaction, India is considering whether it should build a nuclear arsenal. Both countries appear unwilling to agree not to build nuclear weapons, making a nuclear arms race in South Asia seem almost inevitable.

The United States, however, could help prevent this arms race by convincing both countries to stop producing weapons-usable material. Even if production was halted for only a few years, India and Pakistan would have additional time to settle their major political differences without the fear that a military crisis could propel them into rapidly deploying nuclear arsenals, sparking a permanent nuclear confrontation in South Asia.

Present US Attempts are Failing

Current attempts by the United States to stop Pakistan from building nuclear weapons have been crippled by conflicting U.S. policy objectives in the region. Both the Reagan Administration and Congress place a high premium on Pakistan's willingness to provide sanctuary and support for the "mujahedin" in its struggle to drive Soviet forces from Afghanistan.


To help secure Pakistan's support, the United States awarded the Zia government \$3.2 billion in military and economic assistance in 1981. Passage of this aid package required the waiver of the Glenn-Symington amendment which had earlier triggered a cut-off in U.S. aid because Pakistan had received unsafeguarded nuclear enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology. This waiver ends in September, and the Reagan Administration has asked Congress to renew it for another six years and to supply Pakistan with an additional \$4 billion in aid.

Although the waiver includes a provision that requires a cutoff of aid if the United States determines that Pakistan possesses a nuclear device, it does not specify when weapons components become a device. One Congressional aide stated that as long as Pakistan does not bolt something together, the United States will not do anything.

The Reagan Administration and several members of Congress are worried that an aid cutoff could cause Pakistan to start nuclear weapons production. This might happen if U.S. policy singles out Pakistan without including India.

Pakistan has stated that it would renounce the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons and accept bilateral inspections of its nuclear facilities, if India would do likewise. Although Prime Minister Gandhi has repeatedly stated that India does not want to manufacture nuclear weapons, India has largely ignored Pakistan's offers.

The United States therefore has an opportunity to work with both countries to find a way to head off an arms race. However, it will have to act quickly. India, at great cost,



Pakistan might use U.S.-supplied F16s to deliver nuclear weapons.

has been stockpiling separated plutonium free of any international controls and inspection. Pakistan has produced weapon-grade uranium in violation of its 1984 pledge to President Reagan not to enrich uranium over five percent. A recent analysis by this author demonstrates that the Kahuta enrichment plant, near Islamabad, can be operated in a manner that will permit production of enough weapon-grade uranium for one or two nuclear weapons per year. Once both countries have built up large stockpiles of weapon-usable material, acquiring the ability to construct a nuclear arsenal rapidly, the chances of getting both sides to agree on limitations would be greatly diminished.

Therefore, U.S. policy should seek an immediate moratorium on the further production of weapons-usable material in India and Pakistan. This agreement could be adequately verified by on-site inspections, preferably by the International Atomic Energy Agency.


To make this proposal more attractive, the United States should offer both countries additional aid if they stop production. In case they refuse, the United States should be prepared to cut off aid, and in the case of India, halt the transfer of U.S. high-technology items, such as supercomputers or advanced jet engines which India recently negotiated to buy from the United States.

US-USSR Cooperation needed in Region

Stopping a nuclear arms race in South Asia is also of great importance to the Soviet Union. By working together, the US and USSR could more even-handedly discourage India and Pakistan from embarking on a course of action that once started is difficult to reverse, as the United States and Soviet Union know all too well.

—David Albright

FAS STAFF PORTRAIT



The Federation of American Scientists, founded in 1945, was without full-time paid staff between 1948 and 1970 when it doubled the dues (to a majestic \$15) and hired a full-time director (Stone).

Now in 1987, the group portrait shows 14 staff members, one consultant and two officials in residence filling out three adjoining, FAS-owned townhouses on Capitol Hill. And few if any similar groups have accumulated a stronger and more committed group of researchers.

First row, (from left to right):

Mark O'Gorman, Research Assistant, working on space issues; *Tom Stefanick*, Specialist on Navy issues; *Jeremy J. Stone*, Director; *David Albright*, Specialist on non-proliferation, fissionable material, and radiation effects; *Bonnie Ram*, the Bernard Schwartz Fellow in Energy and Environment; *Brad Cohen*, Legislative Liaison.

Second row (from left to right):

Cely Arndt, Special Assistant to the Director; *Edward (Ned) Hodgman*, Staff Associate, working on a pamphlet designed to advance congressional visits to the Soviet Union; *John E. Pike*, Associate Director for

Space Policy; *Frank von Hippel*, Chairman of the FAS Fund, Princeton University Professor in residence at FAS, a substantial fraction of time; *Thomas Longstreth*, Senior Defense Analyst, formerly Military Legislative Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, working on issues involving offensive and defensive strategic weapons; *Christopher E. Paine*, FAS Council Member and consultant, in residence part-time and working on issues of comprehensive nuclear test ban; *Daniel Charles*, author of the recently published book, *Nuclear Planning in Nato: Pitfalls of First Use*.

Back Row, (from left to right):

Jane Wright, Administrative Assistant; *Eleanor Jensen*, Bookkeeper; *Bonnie Frederick*, Administrative Assistant; *Martha Fell*, Research Assistant.

Absent: *Theodore B. Taylor*, Consultant, formerly a designer of atomic weapons, Dr. Taylor is working with FAS in support of a threshold test ban treaty.

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300

307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

Return Postage Guaranteed

May, 1987, Volume 40, No. 5

Second Class Postage
Paid at
Washington, D.C.

- I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1987.
 I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.
 Enclosed is my check for 1987 calendar year dues.

\$25 Member \$75 Supporting \$150 Patron \$1000 Life \$12.50 Student/Retired

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:

FAS Public Interest Report—\$25 for calendar year.

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____
Zip

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE _____