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GORBACHEV IS MAKING THE WASHINGTON PUNDITS LOOK RIDICULOUS

Watching the pundits before the Gorbachev speech, one would have thought, as one observer put it, that they preferred Brezhnev. When McNeil/Lehrer lobed up soft pitches of the form: "Is he as important as Peter the Great?", Henry Kissinger, looking exceptionally dour, said it was not clear whether Gorbachev was a "statesman" or a "juggler," and that he could not figure out Gorbachev's "architecture".

Gorbachev's speech to the U.N. should end that kind of carping. No American President has made a speech like that since John F. Kennedy. (And the New York Times compared it to Woodrow Wilson's 14 points in 1918 and Churchill's Atlantic Charter in 1941.) America may have come out of the cold war with an enormous economic and ideological lead over the Soviet Union but, ironically, it is a Soviet voice that is now thrilling the U.N. audience. One delegate there said the speech was "magic".

The only complaint the Administration spin control specialists could come up with was "timing"; it amounted to the absurd query of asking why his U.N. speech was scheduled during the transition when we could not effectively "answer" it.

Actually, the transition was a boon to both Reagan and Bush. Neither was, really, put on the spot to answer the speech because, in this interregnum, each of them can duck it.

And duck it, the Alliance will. NATO will "pocket" the unilateral reduction. It will argue that the Soviets had their own reasons for the unilateral reduction to make their

forces "leaner and meaner". It will argue that the Soviets still have a big advantage despite the fact that 50,000 of the 500,000 demobilized are coming out of Eastern Europe with a great deal of equipment. It will argue that the reduction is deliberately undermining Western defense expenditures. By the time NATO analysts get done, the uninitiated will think that this maneuver was an effort to gain strategic advantage through unilateral reduction. Indeed George Will warned that Gorbachev's act might produce such a "pell-mell, bipartisan U.S. retreat from defense spending" that Gorbachev might achieve a "relative enhancement of Soviet military power".

But one interesting and useful result of the speech is this; it will be much harder for Western analysts to link the START agreement to future agreements on conventional forces as was the line before. In this sense, Gorbachev may have saved strategic reductions through conventional initiatives.

A Pragmatic Visionary

In any case, no one can doubt anymore that Gorbachev is the real thing—what our CIA once called a "pragmatic visionary". Without any question, he will be awarded, next October, the Nobel Peace Prize. Probably only a desire to avoid disrupting our election processes prevented the Nobel Peace Prize Committee from giving the award this October to Gorbachev and Reagan for the INF agreement. By next year, however, Gorbachev may get it all by himself.

As Mrs. Thatcher put it, the wonderful thing about Gorbachev's speech was how he put the arms race and his own problem in a context of the entire world. Through his own instincts, and the desperate economic plight of his own country, he has become the first superpower statesman to champion the new world trends and developments. These have been, thus far, obscured by the general preoccupation with the arms race.

His speech notes how "radically different" the world is even from that of 1950. This is not only because "mankind's survival and self-preservation" is now at issue but because economic, food, energy, environmental, information and population problems, "which only recently we treated as national or regional ones", have become global problems.

When have we last seen our leaders talking of "new realities" that call for "radical review" of approaches to the "totality of the problems of international cooperation as a major element of universal security".

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WESTERN ADVANTAGES: SEVEN EXTRA DAYS

Senator Sam Nunn made a major contribution to the debate over Gorbachev's speech when he pointed out the significant bottom line to the military advantages provided by Gorbachev's unilateral reduction.

According to Nunn, if the cuts are "fully and honestly implemented", they "could give NATO seven extra days to prepare for a Soviet short-warning attack." This, he said, would provide a "meaningful reduction in the Warsaw Pact's short-warning threat." He went on to list in his December 18 article six different major ways in which the west could use the extra time. These included the moving forward of NATO forces, calling up of reserves, installing of minefields, flying 500 fighter aircraft to airfields in western Europe, and so on. ■



Mikhail Gorbachev

Here in Washington, the locals continue to see their role as nothing more nor less than debunking Gorbachev. The *Washington Post* op-ed page, under the caption "Gorbachev's Gambit", produced an immediate response of four hostile articles. In addition to Will's article, Deputy Editorial Page Editor Stephen Rosenfeld warned that the Cold War could not be considered over until Eastern Europe was "exercising the choices it was promised at Yalta". Soviet Emigre Dimitri Simes said we should offer Gorbachev only "grudging admiration—the sort reserved for honorable opponents bravely fighting against considerable odds—and not the support one would give a new-found friend". And Charles Krauthammer called Gorbachev's speech "guff" except for the military reduction whose significance he called "indeterminate". These commentators have not the least sympathy for the problems Gorbachev faces. When, in his first meeting with Gorbachev, Andrei Sakharov presented a long list of demands, Gorbachev responded that "I don't think that even you, Andrei Dimitrievich, think that I can jump over stages and achieve all this at once." Sakharov agreed. But these commentators do not. They want to know why the new Constitution has no "constitutional provision for a multi-party system". And if you asked them why they are not focusing such attacks on the many other countries without multi-party systems, China, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, they would not know.

Business as Usual in Washington

Watching the Washington scene respond to Gorbachev, one cannot be too cynical. The establishment that bought the "window of vulnerability" moved on to applauding the "strategic defense initiative" and now, faced with what can only be described as a long awaited millennium in Russia, can only say that it "moves in the right direction." The public is warned not to expect too much less the bottom fall out of the Western alliance.

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A distinguished study group of Washington experts, with participation of dozens of experts, has not been able to include in its voluminous recommendations and observations, any answer to the question on everyone's lips: "Is it in our interests to have Gorbachev's reforms succeed and what, if anything, should we do about it?". Asked why this central question of our period has not been answered, the organizers say it has been answered "implicitly" because the paper says that: "Americans should act in America's interests". But if this delphic solution says anything, it says we ought not do anything. Meanwhile, throughout Western Europe, the leaders understand quite well that Gorbachev should be encouraged.

chev should be encouraged.

It is not only the careerists who have trouble with any suggestion of linking their fate to Gorbachev's future. It is also the progressives. A distinguished group of them has decided to settle all arms questions quite unilaterally without regard to negotiation with Gorbachev. They also fear linking their view—that all of this military junk is not necessary if it ever was—to the future of Russia or the viability of negotiations. Thus, both wings of American opinion would just as soon deal with Gorbachev at arms length.

But the public may save the day. And if Gorbachev
(Continued on page 4)

For Sceptics: Gorbachev "Benchmarks"

Defenders of Gorbachev's sincerity note that the speech provides "hostages" in the form of benchmarks which can be applied in the future to judge Gorbachev's consistency. Some of these are:

- **Emphasis on freedom:** "no genuine progress is possible at the expense of the rights and freedoms of individuals and nations . . ." "The Helsinki Process is a great process."

- **Military force:** "[especially] the stronger [nations] must exercise self-restraint and totally rule out any outward-oriented use of force."

- **Freedom of Choice:** ". . . the principle of freedom of choice is mandatory . . . Freedom of choice is a universal principle that should allow for no exceptions".

- **New Attitudes Toward the U.N.:** "We feel that states must, to some extent, review their attitude to the United Nations, this unique instrument without which world politics would be inconceivable today." "New prospects are opening up for it in all areas that fall naturally under its jurisdiction."

- **Emphasis on Treaty Observance:** ". . . Pacta sunt servanda. Treaties must be observed."

- **Emphasis on International Law:** "[We urge] an agreement within the United Nations on a uniform understanding of the principles and norms of international law, their codification with due regard to new conditions, and the development of legal norms for new areas of cooperation."

- **Emphasis on Domestic Law:** "We have become deeply involved in building a socialist state based on the role of law." "Soviet democracy will be placed on a solid normative base."

- **Emphasis on compromise:** "The next U.S. administration headed by President-elect George Bush will find in us a partner who is ready, without long pauses or backtracking, to continue the dialogue in a spirit of realism, openness and good will."

- **Emphasis on Conversion:** ". . . the Soviet Union

is prepared . . . to draw up and make public our internal plan of conversion [and] in the course of 1989 to draw up, as an experiment, conversion plans for two or three defense plants [and] to make public our experience in providing employment for specialists from military industry and in using its equipment, buildings and structures in civilian production."

"It would also be useful to set up a group of scientists to undertake a thorough analysis of the problem of conversion as a whole and as applied to individual countries and regions and report to the secretary-general of the United Nations, and, subsequently, to have this matter considered at a session of the General Assembly."

- **Emphasis on Public-Interest Groups:** "I believe that the idea of convening on a regular basis, under the auspices of the United Nations, an assembly of public organizations deserves attention."

Proposals In Gorbachev's Speech

Buried in the news concerning Gorbachev's unilateral reduction of military forces were a number of proposals, some of special relevance to FAS.

- **Environment:** "Let us also think about setting up within the framework of the United Nations a center for emergency environmental assistance. Its function would be promptly to send international groups of experts to areas with a badly deteriorating environment."

"The Soviet Union is also ready to cooperate in establishing an international space laboratory or manned orbital station designed exclusively for monitoring the state of the environment.

- **Militarization of Space:** ". . . there is already a strongly felt need to develop an all-embracing regime for peaceful work in outer space. The verification of compliance with that regime would be entrusted to a World Space Organization."

- **International Peace Corps:** "We support the proposal to create under the auspices of the United Nations a voluntary international Peace Corps to assist in the revival of Afghanistan." ■

(Continued from page 3)

accepts President Reagan's invitation to visit California and shows himself to Americans, it may produce a transformation of American politics and leave the business-as-usual commentators out in the cold.

Even without that, on-going trends too numerous to mention are bringing the arms race to a halt.

- Glasnost is providing more and more U.S. experts and observers with a first-hand view of the poverty and intellectual confusion inside the Soviet Union. This is having the usual tranquillizing effect on their otherwise overheated speculations.

- The U.S. military-industrial complex can no longer be expected, even by the naive, to produce, reliably, the kinds of weapons that would advance the present state of the art. Two fleets of bombers (B-1 and B-2) are both in trouble. Almost two decades ago, Richard Stubbings observed that the mean time to failure of weapons would shrink as they got ever more highly electronic and complicated. In the present era, the military industrial complex is just producing junk.

- Budget pressures have finally gotten to the point where the long held specter of "guns or butter" is really biting.

- Fears of America's decline and of world environmental problems are now competing with fears of the Soviet Union.

Until now, among the ways of evading the reality of Gorbachev, many observers have suggested that we wait to see if he is going to last. But as Princeton Sovietologist Stephen Cohen observed recently, Gorbachev has been in office now for four years—how long do we wait? □

—Jeremy J. Stone



Henry Kissinger

KISSINGER ON GORBACHEV: "TRUSTED EMISSARIES"

Henry Kissinger's contribution to the debate on Gorbachev's speech was accurate when it said:

"The problem is not his challenge but the Western response, which threatens to jeopardize the opportunities that may be represented by the conjunction of a Soviet internal crisis and a realistic Soviet statesman."

But the rest really misgauged Gorbachev and showed a kind of paranoia. Unlike Senator Nunn who analyzed the reductions, Kissinger simply raised a fog of questions about them and concluded, remarkably, that "the general perception that Gorbachev has put forward unilateral concessions is nonsense, or true in only a highly formal sense." Why? Because "his proposals will surely generate pressures for counter concessions all over NATO." In sum, America should view unilateral initiatives as more dangerous than Soviet stand-patism—which, on conventional force reductions in Europe is definitely our policy.

He goes on to attack the notion that we are seeking a balance of force by saying "Does equality of forces enhance stability?" In sum, if Gorbachev is so diabolic as to remove Soviet conventional force advantages and asymmetries, we might claim that our theory has changed and we need superiority of our own!

New Way of Thinking vs. Machiavelli

Gorbachev is a statesman with a new way of thinking and Kissinger invariably tries to interpret it as if Gorbachev were Machiavelli. Thus: "Gorbachev may be betting that his policy will disintegrate NATO more rapidly than the same policies plus perestroika will dissolve the cohesion of Eastern Europe" and is trying to "push" the U.S. out of Europe.

In the end, predictably, Henry Kissinger seeks to drive the debate away from what he calls "public relations spectacles" into a private dialogue between "trusted emissaries"—and who do you think that ought to be?

Henry Kissinger has met his match in Mikhail Gorbachev but not because Gorbachev is trying to best him or outmaneuver the West. He would negotiate with the West if it could get itself together to negotiate; the mood in Moscow is desperate for agreements. But if the West continues to show itself as too disorganized to negotiate with Gorbachev, it will get just what it deserves—that terrible medicine that Kissinger fears: unilateral initiatives that will "disarm" the West! What a world we live in.

DEFICIT INDUCES ARMS CONTROL

A recent comment by Sen. Sam Nunn, the conservative chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, suggests that the Pentagon budget will have to pay its share in reducing the nation's budget deficit. During a discussion of the future of the B-2 Bomber on "Face the Nation," Sen. Nunn stated, "We have started far too many programs to complete." This remark, coming from a staunch military advocate, points out the severity of the fiscal disorder left behind in the wake of the Reagan Presidency.

The driving force in squeezing programs from the defense budget in 1989 will be the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) deficit reduction targets which must be reached to avoid automatic cuts, otherwise known as sequestration in the Washington lexicon.

Under GRH, if the budget deficit is not cut, or revenues raised by \$32 billion dollars next year to meet the projected budget deficit target of \$100 billion, the difference will be made up through the sequestration process by which equal cuts in domestic and defense spending will take effect. This would mean a reduction of 50% of whatever amount remains over the target. If spending exceeds the target by the full \$32 billion, for example, \$16 billion will come from defense and \$16 billion from domestic programs. Yet, the Pentagon has been planning its budget for next year under the assumption that there will be 2% real growth (above inflation) for a total of \$319 billion. This means that defense would not pay for any of that \$32 billion deficit reduction mandated by law, and ignores realistic projection of the total dollars available for defense.

Even Inflation Increase Uncertain

Political reality suggests that the Pentagon will be lucky to get an increase to account for inflation or \$312 billion in budget authority, though many in Congress will advocate a freeze at the current level of \$299 billion.

Contributing to the budget squeeze for Pentagon programs is the "bow wave" of sharply increased spending associated with the decision to enter full-scale production of weapons systems. Procurement is typically a far more costly proposition than the earlier phase of research and development. Among the programs scheduled for procurement during President Bush's first term are the Trident II missile, the Stealth Bomber, the SSN-21 submarine, the C-17 cargo plane, the Advanced Tactical Aircraft, the LHX helicopter, the Advanced Tactical Fighter, and two new aircraft carriers. If these programs are completed, Ronald Reagan will have succeeded in force feeding the defense budget long after his term in the White House expires.

While non-budgetary factors, including improved U.S.-Soviet relations and progress on negotiations of a START treaty and a Chemical Weapons Convention contribute to an environment which bodes well for arms control, it is the budget deficit and the "bow wave" which will undoubtedly be the driving force in forcing the Congress and the White

House to confront the question neither party has addressed for eight consecutive years: Can the United States afford every system proposed for the U.S. nuclear arsenal, no matter how defective or redundant? When Congress returns in January, it will begin the painful process of answering this question by deciding how to proceed with several weapons programs. Several approaches might be taken including stretch-outs, cancellation of weapons programs or force structure cuts.

One system which is certain to come under pressure is the B-2 "Stealth" Bomber, the subject of the November PIR. This strategic nuclear bomber designed to supplement and eventually replace the B-1 and B-52 is estimated to cost upwards of \$60 billion for production of 132 planes, and will be a prime candidate to be trimmed next year. It will be difficult to justify its procurement at \$500 million per copy when the plane hasn't even flown yet.

A decision to build either 50 additional MX missiles, to be deployed in a rail garrison mode or the "Midgetman" road-mobile missile system, will confront President-elect Bush. With competing forces of significant political stature advocating each system, it is difficult to predict the outcome. However, there is no doubt that the \$46 billion cost for both systems isn't there, and the budget squeeze could force a more definitive resolution this year.

SDI Deployment Fading

And funding for deployment of a Phase One for the Strategic Defense Initiative, technical difficulties notwithstanding, appears even more remote than ever. With the Pentagon brass chafing at other defense cuts already coming down the line, it is unlikely that there will be much pressure from the military to put substantially more resources into SDI. The price for a Phase I deployment—one that would be a very "leaky" defense which would still allow 9,000 warheads to penetrate the United States—could cost between \$69 and \$150 billion. Funding for deployment of a Phase I SDI system is unlikely to receive serious consideration any time soon.

While budget problems will probably slow spending on new strategic offensive and defensive forces, other problems will add to the financial pressures on the Pentagon. The B-1 Bomber, once heralded as the saviour of the bomber force, has a repair bill of approximately \$8 billion to make the plane perform to specification. And, the nuclear weapons production complex, which has been managed for forty years through policies of secrecy and neglect, has now been fully exposed as a national disaster with a repair, modernization and environmental cleanup bill to surpass \$200 billion.

Ronald Reagan is leaving town just in time. His bills are past due and the credit limit has been surpassed. Now, the Democratic Congress and the new Republican President will be left to make the tough choices. The time has come. □

—David Feltman

WILL BUSH BE A CHEMICAL PRESIDENT?

Candidate George Bush spent considerable time discussing chemical weapons, a complicated topic new to much of his audience, during a campaign marked by its general avoidance of substance. And as President-elect he has again alluded to his interest in the finalization of a ban on chemical weapons. Why?

In fact, this is the only arms control issue where truly "George Was There." In Chicago, he emphasized, "I am not new to this field." And it is true. Why? Bush may have several motivations for making the ban being negotiated on chemical weapons one of his highest priorities.

In his role as President of the Senate, he was forced to be involved by casting 3 tie-breaking votes in favor of US production of binary chemical munitions. Further, Bush was delegated to present the US position at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in both 1983 (signifying that the US was resuming participation) and 1984 (the draft treaty which became the basis of negotiation).

Further, he was reminded of the issue repeatedly. From the initial months of their administration, the press has been filled with the alleged proliferation of chemical weapons. First it was the now-discredited "yellow rain" case, but later came various evidence of possibly a dozen or more countries around the world with chemical weapons capabilities. And then documented chemical war waged by Iraq erupted during the Reagan years. But response to the latter was slow and inadequate. The resulting atmosphere of rumor and of flouted international law threatens the creation of the Treaty, which would be the best remedy.

Bush may realize that much of his dutiful involvement in arms issues was on the wrong side, or with the wrong priorities. He told the Atlanta *Constitution* on 20 July 88 that his arms control priorities were, in part, "To assure the peace, you've got to look at the overall perspective. That means START and conventional weapons. For emotional and moral reasons, I'd like to throw in chemical and biological weapons." Even his mother had called to protest those tie-breaking votes for production.

He has obviously made commitments to himself and to others, which is clearly apparent in his speeches. For example, at the University of Toledo he said:

"I want to be known as the President who . . . led to the elimination of chemical warfare and chemical weapons.

And we must act before it is too late. . . . [W]e've got to deal with those nations that have used the gas . . . The barriers against chemical warfare, breached during the Iran-Iraq War, must be repaired and raised even higher. . . . violation of the ban [must carry] a heavy penalty. Not just a fine or a minor sanction that can be ignored. . . . we need to create a more formal 'suppliers' group to control the transfer of chemical technology and weapons. . . . we must develop the means for intrusive . . . onsite inspection on demand of suspicious facilities or plants. . . . Part of [post-WWI security] was to outlaw the use of cer-

YEAR	NUMBER OF VICTIMS
1981	11
1982	29
1983	574
1984	2237
1985	3267
1986	11141
1987	13496
1988 1st quarter	13673

Source: U.N. document No. S/19816, 21 April 1988

tain weapons—chemical weapons — as a sign of our civilization. . . . Yet now . . . the alarm bell has sounded. . . . their destruction forever. That's my solemn mission."

However, so far Bush has not gone beyond an impressive fervor and persistent statements of intent to make concrete policy proposals.

A major aggravation of the chemical proliferation problem is the impression that Iraq got off scott-free after gaining major military advantage from its use of chemicals. It may now be too late, or too politically difficult, to reach international agreement on punishment for Iraq. But it may have been enough that the world has learned its lesson and will redouble efforts to achieve the Treaty.

For our part, there are several unilateral initiatives which Bush could take which would confirm that words will become deeds and progress toward a ban on CW. Several could be taken safely and quietly:

- upgrade the US negotiating team in Geneva (now about 6, compared to 60 during INF negotiations);
- finalize the US-Soviet bilateral data exchange; and then agree with the Soviets to begin mutually verified destruction of their stocks at the earliest feasible date. Richard Lugar wrote that Bush "has also championed efforts to . . . promote the open dissemination of information necessary to achieve a ban";
- initiate the major government studies which are required to support the above agreement, and to permit US compliance with the challenge inspections we have demanded, so that Bush can find a way around his pledge never to sacrifice an ounce of American sovereignty;
- specifically, create a special committee to begin to draft the CW Convention implementing legislation;
- channel \$10 million or more to CW work, out of the \$50 million for verification studies in the FY89 Defense Appropriation;
- continue to resolve regional conflicts — the font of alleged CW use. The Middle East and Central America remain worrisome; and

• fulfill his promise to “put a senior official in charge of overseeing our policies on missile and chemical weapon proliferation.”

A further initiative would transform the negotiating climate: suspend the US binary CW program. Internationally, the US would reverse the example that its program is setting and which other countries may be following. Domestically, the existing stocks are in better shape than thought a decade ago, and the production is not proceeding very fast in any case. This step would cash in those tie-breaking votes as the club which has made the USSR negotiate and would help the budget. It would, however, cancel his campaign-commit-

ment to chemical “modernization.”

Such steps would be particularly bold if they could be announced at the Paris Conference on maintaining the Geneva Protocol, 7-11 January, and affirmed at a Conference on Disarmament plenum preceding his inauguration. Proposals with the imprint of Reagan as well as Bush would indicate continuity and progress in the strongest way. The Conference itself will be most successful if it avoids any odor of a “new NPT.” Thus, the chemical “haves” must emphasize what *they* are going to do to achieve a chemical weapons-free world. And Bush can begin to redeem his pledge. □ —Gordon Burck

NITZE BY TALBOTT: HALF-PRICE

If Paul Nitze is “The Master of the Game”, then his biographer Strobe Talbott is certainly “The Master of the Debate”. In three splendid books (*Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*, *Deadly Gambits*, and this one), he has made himself indispensable to America’s strategic dialogue with itself. No one else really knows so completely who hit whom as this Washington Bureau Chief of Time Magazine who somehow finds time to keep up with everyone. And no one else can track so faithfully the arcane logic splitting which is the ammunition with which the debate is waged. These three volumes show that history can be better written at the time than it could ever be afterward.

As far as Paul Nitze is concerned, the book reveals him as he is: tenacious, ingenious, intelligent, willful in the extreme, canny in the ways of the bureaucracy, prone to excesses of mathematics and, above all, determined to be in charge. In the service of the Reagan Administration, from our point of view, all of these characteristics were put to excellent use. No one else could have served Secretary of State Schultz so well in resisting, for several years, the combined pressures of the White House and Defense. He was Mr. Arms Control in the era of INF and he kept START alive.

As the book reveals, he felt himself treated by the Reagan Administration as if he were a “radical dove with no interest in national security”. This condescending treatment gave him a new empathy for FAS. Partly as a consequence of this, FAS became part of that enormous web of Nitzian co-conspirators—sharing with him our ideas for what should be done and keeping him advised of the relevant notions we were urging on Soviet leaders. From our point of view, he was, really, the only person in the Reagan Administration arms control apparatus worth talking to.

But it was only with the publication of this biography that we were able to see how successful FAS had been (and, funders take note, how little others were doing.) Nitze had been off and running with one FAS idea—on linking reductions to the ABM Treaty—within three weeks of being briefed on its reception in Moscow. And a second FAS idea—on modernizing the ABM Treaty—had caught and sustained his attention also. (Both ideas were, in the end, adopted by the Soviet Union.) The only other “outside” entities that figure in the book are a Rand team

working from the inside with classified information and working through the National Security Adviser McFarlane.

We had all seen the darker side of Paul Nitze’s character in the course of defending Paul Warnke against Nitze’s outrageous attacks during Warnke’s confirmation hearings as ACDA Director. In the course of the SALT II ratification debate, which Nitze dominated, he had even blackmailed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee into not receiving an FAS witness on the grounds that the witness was not a “real opponent” of the treaty but only a critic. It is thus especially startling to see him claim now that *he* was not an opponent of the treaty.

On the other hand, in a bureaucratic shoot-out, no one could ask for a better ally than Paul Nitze. Just about everyone in the defense community, outside the peace movement, has been his ally at one time or another. In the end, we found in him, as others have, far more than enough to admire to provide the always essential personal basis for collaboration.

With the thought that many FAS members would enjoy reading the blow-by-blow of Paul Nitze’s activities (although, of course, not everything got into the book), FAS has arranged to offer FAS members the Talbott book at approximately half-price. Accordingly, send us \$11 and we will send you a copy of this masterful book by return mail. □

—Jeremy J. Stone



Strobe Talbott

Hugh E. DeWitt Described as "Conscience of Livermore Laboratory"

At the 43rd annual Council Meeting of the Federation, Hugh E. DeWitt was awarded the 1988 Public Service Award, becoming the 18th recipient of this honor. He was singled out for his steadfast devotion to FAS goals while working at the Livermore National Laboratory. The plaque given him read:

*Irrepressible and Indefatigable
in the
Pursuit of Truth*

The citation read:

**Public Service Award—1988
to
HUGH E. DEWITT**

Hugh DeWitt has worked for over thirty years as a theoretical physicist at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Throughout he has been a persistent, if frequently unwelcome, champion of an enlightened arms control agenda. He has strongly criticized the belief at the labs that constant technological advancement in weapons design is essential for security. Instead, he has argued that this obsession with technology has been a driving force behind the arms race.

Dr. DeWitt has been an outspoken advocate of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. He has used his authority as a weapons laboratory scientist to dispute the contention that stockpile reliability requires continual testing of already proven designs. Identifying the nuclear-pumped x-ray laser as the technological genesis of the SDI, as well as a key reason the National Laboratories do not support a test ban, Dr. DeWitt has been a staunch defender of the ABM Treaty as well as the 1967 treaty banning nuclear weapons in space.


*In 1979 DeWitt was among a handful of scientists at the Department of Energy's National Laboratories who jeopardized their careers to testify on behalf of the **Progressive** magazine in its fight against government censorship of an*

article on the "secret" of hydrogen bomb design—an issue the Federation sought to have settled out of court.

Hugh has also repeatedly and publicly drawn attention to the inadequacy of the oversight of the Livermore and Los Alamos Labs by the University of California that operates them. He has worked to open the labs to greater public scrutiny in order to check the excesses of the nuclear weapons bureaucracy.

By nature a wholly honorable, precise, and patriotic individual, he never provided the various Administrators of the laboratory with an opening to rid themselves of a person so many must have considered a bureaucratic hairshirt. But because Hugh is, also, a gimlet eyed and relentless yankee, with enormous psychic stamina, he has made a real difference on the issues he has pursued.

Truly, by this record of indefatigable and irrepressible activities in pursuit of responsible goals, Hugh E. DeWitt has become the conscience of the Livermore Laboratory.



Hugh E. DeWitt (left) receives award from Andy Sessler (right)

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