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ARMS CONTROL: A TWENTY-FIVE-YEAR PERSPECTIVE

by Morton H. Halperin

We live now in an arms control world, and because both historical and real memories are very short, we tend to take this world for granted and to act as if it has always existed. Similarly we judge the success of the arms control approach as if it has always been with us.

By an arms control world I mean a world in which the possibility of agreements limiting the deployment of arms by major powers devoting substantial resources to building military forces to oppose each other is proven by the existence of such agreements. I mean also a world in which the desirability of further agreements is widely accepted by governments as well as interested elite groups in the United States. Finally I mean a world in which decisions about weapons production and deployment take account of their possible impact on arms control agreements, and are often justified in whole or in part by the contribution that they are said to make to promoting arms control agreements.

Many tend to forget and others simply do not know that this world did not always exist. In fact twenty-five years ago there were simply no arms controllers and no arms control. There were, as always, utopians who longed for a world without war, but there was no body of literature that rationalized agreements among military and political adversaries. Fifteen years ago there was no widespread consensus of the value of arms control agreements within the Executive branch or the Congress and arms control implications had no effect on weapons decisions. Only within the last decade, with the exception of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, have we had major arms control agreements affecting the nuclear forces of the major powers.

This is an attempt enlivened, one hopes, by snatches from an unwritten memoir to remind those who may be discouraged just how far we have come in a relatively few years, to assess where we are in light of where we have come from. I want also to assess how well we have done in light of the objectives of those who helped in bringing the arms control world into existence. Finally, I want to draw some lessons for the present and the future and, in particular, to relate the freeze proposal to the arms control movement.

The Late 1950s Consensus

When Eugene Rostow testified at his confirmation hearing to be Ronald Reagan's first director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, he presented a view of arms control which was widely condemned and which was viewed by most people as absurd. In fact, the perspective which

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Morton H. Halperin, a political scientist, began his study of arms control as a 22-year-old research associate at the Harvard Center for International Affairs where he authored, co-authored and edited more than a dozen books on various aspects of arms control from 1960-66. At age 28, he moved to the Pentagon where, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning and Arms Control, he advised first Secretary of Defense McNamara and, later, Secretary Clifford on many of the issues discussed here.

When the Nixon Administration took office in 1968, Dr. Halperin moved to the White House and served on the Senior Staff of the National Security Council as an assistant to Dr. Henry Kissinger.

After four years working at the Brookings Institution, where he authored, among other works, "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy," Dr. Halperin founded the Center for National Security Studies which is jointly sponsored by the Fund for Peace and the ACLU Foundation. Its function is to prevent claims of national security from being used to erode constitutional procedures or civil liberties.

Morton Halperin is an elected Council Member; the Federation solicited this memoir from him.

FAS HIRES SPACE POLICY SPECIALIST

FAS has hired a fourth senior staff member to help shape its space policy. John Pike, formerly Research Director of the Institute for Security and Cooperation in Outer Space, joined the staff in May. He has prepared, in consultation with other FAS specialists, the six point program of "mutual initiatives," summarized on pg. 11, on which FAS will be working as a necessary prelude to—and possible substitute for—the much more difficult to achieve treaties.

As part of his duties, Pike convenes weekly a Space Policy Working Group which contains interested specialists on Capitol Hill. At monthly intervals, larger groupings of representatives of interested groups will similarly be convened to be updated on space policy.

Pike would welcome receiving letters or calls from interested FAS members, and other scientists, who would like to work with him on space policy. Send reprints of your work on space policy, and for those persons who seek research topics and problems in space policy, Mr. Pike has a number of issues he wishes to have researched.

FAS welcomes also comments on its evolving space program sketched on page 11.

ANTI-SATELLITE REGIME PROPOSED BY FAS—Pg. 11

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he presented is one that was widely shared in the government, strategic policy circles, and academia until the late 1950s.

As Rostow explained it, arms are only a symptom of political tensions between major adversaries. The geopolitical and ideological disputes between nations determine the evolution of international politics and the possibility of war. Wars arise because of real differences between states which they are unable to settle by diplomatic means. Agreements between nations limiting the production, testing, deployment, or use of weapons systems cannot, therefore, affect the likelihood of war. Such agreements are desirable and possible only after two nations have resolved their political problems. Professor Rostow, reflecting this view, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Rush-Baghot agreement between the United States and Canada was his idea of sensible arms control.

Those who had this perspective (and those who still do) do not argue that the United States should not develop and present arms control proposals. They view the competition in the presentation of "reasonable" proposals as an important part of the political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus the United States should put forward proposals which appeal to public opinion in the United States and abroad and which, to use the currently fashionable phrase, occupy the moral high ground. From the Baruch plan to abolish nuclear weapons, to the General and Complete Disarmament proposals of the early 1960s, this perspective dominated the development of arms control proposals by the United States government.

This approach had two other typical characteristics. The first was that there was no need to assess the strategic or political implications of the successful negotiation of the proposals since there was no expectation that they might actually be implemented. ACDA did not exist, arms control staffs in the State Department, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were small. None of these offices had the capacity or the interest to do a strategic analysis of a proposal before it became American policy.

One reason that all concerned, including the JCS, took such a relaxed view is that another invariable characteristic of all such proposals is that they included a "joker" which insured that they would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union. Usually the "joker" was a demand for such intrusive on-site inspection that one could be sure that the Soviet leaders would never go along. By demanding that there be agreement on inspection first, one could generally avoid serious and detailed negotiations.

If all of these traits seem more familiar than they would have a few years back, it is because they are to be found not only in Mr. Rostow's rhetoric of his first few months in office but also in the proposals of the Reagan Administration, including the moral high ground of the zero-zero option and the demand for inspection in the chemical warfare and nuclear testing proposals.

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In the 1950s these views not only predominated, they were essentially unchallenged in circles with any real influence on policy until the arms control perspective emerged.

The Arms Control Challenge

Beginning in the mid 1950s, one group of civilian military strategists began to develop a new perspective. Striving to figure out ways to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear war, they began to ask whether negotiated agreements with the Soviet Union could somehow contribute to that goal.

Within the government and among those with access to classified information, the event which triggered serious thinking on this question was the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to hold a conference to discuss steps which could be taken to reduce the likelihood of a surprise attack. The Soviets, still smarting from the sudden and unexpected invasion by Hitler, and the Americans, still preoccupied with Pearl Harbor, agreed that preventing a surprise attack was a matter of mutual interest. Each nation, anxious to avoid the possibility of being subject to a surprise attack, was, in principle, willing to agree to steps which would also reduce its capability to launch such an attack. The problem was to see if there were any measures which would be effective and which both sides would accept.

For the first time in the post-war period there was, at least on the American side, a serious desire to arrive at an agreement. Thus for the first time a team of analysts was assembled, including several from the RAND Corporation, to see if any useful ideas could be developed. Little came of the conference itself—the two sides came with very different ideas about everything including what surprise was— but those who worked on the conference came away feeling that they were on to something new and important. Agreements, properly designed, might actually contribute to security.

The wider strategic community—then only a very small group of civilians—quickly became exposed to the ideas involved. Some of them had in fact appeared even earlier in Thomas C. Schelling's seminal work, *The Strategy of Conflict,* published in 1957. The ideas were discussed at a conference convened in June of 1960 by Donald Brennan and others as part of the preparation of a special issue of *Daedalus*, later converted into a book, *Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security.*

By the time that the Summer Study on Arms Control of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences was convened in 1960, the basic themes of the arms control approach were commonplace among a small group of strategic analysts and almost wholly unknown elsewhere.

My sudden emersion into these ideas as a research assistant at the conference was a form of intellectual shell shock. I was just completing academic training in international relations and took for granted the set of ideas that I described above. Early on in the summer, I persuaded the participants that the basic propositions of the new approach needed to be spelled out in a short book, and Schelling and I went to work on the "primer"—as we all described it—which became *Strategy and Arms Control,* published in 1961.

Morton H. Halperin

Development of this new theory was very rapid. There were only a handful of civilian strategists at the time, and they communicated frequently at conferences and meetings, at RAND, with which almost all had some form of association, in the Harvard-MIT arms control seminar, to which most belonged, and by the distribution of papers. By the early 1960s the theory had been developed. The next twenty years were to see its extraordinary popularization but virtually no intellectual development.

The major insight of the new approach was the view that in principle the security interests of two adversaries might be enhanced by agreements between them.

The arms control approach, as it was codified in the "primer," *Strategy and Arms Control,* was described as follows:

> We believe that arms control is a promising, but still only dimly perceived, enlargement of the scope of our military strategy. It rests essentially on the recognition that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violance of war in the event it occurs.
>
> We use the term "arms control" rather than "disarmament." Our intention is simply to broaden the term. We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments. Whether the most promising areas of arms control involve reductions in certain kinds of military force, increases in certain kinds of military force, qualitative changes in weaponry, different modes of deployment, or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems, we prefer to treat as an open question.

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These were the basic ideas. One challenge, as *Strategy and Arms Control* made clear, was to develop concrete proposals which embodied these principles and which were likely to be acceptable to both nations. A second was to secure acceptance of this approach within the government.

The Bureaucracy Resists: The Kennedy Administration

Although many newly converted arms controllers, veterans of these various conferences and meetings, were appointed to high positions in the Kennedy Administration, the arms control approach had remarkably little effect on policy towards "disarmament" negotiations, and none at all on arms procurement and development decisions.

With the partial exception of the Test Ban Treaty, there was no effort to develop proposals which would enhance the security of the United States, and no process to subject arms control proposals to serious scrutiny to determine their strategic implications. On the whole, the government proceeded as if the ideas of arms control had not been developed. Disarmament was a propaganda game which we had to and did engage in, but with no thought or even hope that agreements would result which would complement unilateral military policy.

The efforts to negotiate a test ban leading to the successful negotiation of the three environment ban by Averill Harriman in Moscow in 1962 were at most a partial exception to this rule. The major impetus for the Test Ban Treaty was not strategic, but rather the very widespread fear that nuclear testing was poisoning the atmosphere. There were no systematic attempts to assess the strategic implications of a test ban, or to determine whether a partial or complete halt in testing would enhance or hinder efforts to obtain a stable strategic nuclear balance.

The dominant disarmament effort of the Kennedy Administration was the attempt to negotiate a treaty for General and Complete Disarmament in three stages. This was a classic example of the "Rostow" approach to arms control. No one in the U.S. government took the possibility of general and complete disarmament seriously. The Soviets had proposed it and it was decided, for diplomatic reasons and to compete with the Soviets for support in the third world, that we had to feign interest and engage in negotiations, and so we did.

There was no serious analysis of the strategic implications of any of this, as I discovered in carrying out an assignment as a consultant in the Office of International Security Affairs in the Pentagon. At this point the United States and the Soviet Union were pretending that the major obstacle to agreeing to the first stage of GCD was a difference of 400,000 on what would be the agreed equal number to which the Soviet and American armed forces would be reduced. As I recall, we were holding out for 2.5 million, while the Soviets had proposed 2.1 million. The natural compromise was 2.3.

I was asked to do a paper assessing whether we could accept the 2.3 million figure. Being a relatively newly converted arms controller, I set out to determine how the three possible figures would affect American security. My first

THE DECISIVE PARTICIPANT

Perhaps the clearest lesson which emerges from any review of the recent arms control efforts is that in the absence of a powerful figure within the Executive branch committed to arms control and in a key position, progress will be very difficult.

The key participant must have the support of the President, must be committed to an agreement at all costs for personal as well as strategic reasons, must have control of the process, and must be confident of his ability to understand the issues and to reject the cautionary advice of the bureaucracy. He must be prepared to use informal channels.

The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty came about only because President Kennedy, newly committed to a peace program, sent Averill Harriman to Moscow to negotiate. Harriman was the quintessential decisive participant. He was committed to negotiating an agreement, had no truck for the cautionary warnings of the bureaucracy, was a hard worker with the skills to overcome the efforts of those in the bureaucracy who opposed him. He was back from Moscow in a few weeks with a treaty that would have taken years to negotiate in the existing formal channels.

As the narrative indicates, the Johnson Administration turned to arms control only because of the determined efforts of Robert McNamara, who gained the support of Lyndon Johnson and overrode bureaucratic opposition and made use of informal negotiating channels to start the process.

Henry Kissinger's role was equally essential in bringing the SALT I agreement to fruition, and in negotiating the Vladivostok framework for SALT II. (It is worth noting that the systematic denial of information to other participants is not a necessary part of this process.)

The need for a new and decisive participant has never been clearer than it is now. The Reagan Administration is clogged with determined opponents of arms control who occupy key positions, including that of chief negotiator in the Strategic Arms Talks. If President Reagan is serious about his commitment to the Congress to engage in negotiations aimed at agreement, he must bring in a new player (or empower a current one) so that there is a person with the authority to bring ideas directly to the President. This new player must have authority to talk with the Soviet leaders, be strongly motivated to seek an agreement, and be able to deal effectively with the opposition which will inevitably be brought to the White House.

If it recognizes this lesson, Congress, as part of this deal on the MX, would insist on the appointment of such a figure. The obvious choice is Brent Scowcroft, but taking all the lessons of history into account, the more effective choice may be the person who is reported to be Scowcroft's choice—Paul Nitze.

act was to ask for the study which I had assumed would have been done analyzing the 2.5 million figure that the U.S. had proposed in the on-going talks. I quickly discovered that there was no such study; there was not even a study of what forces the United States would cut to reach the 2.5 figure. No one seemed very interested in what I was doing, even though they all understood that the Administration was likely to propose or accept the compromise figure unless strong objections were raised. The military seemed most concerned that any study which showed how the armed forces could be cut would be used against them in negotiations about the budget.

The preoccupation with GCD and with keeping up with the Soviet Union in the propaganda race meant that no attention was paid to developing proposals which might have affected the testing, or deployment decisions with regard for the consequences for possible future agreements. It was only when a senior official of the government became interested in arms control for his own reasons that things changed. Again the change, when it came was very rapid.

THE GOVERNMENT ADOPTS ARMS CONTROL (1967-68)

Beginning in 1967, the Executive branch of the government moved rapidly to adopt the arms control approach developed ten years earlier. The key actor was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and the key issue was the deployment of an ABM system. Progress came very quickly, and by the end of the Johnson Administration the entire bureaucracy, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had come to accept all of the elements of the arms control world save for the need to take into account the arms control implications of unilateral weapons deployment decisions.

The Secretary of Defense, beleaguered by the growing opposition to the Vietnam war and his own increasing concerns about the war, was determined to prevent the deployment of an ABM system by the United States. He viewed such a system as wasteful and ineffective and one that could not stimulate another round of the strategic offensive arms race. For a number of years, helped by the fact that the technological problems of designing a defense against ballistic missiles seemed to most scientists to be insurmountable, McNamara succeeded in persuading President Lyndon Johnson from holding off a decision to go forward with a deployment.

Nonetheless, the Secretary realized that time was not on his side. As the information from increasingly reliable intelligence sources confirmed that the Soviet Union was indeed beginning its own ABM deployment, the Administration would be open to the charge that it created an "ABM gap." McNamara knew that in the face of growing Congressional, military, and public pressure, Johnson would not go into the 1968 Presidential campaign without announcing an ABM deployment.

Faced with this reality, McNamara extracted three concessions from Johnson in return for going along with the inclusion of funds for the ABM in the defense budget. The first was that he would be able to announce the decision as he chose and to provide the rationale for the deployment. This he was to do in his famous and powerful Ann Arbor speech which was mostly a plea for an end to the spiraling nuclear arms race. In that context, McNamara was able to rule out a deployment aimed at protecting American cities from a Soviet attack while announcing a miniature deployment aimed at coping with a small Chinese ICBM force. The speech was so heavily slanted towards a criticism of the nuclear action-reaction cycle that many observers concluded incorrectly that the ABM deployment announcement had been tacked onto the speech at the last minute.

McNamara's two other concessions were directly related to arms control. The first was that the United States would make it clear that deployment would go forward only if the United States failed to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union to prohibit deployment by both countries. The second was that the United States would make a serious effort to negotiate such an agreement.

(No one was disturbed by the fact that a deployment said to be aimed at the Chinese would be given up in return for an agreement with the Soviet Union which would, of course, not prevent the Chinese ICBM deployment against which it was aimed. In the event the Chinese cooperated, first by not deploying an ICBM first and then by becoming a de facto ally of the United States, against which we no longer design and deploy our military forces.)

This deal, struck in secret between Johnson and McNamara, was in fact the origin of the first serious American effort to develop a strategic arms control proposal which was to be put forward in the hope and expectation that it might lead to an agreement between the two nuclear super-powers which would actually alter their planned strategic weapons deployment. It is worth noting that from the narrow perspective of its original objective—preventing an American ABM deployment—it was spectacularly successful.

Secretary of Defense McNamara

The bureaucracy approached the effort to persuade the Soviet leaders to enter into these talks with the clear understanding that something new and different was going on.

Despite the existence of an on-going forum for the discussion of arms control proposals, the United States, in a quiet approach in Moscow, proposed to the Soviets the establishment of a new bilateral forum in which discussions would be kept secret and free from the propaganda motives which, as both sides knew, dominated the on-going discussions. The Kremlin clearly understood that what was being proposed was something new and very different, and it delayed for some period of time before informing U.S. Ambassador Llewelyn Thompson that it was ready to discuss the specific modalities of beginning serious bilateral negotiations aimed at arms control agreements affecting the strategic forces of the two nations. In retrospect it is clear that the Soviets understood and acquiesced in conducting negotiations which would be secret, serious, and non-polemical and which would have as their objective the negotiation of agreements. The Soviets apparently also understood that this would require discussion of information about their deployments which heretofore had not been shared with the Soviet Foreign Ministry officials, let alone with the bureaucracy of the United States government.

While waiting for the Soviet response to the American proposal to begin talks, the bureaucracy set to work to develop a proposal for presentation in the talks. It was understood by all that this was not business as usual. No reference was made by anyone involved to the American proposal for a freeze which was then ostensibly on the table in the public Geneva negotiations. It was clear that the task was to come up with a serious proposal which, if accepted by the Soviet Union, would enhance American security.

The common recognition of the seriousness of the situation was reflected in a number of organizational changes. Most important was the decision by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, not to turn the problem over to the existing arms control staff but rather to create a new office, headed by General Royall Allison, an Air Force officer with a reputation as a serious analyst. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense an ad-hoc team was assembled to work with Allison and with officials at State and ACDA. The intelligence community, and in particular the CIA, became actively involved in the process. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who seldon appeared at inter-agency meetings outside of the White House, chaired a meeting of what was then called the Committee of Principals and made it clear that the President wanted a serious proposal to present to the Soviet Union.

By this time, in the spring of 1968, Johnson was fully committed to seeking an agreement with the Soviet Union, not only because of his commitment to his former Secretary of Defense (who had just left to become head of the World Bank), but also because he had come to see this issue as a way to portray himself as a man of peace and hence to overcome, at least in the history books, his image as the war maker.

The position developed, which basically called for a freeze on offensive missiles and limitation of ABM to equal and presumably low numbers, was based on the clear assumption that it might be adopted and implemented. The Joint Chiefs and others carefully reviewed its strategic implications.

The outcome of these deliberations was a watershed in the adoption by the United States of an arms control approach to military security. President Johnson, as was his style, asked for and received a unanimous recommendation from his principal advisors. They agreed that the proposal they had developed should be presented to the Soviet Union with a view to reaching an agreement. The proposal did not include a demand for on-site inspection and did not contain any other "jokers" known to be unacceptable to the Soviet leaders.

Most surprising to those observing the process was the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the past they had taken the view that certain arms control agreements might entail justifiable military risks and costs if the advantages in other areas such as diplomacy were very substantial. They had, on the whole, not taken the matter very seriously, assuming that no agreements would ever be negotiated. Now, after very intensive consideration based on the papers prepared by the new office, the Joint Chiefs took a new look at the situation and adopted a wholly new position.

For the first time the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed the unanimous view that arms control agreements, properly designed, could actually enhance the security of the United States. No longer would proposed limitations be looked upon as a cross which the military would have to bear because the civilian leadership gave precedence to other goals. Rather, the Chiefs now proclaimed that reciprocal limitations could contribute to the security of the United States. The arms control approach had been accepted in what has always been viewed as a most difficult conquest. The Chiefs were at least conceptually on board.

W. Averell Harriman

—photo by Bernard L. Schwartz

Almost as significant as the Chiefs' adoption of this approach in principle was their acceptance of it in practice. The Chiefs' red-striped paper reported that, with one exception by the Chief of Naval Operations, they believed that the proposal which they had been asked to consider would in fact enhance the security of the White House.

In adopting this position the Chiefs, of necessity, also radically altered their view of inspection. Previously they had held to the position that on-site inspection would always be essential. Now they were prepared to consider each proposed limitation on its merits and decide whether unilateral means of verification would be sufficient or if some agreed measures would be required. At least as important as the Chiefs' abandonment of the universal requirement for on-site inspection (which they had retreated from once before in reluctantly accepting the three environment Test Ban Treaty) was the approach that they agreed to take to determining how certain the verification had to be.

Previously the Chiefs had taken the position that a limitation could be included in an arms control agreement only if there was 100% certainty of detecting any Soviet cheating. The absurdity of this approach came to the fore in considering whether to include a freeze on the construction of new ballistic missile submarines in the agreement along with a freeze on land-based missiles.

Fixed ICBMs were no problem, I was told by one military officer, because we could easily detect any Soviet violation. SLBMs could not be included, he continued, because we could not be sure of detecting a Soviet violation of the agreement. We then had the following exchange:

Halperin: How many ballistic missile subs do we now have?

Military Officer: Forty-one.

H: How many do we plan to have in ten years, absent their inclusion in the agreement?

MO: Forty-one.

H: How many ballistic missile subs do the Soviets now have?

MO: Nine. (This and the following numbers are very general approximations, not only because I do not want to risk revealing classified information but because I do not remember the actual numbers. However, the orders of magnitude are correct.)

H: How many will they have within ten years, absent their inclusion of the agreement?

MO: Fifty.

H: If there were an agreement freezing the Soviets at nine, how many additional subs could they deploy before we would be certain of detecting a violation?

MO: Three.

H: So if we do not include subs in the agreement the Soviets will deploy 41 more subs in the next 10 years and not be in violation of the agreement, but if we include subs in the agreement they could only deploy two more before we would detect the violation?

MO: Correct.

H: Then why do we not want to include subs in the

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THE DETENTE TRAP

No issue has more bedeviled arms control negotiations than the effort to articulate a connection between arms control negotiations and the conduct of the Soviet Union—particularly its use of military force and its dispatch of military aid.

That there is an underlying reality of "linkage" which cannot be willed away is shown by the first clash between arms control and Soviet behavior. When the Kremlin sought to announce the visit of President Johnson to Leningrad to open arms control talks on the day after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Johnson and Rusk, without any hesitation, told Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin that this was simply not in the cards.

At this very general level, linkage is simply a political fact of life for the United States, although not for the Soviet Union (which could sign SALT I while Hanoi was being destroyed by American bombers.)

The choice comes with the possible effort to make changes in Soviet behavior elsewhere in the world a condition of SALT. Two forms of this linkage have been attempted; both were unsuccessful and served only to delay negotiations. The first might be termed linkage as a consequence and the second linkage as a precondition. Kissinger tried the first and Reagan the second. Both failed.

The Kissinger approach suggested that following the signing of a strategic arms agreement, the Soviets would moderate their behavior in key regions, including the Middle East. When the Soviets continued to behave as they always had, it was clear that Kissinger had promised more than he could deliver. The credibility of strategic arms negotiations suffered a blow from which it has yet to fully recover.

The Reagan Administration, far from learning the lesson, sought to go one large step further. The President indicated that he would not even begin to negotiate with the Soviet Union until there was a fundamental change in Soviet behavior. Pressure, first from Europe, and then from the American public, finally forced the Administration to abandon that position.

We now seem to have adopted the correct posture on linkage. No one can accuse the Reagan Administration of being soft on the Russians or of underestimating the ability and willingness of the Soviet leadership to take actions which are designed to undercut American initiatives and efforts throughout the world. Without expecting that to change, the Administration is actively seeking negotiated arms control agreements.

The point should be clear. If we and the Soviets did not have conflicting interests around the world, arms control would be unnecessary. Arms control agreements may be able to contribute to reducing the risk of nuclear war. To expect them to do more, whether it is an expectation or a precondition, is to doom arms control and to create expectations that cannot be met.

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agreement?

MO: Because we are opposed to including any limitation which we cannot verify with 100% certainty.

In the end the Chiefs abandoned that long-held position and agreed that a freeze on the construction of new submarines should be included in the agreement. They accepted the principle that one should first determine how likely we were to detect various levels of cheating and then decide whether we wanted to have the limitation included in the agreement, taking into account the plans of both sides in the absence of the agreement as well as the strategic consequences of different levels of cheating.

The alteration of the intelligence community position towards verification of an arms control agreement was at least as far-reaching as that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Previously the CIA, led by Richard Helms, had taken the position that unilateral intelligence means, could not be the basis for detecting violations of arms control agreement. This was not because the intelligence community, with its increasingly sophisticated technological means could not detect violations of an agreement, rather it was because the CIA was not willing to have these means relied upon. The intelligence community recognized that if their unilateral technical means were the basis for asserting that an agreement could be verified, there would be pressure to discuss those means publicly in order to assure the public and the Senate that the agreement could be verified. Moreover, if the intelligence community detected a violation, calling it to the attention of the Soviet Union might well entail the disclosure to them of critical information about the effectiveness of American intelligence gathering systems. Worst of all, in order to justify withdrawal from a treaty, the United States would almost certainly feel obliged to make public the evidence supporting the allegation that the Soviets had violated the treaty.

And so the intelligence community wanted nothing to do with the task of monitoring an arms control agreement. It held to this position as a dogma (again with the partial exception of the Test Ban Treaty, for which special unilateral systems had been deployed) until the spring of 1968, when it became clear that the President wanted an agreement and that it would only be possible if the resources of the intelligence community were used. At the Committee of Principles meeting, in the midst of the preparation process, Helms announced that the intelligence community was prepared to accept responsibility for monitoring an agreement. When the specific proposal was ready to go to the President, the intelligence community blessed it with the label: "verifiable."

The changes in position by other agencies were less far-reaching. State had to abandon the view that secret bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union would undermine the NATO alliance and that agreements with the Soviet Union were likely to undermine the alliance also. It also had to concede a significant role to other agencies in developing negotiating positions.

For the bureaucracy as a whole, change meant the acceptance of the conditions of an arms control world. Serious agreements which actually limited deployments on both sides could be negotiated and could contribute to American security. Gradually over time it was to come to accept the final component of the arms control approach, i.e., that unilateral weapons deployment decisions had to take account of their implications for arms control.

The irony of these rapid changes in the positions of the key actors in the bureaucracy was that in the short run they came to naught. Just as the American and Russian leaders were to announce a summit meeting in Leningrad to initiate what was later to become known as the SALT process, the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia and the talks were postponed. This enabled the Nixon Administration to begin the SALT process by taking for granted the basic support of the bureaucracy, including the Joint Chiefs and the Intelligence Community, and it helps to explain why so little attention has focused on the changes in principle and the acceptance of an arms control world. It may also help to explain why so many have been ready to pronounce arms control to be a failure.

The Accomplishments of Arms Control

It is often argued that arms control has been a failure, that it has not put important limits on the arms race, and that by legitimating bargaining chips it has actually stimulated the arms race.

In my view, this argument is profoundly wrong. It ignores the accomplishments of the arms control approach and reaches its conclusions only by comparing the arms control world in which we now live to some imagined utopia, rather than to the world which existed before 1968 or would exist now if arms control were abandoned.

In fact there are a number of very significant accomplishments of the arms control approach.

Far and away the most important is the permanent bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union which effectively prevents either side from deploying a system designed to shoot down the incoming missiles of the other side.



SAFEGUARD EYE—Part of the Safeguard ballistic missile defense system, the perimeter acquisition radar housed in this concrete structure will reach out more than 1,000 miles in search of enemy ballistic missile warheads. The Safeguard site is north of Grand Forks, N.D., and is manned by Army missilemen.

—Air Defense Command Photo

COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS

One of the enduring debates in the arms control community is over the question of whether or not one should seek to negotiate comprehensive agreements.

Many arms controllers have reached the conclusion that the effort to negotiate comprehensive agreements was a mistake and that one should now focus on specific individual measures.

It is not possible to determine how this lesson could have been drawn from the experience of the past 15 years. The only agreements which have been successfully negotiated have been comprehensive ones. The inclusion in the agreement of a number of elements made trade-offs possible. The United States could gain the limitations it wanted while conceding other limits to the Soviet Union. There is nothing to suggest that more narrowly drawn agreements would have been easier to negotiate or that they would have been easier to sell to the Senate.

In fact one could argue the opposite. It is the failure to include limits in the agreement that has often been most controversial. Moreover the Soviets have demonstrated that they will push to the limits of any agreement, not doing anything that clearly violates them but nonetheless exploiting every loophole and ambiguity. Perhaps a careful review would lead us in the opposite direction—to agreements which covered all aspects of strategic forces, leaving no room for loopholes or ambiguity.

Comprehensiveness would also make verification easier.

If everything were to be controlled it might be easier first to stop and then to try to negotiate reductions.

It is worth noting that this was the original goal of those, especially Robert McNamara, who worked for the adoption of an arms control approach within the government. It also is "good" arms control, in that it reflects the philosophy and the goals of those who developed the concept in the late fifties.

The technology of the mid-1960s was moving the world in an extremely dangerous direction. The combination of ICBMs and ABMs, if both deployed in large numbers, would håve produced a situation in which there appeared to be an enormous incentive in striking first if war were to come. The side which attacked first could mount a well-coordinated attack which would ultimately overwhelm and penetrate the opposition ABM system. The second strike by the other side would be sufficiently ragged that all of the responding missiles could be handled by the ABM system. Thus in a crisis both sides would have an enormous incentive to strike first.

Arms control dealt with this danger by permitting both sides to forego an ABM deployment, confident in the knowledge that the other side was exercising similar restraint. The resulting world is one in which the danger of preemptive attack is much lower, in which the two sides by agreement have institutionalized the world of assured destruction in which neither has any incentive to strike first in a crisis.

The ABM treaty standing alone thus accomplishes the central objective of arms control in insuring that technology does not produce a war or an arms race that neither side wants or can win.

Another important success for the arms control approach, which is also in the ABM treaty as well as the SALT I and II agreements, is the establishment of the Consultative Committee. This joint Soviet-American technical committee meets from time to time in secret to discuss possible violations of existing arrangements. This forum permits both sides to bring up actions by the other which they cannot explain or understand and which might constitute a violation of existing treaties. It helps to clarify uncertainties which might otherwise force one side to abandon a treaty or accelerate the nuclear arms race.

Another important arms control success is the various measures that each side has been committed to take so as not to interfere with and in some cases actually to facilitate, the verification of existing limitations. These agreements, assuring us that satellites will not be shot down or rendered ineffective, play an important role in reducing fears of a first strike.

In addition, the creation of an arms control world has meant that unilateral weapons procurement decisions are the subject of much more extensive debate than they were

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VERIFICATION TRAP

Even the most dedicated arms controller feels obligated to say that, of course, the agreement that is being proposed must be adequately verified.

Perhaps we should start putting the issue the other way. An unrestrained arms race is acceptable only in areas where unilateral means of verification are fully acceptable. One of the great surprises of the SALT process is the degree to which the Soviet leaders have been willing to discuss the details of their weapon systems' characteristics and deployments, and their willingness to explain apparent violations. The Security Consultative Committee has been and continues to be one of the most important successes of SALT. The cooperative means which the Soviets have been willing to negotiate, including the agreement not to interfere with national means (including satellite reconnaissance) and to limit the enciphering of telemetry are as important as they are unexpected.

The lesson of all this should be that the more difficult it is to verify and to predict Soviet behavior in a particular area, the more important it is to bring the conduct under internationally agreed limits. Verification is easier and we are then in a position to raise questions about Soviet behavior.

Ask not if verification is good enough to permit including the activity within an agreement. Ask rather if verification is good enough so that we can safely leave it out if we choose to.

BARGAINING CHIPS

One of the most important differences between the American government and every other major world power is the lack of continuity among the officials making policy on issues such as arms control. This permits each new administration to reinterpret the history of the recent past for its own purposes with little regard for what actually happened.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the use of arguments relating to bargaining chips.

President Reagan, who now talks as if he supports and approves of the arms control agreements of the past, argues that it was possible to secure the ABM Treaty only because the Senate, albeit by a one-vote margin, approved going on with the American ABM deployment.

While it may be true that the Soviets would have had less incentive to negotiate if the Senate had turned down the ABM deployment, it is equally true that the Nixon Administration would have had much less incentive to negotiate if it were sure that it would be able to go forward with an ABM deployment.

As the current debate over the MX makes clear, the Congress must be concerned about sending messages to two audiences: the Executive branch and the Russians. If bargaining chips are to be anything but a disaster, they must take into account both targets.

In the case of the ABM the trick was to leave the Russians and the Executive branch uncertain about what the Congress would permit the Pentagon to do in the absence of an ABM treaty. The Russians had to fear that if agreement were not reached, the President would continue to be able to fashion majorities in the Congress which would have permitted an American ABM deployment, which would inevitably have grown into an area anti-Soviet system. On the other hand, the Administration had to be concerned with the possibility that opponents of the ABM system would be able to persuade a majority of the Senate to vote against the deployment, even in the absence of a treaty—especially if there was no evidence that the United States had actively and seriously sought an agreement banning ABM systems.

The mechanism which worked in 1969 was a very close vote in the Senate. This might work again in the early 1980s if close votes on the MX force the Administration to press actively for a ban on testing any new missiles. However, close votes are difficult to contrive and there is a danger that once a program is approved several years in a row, Congress will feel committed to it regardless of whether or not there has been any serious effort to negotiate it away. Moreover the history of arms control negotiations suggests that what is sold to the Congress as a "bargaining chip" usually turns out to be non-negotiable in the international forum. Even in the case of the ABM when the Russians responded to an American menu of choices by picking a zero option, they were told that they had picked the wrong option.

In the case of the MX, the Administration has hedged about whether it is willing to negotiate away the MX deployment, or whether it views the MX as non-negotiable and as a bargaining chip only in the sense that it is supposed to get the Soviets to negotiate on other issues.

Fortunately there is an alternative approach to bargaining chips which focuses on the fact that the Congress needs to bargain simultaneously with the Executive branch and the Soviets. This is the conditional deployment.

In the case of the MX, deployment would be made conditional on the Administration making a serious effort to negotiate an agreement which would make the deployment unnecessary—the most obvious candidate being a ban on the flight testing of even one additional ICBM. Recognizing that the Administration is at least as serious an obstacle to agreement as the Soviets, the Congress should insist that some of its members be fully informed about the negotiations and that sufficient time be provided to work out an agreement.

In short, bargaining chips can work if the Congress recognizes that it is trying to influence bargaining within the Executive branch as well as between the United States and the Soviet Union.

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in the past. In light of the widespread perception that the decision by the United States to begin the testing of MIRVs in the late 1960s was one of the fundamental errors of the nuclear age, it is startling to consider how little public debate and attention attended this decision. Indeed for a long time the development of MIRVs was highly classified. Secretary of Defense McNamara made the decision to declassify the fact that we were developing MIRVs in an effort to head off right-wing pressures for new nuclear delivery systems. There was no fear or expectation that opposition would be generated from the left by those concerned about the destabilizing characteristics of MIRVs, and almost none emerged.

It is only years later that there is extensive public debate about whether the United States should have taken the lead in testing and deploying MIRVs. The contrast with the extensive public debate about the MX deployment is very sharp.

Compatibility with arms control agreements is now an agreed criterion in assessing any strategic weapons deployment, and arms control considerations are taken into account in designing weapons systems. Obviously one would prefer that these criteria be given even more weight, but it is worth noting that there is a very substantial improvement from the situation of twenty-five and fifteen years ago.

It is true that the bargaining chip argument is also a product of the arms control world, and one whose effects are often pernicious. It is worth noting, however, that in the

non-arms control world weapons decisions were made with little opposition that there was no need to put forward such arguments.

The Freeze and Arms Control

For many in the public the freeze movement is seen as rejection of the arms control approach, as an effort to end the arms race rather than to manage it. If, however, one thinks about the freeze as a serious proposal which one actually hopes to see negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, then the arms control movement should be viewed as a necessary forerunner.

The SALT negotiations make it possible to argue that a negotiated freeze is possible. They demonstrate that the Soviet leaders are willing to permit that kind of detailed discussion of weapons system characteristics which would be necessary to negotiate a freeze. The acceptance by the bureaucracy of the verifiability of SALT II greatly eases the burden of arguing that the freeze can be verified. This is so not only in the very general sense that the changes in attitudes towards verification were necessary to permit consideration of a freeze, but also because many of the limitations of a freeze are part of SALT I or II or the ABM treaty regime.

The absence of ABM systems on both sides also makes it easier to argue that a freeze is not a threat to American security. It the Soviets had an ABM system, differences in the characteristics of the offensive forces of each side might seem to be more important.

Moreover, one can use arms control concepts to explain and justify the freeze. The new developments in technology are those such as extreme accuracy which might lead one side or the other to conclude that a nuclear war can be limited and controlled and end in victory and survival. By heading off the new weapons systems, the freeze can help to reduce the incentive to launch a nuclear attack.

The freeze is not as radical a concept as it is often made out to be. Indeed acceptance of it by the bureaucracy would involve a far less fundamental change than the acceptance of an arms control approach in the late 1960s.

The last mass public move to control nuclear weapons was allowed to dissipate with the Partial Test Ban Treaty. That must not be permitted to happen again. Building on the arms control revolution that has occurred since, we must bring a halt to the arms race by negotiating a freeze and then turn to the task of bringing us all out of the nuclear world in which we live into a post-nuclear environment in which nuclear weapons are outlawed.

John Pike, FAS Assistant for Space Policy

FAS SPACE POLICY: THE WE WON'T IF YOU WON'T APPROACH

We are presently poised to the brink of an arms race in space, that will greatly increase the likelihood of war here on Earth. If we are to avert this, we must act quickly, and effectively. There is both the opportunity and the need for the United States to adopt a series of mutual declaratory policies that will avert an arms race in space. The most important and pressing of these would be a mutual agreement for a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.

There is good precedent for the use of mutual declaratory policies to regulate the superpower arms race. We recently marked the twentieth anniversary of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963. That treaty was preceded by a test moratorium, established in 1958 by mutual declarations by the Soviet Union and the United States. The speed with which the treaty was concluded was in part a product of the experience gained during this mutual test moratorium.

The United States has tried two approaches to controlling the space arms race. When we dismantled our early nuclear-tipped ASAT in 1975, some people hoped that this example of unilateral restraint would lead to similar restraint on the part of the Soviets. These hopes were disappointed shortly thereafter when the Soviets resumed testing their ASAT, after a pause of several years. The US and USSR held three negotiating sessions in 1978 and 1979 to consider a possible ban on ASAT's. Given the current political climate, it seems very unlikely that such negotiations will be resumed within the next few years. Even if we were to resume talks by 1985, the continued testing and development of ASAT's and other space weapons would greatly complicate the negotiations.

If we are to avoid an arms race in space, we must act now before it gains irreversible momentum. The six measures we propose require no protracted negotiation. They are subject to ready and unambiguous verification. The burden falls equally on both sides, and the United States retains the ability to act quickly should the Soviets renounce their commitments. These measures can be initiated by a simple Presidential announcement, and the commitments would be honored by the US so long as the Soviets made and kept these same commitments.

These measures would not require ratification by the Senate, but the Congress can play a key role in the effort to implement them, particularly through the budget process. These mutual declaratory policies are not a substitute for a treaty, but they are a much needed prelude, and perhaps an important precondition.

1. A MUTUAL MORATORIUM ON IN-SPACE TESTING OF ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) WEAPONS

A mutual moratorium on ASAT testing would slow the momentum of the arms race in space, as well as set the stage for negotiations limiting such weapons. If the new American ASAT is tested to operational readiness, the verification problems it presents will preclude a negotiated ban on ASAT deployment, which should be a major goal of the negotiations. Given the great difficulties that such

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negotiations will face, and the time needed to negotiate and ratify such a treaty, it is important that the goals of an ASAT Treaty not be undercut by continued testing. The present Soviet ASAT has very limited capabilities, and poses no real threat to our national security. Thus a ban on testing would not place the US at a disadvantage. If the Soviets were to resume testing, a continuing development program would allow the American ASAT to be tested in short order.

2. A MUTUAL PLEDGE NOT TO PLACE ANY DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS IN SPACE

The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits space-based directed energy weapons, such as lasers, for use against targets such as ICBM's. Directed energy weapons for use against other types of targets, such as satellites or bombers, are not prohibited. But it would be very difficult in practice, both technically and politically, to differentiate space-based directed energy weapons according to purpose. If either country were to orbit a small ASAT laser, the other side would very likely regard this move as a violation of the ABM Treaty, creating great pressures for its modification or abrogation.

3. A MUTUAL PLEDGE NOT TO INTERFERE WITH ANY OF THE OTHER COUNTRY'S MILITARY SATELLITES

At present, only national technical means of verification are protected from attack, and there is no accepted definition of just which satellites this includes. A mutual pledge not to interfere with any of the other country's satellites would resolve this ambiguity, while extending this protection to other important military satellites.

4. A MUTUAL EXCHANGE OF SPACE CREWS

Both the US and Soviet space programs have invited individuals from other countries to participate as members of flight crews, excluding each other. The extension of this international cooperation to the two major space powers, with US astronauts flying on the Salyut space station and Soviet cosmonauts flying on the Shuttle, would reduce mutual suspicions concerning the military character of these systems, and pave the way for more extensive exchanges and cooperative activities. The use of existing exchange programs would avoid the cost of technology transfer problems that arose in the Apollo/Soyuz mission.

5. ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION LINKS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET MASTER SATELLITE CONTROL FACILITIES

There have recently been several proposals to upgrade the existing hotline link between the White House and the Kremlin to include Soviet and American military command centers. Establishing similar links between master satellite control centers would provide a means to resolve questions concerning satellite malfunctions, reducing suspicions of attacks on satellites, as well as to facilitate maneuvering satellites to avoid collisions in space.

6. REVERSAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STAR WARS STRATEGY, AND A FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE 1972 TREATY LIMITING ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES

The Reagan Star Wars initiative threatens to renew the arms race in ABM systems, as well as to accelerate the offensive arms race, without protecting the nation's population from nuclear attack. It will lead to the abandonment of the ABM Treaty, our most beneficial and enduring arms control achievement. Instead, the President should be working to further strengthen the ABM Treaty, by closing loopholes, resolving ambiguities, and further restricting the development of ABM test facilities with significant ASAT capabilities, with the eventual goal of banning all testing against targets outside the atmosphere, whether satellites or re-entry vehicles.

—John Pike

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