F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

DEFENSE BUDGET

Volume 36, No. 3 March 1983

DEFENSE SPENDING AND THE ECONOMY

Learning that Rick Jones had recently left the Office of Management and Budget, FAS asked him to prepare an analysis of the Reagan defense budget and its effect on the economy. What follows is his survey, upon which members are invited to comment.

Measuring the various budget outlays in constant dollars, Jones observes that President Reagan inherited the largest peacetime defense budget in U.S. history and is locking in still more massive increases. Besides mortgaging the future with a large "bow-wave" and requiring cuts in readiness, the defense deficits have played hob with the Reagan program and threaten to complicate the recovery.

Mr. Jones proposes a freeze on defense spending (in real terms). And if, by some chance, this produces inadequate fiscal stimulus for a recovery period, then he would spend the relevant monies in some other sector. He would argue, as would most FAS members, that a defense budget as large in real terms as that of the Vietnamese War at its height is enough to defend the Nation and its allies.

The Reagan defense spending binge is the driving force behind the Reagan deficits.

Over the 1981-86 period, from the last Carter budget to the end of the Administration's current forecast, the Administration seeks to raise $156 billion for spending increases:

$14 billion in tax increases (ignoring the $38 billion contingency tax proposed for 1986);
$46 billion in actual spending reductions;
$96 billion in deficit increases (neglecting the ephemeral contingency tax).
(All dollar figures in this article are adjusted for inflation to FY82 price levels, using the GNP deflators forecast by the Administration.)

The Administration proposes to spend two-thirds of this money—$95 billion—on increases in the defense budget. Thirty-four billion dollars is slated for unavoidable increases in transfer payments—largely social security. The remaining $27 billion will be delivered to the nation's bankers and other holders of fixed-income securities in the form of increased interest payments to cover the cost of the swollen deficits, even while interest rates fall.

The relatively conservative (by nineteen-seventies standards) increase in transfer payments demonstrates the Administration's success in restraining social spending increases. Total federal transfer payments grew only $11 billion in 1982 (3%) in spite of a savage recession.

Thus, with social spending under control, the deficits are caused quite simply by the defense spending explosion and the borrowing necessary to finance it.

Were it not for the Reagan defense budgets, the deficit would not increase.

If the defense budget were "frozen" at the 1981 level which Reagan inherited, the forecast deficit for 1986

(Continued on page 2)

Constant Dollar (FY82) Defense Outlays (billions)



FAS & SCOWCROFT COMMISSION — Pg. 6; CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL — Pg. 7

(Continued from page 1)

would be less than the deficit Reagan inherited—roughly $63 billion. This would be true without the addition of the $38 billion "contingency tax" which the Administration now proposes to reduce future deficits. Even the 1984 deficits—now forecast at $170 billion—would be less than $120 billion.

Only relatively simple mathematics is necessary to understand the situation. The Administration proposes to increase defense spending by an amount ($95 billion) which is exactly equal to the proposed increase in the deficit and two-thirds of the total deficit forecast. There is no need to look further for the cause of the deficits.

DOD IS FLUSH—THEY DON'T NEED THE MONEY

Ronald Reagan inherited the largest peacetime defense budget in U.S. history.

Defense budgets, inflation aside, do not "naturally" increase with economic growth. Since World War II, and until Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter was the only President to increase defense budgets without the stimulus of a hot war. The share of GNP devoted to defense is a measure of cost to society, not an index of defense adequacy.

After the Second World War the U.S. defense budget fell by 75% in two years. The Korean War brought defense budgets back up to wartime levels, and thereafter "peacetime" defense spending remained at roughly $135 billion annually—three times the demobilization level. This level remained the peacetime plateau until Jimmy Carter initiated the defense expansion of the seventies. (see figure, page 1)

In the late fifties—after the massive cold-war expansion in U.S. military spending—and in the mid-seventies after the end of the Viet Nam War, the total defense budgets were identical at $135 billion, and the relative claims had shifted only slightly. Operations, Maintenance and Research had grown while procurement costs had fallen.

Personnel costs were $38 billion at the beginning and end of the period;
Weapons Procurement costs fell from $40 billion annually in the fifties to $24 billion in FY76;
Nuclear Weapons costs fell from $7 billion in the fifties to $2.5 billion in FY76;
Operations and Maintenance rose from $28 billion in the fifties to $42 billion;
Research and Development costs grew from $7 billion in the mid-fifties to $13 billion in FY81.

During the Carter years, the federal budget grew in lockstep. Total spending, defense spending, and transfer payments all grew by roughly 27% in the four Carter years. The defense budget experienced its first period of real growth without the spur of war since the original cold-war expansion of the fifties. By 1981 the Defense Department had achieved an unprecedented spending peak. The nation was actually spending more real resources on defense in peacetime than it had to fight the Korean War.

In the never-never land of electoral politics, Ronald Reagan was elected by opposing not simply the expansion of government but the democratic "failure" to spend ade-

(Continued on page 3)

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription $25/year.

(Continued from page 2)
quately on defense.

This paradox has come home to roost in the collapse of the Reagan Administration's economic policy. The necessity of financing a defense "buildup" to close the so-called "window of vulnerability" forced the Reagan Administration to adopt publicly an inherently contradictory program: expansionary stimulus (tax cuts and defense spending increases) with forced contraction (tight money and promised deficit elimination). A heavy dose of "supply-side" snake oil during 1981 prevented political critics from catching firm hold of the contradictions in the structure. The economic realities of 1982 provided the necessary improvement in grasp.

Mortgaging the future: the "bow-wave" of the Reagan defense budgets will lock in massive defense spending increases for years to come.

The Administration is not only committed to massive deficit financing now, but proposes to "lock in" large deficits for years to come through the defense "bow-wave". This is a catchy title for a simple phenomenon: The Defense Department has the ability, unusual in the federal government, to commit itself to spending in future years. A substantial portion of weapons procurement funds is spent over a number of years as weapons system contracts are fulfilled and deliveries occur.

Administrations and Congresses are unable to reduce immediate deficits by "cutting" defense budgets; the benefits are perpetually two to five years in the future, while the deficit of concern is always today's. From the standpoint of a Congress wrestling with budget deficits, defense procurement spending increases are relatively attractive, since they have little immediate impact on the immediate deficit. For the same reason, procurement cuts are unappealing.

Hence the "bow-wave": defense procurement funds "lock in" future spending.

Even within the DOD budget these "Unspent Obligated Balances" significantly reduce the flexibility available each year to alter defense spending totals, since they prevent reductions in actual spending for the immediate future in procurement accounts. Reductions in procurement appropriations (Budget Authority) will not bear fruit in the form of actual spending reductions for several years. Proposals to cut defense spending must therefore be directed only at the remainder of the DOD budget. Operations and Maintenance have historically been the preferred targets; they can be reduced without immediately obvious reductions in manpower or force strength statistics.

In FY82, $57 billion of defense spending—30% of the defense total—was spending on commitments from prior years. The massive increases in procurement budgets proposed by the Reagan Administration would raise this figure to more than $77 billion (35%) in FY84. At the end of that year the Reagan Administration plans to have committed $146 billion for spending in future years.

In the early sixties, these balances were running at around $60 billion, the equivalent of 1.5 years of total procurement. After a $71 billion Viet Nam peak, they declined to $42 billion by the end of FY76—1.8 years of annual procurement. The Carter defense budget increases were focused in Weapons Procurement and Operations and Maintenance. The last Carter defense budget left unspent balances of $92 billion—more than 2.4 years of procurement and well over half of a full year's defense budget.

Federal Deficit Under Alternative Economic Assumptions



—from Congressional Budget Office

The Reagan increases have already driven the unspent balance estimate up to $146 billion by the end of 1984, and the massive Budget Authority figures suggest future balances of perhaps $200 billion. Failure of the contractors to meet DOD's forecast delivery dates would result in an even larger overhang.

This is the genesis of the Reagan "bow-wave". Congress and future Administrations are increasingly helpless to affect defense spending without reducing personnel levels or cutting back on Operations and Maintenance. The FY84 budget now before the Congress already assumes an overhang larger than the total annual peacetime defense budgets of the fifties, sixties and seventies.

In order to protect the procurement increases, the Reagan Administration now proposes to cut readiness funds.

The Reagan Administration has already taken the next step in Washington's always popular "bow-wave minuet" by cutting readiness funds in order to protect the hardware budget.

Personnel costs rose from $12,000 per active duty soldier in 1954 to $20,204 in 1981. The net decline in manpower levels from 3.4 million to 2.1 million left total personnel costs essentially unchanged.

By eliminating the scheduled October, 1983 military pay raise, the Administration proposes to cut personnel costs by $350 per soldier.

Operations and Maintenance costs rose nearly 60% since the mid-fifties, reaching $56 billion in 1981. The Reagan Administration proposes a 29% increase in O&M money through 1986—half the rate of increase of the defense budget as a whole. Of the $95 billion total defense increase, only $16 billion is for O&M, while annual procure-

(Continued on page 4)

(Continued from page 3)
ment budgets are to increase by $48 billion—127%. This reality stands in striking contrast to the rhetorical emphasis on the importance of readiness; it is clearly the "least favored" in contrast with procurement of new hardware.

DEFENSE DEFICITS THREATEN RECOVERY

Defense deficits forced the emasculation of the powerful investment stimulus of the original Reagan economic program.

The Reagan Administration's original conception of economic policy, stripped of overblown "supply side" rhetoric, was classically conservative:

> Reduce federal income tax rates to encourage savings and investment. Focus the corporate reductions on increased deductions for capital investment. Focus the personal tax reductions on the high-income persons considered most likely to save rather than consume.
>
> Reduce the public sector burden on the economy by reducing federal spending.
>
> Eliminate federal deficits (and the accompanying credit absorption) by maintaining reduced outlay levels while tax revenues rise with economic recovery.

The entire program could accurately be described as a contraction in federal influence on the economy.

The primary barrier was believed to lie on Capitol Hill. It was argued that the reductions in federal spending on which the program critically relied were simply beyond the capacity of a Congress dominated by increasingly expert pressure groups principally representing the recipients of federal largesse.

As it happened, the Reagan Administration thoroughly confounded its critics. On taxes, the Administration achieved not only the corporate and personal reductions it sought but also further reductions and the indexing of the income tax.

Success on the spending side was equally impressive—perhaps more so, in view of the relative political attractiveness of tax cuts versus spending cuts. The first Reagan budget year (fiscal 1982) exhibited a decline in real federal spending outside of defense and interest costs—in stark contrast to the $30 billion increase of Carter's last budget year.

The Administration had a reasonable basis on which to forecast economic revival without inflation—even disregarding the anticipation of an economic and moral millenium from the fundamentalist and Lafferite fringes of the Republican party.

The sheer power of the income tax reductions was the key factor. The Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) cut total federal taxes by 22%, personal income taxes by 31% and corporate income taxes by 48% over five years. In 1986, this measure would have left an additional $166 billion in private hands, including $35 billion in corporate treasuries. Individuals would have had an additional $124 billion in after-tax income to spend or save.

These sums are not "fine tuning"; they are massive body blows, even in a three and one-half trillion dollar economy. It did not require reliance on the theories of Arthur Laffer to project that such an increase in private resources would favorably affect private investment and output.

One year later, the Administration has completely reversed its tax policies in order to feed the defense checkbook. At this writing, the Administration has already proposed, sponsored and signed into law two separate tax increases which have effectively emasculated the corporate tax cuts which were the heart of its program for economic recovery.

The Administration now proposes $50 billion in new tax increases for 1986. If accepted by Congress, the net impact of Ronald Reagan's Presidency on federal tax collections would be a reduction of 9% in total receipts—in contrast to the 22% reduction originally proposed.

The bias towards the wealthy remains as strong as ever. The net 26% cut in personal income taxes is itself heavily biased towards upper-bracket taxpayers. The subsequent tax increases and those now proposed are almost entirely excise and payroll taxes—the most regressive available.

Distortions on the corporate side are equally strong, if more complex. Although 1986 corporate income tax collections are only reduced by 17% under the Administration's new proposals (in contrast to the 48% cut enacted in 1981), the original emphasis on capital investment remains. The Reaganized corporate tax code reduces taxation of capital-intensive industries.

The nation will not, in short, test the conservative economic policies on which Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980 and which he successfully forced down the reluctant throat of the Congress. The failure does not lie in either Congressional resistance or the "liberal establishment"; both succumbed almost totally to the perceived political tide, reserving only the protection of a few especially beloved items from the pork barrel.

The failure was internal. The prospect for economic recovery through the old-time economic religion was snake-bitten by the Administration's defense deficits!

The manifold irony in this situation deserves, at the very least, a bit of quiet contemplation. It has its roots in the severe disconnect between the realities of defense deficits and the perceptions which dominate the political debate. The Reagan Administration can no longer lay claim to the cloak of economic conservatism. It now proposes to expand the Federal Government to peacetime record size, while its (presumably) liberal opponents argue (loudly, if not sincerely) that federal budgets must be restricted for the sake of the economy.

The Reagan deficits threaten to re-ignite inflation and drive up interest rates during the recovery.

The Administration's own relatively conservative forecast now calls for economic growth of 9% in 1983 and 1984, accompanied by record peacetime deficits of roughly $200 billion—6% of Gross National Product. The prior record was 3% of GNP, achieved by Lyndon Johnson in his effort to finance the Viet Nam War without tax increases. That experience is widely credited with igniting the hyper-inflation of the seventies. The Reagan Administration appears to have every prospect of outperforming its

(Continued on page 5)

(Continued from page 4)
predecessors in this respect.

The resulting competition for funds between the Federal Government and a private economy attempting to finance a business expansion seems guaranteed to yield a combination of higher interest rates and inflation—in short, the end of recovery.

No President in history has demanded such a large share of private savings for government as Ronald Reagan.

Private investment is the excess of private savings over the government deficit. In 1981 private savings (stated in 1982 dollars) in the United States totaled just over $500 billion—17% of GNP. In that year the federal deficit consumed 17% of the available savings. Over the entire decade of the seventies, the federal claim on savings never exceeded 25%.

On the assumption that private savings remain at 17% of GNP (the seventies average), the Reagan deficits will consume 38% of gross savings through 1986 unless federal taxes are increased.

Capital starvation for business.

Where will General Motors borrow the money for new robots? After the Federal Government drinks its fill from private savings, the remainder would amount to less than $350 billion annually for the next several years—$70 billion below the 1981 level.

This kind of record goes to the heart of "supply-side" economics. Whatever its theoretical content, its premise and promise were the stimulation of private savings and investment. The reality of Reagan policy, thanks to the defense deficits, is capital starvation for the private sector.

Ronald Reagan—the anti-big "gummint" President—now proposes to increase the Federal Government share of the economy to the highest level in peacetime history.

The recurrent theme of Reagonomics was the reduction of the federal burden on the economy. In practice, the Reagan Administration has scored a new record peacetime high and now requests the Congress to approve further increases.

After peaking at 21% during the Viet Nam War, the federal share of the economy vacillated between 19% and 22% through the early seventies. At the end of the Carter Presidency, the federal share stood at 23%. The defense spending increase and decline of the economy in 1982 drove the first Reagan budget to a record 24% of GNP.

The Reagan Administration now proposes that the federal share of the economy rise to a peacetime record 25% in 1983 and remain at 24% for the foreseeable future. Again, one expects students of American political economy to develop a highly tuned sense of irony.

A DEFENSE SPENDING FREEZE

An inflation-adjusted freeze on total defense spending beginning with the FY84 budget would solve all of the major problems with the Reagan defense budgets while preserving a massive defense expansion. This policy would yield real defense budgets of $204 billion annually—the same level as at the peak of the Viet Nam War.

The budget deficit would be cut nearly in half in 1986 without a contingency tax.

A freeze would save $62 billion in annual interest costs avoided by reducing FY84 and FY85 deficits. Over the FY84-FY86 period, the total savings for the taxpayers would be nearly $90 billion.

An inflation-adjusted defense freeze would eliminate the need for federal tax increases.

The Administration now proposes a $50 billion increase in federal taxes for 1986, including the contingency tax proposal. The prospect is for further tax increases beyond that time as the defense budget continues to drive federal budgets into deepening deficit.

A defense freeze would eliminate this prospect of ever-rising federal tax burdens by eliminating the deficit growth which is their driving force.

Resources for defense would be higher than at any time—peace or war—since World War II.

The annual $204 billion devoted to the Defense Department under an inflation-adjusted freeze would be more than 50% larger than the peacetime norm—enough resources to support the most expensive year of the Viet Nam War in addition to peacetime defense costs.

The freeze need not affect readiness.

Under an inflation-adjusted freeze, the Pentagon would retain the flexibility to commit resources to the most critical use. One approach which would meet the constraint would be to:

> Preserve the Reagan-proposed levels in Personnel and O&M to improve readiness;
> hold procurement at 1982 levels ($42 billion);
> hold research, development and "other" costs to 1983 levels.

The overall result would be a $62 billion direct savings in 1986 from the Reagan budget proposal, without reducing readiness money.

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The public record is replete with promising prospects for reducing procurement budgets. The Administration itself has recently expressed reservations about the strategic versions of the cruise missile, which may be vulnerable to near-term Soviet air defense improvements. Outsiders have noted that the B-1 strategic bomber suffers from similar shortcomings. The MX missile, originally described by the Administration as necessary to eliminate the vulnerability of land-based missiles to Soviet strikes, is now acknowledged to be no less vulnerable to such strikes than its predecessor.

Outside of the strategic arena, the acquisition of F-18 aircraft in spite of their failure to meet contractual mission requirements is already the subject of Congressional inquiry.

The Maverick missile system has been the subject of similar criticism.

The application of some fiscal stringency, in addition to

(Continued on page 6)

(Continued from page 5)
the massive macroeconomic benefits, may induce weapons system suppliers to try harder to meet their contractual promises. One benefit of tighter procurement budgets might well be an improvement in the quality of arms available to American soldiers.

The freeze would reduce the inflationary impact of the federal deficits.

Federal borrowing would be held to $83 billion in 1986—roughly 14% of anticipated gross savings, actually less than the 17% average of recent years. Under these conditions, federal competition with private business for funds would be much reduced. The threat of higher interest rates and "inflation psychology" price increases should effectively vanish.

A freeze would establish a downward trend for federal deficits instead of an upward trend—without new taxes.

An inflation-adjusted freeze, particularly if readiness funds were preserved, would eliminate the bow-wave effect of the Reagan procurement increases.

The Reagan Administration promise of ever-upward spiraling federal deficits and new tax increase proposals would be reversed by a defense freeze. Under a freeze, deficits would decline each year. Economic growth would actually yield increases in federal revenues and the opportunity for new federal programs without new taxes—precisely the conditions once promised by Ronald Reagan but lost to defense deficits.

An inflation-adjusted defense freeze would reduce the "gummint" burden on the American people, fulfilling the Reagan electoral commitment.

The inflation-adjusted freeze would allow the federal share of the economy to fall by one percentage point, fulfilling the pledge on which Ronald Reagan was elected. This would stand in clear contrast to the increase in the federal budget which the Reagan Administration now proposes to finance its defense deficits.

Federal Deficit as a Percentage of GNP



—from Congressional Budget Office

FAS TESTIFIES BEFORE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION

In an unusual departure from "defense community" practices, the Administration's Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by General Brent Scowcroft (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) reached outside the usual set of potential witnesses and invited FAS Director Jeremy J. Stone to testify for an hour on the strategic issue of the day: MX basing and related issues. Other witnesses before the Commission have been former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General J.W. Vessey and scientists Edward Teller, Richard Garwin, William Perry and Reagan Science Advisor Jay Keyworth. The Commission requested and received an extension of its February 18 deadline to the end of March.

The gist of Stone's testimony on January 31 was the importance for the Commission of having at least one coherent arms control option for dealing with MX—as opposed to new technical options for basing it unilaterally. The Commission was urged to consider, in particular, a so-called "Option B" [Bilateral Pause, Barter, and (only then) Build].

Under this option, both superpowers would halt flight tests of the one new ICBM permitted under SALT II, with a view to giving their negotiations on reductions a chance to succeed. Should the negotiations succeed, each side would be dismantling ICBMs as part of the agreed reductions, and the whole issue of buying new ICBMs could, would and should be addressed in that context. If agreement on reductions could not be reached, each side would be free to go back to flight testing.

The Commission was challenged to work up a better arms control proposal if it did not like "Option B" so that, in any event, the public could be assured that at least one arms control solution was available to the Administration. Surprisingly, there was applause at the end of Stone's testimony from the dozen or so members sitting around a long table. This may or may not have been a sympathetic response to an unusual hearing for an "outsider."

But it seems to represent, also, a new wind blowing through parts of Washington. The Commission, though stacked with conservative and establishment members, is not oblivious to the desire of the public for an end to the arms race. And on issues like ICBM deployment—which are not so much dove-hawk issues as common sense issues—they may be capable of revolt. Time will tell. (Since the January 31 testimony, there have been rumors that the Commission might put together a large consensual package including much arms control linked to various procurement possibilities.)

Besides Chairman Brent Scowcroft, Commission members include: former Senator Nicholas Brady, former Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, former CIA Director Richard Helms, former Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Admiral Levering Smith, and former Undersecretary of the Navy James Woolsey.

ON CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL

FAS members are busily working for editorials sympathetic to Congressional travel to the Soviet Union, as advocated in the February, 1983 newsletter. Meanwhile, each Senator who had *not* visited the Soviet Union received a letter describing the monies he or she had appropriated for defense without having done so, and listing the various relevant committees on which each had served. Some of the letters which they sent back were revealing:

Senator James Abdnor of South Dakota: Willing to "visit the Soviet Union and receive associated briefings dealing with such questions as the arms race and grain sales to that important market." He believes that "public expenditures for such trips are justified when they are real work missions, not just sightseeing junkets." (We agree.)

Senator Alan J. Dixon of Illinois: Has a "sincere interest in matters pertaining to U.S.-Soviet relations" and hence "would not close off the option of traveling to the Soviet Union at some future date."

Senator Mack Mattingly of Georgia: "Would be inclined" to go if the purpose were "more specifically defined than just that of general education." (Fair enough, we think.)

Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin: "You make a marvelous case for the trip" but feels, as a result of one foreign trip to Europe many years ago, that a few hours of reading "would have informed me far better than anything I learned while traveling." (We have not given up hope that a suitably planned visit in which, among other things, Senator Proxmire would be allowed to run circles around Moscow, would tempt him to deviate from what appears to be a life-long allergy to travel—induced by one bad example.)

Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina: "Being a traditional hard-line critic of the Soviet Union, I have never felt that I would be particularly welcome in Russia." (We have not given up hope that Senator Thurmond might simply travel through that country as a tourist; he need not be welcomed at all! In any case, the Soviets have welcomed anti-communists, traditionally, with more interest than those more sympathetic.)

FAS members should continue to express their views to these and other Senators. In particular, we do not plan to "take yes for an answer." The visits—not just a positive response to their possibility—are our goal. See below for a list of the 75% of Congressmen who have not been to the Soviet Union, and don't hesitate to send your Congressman a copy of the February newsletter.

75% OF U.S. CONGRESSMEN HAVE NEVER SEEN THE SOVIET UNION

Following up on the February newsletter on reciprocal visits by U.S.-U.S.S.R. political leaders, FAS polled the House of Representatives and learned that 112 Congressmen (25%) have visited the Soviet Union while 328 have not. Thus members are encouraged to add these 328 legislators to the list of 58 Senators listed in February, who should be encouraged to make this visit. Their names appear below.

Akaka, Daniel K. (Hawaii)
Albosta, Donald Joseph (Mich.)
Andrews, Ike (N.C.)
Andrews, Michael A. (Tex.)
Annunzio, Frank (Ill.)
Anthony, Beryl, Jr. (Ark.)
Applegate, Douglas (Ohio)
Aspin, Les (Wis.)
AuCoin, Les (Oreg.)
Badham, Robert E. (Calif.)
Barnard, Doug, Jr. (Ga.)
Barnes, Michael D. (Md.)
Bartlett, Steve (Tex.)
Bateman, Herbert H. (Va.)
Bates, Jim (Calif.)
Bedell, Berkley (Iowa)
Beilenson, Anthony C. (Calif.)
Bennett, Charles E. (Fla.)
Berman, Howard L. (Calif.)
Bethune, Ed (Ark.)
Bilirakis, Michael (Fla.)
Bliley, Thomas J., Jr. (Va.)
Boehlert, Sherwood L. (N.Y.)
Boner, William Hill (Tenn.)
Bonior, David E. (Mich.)
Borski, Robert A. (Pa.)
Bosco, Douglas H. (Calif.)
Boucher, Frederick C. (Rick) (Va.)
Bouquard, Marilyn Lloyd (Tenn.)
Boxer, Barbara (Calif.)
Britt, C. Robin (N.C.)
Brooks, Jack (Tex.)
Brown, George E., Jr. (Calif.)
Brown, Hank (Colo.)
Bryant, John (Tex.)
Burton, Dan (Ind.)
Byron, Beverly B. (Md.)
Campbell, Carroll A., Jr. (S.C.)
Carney, William (N.Y.)
Carper, Thomas R. (Del.)
Chappell, Bill, Jr. (Fla.)
Chappie, Gene (Calif.)
Clarke, James McClure (N.C.)
Clay, William (Bill) (Mo.)
Coats, Dan (Ind.)
Coelho, Tony (Calif.)
Coleman, Ronald D. (Tex.)
Collins, Cardiss (Ill.)
Conte, Silvio O. (Mass.)
Conyers, John, Jr. (Mich.)
Corcoran, Tom (Ill.)
Coughlin, Lawrence (Pa.)
Courter, James A. (N.J.)
Coyne, William J. (Pa.)
Craig, Larry E. (Idaho)
Crane, Daniel B. (Ill.)
Crane, Philip M. (Ill.)
D'Amours, Norman E. (N.H.)
Daschle, Thomas A. (S. Dak.)
Daub, Hal (Nebr.)
Davis, Robert W. (Mich.)
de Lugo, Ron (V.I.)
Derrick, Butler (S.C.)
DeWine, Michael (Ohio)
Dingell, John D. (Mich.)
Dixon, Julian C. (Calif.)
Donnelly, Brian J. (Mass.)
Dorgan, Byron L. (N. Dak.)
Dowdy, Wayne (Miss.)
Dreier, David (Calif.)
Duncan, John J. (Tenn.)
Dwyer, Bernard J. (N.J.)
Dymally, Mervyn M. (Calif.)
Dyson, Roy (Md.)
Early, Joseph D. (Mass.)
Eckart, Dennis E. (Ohio)
Edgar, Bob (Pa.)
Edwards, Mickey (Okla.)
Emerson, Bill (Mo.)
English, Glenn (Okla.)
Erdreich, Ben (Ala.)
Erlenborn, John N. (Ill.)
Evans, Cooper (Iowa)
Evans, Lane (Ill.)
Fascell, Dante B. (Fla.)
Fazio, Vic (Calif.)
Feighan, Edward F. (Ohio)
Ferraro, Geraldine A. (N.Y.)
Fiedler, Bobbi (Calif.)
Fields, Jack (Tex.)
Flippo, Ronnie G. (Ala.)
Florio, James J. (N.J.)
Foglietta, Thomas M. (Pa.)
Ford, Harold E. (Tenn.)
Ford, William D. (Mich.)
Forsythe, Edwin B. (N.J.)
Frank, Barney (Mass.)
Franklin, Webb (Miss.)
Frost, Martin (Tex.)
Fuqua, Don (Fla.)
Garcia, Robert (N.Y.)
Gaydos, Joseph M. (Pa.)
Gekas, George W. (Pa.)
Gingrich, Newt (Ga.)
Glickman, Dan (Kans.)
Gonzalez, Henry B. (Tex.)
Goodling, William F. (Pa.)
Gore, Albert, Jr. (Tenn.)
Gramm, Phil (Tex.)
Gray, William H., III (Pa.)
Green, Bill (N.Y.)
Gregg, Judd (N.H.)
Guarini, Frank J. (N.J.)
Gunderson, Steve (Wis.)
Hall, Katie (Ind.)
Hall, Ralph M. (Tex.)
Hall, Sam B., Jr. (Tex.)
Hall, Tony P. (Ohio)
Hance, Kent (Tex.)
Hansen, George (Idaho)
Hansen, James V. (Utah)
Harkin, Tom (Iowa)
Harrison, Frank (Pa.)
Hartnett, Thomas F. (S.C.)
Hatcher, Charles (Ga.)
Hawkins, Augustus F. (Calif.)
Hefner, W.G. (Bill) (N.C.)
Heftel, Cecil (Cec) (Hawaii)
Hertel, Dennis M. (Mich.)
Hightower, Jack (Tex.)
Hiler, John (Ind.)
Hopkins, Larry J. (Ky.)
Horton, Frank (N.Y.)
Howard, James J. (N.J.)
Hubbard, Carroll, Jr. (Ky.)
Huckaby, Jerry (La.)

(Continued on page 8)

Hughes, William J. (N.J.)
Hunter, Duncan (Calif.)
Hutto, Earl (Fla.)
Hyde, Henry J. (Ill.)
Jacobs, Andrew, Jr. (Ind.)
Jeffords, James M. (Vt.)
Jenkins, Ed (Ga.)
Johnson, Nancy L. (Conn.)
Jones, Ed (Tenn.)
Jones, Walter B. (N.C.)
Kasich, John T. (Ohio)
Kastenmeier, Robert W. (Wis.)
Kazen, Abraham, Jr. (Tex.)
Kemp, Jack F. (N.Y.)
Kennelly, Barbara B. (Conn.)
Kindness, Thomas N. (Ohio)
Kogovsek, Ray (Colo.)
Kolter, Joe (Pa.)
Kostmayer, Peter H. (Pa.)
Kramer, Ken (Colo.)
LaFalce, John J. (N.Y.)
Latta, Delbert L. (Ohio)
Leath, Marvin (Tex.)
Lehman, Richard H. (Calif.)
Lehman, William (Fla.)
Leland, Mickey (Tex.)
Levin, Sander M. (Mich.)
Levine, Mel (Calif.)
Lewis, Jerry (Calif.)
Lewis, Tom (Fla.)
Lipinski, William O. (Ill.)
Livingston, Bob (La.)
Loeffler, Tom (Tex.)
Lott, Trent (Miss.)
Lowery, Bill (Calif.)
Lowry, Mike (Wash.)
Lujan, Manuel, Jr. (N. Mex.)
Luken, Thomas A. (Ohio)
Lundine, Stan (N.Y.)
Lungren, Dan (Calif.)
McCain, John (Ariz.)
McCandless, Alfred A. (Al) (Calif.)
McCloskey, Frank (Ind.)
McCollum, Bill (Fla.)
McCurdy, Dave (Okla.)
McDade, Joseph M. (Pa.)
McDonald, Larry (Ga.)
McEwen, Bob (Ohio)
McGrath, Raymond J. (N.Y.)
McKernan, John R., Jr. (Maine)
McKinney, Stewart B. (Conn.)
MacKay, Buddy (Fla.)
Madigan, Edward R. (Ill.)
Markey, Edward J. (Mass.)
Marlenee, Ron (Mont.)
Marriott, Dan (Utah)
Martin, David O'B. (N.Y.)
Martin, James G. (N.C.)
Martin, Lynn (Ill.)
Martinez, Matthew G. (Calif.)
Matsui, Robert T. (Calif.)
Mavroules, Nicholas (Mass.)
Mazzoli, Romano L. (Ky.)
Mica, Dan (Fla.)
Mikulski, Barbara A. (Md.)
Miller, George (Calif.)
Mineta, Norman Y. (Calif.)
Minish, Joseph G. (N.J.)
Mitchell, Parren J. (Md.)
Moakley, Joe (Mass.)
Molinari, Guy V. (N.Y.)
Mollohan, Alan B. (W. Va.)
Moody, Jim (Wis.)
Moore, W. Henson (La.)
Morrison, Bruce A. (Conn.)
Morrison, Sid (Wash.)
Murphy, Austin J. (Pa.)
Murtha, John P. (Pa.)
Myers, John T. (Ind.)
Natcher, William H. (Ky.)
Neal, Stephen L. (N.C.)
Nichols, Bill (Ala.)
Nielson, Howard C. (Utah)
Nowak, Henry J. (N.Y.)
Oakar, Mary Rose (Ohio)
Oberstar, James L. (Minn.)
Obey, David R. (Wis.)
Olin, James R. (Jim) (Va.)
O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr. (Mass.)
Ortiz, Solomon P. (Tex.)
Ottinger, Richard L. (N.Y.)
Oxley, Michael G. (Ohio)
Packard, Ronald C. (Calif.)
Panetta, Leon E. (Calif.)
Pashayan, Charles, Jr. (Calif.)
Patman, Bill (Tex.)
Patterson, Jerry M. (Calif.)
Paul, Ron (Tex.)
Penny, Timothy J. (Minn.)
Perkins, Carl D. (Ky.)
Petri, Thomas E. (Wis.)
Pritchard, Joel (Wash.)
Pursell, Carl D. (Mich.)
Quillen, James H. (Jimmy) (Tenn.)
Rahall, Nick Joe, II (W. Va.)
Rangel, Charles B. (N.Y.)
Ratchford, William R. (Conn.)
Ray, Richard (Ga.)
Regula, Ralph (Ohio)
Reid, Harry M. (Nev.)
Richardson, Bill (N. Mex.)
Ridge, Thomas J. (Pa.)
Rinaldo, Matthew J. (N.J.)
Roberts, Pat (Kans.)
Robinson, J. Kenneth (Va.)
Roemer, Buddy (La.)
Rogers, Harold (Ky.)
Rose, Charles (N.C.)
Rostenkowski, Dan (Ill.)
Roth, Toby (Wis.)
Roukema, Marge (N.J.)
Rowland, J. Roy (Ga.)
Roybal, Edward R. (Calif.)
Rudd, Eldon (Ariz.)
Russo, Marty (Ill.)
Sabo, Martin Olav (Minn.)
St. Germain, Fernand J. (R.I.)
Savage, Gus (Ill.)
Sawyer, Harold S. (Mich.)
Schulze, Richard T. (Pa.)
Schumer, Charles E. (N.Y.)
Sharp, Philip R. (Ind.)
Shaw, E. Clay, Jr. (Fla.)
Sikorski, Gerry (Minn.)
Siljander, Mark D. (Mich.)
Sisisky, Norman (Va.)
Skeen, Joe (N. Mex.)
Skelton, Ike (Mo.)
Slattery, Jim (Kans.)
Smith, Denny (Oreg.)
Smith, Lawrence J. (Fla.)
Smith, Virginia (Nebr.)
Snowe, Olympia J. (Maine)
Snyder, Gene (Ky.)
Solomon, Gerald B.H. (N.Y.)
Staggers, Harley O. (W. Va.)
Stangeland, Arlan (Minn.)
Stenholm, Charles W. (Tex.)
Stokes, Louis (Ohio)
Studds, Gerry E. (Mass.)
Sunia, Fofo I.F. (Am. Samoa)
Swift, Al (Wash.)
Synar, Mike (Okla.)
Tallon, Robin (S.C.)
Tauke, Thomas J. (Iowa)
Tauzin, W.J. (Billy) (La.)
Taylor, Gene (Mo.)
Thomas, Robert Lindsay (Ga.)
Torres, Esteban Edward (Calif.)
Torricelli, Robert G. (N.J.)
Towns, Edolphus (N.Y.)
Traxler, Bob (Mich.)
Udall, Morris K. (Ariz.)
Valentine, Tim (N.C.)
Vandergriff, Tom J. (Tex.)
Vander Jagt, Guy (Mich.)
Vento, Bruce F. (Minn.)
Volkmer, Harold L. (Mo.)
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Walgren, Doug (Pa.)
Walker, Robert S. (Pa.)
Washington, Harold (Ill.)
Watkins, Wes (Okla.)
Weaver, James (Oreg.)
Weber, Vin (Minn.)
Weiss, Ted (N.Y.)
Wheat, Alan (Mo.)
Whitley, Charles (N.C.)
Whittaker, Bob (Kans.)
Williams, Lyle (Ohio)
Williams, Pat (Mont.)
Wilson, Charles (Tex.)
Wise, Robert E., Jr. (W. Va.)
Wolf, Frank R. (Va.)
Wolpe, Howard (Mich.)
Wortley, George C. (N.Y.)
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