

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

END OF YEAR  
REVIEW

Volume 38, No. 1

January 1985

## REPORT CARD ON ARMS RACE: ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC

In this last Public Interest Report of the year, the FAS Council issues a "report card" rating the Administration, Congress and the general public on their attitudes and efforts with regard to nuclear weapons and the arms race.

### Rating the Public

#### (i) Sensitivity to the Danger of Nuclear War: C

Recent polls from the Public Agenda Foundation indicate that the sensitivity of the average American to the danger of nuclear war is quite high. Among their recent findings:

- 68% polled believe that if both sides keep building missiles instead of negotiating to get rid of them, it is only a matter of time until they are used.
- 96% assert that "Picking a fight with the Soviet Union is too dangerous in a nuclear world..."
- 38% of the American people, and 50% of those under thirty, said that all-out nuclear war is likely to occur in the next ten years.

And yet other factors indicate this sensitivity may be somewhat shallow, or is not very focused. Among these are indications that arms control and nuclear war were not significant political issues, and that few Americans have grasped the significance of recent, and widely publicized,

findings on the potential for a nuclear winter.

#### (ii) Level of Education and Sophistication: C-

Again, polls taken by the Public Agenda Foundation and other agencies would indicate that in some important areas, the level of education and sophistication of the average American on issues of nuclear war and arms control is much higher than ten or twenty years ago. Specifically, the polls found that:

- 89% of Americans believe that there can be no winner in a nuclear war.
- 90% said that both the United States and the Soviet Union have an overkill capacity of nuclear weapons, more destructive capability than we could ever need.
- 85% of the American people think there is no such thing as a limited nuclear war; if either side were to use nuclear weapons the conflict would inevitably escalate into all-out war.

Yet many Americans still have noticeable gaps in their knowledge and conception of things nuclear. For example, eight out of ten Americans believe it is our current policy to use nuclear weapons "if and only if" our adversaries use them against us first. More disturbing is the prevalent

*(Continued on page 2)*

## NOTE TO UNCLE SAM ON AMERICA'S PROGRESS

Uncle Sam: with regard to security against nuclear war, your Public, your Administration and your Congress all need much improvement, albeit in varying degrees, over the next year.

The Public is showing unprecedented awareness of the danger of nuclear war and sophistication about dealing with it, and has even shown readiness to participate in calling for solutions—but even peak levels in all these categories are insufficient and the Public, as always, places domestic issues as their first priority unless the foreign policy issues impinge on their daily lives. We could only give the Public a "C."

The Administration was lucky to pass at all. The D-grades reflect a degree of confusion on arms control goals, purpose, and priority that surpasses that of any other Administration of the forty post-war years we have witnessed.

This Administration seems divided over whether it should even talk to the Soviets about arms control at all—let alone whether it wants successful agreements with them. Its priority is an across-the-board program of defense spending, which it calls a defense buildup, and which it believes is at odds with the political atmosphere that would result from arms control agreements. Its negotiators wonder publicly whether America can "stand up to" arms control agreements!

Distrust of the Russians and a dislike of them have

too strong a grip on Administration viscerals to permit serious negotiation. The resultant effort to pretend to wanting arms control, while trying to avoid it, has produced the strangest collection of intellectually incompatible assertions we have ever seen; the notion that "Star Wars" is good for arms control is a prime example. These dreams of a return to invulnerability, through America's vaunted technological ability, infect Administration readiness to face up to reality.

Congress is getting slightly better grades. Characteristically, your House of Representatives, and the Senate more slowly, is moving to placate both the Public and the Administration. Once again, we see the strength of democracy; when things get out of whack, the public instructs the Congress which, in turn, instructs the Administration.

But it takes time, Uncle Sam, and how much time we have to bring the arms race under control before this festering wound can become irrevocably infected, no one knows.

Our young Republic, at only 200 years, is faced with 10,000 nuclear warheads at the ready in the hands of a difficult, albeit cautious, adversary. Whether the Nation will face up to this problem, or just drift along hoping to muddle through, will be a test of the common sense of the American people.

—FAS

(Continued from page 2)

attitude of support for the President's Strategic Defensive Initiative, and its utopian promise to make nuclear weapons obsolete. Many Americans are not even aware we have an ABM Treaty. Moreover, the majority of Americans have been taken in by the recurring allegations of Soviet cheating. Sixty-one percent believe "The Soviets have cheated on just about every treaty or agreement they have ever signed." More encouraging, 44% think the degree to which Soviets cheat is overstated by those who oppose negotiating with them in the first place.

(iii) *Degree of Active Participation: C*

Although the Freeze proposal has lost some of its support on Capitol Hill and has suffered from a lack of coherent legislative strategy, its popularity around the country as a cause for active organization and participation is still very impressive. During the last year, the Freeze movement continued to grow organizationally, with more than 1,300 local groups nationwide. Older and newer groups have also continued to grow, while refining their methods of lobbying, outreach and media contact. Of note, SANE has more than 100,000 members and 50+ chapters, while Common Cause boasts 250,000 members with 50 staffed state offices.

By 1984, the national arms control movement had definitely established itself as an effective lobbying force. Grass roots organizations were crucial in determining close Congressional votes, especially on the MX. Many of the groups also took an active role in endorsing and helping Congressional candidates and local arms control resolutions during the recent elections. However, it is not clear how effective or influential such groups were in determining the outcome of these races.

**Rating the Administration**

(i) *Conceptual Understanding: D-*

We would note that from the President on down through most of the national security apparatus, the Administration's conceptual views of the nuclear balance, strategic stability and the role of arms control appear deficient. While the past year may have seen the President understand that SLBMs are not recallable and that bombers carry nuclear warheads, the conceptual understanding of both the President and many of his top advisors still appears undeveloped and uninformed. The assertion of the President and many of his top advisors that development of a comprehensive ABM system and cuts in offensive forces can be pursued as complementary goals is indicative of the basic contradictions underlying the Administration's approach to arms control and nuclear stability.

For some Administration officials, arms control has generally been perceived as a means of restructuring the nuclear arsenals of both sides toward an unrealistic ideal, rather than as a means of controlling, if not stopping, the arms race. For others, it has always been a dangerous illusion, an impediment to increased military growth and spending. Although some elements of the Administration, notably in the State Department, share our concerns, they

(Continued on page 3)

## FAS

Chairman: JOHN P. HOLDREN

Vice Chairman: MATTHEW S. MESELSON

Secretary: GEORGE A. SILVER

Treasurer: ROBERT M. SOLOW

Director: JEREMY J. STONE

The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 24 members, FAS was first organized in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than a quarter century.

SPONSORS

- \*Philip W. Anderson (Physics)
- \*Christian B. Anfinsen (Biochemistry)
- \*Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics)
- \*Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry)
- \*David Baltimore (Biochemistry)
- Leona Baumgartner (Pub. Health)
- Paul Beeson (Medicine)
- Lipman Bers (Mathematics)
- \*Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
- \*Konrad Bloch (Chemistry)
- \*Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat)
- Anne Pitts Carter (Economics)
- \*Owen Chamberlain (Physics)
- Abram Chayes (Law)
- Morris Cohen (Engineering)
- Mildred Cohn (Biochemistry)
- \*Leon N. Cooper (Physics)
- Paul B. Cornely (Medicine)
- \*Andre Courmand (Medicine)
- Carl Djerassi (Organic Chem.)
- \*Renato Dulbecco (Microbiology)
- John T. Edsall (Biology)
- Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology)
- \*John F. Enders (Biochemistry)
- \*Val L. Fitch (Physics)
- Jerome D. Frank (Psychology)
- John Kenneth Galbraith (Economics)
- Richard L. Garwin (Physics)
- \*Walter Gilbert (Biochemistry)
- Edward J. Ginzion (Engineering)
- \*Donald A. Glaser (Physics-Biology)
- \*Sheldon L. Glashow (Physics)
- Marvin L. Goldberger (Physics)
- Walter W. Helier (Economics)
- \*Alfred D. Hershey (Biology)
- \*Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry)
- Marc Kac (Mathematics)
- Carl Kaysen (Economics)
- \*H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry)
- \*Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry)
- \*Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
- \*Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics)
- \*Wassily W. Leontief (Economics)
- \*Fritz Lipmann (Biochemistry)
- \*William N. Lipscomb (Chemistry)
- \*S.E. Luria (Biology)
- Roy Menninger (Psychiatry)
- Robert Merton (Sociology)
- Matthew S. Meselson (Biology)
- Neal E. Miller (Psychology)
- \*Robert S. Mulliken (Chemistry)
- \*Daniel Nathans (Biochemistry)
- Franklin A. Neva (Medicine)
- \*Marshall Nirenberg (Biochemistry)
- Robert N. Noyce (Indus. Exec.)
- \*Severo Ochoa (Biochemistry)
- Charles E. Osgood (Psychology)
- \*Linus Pauling (Chemistry)
- \*Arno A. Penzias (Astronomy)
- Gerard Piel (Sci. Publisher)
- George Polya (Mathematics)
- Charles C. Price (Chemistry)
- Mark Ptashne (Molecular Biology)
- \*Edward M. Purcell (Physics)
- \*Burton Richter (Physics)
- David Riesman, Jr. (Sociology)
- Walter Orr Roberts (Solar Astron.)
- \*J. Robert Schrieffer (Physics)
- \*Julian Schwinger (Physics)
- Herbert Scoville, Jr. (Def. Policy)
- \*Glen T. Seaborg (Chemistry)
- Stanley K. Sheinbaum (Economics)
- \*Herbert A. Simon (Psychology)
- Alice Kimball Smith (History)
- Cyvil S. Smith (Metallurgy)
- Robert M. Solow (Economics)
- \*Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (Biochemistry)
- \*Henry Taube (Chemistry)
- \*Howard M. Temin (Microbiology)
- \*James Tobin (Economics)
- \*Charles H. Townes (Physics)
- \*George Wald (Biology)
- Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)
- Victor F. Weisskopf (Physics)
- Jerome B. Wiesner (Engineering)
- Robert R. Wilson (Physics)
- C.S. Wu (Physics)
- Alfred Yankauer (Medicine)
- Herbert F. York (Physics)

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

- |  |                                     |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| Ruth S. Adams (Science Policy)         | Philip Morrison (Physics)           |
| Harrison Brown (Geochemist)            | Christopher E. Paine (Def. Pol.)    |
| Rosemary A. Chalk (Pol. Science)       | Victor Rabinowitch (World Devel.)   |
| Bernard T. Feld (Physics)              | George W. Rathjens (Pol. Science)   |
| Randall Forsberg (Pol. Science)        | Arthur H. Rosenfeld (Physics)       |
| Morton H. Halperin (Pol. Science)      | Carl E. Sagan (Astronomy)           |
| John Harte (Energy)                    | Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Pol. Science) |
| Gerald Holton (Physics)                | Robert H. Socolow (Energy Policy)   |
| Jerry F. Hough (Pol. Science)          | Lynn Sykes (Geophysics)             |
| Carl Kaysen (Economist)                | Robert H. Williams (Energy Policy)  |
| Michael D. Mann (Law)                  | Archie L. Wood (Defense Policy)     |
| Jessica Tuchman Mathews (Biochemistry) | Dorothy S. Zinberg (Science Policy) |

\*Nobel Laureate

## FAS FUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501(c)(3) tax-deductible research and education arm of FAS.

- |                           |                              |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Herbert F. York, Chairman | Stanley Sheinbaum            |
| Moshe Alafi               | Jeremy J. Stone (ex officio) |
| David Baltimore           | Martin Stone                 |
| John P. Holdren           | Martin S. Thaler             |
| (ex-officio)              | Alan M. Thorndike            |
| Proctor W. Houghton       | Frank von Hippel             |
| Matthew Meselson          | (Vice Chairman)              |
| Rosalyn R. Schwartz       | Stanley Weiss                |

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1982 by the Federation of American Scientists.

(Continued from page 2)

have been unable to produce or implement a negotiable proposal.

(ii) *Strength and Seriousness of Proposals: D-*

Although the original, and completely untenable, START proposal was gradually modified to encompass greater equality and flexibility, it was still seriously flawed when the Soviets indefinitely postponed the talks last year. The Administration's proposals could be faulted on the counts of both negotiability and strategic stability. In its determination to negotiate drastic cuts in Soviet ICBMs and throw-weight, the Administration generally ignored the valid principle of asymmetrical parity, as well as the historical and legitimate military traditions and security interests of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the U.S. side continued to resist any immediate consideration of serious limits on bombers, cruise missiles and SLBMs. Meanwhile, the Start initiative's proposals to reduce strategic launchers drastically, while permitting the introduction of new counterforce warheads, did not indicate a serious concern or appreciation for either dangerous exchange ratios or strategic stability.

The American INF proposals were generally reasonable and negotiable, constituting a more serious effort to reach agreement. Although the "Zero-sum" proposal, first articulated in November 1981, was definitely one-sided, subsequent proposals represented fair negotiating positions that offered the possibility of reductions in both sides' INF systems.

(iii) *Negotiating Diligence: D-*

Even the best proposals can be undermined by an ineffective or uncooperative negotiating team. The combination of a bad proposal and a bad negotiator, as was the case with START and General Rowney, can be disastrous. According to many accounts, Rowney approached the negotiations from a confrontational stance that left little room for compromise. Further, when directed by Washington to propose the new Builddown initiative, he focused on the missile part of the proposal, which was most advantageous to the U.S. On the other hand, the continued efforts of the tough, but pragmatic, Paul Nitze to forge a compromise on the INF talks almost succeeded in achieving a breakthrough, which was subsequently vetoed by Washington.

Congressional displeasure and frustration with the Administration's negotiation efforts ultimately resulted in the former's direct intervention in the arms control process. In the summer of 1983, a group of six Representatives and Senators, the now infamous "Gang of Six," conditioned their support for the MX on the introduction of the Builddown initiative during the next round of START talks in Geneva. In order to ensure that their proposal was taken seriously, they appointed James Woolsey, a Democrat on the Scowcroft Commission, to accompany the START negotiating team. This highly unusual episode is indicative of the low opinion Congress held of the Administration's negotiating teams and agendas.

On a more general level, this Administration has demonstrated a profound aversion to the ratification of

any treaties. After calling SALT II "fatally flawed," the Administration nonetheless decided to adhere to the unratified treaty. Yet, it now refuses to commit itself to extending the treaty beyond its December 1985 expiration, even though no other offensive arms agreements are anywhere near completion. The Administration's policy toward the signed, but unratified, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNET) and Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) treaties is also indicative of this arms control "allergy." Although both nations have been observing the treaties for almost ten years, the Reagan Administration attempted to renegotiate the TTBT to include stricter verification measures, an effort that was both unnecessary and unrealistic.

(iv) *Priority Given to Arms Control: D-*

With regard to the priority this Administration accorded to arms control, its high declaratory platform has been belied by its actual anti-arms control policy. The majority of the Administration's arms control initiatives have been motivated more by political expediency than by real dedication to the professed goal weapons reductions.

The announcement of a "Zero-sum" proposal for the INF talks in November 1981 was made with extreme reluctance, and only due to the enormous pressure generated by European peace movements and our NATO allies. Likewise, the willingness to begin the START negotiations, signalled by the President's speech at Eureka College in 1982, was largely designed to deflect growing opposition to the MX and other elements of the Defense Budget. In the past, various weapons systems were often requested as necessary bargaining chips for arms control negotiations, even where there was little intention of bargaining them away. This Administration has carried this practice to an extreme, openly—and somewhat hypocritically—using arms control as a means of securing its much-expanded defense program. Although the past year has seen the President strongly commit himself to the pursuit of arms control, the verdict appears still out as to whether this or continued growth in both offensive and defensive weapons is the higher priority.

### Rating the Congress

Under the following headings are short summaries of the activities of the House and Senate during 1984. For those interested in more information, a detailed summary can be found below.

(i) *The House: C+*

Overall, the House has a pretty good record this year. It voted to cut the MX missile request from 40 to 15 missiles, and to escrow funds until a vote in April. It prohibited ASAT tests against a weapon in space, as well as the introduction of nuclear-armed SLCMs. It cut "Star Wars" funding down to almost \$1 billion, and pushed for a limit of 3.5 percent real increase in defense spending.

(ii) *The Senate: D*

The Senate's record on defense spending is far less favorable, although it did display an encouraging interest in arms control initiatives. It voted for production funds for 21 MX missiles, the deployment of nuclear-armed

(Continued on page 4)

*(Continued from page 3)*

SLCMs and ASAT tests against actual targets. It adopted an almost eight percent increase in real defense spending, and trimmed the SDI budget by only \$100 million. However, it did pass resolutions asking the President to submit the TTBT and PNET agreements for Senate ratification, and to maintain compliance with SALT II and other arms control agreements.

### **More Detailed Summary of Legislative Action**

#### *Weapons Systems*

**MX:** The House escrowed funds for 15 MX until voting in April while the Senate voted for production funds for 21 out of a total 41 missiles requested. The Conference Committee escrowed funds until April, when both chambers must vote for the funds' release.

**ASAT tests:** The House prohibited the testing of any ASAT against a target in space, while the Senate permitted tests, but only after the President had certified he was attempting to agree to strict limits. The Conference Committee permitted two "successful" tests against targets, but only after March 1.

**SDI/Star Wars:** The House cut the Administration budget request from \$1.77 billion down to close to one billion. The Senate, however, reduced it only \$100 million, with the Conference agreeing on \$1.4 billion.

**Chemical Weapons:** The House voted against the production of new binary gas shells for the third straight year, while the Senate Armed Services Committee cancelled the funds during consideration of the Defense Authorization Bill.

#### *Defense Budget*

The total defense budget rose significantly for the fourth consecutive year, although not by as much as in previous years. The House had proposed a 3.5 percent real growth, while the Senate had pushed for 7.8 percent. The final defense bill totalled some \$293 billion, representing a 5 percent real increase over FY84. The Administration had originally asked for a thirteen percent increase.

#### *Arms Control Initiatives*

**Quick Freeze:** On April 26, Representatives Jim Leach and Ed Markey introduced the "Quick Freeze" in the House. The binding amendment called for a halt in funds for further testing of ASATs, nuclear warheads and new ballistic missiles. Kennedy and Hatfield introduced the same measure in the Senate on May 3. Neither amendment made it to a full vote.

**CTBT:** The Senate voted 77-21 for a Kennedy-Hatfield resolution asking the Administration to submit the TTBT and PNET for ratification, and to resume negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban.

**No SALT Undercut:** On June 20, the Senate passed the Bumpers-Leahy amendment, asking the Administration to maintain compliance with SALT II and other offensive treaties until December 1985, by a margin of 82-17. The unratified treaty will expire at that time.

*This Report Card was prepared by a staff member, Jonathan Rich, with suggestions from others, and with grades voted on by FAS Council Members at the Dec. 19 Council Meeting.*

## **EUROPE '84**

On the surface, 1984 was a quiet year for arms control in Europe. Pershing II and cruise missiles arrived on schedule. Some Europeans watched the deployments with resignation, some with satisfaction, others with fear and shock. According to the conventional wisdom, the Atlantic Alliance emerged from the "Year of the Missile" bruised but intact, and wiser for the experience. The Reagan Administration goes so far as to claim the ongoing missile deployment as a great victory, proving to the Soviet Union that NATO remains healthy and strong.

In reality, the confrontation over the missiles may turn out merely to have been the opening act in a much longer and more significant drama. In a variety of countries, the foreign policy consensus has come unraveled, and issues such as nuclear strategy and national rights within the Alliance are open for debate. The consequences of this development will not become apparent until some current governments fall from power, but that is only a matter of time. Indeed, the status quo in NATO probably rests on a narrower political base now than at any time in recent memory.

It was hardly surprising that public opinion in Europe responded to the prospect of additional missile deployments and East-West tension with a distinct lack of enthusiasm. In a poll taken in April, over 40 percent of the West German population considered arms control and dialogue with the Soviet Union the most important elements of Western security. Inadequate defense, on the other hand, was the main worry of only 2 percent of West Germans.

### **Missiles Aroused Public Outcry**

Military experts hoped the deployment would remedy a "gap" in NATO's "spectrum of deterrence." The real effect of the new missiles, however, was to arouse a public outcry which is still filtering through the political structures of West European nations and creating a host of new challenges for beleaguered NATO officials.

The first victim of the post-deployment decision backlash was the public silence surrounding NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. Not since the late 1950s has there been such a lively discussion in Europe over the probable effects of nuclear use on the Central Front, as military planners call Germany.

As is the case in the United States, a majority of Europeans think that NATO should either never use nuclear weapons at all or only use them to respond to a nuclear attack from the Warsaw Pact. This has not translated into pressure for a no-first-use declaration, however. Many who oppose NATO's first-use policy see a no-first-use declaration as a limited and essentially rhetorical goal. They would rather campaign for withdrawal of nuclear weapons from European territory. This year, opposition parties in Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany and the United Kingdom called for NATO to get rid of at least some of its nuclear weapons.

Up to now, demands to remove nuclear weapons have been largely confined to the streets, parks, and university

*(Continued on page 5)*

*(Continued from page 4)*

lecture halls, where the peace movement holds its rallies. Another related debate, meanwhile, is being waged in the closed meeting rooms of parliamentary budget committees, government cabinets, and NATO working groups. The topic is modernization of NATO's conventional forces.

All year, General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has been tireless in his advocacy of additional conventional weapons for NATO. Taking advantage of the public mood, he justifies the expense at every opportunity as a measure to "raise the nuclear threshold." In particular, Rogers has advocated the development and deployment of new conventional weapons with extended ranges and extraordinary accuracy in order to attack targets deep in Warsaw Pact territory.

Despite Rogers' rhetoric, his pressure for a buildup of conventional forces has little to do with reducing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons. Following on the heels of the Pershing II and cruise missile deployments, the Alliance has actually embarked on a quiet modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons. NATO's widely publicized withdrawals of American nuclear warheads from Europe is limited to obsolete systems of little military utility and is planned to go hand in hand with deployment of new, more capable nuclear artillery shells during the rest of the 1980s.

If Rogers' campaign needed any additional emphasis, it was provided in June, when Sam Nunn, the Senate's resident NATO expert, proposed an amendment which would have pulled American troops out of Europe unless the Europeans contributed more money for defense. Strenuously opposed by the Administration, the amendment still got 41 votes and shocked the defense establishment of Western Europe.

#### **Rogers and Nunn had some success**

By the end of the year, Rogers and Nunn could feel that they had had some success. On November 9, the NATO Defense Planning Committee approved Rogers' idea of developing the necessary munitions to attack targets deep in Warsaw Pact territory, although all decisions on the financing of the plan were deferred until later. On December 4, NATO defense ministers announced agreement on a six-year program to upgrade certain nuts-and-bolts items such as ammunition stocks and infrastructure, which had been the particular focus of the Nunn Amendment.

These programs need to be financed, of course, and that is where the conventional modernization program is likely to hit a snag. Plans to spend billions of additional dollars on "Deep Strike" weapons systems will have to survive fierce battles over distribution of the government budget pie in most West European countries. The costs of additional defense spending on other public services will be clear to all, including powerful industrial and agricultural interests which depend on government support.

Many defense intellectuals seem to think that public protest against nuclear weapons translates into greater acceptance for more and better conventional arms. On the contrary, those who tried and failed to stop deployment of the

nuclear missiles will attack attempts to modernize NATO's conventional arsenals with special vigor. The trauma over Pershing II and cruise missiles has reduced public trust in and support for military spending, rather than the reverse.

Some deployment opponents have shifted the focus of their critique to NATO's assessment of the Warsaw Pact threat, arguing that it has been vastly exaggerated. An example of this work is the recent study by the German Social Democratic Party, called "Western Nightmares Versus Eastern Nightmares." If this revisionist view of Soviet capabilities and intentions becomes widely accepted, the basis for any future NATO arms modernization will be undermined.

That is not the only reason that deployment of the missiles could very well turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory for the Pentagon. In addition to provoking criticism of NATO's nuclear policy and weakening support for the military, the deployment drew European public attention to continued American dominance in such areas of the Alliance as the control of nuclear weapons, development of high technology weapons, satellite intelligence regarding Warsaw Pact forces, and overall dealings with the Soviet Union.

#### **Nationalism Could Break Up NATO**

If there is any single force which will break up NATO, it is nationalism, combined with the popular realization in Europe that they do not have enough control over decisions relating to their own national security. The deployment opened up a Pandora's box of issues in which the preeminent role of the United States could be questioned.

These concerns are not confined to any particular political point of view. Even a high-ranking German military officer told this author, while describing how little the West German government knows about targeting plans for French and American nuclear weapons, "That is something my generation will change." European arms manufacturers have also been adamant in their insistence on a better transatlantic deal when it comes to NATO weapons procurement and have been working more closely with each other on production of sophisticated systems such as a helicopter, tanks, and aircraft.

These issues strike at the heart of the Alliance. NATO exists as a result of a particular view of the Soviet threat, and as a consequence of a decision by Europeans to accept American leadership in defense matters. Forty years of living with the Central European status quo, culminated by detente, have eased fears of Soviet expansionism, and growing European economic power and political self-confidence have long since begun to undermine the dominant role of the United States. When these foundation pillars of the Alliance erode, the entire structure shakes.

So will the Alliance fall apart in 1985? Almost certainly not. And that isn't even the most important question. The crucial consideration is how well the North Atlantic Alliance serves the interests of peace and stability in Europe. If NATO led to or was replaced by an agreement demilitarizing Central Europe, or by an international security arrangement involving more than the present six-

*(Continued on page 6)*

*(Continued from page 5)*

teen West European and North American nations, millions of Europeans would breathe easier.

Neither nuclear nor conventional modernization addresses the question of political progress leading to security in Europe. Cold War rhetoric and East-West confrontation puts obstacles in its way. That is primarily what we have witnessed during the last year.

—Daniel Charles

## SPACE WEAPONS—THE YEAR AHEAD

In 1984 the space weapons issue rapidly approached the top of the national agenda. 1985 will be a time for decision on space weapons. However, there are a number of uncertainties that make it difficult to predict some of the more significant events of the coming year. In particular, the new "umbrella" talks will certainly complicate the debate on space weapons.

The election did not significantly alter the situation in the Congress, and if anything, it improved the overall political situation in the Senate. In addition, the presidential campaign raised the visibility of this issue. The reelection of Reagan will probably (though not certainly) continue the Administration's commitment to space weapons.

### Goals for the New Year

FAS goals for 1985 on the Strategic Defense Initiative will include advocating funding research at the lowest possible level above \$1 billion, no funds for prototype demonstrations, and continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. In the area of anti-satellite weapons, we will urge a continuation the moratorium on testing, an early resumption of negotiations, and the negotiation of a treaty strictly limiting space weapons. We will also support a general resolution stating policy on space weapons which, when introduced in January, will be the principal early focus of educational and legislative attention.

### The Strategic Defense Initiative

The Strategic Defense Initiative budget suffered an initial defeat in the Congress in 1984, which approved \$1.4 billion of the \$1.8 billion request. However, there will probably be a major increase in the FY86 budget request. The FY85 budget projected a \$3.8 billion SDI request for FY86. Congressional Action in 1984 could result in the FY86 request being changed to between \$3.2 and \$4.2 billion. The outer range of probable requests is between \$2.5 and \$5.0 billion. A very large budget request would tend to focus attention on the overall level of spending. A lower budget number would lead to greater attention to program structure issues.

The FY 85 budget reduction, coupled with technical considerations, led to a rescheduling of some SDI projects (Talon Gold and Airborne Optical Adjunct), so that there will be no prototype demonstrations that would raise questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty until after the next Presidential election. This has somewhat reduced the immediacy of the ABM Treaty compliance issue. However, pressure will continue to restructure the SDI to give greater emphasis to near-term deployments of systems to

defend ICBMs. This could have a significant near-term ABM Treaty impact, as well as leading to a major re-orientation of the SDI debate.

One additional possibility for the SDI that has been discussed would be to transfer some surveillance projects out of the SDI and into the intelligence budget, where they would be used to enhance our verification capabilities.

### Anti-Satellite Weapons

The Congress in 1984 took the first step toward implementing the Freeze, by voting for a five-month moratorium on ASAT testing, which will expire in March 1985. This has set the stage for a debate on whether testing should be resumed following the Congressionally-mandated Presidential certifications on ASAT. This debate will take place in the context of the new "Umbrella" talks, which will include discussions of space weapons.

One of the certification requirements is that the resumption of testing should not impair the prospects for arms control. The Soviets have placed great importance on the ASAT moratorium, and a resumption of ASAT testing could lead to a Soviet walkout. The Administration has indicated a willingness to consider a continuation of the test moratorium once negotiations resume. The major question will be what restraints the Soviet Union will agree to in return for a continuation of the moratorium.

If the "umbrella" process continues on track, the major focus on ASAT may shift to the terms for an ASAT agreement. A great amount of unofficial as well as official interest has recently developed around the idea of a ban on all ASAT testing that would last until around the end of the decade. Such an interim agreement would settle the ASAT issue until after the next Presidential election, but it would still hold open the possibility of SDI testing, should the next President be so inclined. The focus in the arms control community has been on an ASAT Treaty of unlimited duration, like the ABM Treaty, and the acceptability of a more limited agreement of this sort is not clear. And there is always the possibility that the umbrella process will fail from the outset, or that it will deteriorate later on, reopening the ASAT testing question.

There is also some interest in taking an initiative to enhance the survivability of US military satellites, although the exact nature of this initiative has not been defined.

### Conclusion

In general, the Administration seems to be on the defensive on the space weapons issue. However, the scope of Congressional pressure may be limited by a reluctance to be seen as undercutting the American negotiating position in the "umbrella" talks. In contrast to the past two years, the space weapons debate may be conducted in a dynamic and rapidly changing environment complicated by the international situation.

—John Pike

## REAGAN'S SECOND-TERM ENERGY POLICY: CONTINUED ABDICATION OF LEADERSHIP

When the Reagan Administration entered office four years ago, I predicted in a PIR article that its energy policy would be a "mixed blessing." While enforcing existing laws, it would rely on market forces more substantially than previous Administrations, resisting further efforts to interfere in the energy market, particularly with regard to encouraging conservation and renewable energy development.

That prediction turned out to be unduly optimistic. For under the guise of "free market" rhetoric, Administration policymakers launched an all-out crusade against most existing conservation and renewables programs, seeking to wipe out all vestiges of what they perceived as the liberals' energy legacy. Budget raids of mammoth proportions were launched, even on research and development (see graph). Clever ways were found of subverting the law, perhaps the most ingenious of which was the promulgation of "no standard" appliance efficiency standards. The civil service reforms enacted during the Carter years were misused to remove many capable civil servants who were perceived as resisting these changes. Even information programs, the "lubricant" of any free market, were attacked.

### Free Market Failed

But while the ax fell on conservation and renewables programs, the "free market" approach failed to materialize with other supply-side options. The white elephant of the Carter years, the Synthetic Fuels Corporation, has remained, although tarnished by a series of corruption scandals. Federal coal leases have been sold at "bargain basement" prices. Federal funding for the Clinch River demonstration breeder reactor was stalwartly supported to the bitter end. And a Three Mile Island "R&D" fund was ingeniously created, 40 percent of which is actually used to offset utility costs for cleaning up the accident at that plant.

To be certain, the most egregious excesses of the Reagan policymakers have been tempered by Congress and in recent years—as the 1984 election loomed—from within the Administration itself. But the result of this standoff has been the lack of any real federal leadership on energy policy or any sense of direction.

Into this vacuum have stepped many unlikely actors—state and local governments, utilities, and some companies—to pick up the mantle of leadership. The result has been mixed. In some cases it has been positive; who would have guessed a few years ago that one of the most vocal advocates today of a sound national conservation effort would be Chrysler Corporation? Yet often the result has been a patchwork of conflicting regulations and programs throughout the country that benefit no one. For example, appliance manufacturers, exempted from federal efficiency standards, are now finding they must comply with regulations that change across state borders and even across utility service areas.

So what will happen in the Reagan Administration's second term? The answer, unfortunately, is likely to be more


of the same, only worse. Early indications are that the Reagan budget-cutting plan will take a sharp whack out of non-nuclear energy funding. While Congress is likely to restore some of those cuts, the pressures of reducing the deficit without unduly hurting the poor will limit how much it can add back to non-social programs.

Furthermore, in the wake of their past successes, word has it that Administration ideologues are gunning for other major energy programs of the 1970s—automobile fuel economy standards, and the Residential Conservation Service, a utility-run energy audit service. In addition, the Administration is under increasing pressure from the right to take an active hand in revitalizing the nuclear industry. The Heritage Foundation, a right-wing thinktank that set much of the Administration's first-term agenda, has called upon the President to "reaffirm the importance of nuclear power" through a variety of actions, including strengthening the federal role in insuring the industry.

All is not bleak in the energy scene, though. The Treasury Department's tax reform proposal—while acknowledged as not having much chance in either this Congress or this Administration—has provided the first major endorsement from a high government agency for a broad desubsidization of the energy industry. This could prove an important tool for future desubsidization efforts.

The last four years of federal energy policymaking have been likened by many to entering a time warp: time seems to have stood still; little intelligent assessment or planning has occurred. It now appears the time warp will last at least another four years.

—Deborah Bleviss



Graphs show Congress reinstating some funds from large Reagan Administration cuts in energy conservation programs but leaving the programs still sharply reduced.

### ADAMS RECEIVES FAS AWARD

Ruth S. Adams, former Managing Editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, long-time Pugwash participant and FAS Council Member, has been awarded the 1984 Public Service Award of the Federation of American Scientists.

In ceremonies at the FAS annual council meeting on November 19, Ms. Adams received a citation, reprinted below, and a plaque carrying the message of the last six lines on the citation in the adjoining column.

In her responding remarks, Ms. Adams, who is now Director of the MacArthur Foundation Program on International Security, spoke movingly of the role Roderick MacArthur had played in her recent successes; Mr. MacArthur died tragically in December, of pancreatic cancer, after selecting Ruth Adams for her position and helping prepare the Foundation for her program.



Ruth S. Adams

### PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD—1984

*Ruth Adams was liberated before the overwhelming majority of her gender even knew that this was an issue. The rest of us have been the beneficiaries.*

*For thirty years, the main benefits of her vigor and independence of mind accrued to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. She maintained its crucial direction, kept the quality up, handled the authors and the editors, and generated a series of fresh ideas for educational work ranging from booklets on China, the ABM, human migration, and nuclear war to teach-ins.*

*In a community bedeviled by personalities, no one has ever had a cross word to say about Ruth. This special asset of character has been put to the service not only of the Bulletin but also of Pugwash where, from the first Pugwash Conference in 1957 to the most recent one in 1984, Ruth's unflinching judgment and personal diplomacy have helped bridge troubled waters.*

*Now all of her intellectual and personal skills, and her reputation, have been put at the service of an even more highly leveraged project: in the interests of arms control, she is turning on the spigot of one of America's largest foundations and leading the way for still others.*

*Under her leadership, at least one large foundation is being led to understand that not all funding should be restricted to "new knowledge" and academic studies. Those who have been in the trenches are not, finally, being forgotten by the large foundations.*

*The struggle to prevent nuclear war lends itself to anxiety and frustration; but Ruth has been even-handed and steady. The struggle to maintain a magazine leads often to burn-out; but Ruth has preserved her tenacity. The struggle to set precedents in a new and inchoate foundation lends itself to problems which we hesitate even to characterize. But Ruth has been victorious.*

*In sum, Ruth S. Adams is a woman for all seasons and fully deserves the citation on our plaque that, for scientists of conscience, she has been and is:*

**AUTHOR AND EDITOR  
MANAGER AND MAHOUT  
DISPENSER OF  
BALM AND BREAD**

### FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300

307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

**Return Postage Guaranteed**

Volume 37, Number 10, December 1984

**Second Class Postage  
Paid at  
Washington, D.C.**

I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1984.

I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.  
Enclosed is my check for 1984 calendar year dues.

\$25 Member     \$75 Supporting     \$150 Patron     \$1000 Life     \$12.50 Under \$12,000

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:

FAS Public Interest Report — \$25 for calendar year

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of \_\_\_\_\_ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE \_\_\_\_\_ Please Print

ADDRESS \_\_\_\_\_

CITY AND STATE \_\_\_\_\_ Zip \_\_\_\_\_

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE \_\_\_\_\_