

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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## ARMS CONTROL IN EXILE: CARTER AND FORD CONVENE

It was like a reunion of two mafia families whose differences had palled in relation to their joint problems with the Feds.

President Carter's team in arms control was joined with President Ford's team in a gala week of formulating arms control positions. Hosted by the Carter Center of Emory University, where President Carter now functions in Atlanta, the "Consultation on International Security & Arms Control" featured some very prominent former officials and a good many present ones.

Besides the two Presidents, there were three Secretaries of State (Rusk, Kissinger and Vance), three National Security Advisors (Bundy, Scowcroft, and Brzezinski), two Secretaries of Defense (Schlesinger and Brown), a former Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), two former Directors of DOD's Defense Research and Engineering, and on and on.

There were key sitting Senators (Stevens, Nunn, and Gore) and key Congressmen (Downey and Dicks).

### Distinguished Soviet Delegation

The Soviet Union had sent Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin with a distinguished delegation from Moscow headed by the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Vice President E.P. Velikhov. The Chinese sent their Ambassador for

Disarmament Qian Jia-dong.


To defend itself, the Administration sent Secretary of the Navy John Lehman and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane.

The Consultation was the end of a long process which had included preliminary meetings at Emory and at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Michigan. The bipartisan character of these independent forays into policy research was apparently begun on a long flight to the funeral of President Sadat. On this flight, while President Nixon was closeted talking to former aide Alexander Haig, the two other former U.S. Presidents got to know each other and later began working together.

It was interesting to watch the first of two days of summary. When John Lehman, in a characteristically wiseacre comment, savaged a report presented by Brent Scowcroft, President Ford lashed out at him, calling him either "misinformed" or a "liar" and ticking off a number of relevant facts. Meanwhile President Carter was alertly drawing from various speeches certain actionable items, as a good negotiator would.

Henry Kissinger is still saying, as he did to this observer 23 years ago, that anti-ballistic missile defenses cannot be

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*President Ford & President Carter*

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both "ineffective and destabilizing." (In between, in 1972, he negotiated the ABM Treaty for reasons he apparently has forgotten. See page 8 for a response to his position.) Richard Garwin responded that anyone could discover how a weapon could be ineffective and destabilizing by buying an artificial pistol in a dime store and pointing it at a security guard!

Kissinger felt that the arms control community was "out of ideas" except for symbolic agreements and that any agreements had to be joined with political measures and "quiet political dialogue."

Japanese representative Kinya Niiseki, of the Japan Institute of International Relations, called for a "step-by-step" reduction in the 150-kiloton threshold test ban treaty to prevent "discontent among developing countries from reaching a dangerous point."

### The Chinese View

China's Ambassador Qian said that China was reviewing its position on the limited test ban treaty and might sign it. He expressed the "wish that the strained relations between the two superpowers be improved" and then listed three recommendations: no-first-use, a freeze on intermediate range weapons, and no outer space weapons. (A seat-mate in the audience mumbled: "All Soviet proposals.") Qian said that "rivalries and superpower politics are at the root of regional conflict"; even when the crises are indigenous in origin, the "meddling of superpowers makes them worse."

Ambassador Dobrynin said that "we are ready" for a comprehensive test ban but that the State Department had repeatedly refused to reopen the negotiations. He said it was "our impression that the U.S. is not willing to negotiate anything specific at Geneva." The Soviet Union considered the possibility of improving relations as practical, realistic and desirable" but the U.S. was living in a "two-dimensional world of black and white."

Kissinger decried the "constant stigmatization of (nuclear) weapons on which our security depends" and said that SDI should be given prayerful consideration."

Over a subsequent lunch, seated with former California Governor Jerry Brown, it became evident that he is still enamored with space. (The space enthusiasts seem to believe that there are limits to growth everywhere—and free lunches nowhere—except in space.)

### Lehman Attacks Arms Control

Lehman said that "arms control had not significantly improved the security of the country," that Star Wars was "far more satisfying ideologically and morally," and that a "little bit of Strategic Defense Initiative would go a long way." He regretted the notion that the Soviets would build more missiles in response to our defenses because it "doesn't make common sense." (Why then, one wonders, are we totally prepared and committed to do just that?)

Harold Brown said that arms control was a "sacrament—an outward sign of an inward grace"—and that participation in it had important political and symbolic consequences.

Richard Garwin talked of a possible agreement to 1,000 warheads on a side (about 400 on ICBMs, 400 on 40 sub-

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marines and 200 air-launched cruise missiles) which might be achieved in 1995. And he contrasted the positions of Nitze (that we should only deploy Star Wars if it was effective) and Weinberger (that Star Wars was the "centerpiece of our strategy") to show the Administration disarray.

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, said that the military "didn't think either side could get a first-strike capability" and that people at both ends of the political spectrum "expect too much from arms control." He felt the "process was as valuable as the results" and he advocated a "good dialogue between military officers" which he thought would be especially useful on verification and inspection. (59 Senators have signed a letter, sponsored by Senators Carl Levin and Sam Nunn, in favor of such exchanges, but this appears to be the first time that high-ranking military officers have openly endorsed the idea.)

#### **Perry Analyzes Star Wars**

William Perry, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering in the Defense Department, said of the Strategic Defense Initiative that its technological pieces could all be "achieved separately" but that, together, they would not provide "assured survivability." One reason was that technology was a "two-edged sword" and that technological advances such as x-ray lasers could be useful for anti-anti-missile systems as well as anti-missile systems.

Perry summarized by saying: "With great certainty, we will make major advances. It is possible that these advances could be made into a defensive system beyond what we expect now. It is also possible that the defense systems could be used to enhance deterrence. But it is beyond possibility to achieve assured survivability." In answer to questions, he said it would cost "hundreds of billions of dollars."

#### **President Ford Opposed Star Wars**

President Ford called SDI the same kind of mistake as the Maginot line and, while approving research, felt it was unwise to "put all our eggs in the defense package."

Academician Velikhov said that the summary prepared for the conference by Scowcroft was "exact and comprehensive" and that a consensus existed that "war-fighting was unworkable." He added that ignorance about nuclear war was such that we had a choice of having "people without knowledge or knowledge about nuclear war but no people." The likely result of Star Wars research, he felt, would be anti-space weapons but not an effective anti-ballistic missile system.

He said the trouble with the SDI program was that, even though it did not violate the ABM treaty in its initial phases, it made it possible for this violation to be carried out quickly. He compared it to Hitler putting his troops on the Soviet border in 1941. There was no violation of the border but the violation came later in one night.

So this was the flavor. It is evident that Presidents Carter and Ford can convene any arms control community they wish. Nothing like this galaxy of stars has ever been convened before. While the background papers themselves may not have broken new ground, the discussions in and around the conference were certainly important. □

## **FAS DELEGATION IN MOSCOW**

In the first week of April, the Federation sent a delegation to Moscow to lecture on arms control issues. Director Jeremy J. Stone led the delegation and spoke on "Star Wars and the Shrinkage of SALT II"; he took the line described in the April newsletter article, "A Bear Hug For Star Wars." It is proposed that the indefinite shrinkage of SALT II limits and sublimits would hold Star Wars hostage inasmuch as the deployment of Star Wars systems would then upset the desirable program of reductions.

A second lecture given to the audience of about 40 persons was made by Associate Director for Space John E. Pike. He described the Star Wars program and some problems it would create.

On a second day, Council Member Archie Wood spoke on problems of ballistic missile instability and such solutions as the ballistic missile holiday (in which flight tests of new ballistic missiles on land and sea are precluded, thus preventing deployment of new ballistic missiles).

The audience was, primarily, the Soviet Academy of Sciences Scientists' Committee for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat. This committee has been bolstered by some new cosmonaut generals and others and includes already the head of the Soviet Space Institute (Roald Sagdeev), the Deputy Director of the Institute for the USA (Andrei Kokoshin), Anatoli Gromyko (son of the Foreign Minister) and others.

Later discussions were held at Ivestia, at the Institute for the USA, at the Presidium of the Soviet Academy, and elsewhere.

#### **A Traveling School**

There was useful debate, sometimes heated, at all sessions and the level of discussion was raised above earlier sessions. The Federation is, in effect, running a traveling "school" in which it lectures on arms control once a year in the Soviet Union and, in return, once a year, the Soviet Academy lectures here as a guest of the Federation.

Through the good offices of its host, Vice President E.P. Velikhov, Director Stone had a 70-minute discussion with Lev R. Tolkunov, Chairman of the Soviet Union's Council of the Union (i.e., the Speaker of the Soviet House of Representatives). This discussion, in which arms control issues were merged with the issues of parliamentary exchange, provided the Federation with an opportunity to express its ideas and views on Congressional travel to the Soviet Union and Soviet official travel here.

The Federation is urging direct contacts between the Committees of Congress on the one hand and the "Commissions" of the Supreme Soviet on the other. An adjoining box shows the relationships as best we can determine. For example, the Supreme Soviet has no committee on "armed services" but it does have an agriculture committee and a foreign relations committee. Sufficient parallelism exists to make some direct exchanges possible.

In the absence of such links between Committees, parliamentary exchange would otherwise likely fall back into the rather formal links between "parliaments" rather than the more numerous contacts between "parliamentarians"

*(Continued on page 4)*

## STANDING COMMISSIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION

(and U.S. Congress Equivalent Committees)

### *Agroindustrial Complex*

S. Agriculture  
H. Agriculture

### *Budget and Planning*

S. Finance  
H. Budget; H. Government Operations

### *Communal Housing and Municipal Economy*

S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs  
H. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

### *Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources*

S. Environment and Public Works  
H. Interior and Insular Affairs

### *Construction and Construction Materials Industry*

S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs  
H. Public Works and Transportation

### *Consumer Goods and Trade*

S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
H. Energy and Commerce

### *Credentials*

S. Rules and Administration  
H. Administration; H. Standards of Official  
Conduct

### *Energy*

S. Energy and Natural Resources  
H. Energy and Commerce

### *Foreign Affairs*

S. Foreign Relations  
H. Foreign Affairs

### *Health and Social Security*

S. Labor and Human Resources

### *Industry*

S. Commerce, Science, and Technology  
H. Energy and Commerce; H. Small Business

### *Legislative Proposals*

S. Appropriations  
H. Appropriations; H. Ways and Means; H. Rules

### *Maternity, Child Development, and the Work and Life of Women*

S. Labor and Human Resources  
H. Select Committee on Children, Youth, and  
Families

### *Public Education and Culture*

H. Education and Labor

### *Science and Technology*

S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
H. Science and Technology

### *Transportation and Communications*

S. Commerce, Science, and Transportation  
H. Public Works and Transportation

### *Youth Affairs*

S. Labor and Human Resources  
H. Select Committee on Children, Youth and  
Families



*FAS delegation at Academician Velikhov's home: l to r, the Velikhovs, Andrei Kokoshin, Stones, Wood, Pike.*

*(Continued from page 3)*

which the Federation seeks.

Chairman Tolkunov was much in favor of such exchanges and said he had the authority to negotiate them. Since he was meeting with Speaker of the House O'Neill in the very next week, this seemed most relevant. (The Federation had earlier briefed a representative of the O'Neill delegation on its views.)

When Speaker O'Neill was received by Secretary-General Gorbachev, this was obviously much in the Secretary-General's mind as well, since he said:

"We know the role played by Congress in America's political life and we attach great importance to developing contacts along the parliamentary line as one of the elements of invigorating Soviet-American relations." The time is such now that people, shaping the policy of the two countries, should by all means converse with one another."

Chairman Tolkunov said he had asked the Congress, in 1974, for the same kind of special parliamentary oversight institution which exists between the U.S. and Canada and the U.S. and Mexico. This had been refused at that time.

The Federation believes that a special parliamentary link would facilitate these committee exchanges and others. The Soviet Union is, like Canada and Mexico, a country which borders on our own.

On April 8, when Federation host E.P. Velikhov passed through Washington en route to the Atlanta Consultation, FAS arranged a lunch for him with Congressman John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Since Academician Velikhov is, among other things, Chairman of the Energy Commission of the Soviet Union, this represented just such a Committee contact.

*(This FAS visit was funded through the Robert Scrivner Memorial Trust to which the Prospect Hill Foundation made a timely grant.)*

### LEND-LEASE FUNDING OF EXCHANGES?

The Committee on East-West Accord is advancing a 1978 notion of former Senator J.W. Fulbright that the remaining Soviet Lend-Lease debt of \$674 million be used to fund bilateral exchanges of all kinds. Soviet payments of \$20,000,000 per year were halted after three installments because the U.S. denied the USSR "Most Favored Nation" treatment in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974. Fulbright proposed that the payments be restarted by the Soviet Union with the understanding that half would be paid in dollars and half in rubles with both halves being used to pay for exchanges in the two countries.

As far as Congressional exchanges are concerned, it would take only \$2 to \$3 million to pay for all of the 325 Senators and Congressmen who have not already done so to visit the Soviet Union with an aide or two. The 1200 Supreme Soviet members would cost more but one year's payment of the Lend-Lease debt discussed above would cover more than the entire backlog of Parliamentary exchange by "new faces"—after which the continuing problem of introducing new parliamentarians to the opposing Nation would cost only hundreds of thousands per year.

### SAKHAROV ON STAR WARS (AT LEAST IN 1968)


The third aspect of thermonuclear peril (along with the power and cheapness of warheads) is what we term the practical impossibility of preventing a massive rocket attack. This situation is well known to specialists. In the popular scientific literature, for example, one can read this in an article by Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe in the *Scientific American* of March, 1968.

The technology and tactics of attack have now far surpassed the technology of defense despite the development of highly maneuverable and powerful antimissiles with nuclear warheads and despite other technical ideas, such as the use of laser rays and so forth.

Improvements in the resistance of warheads to shock waves and to the radiation effects of neutron and X-ray exposure, the possibility of mass use of relatively light and inexpensive decoys that are virtually indistinguishable from warheads and exhaust the capabilities of an anti-missile defense system, a perfection of tactics of massed and concentrated attacks, in time and space, that overstrain the defense detection centers, the use of orbital and fractional-orbital attacks, the use of active and passive jamming, and other methods not disclosed in the press—all this has created technical and economic obstacles to an effective missile defense that, at the present time, are virtually insurmountable.

The experience of past wars shows that the first use of a new technical or tactical method of attack is usually highly effective even if a simple antidote can soon be developed. But in a thermonuclear war the first blow may be the decisive one and render null and void years of work and billions spent on creation of an antimissile system.

An exception to this would be the case of a great technical and economic difference in the potentials of two enemies. In such a case, the stronger side, creating an anti-missile defense system with a multiple reserve, would face the temptation of ending the dangerous and unstable balance once and for all by embarking on a pre-emptive adventure, expending part of its attack potential on destruction of most of the enemy's launching bases and counting on impunity for the last stage of escalation, i.e., the destruction of the cities and industry of the enemy.



*Sakharov*

Fortunately for the stability of the world, the difference between the technical-economic potentials of the Soviet Union and the United States is not so great that one of the sides could undertake a "preventive aggression" without an almost inevitable risk of a destructive retaliatory blow. This situation would not be changed by a broadening of the arms race through the development of antimissile defenses.

In the opinion of many people, an opinion shared by the author, a diplomatic formulation of this mutually comprehended situation, for example, in the form of a moratorium on the construction of antimissile systems, would be a useful demonstration of a desire of the Soviet Union and the United States to preserve the *status quo* and not to widen the arms race for senselessly expensive antimissile systems. It would be a demonstration of a desire to cooperate, not to fight.

—Drawn from *Progress, Coexistence & Intellectual Freedom*, 1968

## HAWKS, DOVES, OWLS & BEAVERS

*Book Review*

"Hawks, Doves and Owls"

edited by Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale  
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

This book is safe. The ideas are not really new—they were the stock in trade of researchers in this field more than twenty years ago—and all are intelligently phrased and well researched. Foundation executives new to the field will learn much from it and none will be criticized for grants in support of it. The editors position themselves carefully between "hawks" and "doves," albeit at the affordable cost of portraying doves as a modern form of Neville Chamberlain ("conciliation" rather than "appeasement" is repeatedly charged).

Book reviewers will not fail to note that "owls" are believed to be wise. In sum, this volume of sophisticated conventional wisdom will sell—and with Harvard's name behind it, "thoughtful" persons everywhere will be compelled to deem it a "real contribution."

But is it? Most of what it worries about, it admits, cannot be fixed. Whatever can be fixed always requires real-world campaigning of a kind that is never discussed. And the editors, despite certain concluding observations, have little stomach for the heretical observation that the major gains to be made in preventing nuclear war now lie, as they have for many years, in shaping and changing the nature of the relations between the superpowers.


Putting aside, for the moment, the introductory and summary chapters written by the three editors, this book contains six very well-informed and well-written essays on "Paths to Nuclear War." With rare exceptions, none of them sees much to be done.

Richard K. Betts is pessimistic about the probability of "marked improvements" in our capacity to avoid surprise attack or pre-emption because so much has already been done to lower this probability.

Fen Osler Hampson observes that, in Europe, it would be "difficult, if not impossible, to implement" desirable policies for the long term. (He does urge that NATO "devise a long-term political strategy toward Eastern Europe" but, aside from mentioning that arms control could play a role in that strategy, there is no description of it at all.)

Francis Fukuyama observes, in discussing the Middle East, that the most dangerous superpower confrontations will be precisely those that are least expected. He observes that "the single most important factor influencing [crisis] outcomes is political prudence on the part of national leaders." He urges a "thorough study of history" rather than the "trendier approaches such as psychologically based theories of political behavior" or, he might have said, "strategic stability."

Henry S. Rowen presents his essay with the soft sell that it is devoted to ways of making catalytic war "an even



*Left to Right: Allison, Carnesale and Nye*

more remote possibility than it is today." (The most interesting comment in this chapter is the reference to "reports that in 1973 Israel considered the possibility of dropping a nuclear bomb on Moscow.")

Stephen M. Meyer provides so many worrisome ways in which strategic alerts could trigger attacks that he reaches the actionable conclusion that "One must wonder whether military alerts involving nuclear forces can be considered a prudent form of political communication between the United States and the Soviet Union in the contemporary politico-strategic environment." He also warns plausibly that "any NATO use of nuclear weapons is likely to unleash a massive and devastating Soviet theater nuclear strike against all NATO military facilities." The book does not support any form of no-first-use, however, not even the Federation's "no-one-decisionmaker," which it fails to discuss.

By comparison with these invited essays, the contribution of the editors is less successful. First off, the editors were unable to translate their jazzy title into defensible distinctions. With regard to the source of the dangers of nuclear war, the real distinction between American hawks and doves has always been that the former saw the Russians as the danger and deterrence as the solution. By contrast, the doves considered nuclear deterrence adequate but saw the arms race itself as an autonomous source of dangers which could best be resolved by controlling, limiting and, to the extent possible, ending the arms race.

All of the allegedly middle-ground dangers ascribed by the editors to the wisdom of "owls" have long been the well-advertised nightmare of doves: accidental war, inadvertent war, war by political and bureaucratic miscalculation, war by uncontrollable escalation, etc. To say that both hawks and doves see war as "starting deliberately" is absolutely and totally false in the case of doves.

The constant references to doves as seeking "conciliation and reassurance" or as fearing that "increasing

military strength" may cause deterrence to break down are more than caricatures—they are misdirected. The doves, trying to end the arms contest, and more generally, trying to create international political conditions in which inevitable political perturbations will not automatically escalate into general nuclear war, have a vision that is here simply ignored. The editors' lust, known to all editorial writers, for positioning themselves in the middle has, predictably, done the Federation's school of thought a disservice.

What the self-proclaimed owls really mean when they say that they are limiting their agenda to the "inadvertent sources of a major nuclear war" is that they are limiting their (otherwise dovish) agenda to a certain kind of technical fix that presumes a continuation of the present state of the U.S.-Soviet quarrel. These owls are really, in their motivations, doves with blinders.

Because of their blinders, the owls lose perspective. By contrast to Mr. Hampton's essay, the editors give only a paragraph to Star Wars. While they reach a respectable, if unreal, conclusion (keep SDI within the ABM Treaty because major cuts in strategic forces would "almost certainly" be necessary to make Star Wars work and these would require a "highly cooperative arms control environment"), they are oblivious to the many different issues of strategic stability that it raises—even while their book emphasizes just such issues. Here is a new problem that was not with us for the last 20 years and they just skip over it.

The lack of perspective of the "owlish" editors leads them to focus only on ideas that could be lectured on respectably at the war colleges. They also show a civics book understanding of America. Especially at the Kennedy School of Politics, one would expect them to understand the imperative of arousing political support for arms control. Without public uprisings led by Linus Pauling on atmospheric pollution and Senator Edward M. Kennedy on the ABM, there would never have been either of the two arms control treaties we have ratified. While President Kennedy thanked the two sides of the debate for making his free choice possible on the atmospheric test ban, these Kennedy School observers warn, "Don't oversell arms control," because it will endanger public support for arms control.

They need not worry; nothing proposed in this volume is likely to excite the Nation to the point of the 67 Senate votes necessary to ratify a major treaty or, in the case of unilateral actions, to the point of insisting on their implementation.

The editors do end by calling for "less conventional, more imaginative alternatives for the long run," urging that "bold creative approaches" be rewarded and warning the defense "community" to resist "cynicism toward non-traditional concepts" and also "condescension to newcomers."

In sum, they say they are open to revolutionary ideas though they are not themselves the carriers of any. They recognize the marginal character of their recommendations. But they do not explicitly recognize the necessity,

even for these well-trod ideas, of some determined "beaver" to get the notions implemented. Even that warmed-over hot-line called the Crisis Center—espoused by some Senators such as the late Senator Jackson as a political shelter in a freeze movement storm—requires enormous work to get it in place.

The editors are, really, the direct descendants (and sometimes the literal students) of their senior Harvard colleague Thomas C. Schelling. They recite, in an age of 10,000 warheads on a side, the same observations he recited in a political age when the number was ten times less. And they recommend much the same conclusions as if nothing much had happened.

Like Professor Schelling, they are not by temperament political campaigners or anti-war activists. Like theorists who need experimentalists to verify their theories, these cerebral commentators on the state of the arms race will never much change the political climate or even see, without the help of a different subspecies of person, the fulfillment of their technical fixes. What our entrepreneurial society really needs today is not more analysis of complex issues but more committed entrepreneurial beavers able to combine a small amount of theory with an indefatigable visceral desire to influence superpower practice.

—Jeremy J. Stone

*(Continued from page 8)*

first strike that leaves only a scattered retaliatory response. Thus ABMs protecting the population will be first-strike weapons. And to those who think that they can get hundreds of military-industrial-complex corporations, once started, to build lesser ABMs only—all I can say is, "Lots of luck."

Of course, with so many warheads on each side, neither side need really fear such deliberate first strikes. Instead, both sides will return to the situation that the research associate feared two decades ago: An ABM will be too ineffective against countermeasures to be useful, much less to be relied on. But it will be effective enough in prospect, in worst-case analysis, to stir up the arms race. Accordingly, ABMs are well worth banning, and such bans are indispensable for getting control of the offensive strategic weapons that respond to them.

A few days after Kissinger's article appeared, he was shown advising the President on the talks with Andrei A. Gromyko. Then, on Oct. 7, Kissinger called for a bipartisan U.S. commission that would, immediately after the elections, embark on a crash program for arms-control strategies.

The research associate is torn. Perhaps the absurd arguments above are just bargaining counters in a play to create and direct a commission. With Kissinger chairing it, it could hardly do worse than the Reagan Administration has done thus far. And if the Republicans win the election perhaps the commission will be better than nothing. Maybe. Perhaps giving lip service to arguments in which you could not possibly believe is a price of power. How would I know?

—Jeremy J. Stone

*Reprinted from L.A. Times, October 25, 1984*

## ABM: KISSINGER NOW PUMPS FOR WHAT HE ONCE NEGOTIATED AWAY

Twenty years ago Henry A. Kissinger introduced a young research associate at his Harvard Center for International Affairs to a touring member of the Board of Visitors by observing sardonically: "He is trying to show that the ABM is so ineffective that it won't work but so effective that it should be banned by treaty." It was a good laugh.

The research associate was bemused, 10 years later, to see Kissinger successfully negotiating the very treaty in question and observing that opponents of anti-ballistic missile systems were correct.

Now Kissinger is backsliding. In a recent article he calls the arguments for the ABM treaty "superficial."

In the years since the ABM treaty was signed, he writes, "it has become clear that to rely on a strategy of mutual annihilation based on unopposed offensive weapons raises profound and political issues."

Were not these issues clear in 1972 when the treaty was ratified—even in 1962 and 1952? What is new?

The specific reasons given for his new position are remarkable.

Kissinger argues that an ABM defense of our land-based missiles and bombers would "add hugely" to deterrence. But can anything add "hugely" to deterrence when we have so much of it, with 10,000 strategic warheads at the ready, half of them based securely under the oceans?

He next invokes the need for a "thin defense" against third powers. This was the major argument that was used from 1964 to 1972 for an ABM: defense against the Chinese. It disappeared without a trace after Kissinger went to Peking and revealed that the Chinese were not really the madmen whom we had seen in the Tong-war movies. So now Kissinger, having himself laid to rest the "yellow terror" rationale for the ABM, refers to "leaders of the Kadafy variety." But which of these Third World leaders is going to get ICBMs? The method used by the underprivileged is the suitcase bomb, and to this the ABM is no answer.

Apparently recognizing how little appeal these arguments would have, Kissinger goes on to say: "Perhaps the

most compelling argument" is the "possible beneficial effect" of some missile defense on arms control. Guess why. If we get far-reaching disarmament of weapons down to "a few hundred, a number astronomically below any so far envisaged," we might need defenses to ensure against cheating.

On the basis of this "most compelling argument" about reductions on a currently "inconceivable scale," Kissinger would have us forgo any current moratoriums on the testing of space weapons and not commit ourselves to the demilitarization of space. This concern for protecting the interests of Utopia is certainly praiseworthy, but is it practical? In short, he is giving support to President Reagan's "star wars" program—the current embodiment of the old desire for anti-ballistic defenses against nuclear war.

Even in 1963, as the scorned research associate, I well knew that Dr. Kissinger was not infallible in matters of military doctrine. He had already expressed some regret over supporting the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe (in an essay that had been published a few years earlier, titled "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal"). And many of us believed that he had an irrepressible soft spot in his heart for nuclear gadgets.

At a recent international conference a few "star wars" supporters presented assigned papers only to find virtually every member, save two, of the audience of about 50 American and European strategists and diplomats opposed to it—many sharply so. Even more revealing, the supporters were straining to find some ABM, any ABM, that could be supported, even when the ABMs in question had little or nothing to do with the American President's announced goal of defending the nation's population and making offensive weapons "impotent." Like the optimist looking at a pile of horse manure, they feel that there must be a pony in there somewhere. But there isn't.

What there is, is danger. The ABMs themselves are going to be vulnerable to attack, and thus useful for destroying offensive weapons only if used in conjunction with a

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