

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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## ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL AT A CROSSROADS

Argentina and Brazil have had a "nuclear detente" since their return to democracy in the mid-1980s. Roberto Garcia Moritan, Director, Office of Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament in the Argentine Foreign Ministry, said that both countries are attempting to build "a net of confidence" that could eliminate the threat of a nuclear arms race.

Despite significant progress in reducing their nuclear rivalry, Argentina and Brazil have been unable to conclude a verifiable agreement not to build nuclear weapons. Both countries also continue to give a high priority to expanding their indigenous uranium enrichment facilities. Without bilateral or international inspections at these plants, a future government could secretly produce highly enriched uranium, a nuclear explosive material.

Argentine President Raul Alfonsin and Brazilian President Jose Sarney are near the end of their terms, and they are running out of time to institutionalize bilateral arrangements against nuclear bombs. If, as anticipated, the ultranationalist Peronist Party wins the Argentine Presidency in May, Argentine support for cooperation with Brazil could wane. Already, this support is being undermined by severe economic problems and by the increasing power of the military.

Although the major parties in Brazil's presidential election next November are supportive of continued cooperation with Argentina, the current economic crisis could undo the next government, possibly leading to a military takeover. Brazil's inflation was over 900 percent in 1988. Unless recent austerity measures bring the economy under control, President Sarney said, "the high inflation could lead to the destruction of democracy and freedom."


### Threat of an Arms Race Remains

As future Argentine and Brazilian governments grapple with severe economic problems, we must work to assure that neither country decides to build an atomic bomb as a popular diversion from its economic problems. The development of a nuclear explosive by one of these countries will almost certainly propel the other to do the same, resulting in a Latin American nuclear arms race. Such a nuclear arms race would divert funds from desperately needed social and economic development and set back international efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The Bush Administration's first priority in Argentina and Brazil should be to find ways to relieve their crushing foreign debt burden and foster their economic development under democratic governments. The United States

should also press Argentina and Brazil to apply bilateral or international inspections to their sensitive nuclear facilities and to make international or regional commitments not to build nuclear explosives. Such actions would surely be in the interests of Argentina and Brazil, minimizing the possibility that one of their future governments will decide to build nuclear weapons.

Although Argentina's and Brazil's well-known criticisms of the discriminatory nature of the international non-proliferation system may be justified, these criticisms should not be used as a shield for their own nuclear arsenals. With the United States and the Soviet Union making progress in reducing their own nuclear arsenals and accepting intrusive bilateral inspection arrangements as part of these arms reductions agreements, Argentina and Brazil need to take additional steps toward the creation of a world free of the danger of a nuclear holocaust. □



*Argentine President Raul Alfonsin, whose term in office ends later this year, has taken the leading role in establishing joint visits of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear facilities. These visits have greatly reduced the nuclear rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.*



*This map of Latin America uses the Peters' Projection which minimizes the distortions of the more standard maps where the northern hemisphere has assumed an unwarranted geographical proportion of the earth's surface.*

## FAS VISITS ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

Concerned that Argentina and Brazil might simply drift toward nuclear weapons for lack of scientific or civilian vigilance, FAS decided to work more actively with scientists in these countries to strengthen institutional constraints against nuclear weapons. In early December safeguards expert and original FAS Chairman, William Higinbotham, and staff scientist, David Albright, spent a week at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro at the invitation of the Brazilian Physics Society giving briefings about safeguards, physical protection, and the status of Brazil's and Argentina's unsafeguarded enrichment plants. The following article describes this trip.

Albright went on to Argentina to discuss with scientists the prospects for working together on projects that could strengthen constraints against nuclear explosives. In October, the Argentine Physics Association formed a committee to address nuclear questions that is similar to the Brazilian commission. He met with two members of this commission, Luiz Masperi and Alberto Ridner. They appreciate FAS's support and advice and look forward to working with us, although they first must define their own priorities and plans.

During this visit and a previous one a few months earlier, Albright interviewed many nuclear and government officials and scientists about the current prospects for keeping nuclear weapons out of Argentina and Brazil. The second article summarizes some of what he learned. ■

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## FAS NONPROLIFERATION EXPERTS PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO BRAZILIAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY

The new Brazilian constitution, which went into effect last October, requires that all nuclear activities be for peaceful uses only and assigns authority for the nuclear program to the elected Congress. Although the constitution does not prohibit "peaceful" nuclear explosives, it does provide the Congress an important opportunity to exercise oversight over the unsafeguarded nuclear program, particularly the Aramar centrifuge enrichment plant being constructed in the state of Sao Paulo which will be able to produce significant quantities of highly enriched uranium within a few years.

However, the Brazilian Congress is inexperienced in overseeing technical programs, particularly nuclear ones. As a way to bolster the Congress' oversight capabilities, the Brazilian Physical Society (BPS) launched a project last year to work for a Congressionally-controlled inspection system of the unsafeguarded nuclear program that would ensure that public policies are followed. This proposal is opposed by the current government.

At the invitation of the BPS, we travelled to Brazil to participate in workshops at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro on safeguards, physical protection, and the capabilities of the unsafeguarded enrichment plants in Brazil and Argentina. Our hosts were physicists Fernando de Souza Barros and Luiz Pinguelli Rosa. Dr. Souza Barros is a Professor of Physics at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and a past President of the Brazilian Physical Society. In the early 1980s, he established the Society's Commission on Nuclear Questions which is charged with developing credible controls over the nuclear program. Dr. Pinguelli Rosa is chairman of COPPE which coordinates all graduate engineering programs at the Federal University of Rio. He works actively with members of Congress and the press to promote increased Congressional and public scrutiny of the nuclear program.

### Briefing by our Hosts

Our first day was spent at the university meeting with our hosts. They told us that the military and the Atomic Energy Commission were actively lobbying Congress to support the unsafeguarded nuclear projects and that, as a result, the BPS's efforts were even more important now. They briefed us on the government's recent reorganization of the nuclear program and the formation of the Superior Council for Nuclear Energy which reports directly to the President and oversees the entire nuclear program. Our hosts explained that military officials dominate the Superior Council and remain in charge of the unsafeguarded enrichment program, although the civilian National Nuclear Energy Commission is nominally the head of it.

One encouraging development was the government's appointment of Professor Jose Goldemberg to the Superior Council. Professor Goldemberg, a physicist and currently the Rector of Sao Paulo University, is a leading advocate of civilian control over the nuclear program. We were fortunate enough to meet twice with Dr. Goldem-

berg, first on Tuesday at the university, where he happened to be giving a seminar on energy policy, and on Friday, at Sao Paulo University. He told us that the Superior Council had not yet met. He said the nuclear program needed to be split into separate promotional and regulatory agencies, similar to what the United States did when it divided the old Atomic Energy Commission in the mid-1970's. He would assign responsibilities for domestic safeguards to the regulatory agency.

On Tuesday, we gave a seminar at the University. We discussed how the US Congress exercises oversight over the US civilian and military nuclear programs, the prospects for proliferation in the rest of the world, and details about the Brazilian uranium enrichment program.

On Wednesday and Thursday, we participated in two workshops for physics and engineering faculty and graduate students. On Wednesday, Higinbotham described IAEA and national safeguards systems and techniques for centrifuge enrichment plants. Souza Barros was particularly interested in the technical feasibility of periodic inspections of enrichment plants since he felt that a Congressionally-controlled agency may not be able to apply continuous inspections. We said that the US government had been developing monitoring equipment that could be used for periodic inspections at centrifuge enrichment plants. This equipment was being developed for possible use in Pakistan's Kahuta enrichment plant if a regional agreement allowed periodic inspections. We agreed to prepare a review of the status of this type of monitoring equipment.

On Thursday, Albright discussed the current status of

*(Continued on page 4)*



*Jose Goldemberg, a long-time critic of the military nuclear program, is a member of the recently formed Superior Council on Nuclear Energy. He thinks that it is currently more important to establish domestic oversight of the military nuclear program than to press the government for international pledges against nuclear weapons. He says that the people of Brazil first need to know what the nuclear program is doing.*

*(Continued from page 3)*

the Brazilian enrichment program. His assessment of this program was part of his nonproliferation project that is evaluating the capabilities of several threshold countries to produce nuclear explosive materials and nuclear weapons.

### Congressional Guest

A special guest at the Thursday workshop was Brazilian Congressman Fabio Feldman, an ecologist, who talked about the new legislature. As a result of the new constitution, he said the Congress will be reorganizing itself for some time to come. He stated that a major priority is putting nuclear issues on the Congress' agenda, since the nuclear program has not traditionally been one of its major concerns, particularly under military rule from 1964 until 1985. Feldman also emphasized that the Congress needs reliable information and advice. He said that many Congressmen remain suspicious

that Argentina is building a bomb, making them reluctant to support efforts by Brazil to give up the option to develop "peaceful" nuclear explosives.

Feldman told us that the most immediate issue facing the Congress is the federal budget. For the first time in many years the Congress is approving the budget, and as a result, the budget of the unsafeguarded nuclear program is open to Congressional and public scrutiny.

Everyone involved felt that our week together was constructive. Besides sharing valuable information and developing good rapport, we established several collaborative research efforts. Our next meeting is scheduled for Washington in late-February when Pinguelli and de Souza Barros will visit governmental agencies and Congressional offices to learn first-hand about U.S. Congressional oversight on scientific and technical policies. □

—David Albright and William Higinbotham

## OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL

One of the most often-asked questions about Argentina and Brazil is whether they have secret nuclear weapons programs. They clearly are developing the capability to produce nuclear explosive materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium. And they both have refused to support the international non-proliferation regime — rejecting both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty) while maintaining their right to build "peaceful" nuclear explosives.

Yet what stuck me most during my two trips to Argentina and Brazil is the lack of any hard evidence of nuclear weapons programs and the staunch opposition to nuclear weapons among many nuclear and governmental officials, scientists and the public. Many of the Argentine nuclear scientists and officials said that they were confident that members of the nuclear establishment would resist a future government's decision to build nuclear explosives. Two of these scientists were top officials at INVAP, the contracting company that secretly built and now operates the enrichment plant near Pilcaniyeu for the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission.

However, underneath this nearly universal opposition to nuclear weapons lie deep divisions over the type of domestic controls on the nuclear programs that are needed and the amount of bilateral controls that should be implemented at each country's nuclear facilities. Whether future governments in Argentina and Brazil refrain from building nuclear explosives may well depend on how these divisions are resolved.

### Bilateral Arrangements

With Presidents Alfonsin and Sarney nearing the end of their terms, it is unknown whether succeeding governments will continue mutual visits to each country's most sensitive nuclear facilities. These visits, begun by the Alfonsin government, have greatly reduced the nuclear rivalry between these two countries.

President Alfonsin deserves special praise for initiating

these mutual visits and opening up his country's nuclear program to Brazil despite widespread public suspicions. One Argentine government official explained that President Sarney's visit to the Pilcaniyeu enrichment plant in the spring of 1987 was arranged quickly without telling the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission for fear that it would oppose the visit.

However, prospects are currently remote for expanding these visits into actual inspections of each others nuclear facilities. One Argentine government official said that because of Brazil's opposition to mutual inspections, Argentina has backed away from promoting them. Officials at Brazil's Atomic Energy Commission stated, "We think a good relationship with Argentina is enough, particularly if



*Brazilian President Jose Sarney, who will leave office this year, has played an important role in reducing Brazil's nuclear rivalry with Argentina. His government, however, has opposed joint Argentine/Brazilian inspections of its sensitive nuclear facilities.*

there is a close interrelationship of the two nuclear programs."

Several officials in the Argentine Foreign Ministry, however, remain supportive of bilateral inspections, and expressed their optimism that inspections will take place eventually, although they could not predict how comprehensive such inspections would be. Roberto Garcia Moritan, Director of the Office of Nuclear Affairs and Disarmament in the Argentine Foreign Ministry, said that the process is like building a house and they are still working on the foundation.

### Opposition Hardens To International Treaties

Despite Argentina's and Brazil's commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons, their opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Tlatelolco Treaty has hardened. Both treaties would require them to pledge not to build nuclear weapons and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all nuclear facilities, although the Tlatelolco Treaty would leave each country free to develop peaceful nuclear explosives. (The United States, however, interprets this treaty as forbidding nuclear explosives of any kind.)

While President Alfonsin was attending the inauguration of Brazil's unsafeguarded enrichment plant last spring, he said: "The Tlatelolco Treaty invariably leads us to the Non-Proliferation Treaty," which "appears to create a club of older members who can do as they please and another club of latecomers who cannot do anything." He expressed support for a new Tlatelolco Treaty "where we can offer the necessary safeguards, and where we ourselves establish our goals for the peaceful use of nuclear energy."

### Domestic Controls

The current governments have made only tentative steps toward domestic checks and balances on their nuclear programs. The new constitution and the recent reorganization of the Brazilian program and the formation of the Superior Council, described briefly in the previous article, are steps in the right direction. However, the Superior Council does not provide the public or Congress with significantly more control over the unsafeguarded nuclear program than the previous system. Whether the Congress will be successful in exercising greater oversight over the military nuclear program remains to be seen.

In early December *Nucleonics Week* reported that President Alfonsin had abandoned plans to impose stricter government controls on the National Atomic Energy Commission and to share that control with Congress. This decision followed several years of opposition to increased controls by the Peronists, who are reported to favor the present system where the Atomic Energy Commission is controlled directly by the President's office, with the Foreign Ministry supervising nuclear export policy.

However, under the present system, the Atomic Energy Commission is essentially autonomous. Such a system, effectively removed from public and Congressional scrutiny, could facilitate secret projects, allowing a repeat of the

military government's surprise announcement in 1983 that it had built the secret Pilcaniyeu uranium enrichment plant. The decision to build the plant was made in 1978 and construction proceeded in secret until the 1983 announcement. According to the general manager of INVAP, only about a dozen people in the entire country knew about the Pilcaniyeu project.

It will be difficult to achieve strong Congressional control in Brazil if this is not also the case in Argentina. Both countries have proven they can keep a secret — the next time the secret might be the production of highly enriched uranium or an atomic bomb. □ —David Albright

### THE WEAPONS COMPLEX DEBATE HAS JUST BEGUN

Asked to comment on the House Armed Services Committee's lack of oversight over the nuclear weapons production complex, a spokesman for the Committee recently stated, "It's been a poor stepchild. It just doesn't fit in around here." Although difficult to believe, this statement comes from the Committee with primary responsibility for authorizing a military budget which now runs more than \$300 billion every year. The comment begins to shed light on the prevailing atmosphere which fostered a conspiracy of secrecy and silence surrounding the nuclear weapons complex for the past forty years. Virtually no one wanted to touch it.

Now, after six months of blazing headlines, the future of the nuclear weapons production complex, an issue which received scant attention in the last Congress, will be a central focus in this year's debate over defense spending and the overall federal budget. The amount of money it will take to clean up and modernize these facilities, estimated at \$150-\$200 billion over the next several decades, will force the Congress and the Executive branch to address issues which have been far easier to ignore than confront.

For its part Congress has left the complex virtually untouched by proper oversight. The House and Senate



Senator John Glenn (D-Ohio) (right) has been crusading for better oversight at the complex.

Armed Services Committees, which have primary jurisdiction over these facilities, have been lax in tracking the operations and management of the complex. Pressed to explain why the House Armed Services Procurement Subcommittee hadn't been more vigilant in pursuing problems at the Rocky Flats Plant, for example, former Chairman Sam Stratton, who retired this year, replied, "We felt it was a little out of our purview. We had enough problems already, so we never went out there to look at it." Some would argue that this is a transparent excuse for what critics have termed a "production first" attitude by the Legislative and Executive Branches.


If the neglect of this issue by Congress is somewhat startling in view of revelations in the press, the Executive Branch is similarly deserving of a resounding reprimand for disregarding years of concrete indications that the complex was falling into disrepair. The Reagan Administration would be hard pressed to defend itself against charges that it ignored clear, unambiguous warnings. As early as 1981, a group known as the Crawford Committee, operating under the sponsorship of the Department of Energy, reported that "significant deficiencies" existed in the operation and management of the government's nuclear reactors and that there was a serious lack of attention to safety aspects of the operations. Of the 20 proposals for improvements made in the Crawford study in 1981, none has been completed to date.

### No Rigorous Oversight

In short, neither the Congress nor the Executive Branch has upheld its responsibility to conduct rigorous oversight over the complex. After forty years of operations many of the plants are in a state of disrepair. But of equal importance, it is now known that health and safety implications of the very dangerous processes involved in weapons production were never taken seriously by the US government. For both Legislative and Executive branches, the revelations of the past six months are an embarrassing spectacle which exposes the negligence resulting from placing a higher priority on making nuclear bombs than on the health and safety of those who work and live near these facilities.

The focus on the weapons complex by the media has, of course, provoked a remarkable level of interest in this issue on Capitol Hill. Chairman Les Aspin of the House Armed Services Committee has now declared that, "It's clearly a major issue that will require the committee to launch a major effort." Last year it was nearly impossible to find a member of the Armed Services Committee who knew or cared about the operations of the complex. The new-found interest on the House side will probably take the form of a special panel to be headed by Rep. John Spratt of South Carolina. With a variety of committees clamoring to get a piece of the action, the Armed Services Committees in both Houses are certain to be active, especially since they have primary legislative jurisdiction over these facilities.

However, it is certain that others will step in to claim their piece of the pie. The Governmental Affairs Commit-



*Congressman Albert Bustamante (D-Texas) is one of the few House members actively involved in monitoring the weapons complex.*

tee in the Senate, chaired by Sen. John Glenn, a leading crusader on safety concerns long before this issue hit the front pages, and the House Government Operations Environment, Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee, chaired by Rep. Mike Synar, will continue to stake a claim, particularly in the area of safety and health. Sen. Glenn, who has been advocating a strong watchdog agency to oversee the DOE's military operations, will continue to use his committee to advance his proposals.

But Senator Glenn will not be the only competing force in the debate as it develops in the Congress this session. There are a variety of issues which will have a major impact on how the debate unfolds and which could take this issue in some form to a plethora of committees, stretching from one end of the Capitol to the other. The issues which will enter the debate include approaches to arms control, reform of environmental laws, management oversight of the Department of Energy nuclear programs, clean-up funds for contaminated sites, safety upgrades for existing reactors and other facilities, health studies of workers and residents, waste disposal, development of new nuclear technology and proposals for construction of new production reactors and other bombmaking facilities. Among the committees that will grab a piece of the action are Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Energy and Natural Resources, Government Operations, Governmental Affairs, Interior, Appropriations and Science and Technology. It should be readily apparent that the jurisdictional tangle will be an important factor in the legislative maneuvering which will begin to emerge in the next few months.

For those whose curiosity has been aroused by the spate of press coverage about the nuclear weapons complex, the debate is just beginning, the back room dealing is in progress and the Congressional press offices are inking up. So, take a seat, buckle up and prepare yourself for a long, tumultuous session. □

—David Feltman



## Vienna Mandate for Conventional Arms Control

After months of stalemate, the logjam at the Vienna talks on a mandate for conventional arms control was finally broken last month, and a new acronym born. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CAFE, talks are now scheduled to begin on March 9. These new negotiations will allow President Bush to make a fresh start on conventional arms control while the MBFR experience fades from memory. But it will also force the Bush Administration to get its arms control act together quickly.

Twenty-three countries will participate in CAFE: The US and USSR, the other nations of their respective NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, and France. Many months were spent debating the precise relationship between these talks and the larger Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which includes other "non-aligned" countries, but it was finally agreed that, while CAFE will take place within the CSCE structure, it will be a separate and essentially autonomous negotiation.

The conclusion of the Vienna mandate talks was anticlimactic, coming as it did after Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's dramatic announcement at the U.N. of large Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's plan: to unilaterally withdraw by 1991 six Soviet tank divisions with 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks and disband them; as well to reduce all Soviet forces in Europe and the Western USSR by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery and 800 combat aircraft and by 500,000 troops worldwide, left even hardened Western analysts of Soviet defense policy gaping in amazement. Once again, Gorbachev has demonstrated his mastery of public diplomacy and put pressure on the West to fundamentally re-think its negotiating approach.

### Impact of Soviet Cuts

A reduction of 5,000 tanks will cut Soviet forward-deployed armor almost in half and will reduce significantly the Soviet threat to Europe. As military expert Philip Karber explained, "For close to 40 years NATO's fear of surprise attack by the Pact forces has been the main driver of NATO's force structure and defense budgets. Now Gorbachev appears to be saying that he is going to . . . in effect eliminate that Soviet capacity."

Equally as important as the military impact of these cuts will be their political effect. In Europe, Gorbachev is now increasingly perceived as the driving force behind reducing confrontation and Western political leaders as seeking to perpetuate it. In the wake of Gorbachev's move, NATO's own negotiating position for the CAFE talks, announced in Brussels on December 9, appeared unimaginative. House Armed Services Committee Chairman, Les Aspin, summarized NATO's dilemma by saying recently, "Mr. Gorbachev may well have convinced our citizens that the ball is in our court. NATO must now do what alliances of independent, sovereign nations find most difficult. It must respond in a coherent, coordinated way with innovative, ground-breaking proposals of its own."

NATO should have sufficient motivation for wanting rapid progress at CAFE. Budgetary problems, a shrinking


manpower pool and lack of a public perception of a serious Soviet threat are all contributing to pressure in both Europe and the US to reduce the size of defense budgets and armed forces. Recent announcements by Eastern European countries of budget and force cuts will undoubtedly increase similar pressure in the West. Moreover, increasing resentment among Americans that their allies are not paying enough of the burden for their own defense—and from Europeans who believe that the American military presence has gone on long enough—are taking their toll.

### NATO's Response

However, there is reason to doubt whether NATO is capable of responding to Gorbachev's challenge. NATO leaders have been spending most of their energy and effort explaining what they *cannot* trade away at CAFE. They say that NATO cannot reduce its own ground forces, because they're already at the minimum level necessary to cover the front. Nor is NATO interested in reducing combat aircraft, arguing that aircraft cannot seize and occupy territory. And NATO refuses to discuss further tactical nuclear force reductions, saying such talks could only come after the two sides reach conventional parity, if ever.

How might the alliance respond to Aspin's call for a "ground-breaking" proposal of its own? First, it must develop its own long-term vision of a safer, more secure Europe that all Western nations can support. With the CAFE talks fast approaching, the West still lacks an agreed position on what real "stability" in Europe should look like. Secondly, it must come forward with specific proposals that grab the public's imagination and take advantage of Gorbachev's demonstrated interest in reducing the Soviet military burden.

Presumably, NATO's principle negotiating objective will remain the reduction of Soviet armored and other offensive ground forces. Yet thus far, the West has fiercely resisted any offsetting reductions in deep strike combat



*Soviet SS-21 Short-Range Nuclear Missile and Launcher on display. The USSR says it will remove some nuclear missiles from Eastern Europe as well as tanks and troops.*

aircraft—precisely the arms category that offers the most promise of a trade.

NATO's qualitative and, arguably, quantitative advantage in deep-interdiction, ground attack combat aircraft could be traded for further deep cuts in Soviet tank and mechanized infantry divisions. NATO's concessions could take the form of both drawing down certain existing tactical fighter wings and/or deferring certain modernization programs (e.g., the transfer of U.S. F-15E or FB-111 aircraft to Europe.)

Another area where NATO could regain the initiative and improve European security would be a reduction in shorter-range nuclear forces. Gorbachev's speech, and the subsequent comments of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that the USSR would be withdrawing some tactical nuclear forces along with its troop reductions complicated prospects for NATO deployment of new nuclear missiles like the Follow-on-to-Lance (FOTL) or Tactical Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM-T). The West German government is likely to resist any U.S. effort to press ahead on these systems and turn their deployment into a test of "alliance solidarity," as was done with the Pershing II and the GLCM deployments.

Deployment of FOTL and SRAM-T might succeed in conjunction with a "comprehensive concept" for reducing the tactical nuclear stockpiles in Europe through selective retirements and a moratorium on additional nuclear artillery—while challenging the Soviet Union to follow-up on Shevardnadze's announcement and truly reverse its own build-up in short-range nuclear forces during the 1980's and eliminate their advantage in armored divisions against which NATO's nuclear weapons are supposed to defend.

Reductions in either combat aircraft or tactical nuclear weapons would be fiercely resisted by many quarters within the alliance, but NATO must begin to develop just such proposals and not miss this unprecedented opportunity for a reduction in the East-West military confrontation. The prospect of eliminating the Soviet threat to Europe should be incentive enough for some revolutionary thinking. □


—Thomas Longstreth

## FAS INVITES CAMBODIAN AMBASSADOR

As the Vietnamese withdraw from Cambodia, there is the ever-present possibility that the Khmer Rouge, whose 3 year reign of terror killed from one to two million Khmer, may return. Complex negotiations are underway between the Government installed by the Vietnamese—the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)—Prince Shianouk, and the Khmer Rouge to determine the future of the country. As part of an emerging campaign to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge, and to learn more about the situation in the country, FAS met in Moscow with Ambassador Hor Namhong, the Ambassador of the PRK to Moscow.

Ambassador Namhong represents the PRK in its negotiations with the other parties. Finding him a key player, knowledgeable and candid, FAS invited him to the US for a week in March. If all goes well, the undersigned will visit Hanoi and Phnom Penh in February. The visit to Hanoi is designed to advance the establishment of scientific relations between Vietnam and the US. The visit to Phnom Penh is related to the above issues of security in Southeast Asia. □

—Jeremy J. Stone



Ambassador Hor Namhong

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