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TRIP TO CHINA

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FAS REOPENS DIALOGUE WITH CHINA

The Federation sent a delegation to China in January 1986, composed of FAS Chairman John P. Holdren and FAS Director Jeremy J. Stone. What follows is a trip report prepared by Stone; an article on Chinese foreign policy by Holdren appears on pages 11-12.

We arrived in China on the evening of the 10th anniversary of the death of Premier Zhou Enlai. Premier Zhou (pronounced "joe") is now, by far, the most beloved of past Chinese leaders of modern times. (See page 6)

It brought back memories. In 1972, the Federation had sent the first scientific delegation to China in more than two decades, after Premier Zhou gave permission to FAS to send a delegation. It arrived on May 21, a few months after President Nixon's historic visit in February.

The purpose of the visit was to initiate scientific exchange. On the Chinese side, only a ping-pong team and a group of medical doctors had been to America by that time. And scientific exchanges were hampered by the Chinese view that the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) had become unacceptable when it established links to Taiwan. Characteristically, FAS jumped into the breach and offered to do what it could to promote exchanges until that diplomatic problem was solved.

The Chinese accepted orally the FAS invitation to send a first scientific delegation. But before the delegation arrived, they had been persuaded by the full weight of the Nixon Administration to overlook the NAS disability. Federation officials watched with mixed emotions as NAS hosted a delegation that announced, at each stop, that it had come at the joint invitation of the Federation and the National Academy.

FAS Role in U.S.-China Relations

Scientific exchange having begun, and the Federation's main business being, in any case, nuclear arms control, FAS dropped out of U.S.-China activities except for one activity. Premier Zhou had told me: "So you will introduce us to many people in America." Taking this as an important comment, I helped introduce members of the Chinese Liaison Office and, later, the Chinese Embassy, to just about everybody I knew in Washington.

In 1972, while in China, we had thought the Cultural Revolution, which had reached peaks of disorder in 1968, to be effectively over. In fact, the infighting over a successor to Chairman Mao continued through the 1976 deaths of both Zhou and Mao and was not really settled until 1978 when research institutes and universities started functioning normally. (Today the Cultural Revolution is considered officially to have lasted from 1966 to 1976.)

And it was only in 1984 that the Chinese political scene reached the point of the organized disarmament meetings that had led to our invitation.

As a consequence, it had been 14 years since our last visit. Accordingly, it was astonishing to find, on the second night, that we were being received by none other than the indefatigable Zhou Peiyuan.

In 1972, Zhou Peiyuan was already 70 years old and the acting rector of Peking University. A participant in Pugwash conferences in the mid-1950s, he had evidently been one of the handful of moderates on a private list of Zhou Enlai that prevented them from being destroyed by either the Red Guards or, subsequently, by the minions of Jiang Qing, Chairman Mao's wife.

Now 83, but still moving like a perpetual motion machine, Professor Zhou had surfaced in Brazil at a Pugwash meeting in 1985 and was in Warsaw before our week's visit to China was over! As Chairman of the newly-formed Chinese Association for Peace and Disarmament (CAPAD), he presided over a coalition that included half of the Chinese population. (See page 5)

Memories of 1972 Trip

The first trip to China had been traumatic. Everyone had been eager to achieve something slightly (or greatly) different and my own insistence on using every possibility to achieve scientific exchange had grated on them all. Traveling with the spouses of others always poses problems of social interactions—as minor disagreements escalate to involve loss of intrafamilial face. And the Chinese social environment sometimes leaves Americans with a kind of social culture shock that makes them anxious. Never experienced in living close together—as the Chinese are—Americans confront novel emphasis on protocol with inner consternation. Worse, the Chinese society absorbs American social signals without an interpretable response, leaving the Americans unsure of themselves—like a radar dealing with a stealth bomber that simply absorbs the radar signals. What would it be like this time?

Accordingly, somewhat on edge for a number of reasons, we left Washington at 10:00 A.M. Tuesday the 7th of Jan-



Director Stone and Chairman Holdren with Shen Qurong, Deputy Director of the Institute for Contemporary International Relations.

uary. At 6 P.M. (Japanese time), 19 hours later, we met Holdren in Tokyo. By 9:45 P.M. we arrived in Beijing where we were met by CAFIU's counsel member Qi Xiyu (chi hsi yu) and staff. (See page 5 re: CAFIU)

In China protocol is king. A big black car was provided for the Chairman and a smaller one for the Director and his wife; we arrived not at an ordinary hotel, but at the Wanshou Guest House.

Our room had twin beds and was adjoined by an enormous sitting room that seats about 20. It is very quiet at the Wanshou, with the only sound the gurgling of the refrigerator (armed with juice and seltzer water). It sounds like a fish tank.

The Wanshou had been chosen, we learned, because in its next wing, the headquarters of both the CAFIU and the CAPAD (of which CAFIU is the main active element) can be found.

Deng Xiaoping

We brought with us a number of copies of the current *Time* magazine, whose cover story featured (as Man of the Year for the second time) Deng Xiaoping. Deng is the successor to Zhou Enlai in the hearts of the people and was the main adversary of Jiang Qing in the final struggle to succeed Mao.

At 4 ft. 11 inches, the indomitable Deng, who survived three political purges, has a perky and self-deprecating quality. Once in Washington, when I had a quick chance to say something to him, I observed:

"Premier Deng, you are the second liberator of China."

His response was jokingly to stick out his chest and flex his muscles in a fashion which, when I describe it to Chinese, evokes grins and "that's Deng" responses. Chinese in the Embassy at the time commented: "That's how we think of it; it was a fascist regime at the end and he got us out of it."

Deng is, above all, pragmatic, and this takes more than the form often quoted: "It does not matter whether a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice." In fact, he was once quoted in Japan as saying that Communism might be just a phase of some decades and that China had in the past flirted with, and later abandoned, various Western forms.

The balance he has struck in China appears to be one in which the left wing is permitted to maintain relatively tight ideological control over such things as freedom of speech while the right wing gets the economic reforms it wants in terms of incentives.

During the Cultural Revolution, the ultraleft even wanted to abolish money and just supply everyone with equal access to food, housing and medicine. The ordinary left was debating whether it was more important to be "red" or "expert" and was deemphasizing schools. Imagine, by contrast, what it means to have Deng freeing peasants to grow what they want and to start private businesses. This alone far exceeds the worst fears of those left ideologues who had drummed him out as a "capitalist roader." But, in addition, he then concentrated on getting the state-owned enterprises to work on profit incentives.

(Continued on page 4)

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CHINA'S CULTURAL REVOLUTION

The Cultural Revolution of 1966–76 was the world's largest spasm of McCarthyism, involving a search for subversives in high governmental places by one quarter of humanity. Of 270,000 cases in which one or more persons were charged with counter-revolutionary activity, it is now asserted even by the Chinese Government that two-thirds were convicted unjustly. Twenty-eight thousand cases involved the persecution of persons connected to the President of the Republic, Liu Shaoqi, himself. China is still reeling from this traumatic event which is here summarized.

Mao's Theory of Continual Revolution

Chairman Mao was determined to remain personally radical, and to keep China from being bureaucratized, by stirring up the public every seven or eight years. Accordingly, in 1957, eight years after the real revolution had succeeded in 1949, and one year after the "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom" campaign had shown more popular opposition than he liked, he launched the "Great Leap Forward."

This disastrous waste of effort—with backyard furnaces producing useless steel and much ideological waste of time—was bitterly opposed by his heir apparent, Chief of State Liu Shaoqi. As a consequence of the failure, Liu Shaoqi grew in influence and Mao, who felt kicked upstairs, saw, to his horror, private agricultural plots, overtime pay, and other manifestations of capitalistic tendencies.

Isolated, Mao chose an unpopular and sycophantic general, Lin Biao, as his Defense Minister in an effort to reverse the situation. In 1964 and 1965, he began encouraging a "cultural" revolution, using the contacts of his wife Jiang Qing. By May-August 1966, as Mao swam in the Yangtze, the Cultural Revolution had officially become an attack on "capitalist roaders" inside the Party, and Lin Biao had become the official chosen successor to Mao.

Red Guards Spread Revolution

Red Guards descended on Beijing. Everywhere citizens were urged to rise up and look for corruption. As the witch hunt took on momentum, Zhou Enlai sought to protect some of his associates, seizing the moment when Mao asked that an official be "protected" to provide Mao with a long list of other officials who should be "protected" from the rampaging Red Guards.

By January 1967, it was official that the President of the Republic, Liu Shaoqi, was "China's Krushchev" and the main target. His private offer to Mao to retire quietly was rejected.

As the anarchy progressed, the British Embassy was sacked and Premier Zhou is said to have threatened to resign. Schools were closed and legitimate authority everywhere was supplanted by "revolutionary committees." Eighty-six members of the Central Committee of

the Communist Party had been purged and the Cultural Revolution Group had supplanted the Politburo, which ceased to function.

By 1967, it had become too much even for Mao—who had learned in particular that some Red Guards were really seeking perquisites rather than revolution—and he disbanded them and sent many to the countryside. Officially purged in 1968, Liu died in prison in late 1969.

Fall of Lin Biao

By 1970, Lin Biao was getting ever-colder receptions from Mao. After a last effort to get Mao to accept the position of Chief of State (which had favorable succession implications for Lin), he began plotting violent overthrow. When an attempt to assassinate Mao by blowing up his train failed, Lin was about to join his co-conspirators in an effort to set up a rival capital, when his daughter turned him in by phoning Zhou Enlai. Lin's September 12, 1971 effort to escape by Trident to the Soviet Union failed when the plane crashed in Mongolia, killing all aboard.

Opening of U.S.-China Relations

Kissinger had arrived in China in July 1971, the President in February 1972 (and the Federation in June, 1972). It seemed that the Cultural Revolution was coming gradually to a halt although formally, the revolutionary committees were still in charge.


In retrospect, however, there were to be four more years of succession struggle during which normalcy could not be re-achieved. First Jiang Qing denounced her earlier co-conspirator Lin Biao. But then, in 1973, she and her associates kicked off a campaign to criticize Confucius. (When this turned out to be aimed at Zhou Enlai, he sought to deflect the attack by adding to the campaign "and Lin Biao.")

In 1973, Mao brought Deng back from his "capitalist roader" exile. But, at the same time, he promoted a leading Gang of Four representative to be the number three person. For three years, Mao's wife maintained the McCarthyite fervor and intimidated the Chinese establishment.

End of Cultural Revolution

It all came to an end in 1976. Zhou died on January 8 and Mao on September 9, with a major symbolic earthquake in between. Zhou's death produced an outpouring of grief that turned into a demonstration for the moderates. When Mao died, the Central Committee was split and Hua Guofeng was appointed Premier and Chairman of the Party.

Under pressure from the military, Hua arrested the Gang of Four a month later but continued to criticize Deng. But by March 1977, the Politburo and regional military commanders together decided to bring Deng Xiaoping back. □



l-r: Miss Ma, Mr. Qi, Professor Zhou, Holdren, Zhou Peiyuan, Stone, Mrs. Zhou Peiyuan, B.J. Stone.

(Continued from page 2)

Time magazine is saying that if this succeeds, it could be a "triumphant heresy" in the communist world that would transform a regional "political foe" into a mighty economic competitor. Where old China hands visiting in 1972 were astonished at the immense improvement in Chinese health and living standards over conditions in the 1930s and 1940s, now observers are astonished again at the street vendors, the shops with western merchandise, the openness to foreign influences, the immense growth in numbers of apartments, and so on. Deng calls it "socialism with Chinese characteristics." Food production has doubled since the middle 1970s. All in all, Deng is competing with Secretary General Gorbachev in a race to liberate and modernize their respective economies.

Thursday Morning

We discussed the itinerary with Mr. Qi. He urged us to suggest any changes, but a combination of our (new-found) politeness and our slowness to assimilate the itinerary precluded any real analysis. In fact, only one "institute" was listed—the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies which, we learned, is the think-tank close to the military. (While in Washington, I had met its number two man, Xu Xin, who was, in fact, the active-duty Deputy Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army!)

To make a long story short, we did manage to achieve our goals by supplying CAFIU with the names of highly-placed Chinese officials whom I had earlier hosted in Washington. (In this regard, all readers should learn to cooperate closely with the Committee on U.S.-China Relations which, at one time or another, had sent six of these officials to me in Washington where I provided an evening's entertainment or an overnight.)

Thursday Afternoon

We toured the city and saw street activities that had brought Beijing well along from the somber, empty quality of 1972 but not yet to the frenzied quality of Hong Kong. The city now has 5,000,000 bicycles for its 9,000,000 people, and the 30,000 motorbikes are causing even more intense traffic problems. Bicyclists often wear white surgical-type masks to combat the cold and dust. Mao now has his own mausoleum. Wages seem to be about \$25 a month. There are horse-drawn carts, open stoves heating the shops, and much more color in the dress. Our escort says that he pays about \$9 a month for six-day-a-week care for his baby and about

\$4 for heat and rent for his apartment. Since his wife also works and both have good jobs, they are doing well.

The residential area we were shown had 50,000 people in 15,000 households and, according to my calculations, there were about 9 square meters of usable space per person (this is about 9 feet by 9 feet). New cooperatives are required to sell at least 20% of the apartments they build, but it was unclear why anyone would buy since the rents are very low and the costs of buying high—the desire to avoid long waits seems to be the main reason.

The couple we visited had four rooms for themselves and their son and his wife. (But this is very "upper middle" class and represents the apartment that, rather obviously, all foreigners are shown.) Asked whether the owner was indebted to Deng, he said "exactly," that the whole country wanted modernization and that, in particular, he had now gotten a refrigerator and had had a TV since 1979. Retired from working at the Beijing airport, his pension was 110% of his earlier salary because he had joined the Communist Party before the 1949 revolution. His wife was a physician. The main flaw in the apartments was, he said, noise.

When we asked how long they had owned the colorful pictures of Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Mao and Liu Shaoqi, they laughed and explained that, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, they had felt safe in having only a picture of Mao himself. (The revolution's greatest general had been purged first and its chief of state later; even Zhou Enlai had come under attack briefly.)

Finally, we saw several adorable kindergarten classes in which, we were told, the main problem was that they are all—as a result of the one-child policy—"only" children and somewhat spoiled. What will be the foreign policy of a nation of spoiled brats? (But, in China, growing up in collective nurseries, a spoiled child may be far less spoiled than what we in the West are used to normally!)

Thursday Evening

At dinner in the Great Hall of the People—the place where State guests are received and where Zhou Enlai had received us in 1972—Zhou Peiyuan said the Cultural Revolution had caused "great difficulties" but that now, the economic reform had scored significant achievements; he referred to new buildings in Beijing as an example.

His Chinese Association for Peace and Disarmament had been founded as a consortium of 21 organizations on June 1, 1985 (the day before it hosted the disarmament conference to which we had originally been invited).

He knew of our scientific exchanges with Soviet Academy scientists and was interested in knowing whether we had achieved "concrete results."

Meanwhile, Professor Zhou Guangzhao, on my left, Vice President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was concerned about feeding China: "Was the agricultural expansion due to the private plots limited in possibility?" (That morning Chinese newspapers had reported a very good 10% growth in the gross agricultural output value, despite a drop in the sown acreage of food grains due to natural disasters.) A list of incentives had been announced the day before to keep agriculture moving: stabilizing the prices of farm inputs, permitting still more farm production for market sale, and supplying farmers who sign grain contracts with fertil-

izer at low State-fixed prices. Meanwhile, 20% of the rural labor force was working in township enterprises—Chairman Mao must be rotating in his grave over all this.

Zhou Peiyuan urged us not to wait “another 14 years” before coming back, and we left. Apparently state organizations can use the Great Hall of the People as a kind of high-priced restaurant (\$50 a head) for such events if the Great Hall is not otherwise in use.

Friday Morning

The next morning, in our hotel, John and I gave a talk on FAS and on arms control to an audience of about 25. About four each were from the Beijing Institute of Strategic Studies (the Defense Ministry think-tank) and the Institute for International Studies (the Foreign Ministry think-tank). Some were from CAFIU and CAPAD and some were students. (Apparently ten organizations had been invited but I never got a list.)

The first questioner, to my astonishment, raised six different questions at once! He turned out to be from the “liaison section” (i.e., foreign policy section) of the Communist Party. (Three were about SDI; another was about whether the U.S. had gone into a second cold war.) After John answered the first three at great length, so as to permit others to get a word in edgewise, I intervened and answered the last three rather curtly. (He later privately thanked John for responding so thoroughly which, I supposed, was a Chinese way of complaining indirectly about my curtness.) Others wanted to know if the Freeze Movement was really dead or not—Randy Forsberg had been through the same route and made a “deep impression” upon the student who asked.

In the afternoon, we canceled a visit to the Capital Iron and Steel Corporation in favor of visiting for an hour with the new U.S. Ambassador Winston Lord. Winston, whom I had gotten to know when he was President of the Council on Foreign Relations, had been with Kissinger on the first visits, seen Chairman Mao, and had an ethnic Chinese wife, Betty Bao, who had written a remarkable book, *Spring Moon, now to be made into a movie*. He was an obvious choice to be Ambassador to China and seemed to be enjoying himself. He and his staff helped orient us and were impressed with the people we were scheduled to see.

Saturday Morning

Representatives of the China Association for Science and Technology's Department of International Affairs met with us to learn with astonishment that we had been their guests in 1972! They have 106 constituent societies with more than one million scientists and are in charge of connections between the societies, multidisciplinary studies, science education and international relations.

They said that they were sometimes accepting self-paid tours of scientists and spouses (16 to 22 to fill a bus) who would lecture and travel in China. It would cost \$1100 for three weeks in China with all expenses covered, including domestic air travel, sight-seeing, food and hotels. Zhu Baochen displayed an amazingly accurate accent in explaining all this and turned out to have spent a year at Cal State Fresno.

That evening, we visited the apartment of an old friend, Chen Hui, formerly the Chinese representative to the World

CAFIU & CAST

The Chinese Association for Peace and Disarmament (CAPAD) calls itself a “non-governmental organization sponsored by and composed of the concerned people's organizations and prominent public figures from various nationalities and sectors in China.” Its 21 member organizations include such “All-China” Federations as: the Federation of Trade Unions, the Federation of Youth, the Federation of Students and the Federation of Women. It contains the Buddhist Association, the Taoist Association and the Islamic Association. Listed first is the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU), which organized CAPAD.

CAFIU says it is “sponsored by and composed of prominent personages, scholars and social activists from various organizations, political parties and other social bodies.” Its aims are “promoting mutual understanding and friendship between China and other countries and safeguarding world peace.” Its means are “exchange of visitors, organization of forums and lectures, participation in international conferences and exchange of publications.”

Both of these organizations have the same address: 12-A Wanshou Road, Beijing, China; their offices are housed in the same wing of the Wanshou Hotel.

The China Association for Science and Technology (CAST) is a post-Cultural Revolution form of the Scientific and Technical Association of the People's Republic of China (STAPRC) founded in 1958. CAST is an “amalgamated organization of mass organizations of workers in science and technology.” It has about 150 constituent societies in every field of science (even an Abacus Association). Its present Chairman, Zhou Peiyuan, studied under Albert Einstein at Princeton in 1936 and rose to become president of Beijing University and a high official of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

CAST can be reached at: China Association for Science and Technology, Sanlihe, Beijing, China. □



Chen Hui and his wife



PROFILE OF PREMIER ZHOU

Zhou Enlai had, in very high degree, the qualities of a military and political organizer, of an actor and diplomat, and of a very hard-working administrator of enormous integrity—all combined in a very humane personality.

A child prodigy, grounded in the classics, he was, at age 10, already required by poverty to look after two younger brothers. By 22, as a Marxist in France, he had already lived in Japan (as an aspiring college student), created a Chinese student society (The Awakening Society) and narrowly avoided death in the Chinese repression that followed this creation.

In France, he worked closely with Deng Xiaoping—as an older brother with a younger one—organizing a Chinese Communist Party and publishing the Party's journal in Europe. At 26 years of age, back in China, he was appointed the Political Director of the Whampoa Military Academy (pre-liberation China's West Point) and leader of Communist Party activities in two provinces.

Zhou's Role in Revolution

Three years later, when Chiang Kai-shek turned on the Communists, Zhou was composed, organized and resourceful in arranging uprisings in Shanghai and Nanchang. As a consequence of these activities, he was much better known and respected in revolutionary circles than Mao Zedong when he subsequently deferred to Mao, who had the now well-known plan for rousing the peasantry rather than the urban workers.

Zhou's capacity to play the role of number two emerged in adolescence and underlay his capacity to hold the Nation together later during the Cultural Revolution. He was remarkably self-effacing and selfless, and many stories are told about it. On one occasion, in 1946, in a plane that was deemed to be crashing, he insisted on giving up his parachute to a young girl who was crying

Then and Now

Above, 1972 FAS trip, left to right: Premier Zhou, interpreter Nancy Tang, Stone, and B.J. Stone. (Zhou Peiyuan can be seen between the Stones; Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guan Hua is seen talking to Harvard Professor Fairbank at far left.)

Right, 1986 FAS trip: Jeremy Stone and B.J. Stone meet again with Zhou Peiyuan.

when she realized that her seat was not equipped with one. The plane survived.

At fifty-one years of age, in 1949, he was Premier of China. His work habits were extraordinary and, for extended periods, would involve no vacations and 20-hour days. His frugality would have made Ralph Nader seem profligate—guests to his home were asked to bring ration cards because he was not accepting any privileges. And he insisted that his relatives get no special favors even to the point of following up to ensure that the Army did not admit a niece who had earlier pledged to work on the frontier.

A master of the official gesture, he was ever conscious of those with hurt feelings and of his ability, as Premier, to make it right with some carefully calculated comment or action. Nothing he did seems ever to have been without a quiet understanding of its effects.

Zhou married fellow revolutionary, Deng Yingchao, whom he had met at 20 years of age, telephoned her almost every day of his premiership when they were apart, and lived an exemplary married life which even Chairman Mao, something of a lecher and married four times, is said, on occasion, to have envied. (A new biography *Zhou Enlai, A Profile* is available from Guoji Shudian, P.O. Box 399, Beijing, China). □



REFLECTIONS ON ZHOU'S CANCER

During the 1972 pre-banquet discussion with Premier Zhou in the Great Hall of the People, he alluded to the greater Chinese interest in medicine and related issues over certain foreign policy themes. He smoked a cigarette, noted that his doctors had urged against it and alluded to cancer.

The next day, responding to this interest, I offered, on behalf of the Federation, to send a delegation of cancer specialists. Sensing that the allusions might have some particular individual in mind, I asked repeatedly what kind of cancer should be emphasized in choosing the specialists. There was no clear answer from Host Zhou Peiyuan, who responded only that the delegation should emphasize "theory and practice."

In July, 1972, on return, I organized a brilliant collection of cancer specialists but, to our surprise, no answer to the FAS offer to send them was ever received. Was it because one delegation member, Jerome Cohen, had written an ill-advised op-ed piece suggesting that this episode referred to a (now known to be false but then rumoured) throat cancer of Chairman Mao? Or were there internal reasons?

In any case, we have confirmed on this trip that Premier Zhou had been advised by his doctors that he had cancer only a few weeks before we met. The cancer was cancer of the bladder and led to his death four years later. Did Zhou consider, at least briefly, the possibility of FAS's helping? Nothing that Premier Zhou ever said or did was without forethought. But perhaps the Chinese emphasis on self-reliance and Zhou's emphasis on setting an example precluded more than some indirect American consultation. In any case, the relative survival rate for bladder cancer at that time, with American treatment, was 50%. I am still disturbed that this matter may not have been handled as well as it might but unsure what else could have been done. JJS. □

(Continued from page 5)

Bank and now the Deputy Editor of *China Daily*. Chen Hui had graduated from my alma mater, Swarthmore, in 1949 and had returned to help rebuild China. He took us to dinner at a nearby family restaurant, and for the first time, we saw how the Chinese eat in a neighborhood restaurant. It was very good; indeed the meal tasted better to me than banquet food. A wedding party provided pleasant noise nearby and patrons were eating multiple dishes at tables so small that the dishes had to be stacked up in alternate directions to amazing heights.

Chen Hui's older child, a daughter, and her husband suffered a dozen years of closed schools during the Cultural Revolution. It made the abstract excesses of that period very real to see persons trying to resume their education after such a setback. His daughter is now studying cancer. Chen Hui bicycles back from *China Daily* at one A.M. after the paper is put to bed, with goggles and heavy coat to protect himself against the cold, and then climbs eleven flights because the elevator is off at that hour.

Sunday Morning

On Sunday, we toured the city with two old friends, John and Mary Israel, who are working in Beijing this year. John, who is Professor of Chinese History at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, is writing on student movements in the 1920s. Mary, who is Chinese-American, is teaching English to Beijing University students. They live in a kind of cold-water flat with two small rooms and kitchen, with taped windows to keep out the penetrating Beijing dust. (Women on the streets often have gauze veils over their heads for the same reason.) The students are not as feisty now as they were in the periods that John Israel is studying but the Chinese officials, remembering the key role of Chinese students, especially in the Cultural Revolution, are very cautious in dealing with any student commotion.

Sunday Evening

We received a banquet from the Chief of the U.S. Affairs Division in the Foreign Ministry, Ni Yaoli. Mr. Ni had

(Continued from page 7)

stayed overnight in our home a few years before. And to our pleasant surprise, he brought with him two Chinese foreign service officers whom we had known in the Chinese Embassy in Washington: Xu Shangwei (from the Department of International Organizations and Conferences) and Wang Hongbao, his wife, who is Mr. Ni's Deputy.

Taiwan appears to be an especially high priority for the Chinese now. (Symbolic of this general interest, Zhou Enlai's last gesture was to have his ashes rest in the Taiwan room of the Great Hall of the People to symbolize his last wish that reunification occur). But today, I sense, they are worried that their old foes in the Kuomintang might die before reconciliation is achieved, which would make still more difficult the negotiation of reunification. The "one nation-two systems" approach with which Hong Kong has been prospectively reunified is, obviously, a stalking horse for using the same technique with Taiwan. Accordingly, the Chinese have a very sincere interest in making the Hong Kong solution work.

Interest in Taiwan is so high that there may be desire to involve the United States in achieving reunification, where heretofore there was interest only in keeping America out of the problem. But what the specifics of this interest are is impossible to say.

Monday Morning

Chen Hui had offered to print an article on Star Wars if I wanted to write one for the *People's Daily* of which he is Deputy Editor. Since John Holdren had aired his thoughts over Beijing Radio to domestic and foreign audiences alike, I thought I would approach the English-reading audience.

China Daily turns out to have 100,000 English-reading subscribers. Begun in 1979 with 150 workers, it pays only \$10 per op-ed piece—but it publishes quickly (two days later).

Monday Evening

We had a 90-minute audience with General Wu Xiuquan, President of the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies, followed by a banquet in the Diaoyutai State Guest House. General Wu is an extremely high-ranking Chinese official. He worked closely with Chairman Mao in the 30s, was one of the first to be appointed a general in the 40s, and, after the revolution, was appointed the Director of the Department of Soviet and East European Affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry. There he traveled with Premier Zhou to Moscow to help Chairman Mao in his talks with Stalin. Later he was Vice Foreign Minister and, still later, Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Especially significant, General Wu had led the Chinese delegation to Lake Success in 1950 when, as a party to the Korean War, China was first permitted to speak at the United Nations.

General Wu was jovial. He announced that he was about to read a very long speech but we could interrupt. I rejoined that scientists would be afraid to interrupt a general. He suggested we follow the new ideas about protocol and not worry.

The gist of the speech was that both superpowers had very large nuclear stockpiles and were each seeking superiority—the U.S. through expanding the arms race into outer

space. The superpowers had 95% of the weapons but still, counting kilometers, they could not kill everyone. (I mentioned the nuclear winter theory and he asked whether it was not, after all, a theory). Also, he noted, Africa would continue to exist because the superpowers were not going to waste too many weapons on Africa.

On the other hand, he felt that nuclear war would end civilization which, he believed, was critically based in the national capitals (e.g., France was, he said, the most civilized country of Europe but its civilization would be destroyed if Paris were annihilated).

On other matters, General Wu emphasized that China would not use nuclear weapons first even if invaded conventionally by the Soviet Union. He called for a general ban on first use of nuclear weapons. On questioning, he confirmed that China was not afraid that, in the aftermath of such a ban, the Soviet Union would have conventional advantages in Europe.

General Wu felt that China would catch up with the advanced countries 50 years into the next century. Meanwhile, the factors for peace were increasing faster than the factors for war.

In answer to questions, General Wu said that his institute numbered about 60 persons, most of them generals.

At dinner, it turned out that General Wu had presided over the trials of the military co-conspirators of Lin Biao—once Chairman Mao's "closest companion in arms"—who, in 1971, tried to kill Mao.


Tuesday Morning

We met with Li Chang He who heads the disarmament section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and his assistant, Sha Zukang. China takes pride in the following disarmament activities:

- Asserting that it would never use nuclear weapons first when it exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964 and adhering to that view today; proposing, more generally, that the nuclear powers undertake the same commitment.
- Standing for complete destruction of nuclear weapons, reducing conventional armaments, and destroying all chemical weapons.
- In June, 1982, calling at the U.N. for a 50% cut in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles.

However, the Chinese have not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty or Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty.

While we were away on our trip, the *Washington Post* published a summary of the Administration's effort to get a Chinese commitment not to advance proliferation so as to make possible the sale of nuclear reactors to China. The Chinese, throughout, refused to put anything in writing, insisting that a toast of their Premier was sufficient. But the Administration was bedeviled by intelligence reports that Chinese scientists had been seen working at the atomic centers in Pakistan and that Pakistani scientists had consulted with the Chinese atomic scientists as to whether a design they had for a bomb would, or would not, work—a design quite similar to Chinese designs, it is alleged.



l-r: Chen Zhongjin, Li Chang He, and Xu Dashen

While there may well, therefore, be flaws in China's record on non-proliferation, it is credible that China is, on the whole, against proliferation. The whole of Chinese foreign policy is centered around peace and leadership in the developing world—which wants non-proliferation and nuclear controls. And there is the general interest of nuclear powers in not arming others. But China's reluctance to commit itself to existing treaties, or to make formal commitments, is a serious impediment to international trust in China's policies.

As Mr. Li explained, the Chinese argument against signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the allegation that it has not led to disarmament which, in the Treaty, the superpowers pledge to pursue. Their criticism of the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty lies in the alleged "insincerity" of the superpowers, who only wanted to stop "environmental" tests. Mr. Li said that the Chinese had not tested in the atmosphere for five or six years but have not announced that they would never do so again.

For our part, we spent a good deal of time explaining the advantages of "shrinking SALT II" through percentage annual reductions, as a simple method of achieving a good start toward disarmament at the next Reagan-Gorbachev Summit.

Tuesday Lunch

A one-time guest in our home in Washington, Xu Dashen, is the Deputy Director of the Center for International Studies of the State Council of China. The State Council is, in effect, the Administration—the "executive body of the highest organ of state power" reporting to the National People's Congress. It contains the Premier, Vice-Premiers, State Councilors, and Ministers.

Xu Dashen had arranged to have his superior, Huan Xiang, preside. Mr. Huan had been stationed as long-time "Ambassador" to Great Britain in the fifties, before ambassadorial relations had really begun, and as Ambassador to the European Common Market. (Already in 1949, he was head of the Foreign Ministry's Department of Western Europe and Africa.) He spoke English well and seemed very sophisticated.

Mr. Huan said there were "no really important issues" between China and America except Taiwan which, once solved, would permit a great improvement in relations. (He

was not, however, able to describe examples of what closer relations would exist if the Taiwan problem were solved.)

Huan said, jovially, that most of their Center's proposals had not been accepted by the State Council. State Council members evidently had their own opinions about things. In particular, he noted that almost all, he thought 95%, of the State Council had been to the United States. (In terms of the FAS program to get Soviet officials here, this is remarkable and shows the outflanking of Moscow by Beijing.)

Huan and Xu had both suffered for almost a decade during the Cultural Revolution. Almost everyone in high position that we met had been some kind of "capitalist roader" in the eyes of the Gang of Four. He noted, with approval, that the decision had been made to continue publicizing the crimes committed during the ten-year Cultural Revolution to make sure that young people would be aware of what had happened.

Huan's center is about two years old and has a staff of 20 to 30.

Tuesday Afternoon

We visited the Institute of International Studies, formerly named the Institute of International Relations, established in 1956 with connections to the Foreign Ministry. Suspended from 1966 to 1972, it was reestablished thereafter.

IIS has about 100 researchers and three or four deputy directors and is organized into five area and country studies groups and two functional divisions: international politics and international economics. The staff are often foreign service officers who may leave the institute to go abroad. The rest are scholars and graduate students. They do short-, medium- and long-term assessments. They have regular contact with foreign and domestic institutes in Japan, the U.S. and Great Britain and, in particular, have good relations with Stanford University's Center for Arms Control with whom they co-sponsored a conference in Beijing last September. They have had a Fellow at the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies since 1980.

We talked mainly with Ye Ruan and his associate Xie Xiaochuan about the Summit and ways of getting disarmament started. Mr. Ye was well-informed about such arms control issues as "build-down."

Tuesday Evening

Tuesday evening a banquet was given by our hosts (CAFIU and CAPAD) and included CAPAD's Vice President Madame Ou Tangliang, who is a counterpart to Senator Nancy Kassebaum—the only woman on the standing Foreign Affairs Committee. She had been, I believe, the Secretary-General of the Chinese arm of the World Peace Council before the Chinese split with the Russians and dropped out.

Representing CAFIU was General Hou Jingru, a former Kuomintang (KMT) general who had received special permission from Premier Zhou to defect to the Communists during the KMT retreat to Taiwan. One of the first 500 graduates of Chiang Kai-shek's Whampoa Military Academy, he had known Zhou Enlai since the earliest days. At the time of his defection, he had been head of an Army group composed of five Chinese armies in the Northeast area. When the armies were sent to Quemoy, he had escaped

via Hong Kong. Now General Hou was Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Party, a political party composed of similar defectors from Chiang Kai-shek.

The main thing that comes through in these ceremonial, but high-level, banquets is the emphasis that the Chinese government is putting on peace as a means of maintaining its program of modernization. High-ranking figures of all kinds are recruited as part of what amounts to a peace offensive. But sometimes little is said other than banalities about peace and friendship.

Wednesday Morning

Our host, Mr. Qi, answered questions first about CAFIU and then about foreign policy. CAFIU's President is Li Yimang, now in his 80s, a veteran of the Long March and former deputy head of the "liaison department" of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He had been a roommate of Deng Xiaoping and was now in charge of the commission for the editing and publication of ancient books. It appeared that he presided rather loosely over the organization.

CAFIU is sending a delegation around March 14-16 to a Philadelphia meeting of the Physicians for Social Responsibility and then plans to leave behind two members for a few weeks to study the arms control scene in Washington.

Over lunch we met with officials of the largest single institute of its kind, the Institute for Contemporary International Relations (ICIR). Chen Zhongjin chaired the lunch. A former President of the Institute, he now heads the research committee while he works on a book on international relations. Mr. Chen, 70 years old, had studied for a few years at Columbia University around 1947 as he disengaged himself from undercover work for the Communists against the KMT. Later he had been a member of the nine-person delegation to Lake Success (which General Wu had led). Chen is a delightful person who in size and attitudes much resembles Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky of Stanford.

The lunch included the Deputy Director of the Institute Shen Qurong. It developed that he was interested in spending a year in Washington or nearby, and we undertook to help locate a way for him to do this. (The IIS, it was later discovered, already had a deputy director studying in America.) The institutes found it useful to have a high official in America to encourage and anchor other exchanges and so the Institute itself was eager to have Mr. Shen go.

Later we visited the ICIR and talked to seven staff members about some Federation ideas. They seemed to be serious students of the issues. Of special importance, this institute has close ties to the State Council.

Wednesday Evening

Holdren had remembered that return banquets were politic, and we decided to add some American touches: special questions for each of the 12 guests to answer and even synthetic fortune cookies (a piece of candy wrapped with a specially devised message for each guest). It was our small revolution against the otherwise humdrum atmosphere of the typical banquet.

The Chinese are remarkably reluctant to issue personal opinions, at least in these settings. They can make the Russians seem open (even as the Japanese make the Chinese seem candid). One was unwilling to suggest who ought to be given the next Nobel Peace Prize. One termed the Freeze the most promising disarmament proposal (!). In answer to what were Western visitors' main misconceptions about China, a CAFIU staff member observed that visitors either thought they already understood everything or, at the other extreme, forgot that the Chinese are people like other people and treated them as excessively strange. This was the best answer. But we thought it politic to announce that there had been "no clear winner."

Conclusion

The Chinese are relying upon diplomacy, rather than military strength, for their defense. A peace offensive is part of the diplomacy. Accordingly, anyone who is interested in peace can get a warm reception in China. Gone are the days when Chinese policy urged that only universal proliferation could be a basis for eventual disarmament. Gone are the days when the U.S. was urged to be vigilant in dealing with the Soviets and urged to be slow to agree to arms control.

Now the Chinese want to champion the general notions of the Third World and to become, if they can, some kind of a mediator or catalyst for world peace.

The Chinese are developing, besides a people-to-people peace program, a series of institutes that will, in due course, produce many serious scholars in the field. But they are only just beginning to get the degree of Western contact which they might wish.

Contact with China is very desirable in light of the possibility that someday, in some fashion, Chinese influence and ideas may be important in moderating the arms race. Obviously, Americans are also eager to see the standard of living of the Chinese improved and their progress maintained—and contacts can be useful here. Not least important, China is central to the issue of peace in Asia and in the Pacific, and Americans interested in international security affairs, as is FAS, have to maintain a dialogue with the Chinese for this purpose also. All in all, we look forward to maintaining communications with China. JJS. □



Ye Ruan of the Institute for International Studies and family

THE DEFENSE POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS OF CHINA

John P. Holdren

Given that our discussions focused heavily on matters that obviously are of central concern to the Chinese leadership—and on which the views of that leadership have been made known, in many cases, through publicized speeches and other official documents—I was struck by the diversity of views that our various hosts expressed on some of these topics. In a number of instances, officials of institutes reporting to different branches of the Chinese government gave strikingly different answers to a given question, and a number of people with whom we spoke called attention to and explained differences between China's official position on a given issue and their personal positions.

In what follows, a composite of the views of Chinese with whom we spoke is presented in the form of a set of questions we asked and summaries of the range of answers we received.

China's Global Role

Q. What role does China envision for herself in international affairs in the years to come, particularly in respect to her relations with the United States and the Soviet Union and to her influences on the prospects for arms control and reduction of tensions more generally?

A. In their answers to this question our interlocutors were uncommonly uniform. China does not consider herself a "superpower" and does not aspire to become one. (This position is consistent with the heavy emphasis given by official Chinese foreign policy pronouncements to "equality and mutual benefit" and "mutual respect for sovereignty" as principles of international conduct, and to criticism of "hegemonism".) Most Chinese are not even comfortable with a characterization of China as a leader among the countries of the Third World.

Once these broadest of generalizations are left behind, however, the discussion usually turns to China's desire to maintain an "independent" foreign policy (meaning not too closely aligned with either the United States or the Soviet Union), which the Chinese clearly regard as having a stabilizing effect. At the same time, most of those with whom we spoke indicated that they expected China's relationship with the Soviet Union to remain much more difficult than that with the United States indefinitely.

China expects to continue to criticize both the United States and the Soviet Union for the many excesses of the nuclear arms race. It was the general view that, if the United States and the Soviet Union initiated a process of nuclear-arms reductions, China would join in long before the larger arsenals had shrunk to the size of China's.

Sino-Soviet Relations

Q. Official Chinese statements emphasize three obstacles to better relations between China and the Soviet Union: the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Soviet support for Vietnamese aggression against Kampuchea, and the size of Soviet military deployments along the border between the Soviet Union and China. Which of these do the Chinese regard as most inimical to better relations? Does early progress seem possible on any of them?

A. On the question of which of the three obstacles is most troublesome, the answers were interestingly diverse. Some said the Soviet forces on the Chinese border posed the most troublesome problem, because this situation represents a direct threat to China itself. Some said the situation in Kampuchea was the worst, implying that it represents the most immediate danger of an expanded conflict that might involve China. Only one or two singled out Afghanistan, arguing that the size and cost of the Soviet involvement there was the most distressing evidence of Soviet expansionism.

U.S. Forces in Pacific

Q. The United States has sizable military forces deployed more or less in China's backyard, including in South Korea (where the U.S. forces include nuclear weapons) and in and around Japan. When and if the Taiwan issue recedes in importance as an obstacle to further improvement in China's relations with the United States, is the presence of these U.S. forces in China's neighborhood likely to replace it as a major focus of disagreement? Or is the presence of these forces actually welcomed by China as a counterweight to Soviet military power in the region?

A. These questions drew startlingly diverse responses. Some respondents took a rather doctrinaire position: there is no reason for the United States to have all these forces so far from its own borders; certainly there is no chance that smaller and weaker North Korea would attack bigger and stronger South Korea, and China would never back such an invasion, so the U.S. troops and nuclear weapons there could and should be withdrawn. Others expressed some (for me) quite unexpected views: the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea is really the business of those two governments; while for obvious political reasons China must not seem to be taking the side of the United States in this matter, neither will she make a big issue of objecting to the U.S. forces. And, less unexpectedly: if a (hypothesized) reduction of the U.S. military presence in and around Japan led that country to increase substantially its own independent military capabilities, China would not be pleased at all.

Military is Fourth Priority

Q. In the "Four Modernizations" program announced in the late 1970s by Mao's successors and pursued with increasing success ever since, the military was given fourth priority behind agriculture, industry, and science and technology. This set of priorities seems as remarkable as it is admirable, given the primacy accorded to the wants of the military in so many other countries. What is the explanation for the imposition of this restraint on the Chinese military?

A. Most started with the observation that China is a poor country and so has not been in a position to spend more money on her armed forces. Many emphasized that the roots of national strength are first of all economic, which is why the agricultural, industrial, and scientific/technological bases of economic development have been given priority over the military. Only one or two made arguments along the lines that "China is inherently peace-loving"; one contended that


the key point might be the deep-rooted inclination in the Chinese culture "to oppose excesses of all kinds."

Concerning the future, some expected military spending to grow at the same pace as the economy as a whole, while others thought it might grow somewhat faster once basic societal needs had been met. The recently announced reduction of the size of the People's Liberation Army by a million men (to take place over the next few years) was mentioned by some as evidence of the Chinese commitment to continue to set an example of military restraint; others saw it as a pragmatic move aimed at producing a more streamlined and better equipped fighting force.

Is China's Nuclear Force Vulnerable?

Q. China's strategic nuclear forces are said to include about a half-dozen ICBMs, some 110 intermediate-range and medium-range land-based ballistic missiles, two nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines with 12 missile tubes each, and a modest number of subsonic, nuclear-capable, medium-range bombers. Are the Chinese concerned that this force, so much smaller than that of the Soviet Union, might be vulnerable to a Soviet pre-emptive strike in a time of crisis?

A. A few of those asked this question said they did not think the Chinese force was vulnerable and changed the subject. A more common answer was that, although the force might be vulnerable to a very large Soviet attack, the Chinese considered the possibility of such an attack to be extremely remote because the Soviets would have nothing to gain from it that would justify the enormous risks and uncertainties involved. Enough Chinese nuclear forces might survive to do serious damage to the Soviet Union; the Soviets could not predict how the United States would react; and even if the Soviets succeeded in completely destroying the Chinese nuclear forces and the United States stayed out, the Soviets would still not be able to invade and occupy China successfully because of the size and determination of China's army and population as a whole.



l-r: Xu Yuanchao, Deputy Director of CAPAD; Xu Wenming, Deputy Director, Research Section, CAPAD; Zhang Zhijun, Program Organizer

Concerns About SDI

Q. The questions the Chinese asked us had to do with the Strategic Defense Initiative more often than with any other topic. Obviously the Chinese are very concerned about this issue. What are the main focuses of that concern?

A. The concern most often expressed by the Chinese with whom we spoke was that pursuit of the strategic defenses would lead to a massive expansion of the superpower nuclear arms race and would make progress in arms control of any kind impossible. I asked a number of our discussants whether some kind of Chinese concern about strategic defense was attributable to the fear that improvements in Soviet defenses would degrade the Chinese deterrent. None was willing to give much weight to this aspect of the issue.

Some expressed the view that the main motivation of the United States in pursuing the SDI was probably not to develop an effective defense but simply to engage the Soviet Union in an expensive and technologically demanding competition as a form of economic warfare. □

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