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THE ANDREI SAKHAROV AFFAIR

As of December 21, the Sakharovs are recovering from their hunger strike and Yelizaveta K. Alekseyeva has left the Soviet Union. Her success in securing the right to leave the Soviet Union is, obviously, due first and foremost to mother-in-law Yelena Bonner, and her stepfather, Andrei Sakharov, and to their joint extraordinary determination and courage. But many helped them in vindicating their desperate decision to engage in a hunger strike. These included Alexei Semyonov, who engaged in many press conferences, in support of his wife by proxy marriage; his sister Tanya Yankelevich who, among other things, traveled to Europe in search of support; West German and Norwegian officials and doubtless those from many other countries including the Vatican.

In the scientific community in America, there were such helping groups as: the (New York-based) Committee of Concerned Scientists (not to be confused with the *Union* of Concerned Scientists) which rounded up scientists, issued press releases and arranged demonstrations; active scientific supporters of Sakharov such as Sidney Drell and Paul Flory of Stanford (who agitated on the West Coast); the National Academy of Scientists (NAS); and, of course, our own Federation of American Scientists.

The story on this page conveys some of the relatable events as viewed from FAS which, in March 1980, "adopted" Andrei Sakharov and considers him a unique leader of that world-wide movement of atomic scientists of conscience who, in 1945, founded this organization.☐

The episode of the Andrei Sakharov hunger strike may, surprisingly, have strengthened, rather than weakened, the reputation and standing of this unique individual. The world moved from an understated concern about his well-being during the first week of the hunger strike to a massive, if quiet, response in the second week.

On December 9, FAS, and a few other individuals, received a personal announcement of Sakharov's intention to hold a hunger strike along with a letter dated Oct. 9.

It said that he and his wife Yelena Bonner, "having despaired to break through the KGB-built wall by any other means, are forced to begin hunger-strike demanding that our daughter-in-law Liza Alekseyeva be allowed to leave the USSR to join our son."

Sakharov had been emphasizing in all his correspondence for the last 18 months or so, the problem of securing the right to emigrate of "Liza" Alekseyeva. Ms. Alekseyeva was at first only the fiance of his stepson Alexei Semyonov. Semyonov, the son of Yelena Bonner, Academician Sakharov's second wife, studies at Brandeis University (not far from Yelena Bonner's daughter, Tanya Yankelevich, who lives in Newton, Mass.)

Mr. Semyonov had emigrated from the Soviet Union earlier and, in Massachusetts, had divorced his wife from whom he had been separated for some time. (Shortly after the divorce his first wife and son also emigrated.) During the subsequent struggle to secure the release of his fiance, he married her by proxy in Montana—one of the few U.S. states that permits it—in order to strengthen his claim to be part of a family requiring unification under, among other things, the Helsinki Accord.

Bureaucratic Resistance?

Not surprisingly, the Soviet authorities may have considered this too thin a case. But, from Andrei Sakharov's point of view, Ms. Alekseyeva's presence in Russia seemed a hostage being used against him. He repeatedly advised FAS and others that her defense by scientists was justified in logic because she was being used against him.

In his letter of October 9, he said that Liza had become "the hostage of my public activity" and that the authorities were "persecuting her, threatening her with arrest, attempting to deprive her of hope and drive her to despair."

He noted that the Soviet authorities did not acknowledge the validity of the proxy marriage although they could do so. [Article 32 of the Soviet Matrimonial Code accepts marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners when contracted outside the USSR, if "the formal requirements established by law of the place of such contract are met and recognized as authentic (legal) in the USSR."]

Sakharov considered Liza Alekseyeva's suffering to be "entirely caused by (her) nearness to me, their confidence in me when I insisted that Alyosha emigrate thinking that Liza would be able to join him later on." Noting that he was ready to take responsibility for his utterances in an open trial, he said he would not make contact with Soviet colleagues nor do scientific work while this "tragedy of my loved ones continues."

He recited his efforts (a message to Leonid Brezhnev of July, 1980 and May, 1981 which he presumed the KGB had stopped) and his repeated efforts to get the Soviet Academy to take action.

On November 16, in Moscow, Yelena Bonner held a press conference to announce the joint hunger strike. She has been his main link to the rest of the world, through her travels to Moscow where she has spent about half of her time.

The hunger strike began on November 22, with very lit-

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tle attention drawn to it here or in Western Europe—at least on the surface. November 22 was, however, the day on which Leonid Brezhnev was arriving in Bonn for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany and there is reason to believe that Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other members of the Social Democratic Party did make their concern known. (Since this was, after all, the country to which Solzhenitsyn had been delivered when he was summarily sent out of the Soviet Union, they may well have made known a readiness to receive yet another distinguished emigrant.)

In the West, the references to the hunger strike received approximately two inches of coverage except for a New York Times article on a letter signed by a few dozen Nobel Prize winners, many of which had been rounded up by the FAS office. Accordingly, on November 25 FAS sent Andrei Sakharov this telegram:

> Attention has now been drawn to this problem. It may not be possible to secure results immediately. The Federation of American Scientists asks you to discontinue the hunger strike while your supporters work to help you achieve your goal. The world needs you. Do you have the right to risk yourself in this way?

The New York-based Committee of Concerned Scientists had held a "non-lunch" lunch to symbolize the hunger strike and, at it, Joel Leibowitz, former Chairman of the New York Academy of Sciences had sent a similar telegram. We, and no doubt he, were in some despair as to whether the hunger strike would work. Nature Magazine was editorializing, "It is possible that on this occasion their isolation has led them to misjudge the future." (Nov. 26, 1981) and even Sakharov's stepchildren were startled at the lack of media coverage.

By November 28, when an emigrant friend of the Bonner family arrived from Detroit to picket the White House on the 6th day of the hunger strike, FAS was not able—even on an exceptionally quiet Thanksgiving Saturday—to get even local coverage of this picturesque event despite calls to local radio stations and news media.

On Monday, however, we got word that Sakharov had responded to Jeremy J. Stone and Joel Leibowitz in a message that ended:

> I can no longer believe in the kind of promises of the authorities not backed up by action! I ask you to understand and take this into account. With esteem and thanks.

The hunger strike having started on a Monday, this was the beginning of the second week of the strike and—coupled with the "event" of a message back from Sakharov—media people were beginning to listen. FAS began to have success, which rapidly escalated, in asking very highly placed former Government officials to weigh in with private messages, either to the Soviet Ambassador or to the Soviet Government.

Working on this through intermediaries, on Monday

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* Sakharov had been on hunger strikes in 1974 during President Nixon's visit to Moscow, demanding the release of V. Bukovsky and other prisoners of conscience, and also in 1975 over the issue of getting a visa for his wife to visit an eye doctor in Italy. [See FAS PIR September, 1975]

FAS

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The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 24 members, FAS was first organized in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than a quarter century.

FAS FUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501(c)(3) tax-deductible research and educational arm of FAS. It is governed by eight trustees, of whom six are appointed by the FAS Chairman.

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and Tuesday, FAS found more rapid and instant cooperation across a wider spectrum than it had ever found before on any issue. Sakharov is, of course, deeply loved on both left and right. Most important, only one adviser of one such former high official felt that the cause of the hunger strike was too personal to be worth protecting ("a family affair"). We doubt that the Soviet Embassy ever saw such a groundswell of influential concern over any individual complaint by a Soviet citizen in the postwar period.

On Tuesday, we discovered, almost by accident in offhand discussions with a Washington Post reporter, an interesting and powerful formula for motivating the media. We complained that the newspapers were in danger of going from one-inch stories to full page "obits," with nothing in between to alert their publics that a major story was brewing; would they not be culpable in retrospect of poor editorial judgment? After this was conveyed to the Washington Post and New York Times editors, each "queried" its Moscow correspondents for stories. Two days later both papers displayed front page stories (with pictures) on the Sakharov hunger strike. From then on, a reporter advised FAS accurately, the "story was assured."

Apparently the rules in Soviet prison camps are to force-feed persons on hunger strikes after twelve days; the Friday newspapers reported that, on the 13th day, true to its bureaucratic regulations, the Soviet authorities had hospitalized the Sakharovs.

Force Feeding Can Be Dangerous

On locating a rare American specialist on related fasts, FAS learned that the most dangerous period of the fast was coming out of it and that, if this period were not handled properly, it could cause "cardiac arrhythmia." Alarmed at the potential for either medical screwups in far-off Gorki—or about mischief in a country known for Byzantine maneuver—FAS sent cables both to Moscow and to Gorki authorities warning of the dangers, and noting our view that they would be held responsible if Sakharov were harmed. We urged that he be moved to the hospital for Academicians in Moscow where his colleagues could oversee his recovery.

It now appears that the medical doctors did not attempt force feeding but, instead, sought to induce both Sakharov and Bonner to begin eating by telling each that the other was dying, and so on. In retrospect it appears that, when it became evident that they would not give in, word was passed to give Ms. Alekseyeva the right to leave.*

So what is the result? Academician Sakharov, made desperate by isolation, managed to get world-wide support, even on an emigration case linked to him personally. Thus his voice continues to resonate from Gorki with even greater force than from Moscow, as other utterances have shown. And were he in future to feel desperately committed about some broader issue, it is possible that he would get a further renewal of this support—if not from high placed individuals, as in this case, then from groups who felt strongly about that world-wide problem which his future protest might involve. Under these circumstances, the Soviet authorities do seem to have incentives to restore him to some kind of normal life.

Whether this would be a return to Moscow or a release to the West, is unclear. We do believe that he would be willing to leave the Soviet Union now, if permitted, as a consequence of his intellectual confinement in Gorki.

Sakharov Has No Secrets

In this connection, it is worth noting that it has been a quarter of a century since Sakharov ceased to be a "secret" person in a weapons lab, as indicated by his being permitted to sign published Soviet scientific papers in the mid-fifties. And it has been 14 years since he lost his Soviet security clearance even as a consultant, over the publication of his treatise on co-existence. Accordingly, Soviet explanations of why he would not be permitted to leave have gotten steadily weaker. ("Although he can't help the Americans, of course, he might still help the Chinese!" or "Well, he still has his head on his shoulders and might invent something against us.") If these are the only current rationales, we may soon see Andrei Sakharov amongst us. This would be an enormous relief and not only because his safety would be assured. In addition, it would remove a serious current and potential obstacle to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations, and to arms control.



John P. Holdren
Can even his productivity survive prosperity?

FAS VICE CHAIRMAN HONORED

John Holdren, FAS Vice Chairman, was named one of 19 MacArthur Foundation prize fellows announced on November 18, 1981. These fellows are awarded five-year grants worth approximately $200,000 and asked only to do what comes naturally in view of their "exceptional talent, originality, self direction and promise for the future." Holdren is Professor of Energy and Resources at the University of California, Berkeley and received, in 1979, the Federation's annual public service award for "The Pursuit of Excellence in the Policy Analysis of Energy Issues."

Another of the 19 fellows was FAS member Paul G. Richards, 38, a theoretical seismologist at Columbia University where he is Chairman of the Geological Sciences Department.

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* As this is going to press, the cultural counselor of a small but very relevant and distinguished nation has called to report that, based on an FAS appeal to him (and a letter Sakharov sent to one of his country's citizens before the hunger strike began), his nation had taken the matter up at a high level with a fully informed and responsible Soviet representative. The Soviet representative had observed, at that time, that the Soviet Government was worried that proxy marriages might be used as a device in future if this precedent were permitted. This may well explain why Ms. Alekseyeva's right to leave was given in the form of a Soviet passport, with right to travel abroad, rather than as an emigrant's exit permit. From the point of view of the Soviet bureaucracy, she is not now leaving as part of an unreunited family but just as a Soviet citizen taking a Western vacation. (Ed. Note: Those who think this is a distinction without a motivating difference have never been to Russia! J.J.S.)

ENERGY IN THE LDC'S: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

José Goldenberg* and Amulya K.N. Reddy**

Two of the most distinguished scientists in the third world have joined to prepare this article.

Professor José Goldenberg is known to FAS members for his courageous critiques of the German-Brazilian nuclear deal and his forceful advocacy of alternatives. A long-time president of Brazil's Physical Society, he figured prominently in FAS's report on the Brazilian scientific community's problems. (FAS PIR November, 1977).

Professor Reddy is the convener of a program called ASTRA (Application of Science and Technology to Rural Areas) and is a leader of the movement to understand, and develop innovative solutions to, the energy problems of third world villages.

The August 1981 Nairobi Conference on New and Renewable Energy Sources met with very little success primarily because the US effectively opposed the creation of any new institution or international fund to promote the use of new and renewable energy sources. The US made a few pledges to increase bilateral assistance and US AID has plans for 1982 to step up its $38 million per year effort to $80 million. But this commitment is trivial compared to the World Bank estimate that the Less Developed Countries (LDC's) will need investments in their energy sectors of at least $50 *billion* per year for the next few years.

The US attitude seems to be based on the view that the development of the energy sector in LDC's should be left to market forces and to multinational enterprises. Thus, early in 1981, the US indicated its opposition to the World Bank proposal of creating an Energy Affiliate on the grounds that it did not want duplication of the efforts of private US firms. There appeared to be a change in approach at the Ottawa meeting held in the middle of 1981 when the US agreed to encourage the World Bank (and other institutions devoted to development banking) to assign high priority to energy funding. But, just before the Nairobi Conference, an interagency study led by the US Treasury Department concluded that the proposed doubling of the World Bank's energy funding program "could not be justified." According to a report published in *Science* (September 11, 1981), the study essentially argued that "the US private sector would provide sufficient investment in LDC's if their governments would open their doors to multinational enterprises."

This approach of the US was endorsed and echoed at Nairobi by most OECD countries barring Canada and Sweden which were outstanding exceptions. In fact, Ulf Lantzke, Director of the International Energy Agency, bluntly recommended that governments of the Third World with "*good*" energy programs should approach commercial banks of the industrialized countries for solutions to their problems.

Such attitudes and policies completely ignore the basic realities in most LDC's. These countries are predominantly rural in character. A mere 10-20% of their population live in cities, but these small minorities have overwhelming political power and use the resources of their countries primarily for their own benefit. As a result, most cities of the LDC's are quite modern, and the affluent sections living there are closer in their aspirations and life styles to the industrialized world than to their own underprivileged compatriots in their metropolitan slums and rural countryside. Their conspicuous patterns of consumption (including energy consumption patterns) are copied from the industrialized world. These elites are in no sense "underdeveloped," although countries in which they live are.

The old viewpoint that economic growth based on catering to the demands of elites would result in progress "trickling down" to the poorer sections of their societies has been completely invalidated and discredited. At best, small sections of the poor ascend one step of the social ladder and move into the lower middle class. This is particularly true in Latin America where many countries have become highly urbanized with about half the population living in stark poverty in urban slums.

In contrast, the bulk of the rural populations of LDC's live for the most part outside the market economy. Above all, the energy consumed by these people is not "commercial"; it is obtained "free," mostly in the form of gathered fuelwood for cooking. For instance, in India, roughly half the total energy consumption is "non-commercial" in character, and even in Brazil, which is highly urbanized, 25% of the energy is consumed outside the market.

It is futile to hope that the "rules of the market place" will operate in these "dual societies" of most LDC's. The bulk of their populations do not have the purchasing power to articulate their needs as demands upon the market, and therefore their energy needs will be ignored by private companies and multinational corporations. Instead, these profit-seeking enterprises from industrialized countries tend to respond to the energy demands of the affluent elites: oil for private automobiles, electricity for the industrial production of luxury consumption goods and for air-conditioners and other domestic appliances, liquefied petroleum gas for cooking, aviation transport fuel for planes, etc. No wonder that oil companies can be attracted to drill in the LDC's, and exporters of nuclear reactors can easily arrange financing.

Sensitive elements in LDC societies see the problem; they realize that the expectations of their underprivileged sections are rising and are being expressed with increasing vigor even though they do not yet constitute a market. And they realize that moral considerations and political common sense dictate that development programs, including energy projects, must be geared to the needs of the deprived sections of their population, even though they do not have the financial resources to pay for the projects until their living standards are improved.

What is required therefore is first an understanding of

*Professor, Instituto de Fisica, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

**Professor and Convener, ASTRA, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India, and Secretary, Karnataka State Council for Science and Technology, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore 560012, India.

India's Amulya Reddy

the energy needs of the poor in villages and cities, second the formulation of projects to meet these needs of cooking fuel, domestic lighting, water heating, draft power for agriculture, water pumping, etc., through hydroelectricity from major, mini-, and micro-plants, social forestry, community bio-gas plants, etc., and third the financing, organization and implementation of such people-oriented energy projects.

Many LDC governments are attempting all this. They are raising the necessary resources by a number of measures including taxing the wealthier sections of their populations and arranging long-term loans from local and international development banks.

There are in fact precedents for such an approach in the industrialized countries too. The Tennessee Valley of the US was an underdeveloped area, and it is unlikely that the poor people of that depressed region could have solved their problems in the 30's without the massive investment of public funds made available by the New Deal of President Roosevelt. TVA might be a good business proposition today, but it was not so when it was started.

What is required therefore is a "New Deal" for all LDC's. But, the people-oriented energy projects which must be the basis of such a "New Deal" are unlikely to be viewed as "*good*" energy programs by the commercial banks of Europe and the US. To expect therefore that these commercial banks and private enterprises will promote people-oriented energy projects in, for instance, the Sahel region or Bangladesh shows a complete misunderstanding of the realities of the situation in LDC's.

What private companies can (and will) do is to "make a fast buck" and/or get LDC's to subsidize their development/production field-testing expenditures by selling photovoltaic devices or other gadgets or by convincing sun-drenched countries to erect solar towers, but it is foolish to expect that such sales will make a serious dent on the real energy problems of LDC's. But precisely such a naïveté was displayed by many representatives of the industrialized countries when they complained that expensive solar-pumping units and other gadgets installed by them in the LDC's were left to rust in the fields as soon as their foreign experts left. Anyone familiar with the LDC's could easily have predicted such an outcome and interpreted it as meaning that the gadgets were an irrelevant answer to the real energy needs of the people and therefore quite inappropriate. Responding to, say, the desperate need for cooking fuel with photovoltaic-powered relays for television sets (which only a miniscule few can afford) is a modern version of Marie Antoinette's question regarding bread for the poor, viz., "why don't they eat cake?"

As for commercial banks in the industrialized countries, their demand is for quick and large profits on their limited capital resources. This expectation is totally incompatible with the extended gestation times and temporary immobilization of resources required to satisfy basic needs whilst simultaneously raising incomes and creating markets that yield returns only in the long term. In short, *the removal of poverty is not a bankable program from a narrow-minded commercial point of view;* it is a moral imperative and a matter of global survival.

In contrast, the World Bank and other international development banks seem to have attained a slightly better understanding of the energy problems of LDC's, and are seeking to approach the real energy needs of the poor in these countries with organizations like the proposed Energy Affiliate.

Instead of encouraging the World Bank in these efforts and ensuring an improvement over its previous performance, the US and most other industrialized countries have adopted an obstructive approach. They have even opposed a more modest proposal rooted at Nairobi, viz., the setting up of a UN agency to assist LDC's—particularly the very poor ones—to assess the energy needs of their people and to formulate programs for satisfying these needs. This attitude of the industrialized world is in striking contrast to their enthusiasm some 20 years ago to establish under UN auspices an International Atomic Energy Agency to promote the commercial use of nuclear reactors. The very least one expected from the Nairobi Conference was the establishment of a similar agency to spread the use of new and renewable sources of energy.

In such a context, it is useless to hope that the US and, barring a few possible exceptions, other industrialized countries will see (1) the energy sector in LDC's as an integral aspect of their development, (2) energy self-reliance as the crux of this development, (3) the strengthening of LDC scientific and technological capability in the field of energy as the basis of self-reliance, and (4) the role of agencies and institutions in the developed world as the strengthening of LDC scientific and technological capability.

The consequences of the naïve and short-sighted attitude of the industrialized countries are not difficult to foresee. Increasingly larger sections of LDC populations will abandon hopes of getting significant and genuine help from the industrialized countries and will turn their backs on the US and Europe. North-South conflicts will increase thanks to the selfishness and avarice of industrialized countries in the matter of energy. If LDC's do not succumb to irrational political doctrines and destructive chauvinism, there is a strong possibility of their developing an authentic self-reliant attitude which cannot easily avoid anti-western manifestations. In the process, there might be a substantial increase in South-South cooperation through which LDC's will help each other to tackle their common energy problems. All these tendencies will result in the West losing both commercial benefits and political influence—unless there is a radical reorientation in its policies.☐

SOME DEFENSE BUDGET CONSIDERATIONS

Edward L. King (U.S. Army, ret.)

Early next year Congress will begin debate on the Reagan Administration's Fiscal Year 1983 defense budget. At issue will be the future of already reduced domestic entitlement programs versus increased defense spending.

In December Congress approved a compromise $200 billion defense appropriation bill for FY 1982. This bill included $15 billion more than the Carter Administration had requested for defense. This additional funding had been requested by the Reagan Administration as the first phase of their program to "rearm America." What remains at issue is whether the huge amounts being requested are actually required and whether or not additional funds will buy any more combat-ready defense forces or will be wasted.

In examining the conventional forces, Congress should relate the number and deployment of the forces to what it considers reasonable to support the nation's foreign policy. It is in these conventional forces that we maintain the land, sea and air power that projects American presence abroad in support of foreign policy objectives. In FY 1982 they will cost in excess of $100 billion.

But despite this huge appropriation of monies, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported this year—as he has for the past four years—that U.S. forces are in a low state of combat readiness. Rep. Addabbo, Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, called this, "a great indictment of the military and civilian leaders of the Department of Defense and the military services to suggest that having been appropriated these vast sums of money they have permitted our defense to fall into a state as poor as that which is indicated in their statement."

Congress needs to examine the FY 1983 defense budget with different criteria if cost efficiencies and improved combat readiness are to be achieved. For more than a decade each Secretary of Defense has paid lip service to the thesis that the armed forces' principal mission is to support U.S. foreign policy. But each year the Secretary of Defense, not the Secretary of State, makes the chief policy presentation to the Congress. It is unrealistic to expect that the Defense Department isn't going to push its own objectives rather than merely support the foreign policy objectives of the Department of State.

The Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees should work out an arrangement where each would receive the Secretary of State's statement regarding the foreign policy objectives first, only then would they receive the Secretary of Defense's statement regarding how those objectives were to be supported by giving dollar costs and force levels pertinent to each objective.

Allies and Commitments

In the new atmosphere of austerity in domestic programs and large-scale budget cuts, allies must be held to standards of defense spending related to those the American people are being asked to accept. It is interesting to note that there is no treaty to which the United States is a signatory power (four multinational and four bilateral) which requires us to defend any country with specific land, sea or air forces. The treaties really provide little explicit guidance for force levels.

For example, the United States contributes on average about 45% of the ground, sea and air power of the thirteen-member NATO Alliance, while also accepting the responsibility for providing over 80% of the ground, sea and air requirements in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. Considering that our NATO allies obtain 57% of their oil from the Persian Gulf region (while we obtain only 30%), it seems only equitable that they either assume a much larger share of their own defense in NATO or accept a share of the costs of the U.S. defense effort in the Middle East. To give some indication of the magnitude of the costs to the U.S. of the NATO alliance, out of the $33.5 billion addition to the defense bill requested by the Reagan Administration, $16.6 billion was for general support of NATO allies and theater nuclear forces for Europe.

According to Secretary Weinberger the U.S. plans to provide 19 active and reserve divisions for NATO defense—about as many as the European allies provide with their 23. But the Secretary is talking of 17 more such divisions for the Middle East.

If the Europeans would shoulder more of the ground forces necessary to their own defense, America could plan to use some of their forces released from NATO missions to redeploy to the Middle East which, after all, provides more resources to them than to us.

Does it make sense for the U.S. taxpayer to have to pay billions each year to maintain U.S. forces in Europe that are in tripwire positions—which would require the early use of tactical nuclear weapons—simply because the other NATO allies continue to refuse to put up sufficient numbers of ground divisions to make a successful conventional defense practical?

Similarly, the U.S. provides over 70% of the ground, sea and air forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions at a cost of over $2 billion in FY 1982. These forces provide primary defense of Japan and protect the vital sea lifelines of Japan and our European allies. Japan, which relies on us for national defense, obtains 73% of its oil from the Persian Gulf at no defense cost to the Japanese taxpayer. When U.S. domestic programs are being drastically cut back to provide additional billions for defense, it seems eminently unfair to require the U.S. taxpayer to fund a defense budget which permits Japan to receive a nearly free defense ride, while allowing them practically unlimited access to our domestic markets to the detriment of taxpaying U.S. workers and businesses. If Japan continues to refuse to increase their self-defense forces, then Congress could consider imposing a defense tax on all Japanese imports to offset U.S. costs in defending Japan.

U.S. forces in Korea are another example of a costly military force which has: marginal foreign policy justification; no explicit treaty requirement; and poses the danger of involving us in a war. Under the Carter Administration all U.S. ground combat forces were scheduled to be withdrawn by 1982 because there was no legitimate

Edward L. King

military or foreign policy reason to continue them there. But in 1977 the Defense Department discovered that their previous estimates of North Korean force levels had been incorrect for five years and there had been a massive North Korean buildup against which the previously superior-rated South Korean forces could not defend without the continued presence of one understrength American infantry division.

So the 32-year U.S. military presence was continued under the provisions of the 1953 bilateral treaty which in its operative article indicates that "each party recognizes that an attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own safety and each party would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." This hardly seems justification to continue to station over 20,000 troops in South Korea. In any case how could U.S. constitutional processes effectively function if these U.S. forward-positioned, hostage troops were involved in combat from the first moments of any misstep by either North or South Korea?

In the FY 1982 budget the Department of Defense for the 28th successive year indicates that South Korean ability to defend against North Korea depends on continued U.S. military assistance to "modernize" the South Korean forces. The question that begs to be asked is when do the South Korean armed forces finally become sufficiently modernized to defend their own country without U.S. troops and advisors? The presence of our troops in Korea has some benefits but the costs and risks are high—and is it militarily necessary to support our foreign policy?

Rapid Deployment Force

A major item in the FY 1983 defense budget will be continued increased funding for the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). The Reagan Administration requested $5.6 billion for the RDF in the FY 1982 revised budget. This will increase as the Pentagon forges ahead with this centerpiece force being developed to project American power into the Middle East. The Congress has already agreed to provide $9 million to start work on a headquarters in Florida, as well as $14 million for the Army-Air Force base at Ras Banas, Egypt (despite the fact that we do not yet have a base agreement worked out yet with Egypt—nor a treaty) and $237 million for the Indian Ocean base at Diego Garcia. These bases will enhance U.S. ability to deploy military forces in the Middle East—much as the huge base we built at Cam Ranh Bay enhanced our ability to deploy forces to protect Vietnam.

The Armed Services' enthusiasm for the RDF and its Middle East mission is reminiscent of the late 1950's and early 1960's when they were forming its predecessors, the "Freedoms Fire Brigade" and the "Rapid Reaction Force," while looking toward Southeast Asia as a region where those forces could deploy to confront Communist aggression.

The rapid deployment concept is not new and its real capability should be kept in perspective. As Rep. Whitten, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, recently said, "To merely provide increased defense spending does not necessarily mean more defense or better defense. Wasteful spending in the name of defense—is highly inflationary but it might lead the President and our leaders to believe we are much stronger than we are and lead them to take steps that are dangerous in the extreme."

The RDF concept presents such a danger. The recent Bright Star Exercise in Egypt involving 4,000 RDF troops should not mislead anyone into thinking we have the ability to project real ground power into the Middle East. There is not sufficient military air- and sea-lift to transport and supply a large-scale rapid deployment force. Many military officers still recall how we were forced to commit our divisions one at a time into Vietnam because of the shortage of military air- and sea-lift.

The Bright Star Exercise is a good case in point. It cost $50 million to transport 4,000 RDF troops (about 2,500 of which were combat-skill personnel), 21 tanks (shipped by sea 3 weeks in advance of the "rapid" deployment) and one bomber squadron to Egypt. Such a force could hardly provide an effective response to any probable level of Soviet attack. The Pentagon has indicated that at least six divisions (100,000 troops) would be needed in the Persian Gulf to meet a Soviet attack. Considering the cost of a small operation such as Bright Star and that it costs $11,050 per flying hour to operate each C-5 transport aircraft, it appears doubtful if we could afford to deploy the RDF even if we had sufficient air- and sea-lift and the necessary combat-ready forces.

The RDF is a rhetorical giant which is in truth a force and sea-airlift pigmy. It is similar to the past 2½-war concept which was used for years to justify larger defense appropriations, but was never possible for the same reasons RDF is not possible—never enough combat-ready troops or sea-airlift. If Congress wants a real RDF then they need to decide to: 1) greatly increase air-sealift funding and add at least two additional divisions, or 2) cause our allies to assume more of the NATO ground defense to free up U.S. reinforcement divisions for RDF missions, while increasing funding for sea-airlift, or 3) reduce forces in Europe to use for RDF, or 4) admit it is a concept beyond our budget, considering our NATO responsibilities, and quit wasting billions on tokens.

Personnel

The Secretary of Defense has said, "the most serious single readiness problem we have today is the shortage of experienced personnel." All services exceeded their recruiting goals in 1981, but at the same time continued to lose experienced personnel. A critical problem for all services is the acute shortage of experienced non-commissioned officers. These shortages of experienced personnel have impacted on unit readiness. In 1981 none of the Army's 16 divisions were rated fully combat-ready and 6 were rated not combat-ready.

The Department's answeer to this problem is to again request money to increase military pay to a "comparability level" with industry. The Reagan Administration requested a 5.3% raise for 1981-82 at a cost of $2.2 billion. This increase is on top of an 11.7% increase in 1980 which cost nearly $5 billion. And in 1982 $900 million more will be paid out as bonuses and proficiency pay. Since these are across-the-board raises, a large amount of the increased pay will go to senior officers rather than to lower-ranking volunteers. These increases total nearly $8 billion to try to attract and maintain enough volunteers to man a 2.3 million force.

But why haven't past substantial pay increases enabled the Services to maintain enough volunteers to man our forces at near combat-ready status? One of the many answers is that intangibles besides money motivate people to career military service. For ten years the armed services have been attempting to solve, with money and relaxed standards, a retention problem that is predicated as much on poor conditions of service, boredom with makework, loss of discipline, lack of career and family stability because of frequent moves, and impersonal management of personnel resources. The Services try to alleviate with higher pay morale problems caused as much by conditions of service as by salary levels.

What can be done? The Reagan Administration is moving in the right direction trying to upgrade combat readiness. However, to effectively do this and be cost-effective, they will need to change many practices in the Services. A few of these are:

- excessive worldwide rotation of personnel which is frequently more for staff or career enhancement than military effectiveness. This shuffling of personnel helps create the low morale and retention rates which plague the services. Rotation will cost over $1 billion in FY 1982
- overly lavish command and support doctrines that attempt to cover too many contingencies while going "first class." Service Tables of Organization & Equipment need austere revision. In any Army infantry division there are more authorized officers and non-commissioned officers than privates.
- military training and school systems are duplicative and curricula are often unrealistic or unnecessary. Hundreds of field-grade officers attend individual service Command & Staff and War Colleges to learn to be 3- or 4-star generals in event of mobilization. Most never achieve that rank and there is a large reservoir of relatively young colonels and generals in the retired reserve.
- grade creep continues throughout the armed services. Thousands of officers serve and retire in higher-ranking "temporary" grades costing extra millions in pay. Average grade level of officers on active duty increases despite force fluctuations and this costs more as pay is raised.

These are but a few of the areas where substantial savings are possible with changes in Pentagon manpower procedures and policies. □

NEXT ISSUE: THE DEFENSE OF GERMANY

The European Disarmament Movement, discussed in the December PIR, and a number of other factors have raised the question of possible future rearrangements of NATO strategy. Because this strategy revolves centrally around the division of Germany and the defense of West Germany, the February PIR will combine a survey of German attitudes toward defense with a report on the military problems of conventional and/or nuclear means of deterring invasion.

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