

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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## PEACE AND THE PECKING ORDER

In a post-war period, the Soviet Government has not, with a few exceptions, been looking for trouble with the West. There were, of course, two efforts to take Berlin, an effort to put missiles in Cuba, and the gratuitous explosion of a 50-megaton bomb.

But, for the most part, the Soviet approach to foreign policy has been to try to calm the West down, not to rile it up unnecessarily while, of course, pursuing Soviet foreign policy aims that may have irritating collateral effects.

Most Americans have the opposite impression. For most of the last third of a century, their attention has been drawn to Soviet statements and Soviet procurement of weapons by American hawks eager to cry alarm. Of course, viewed through that lens, the Soviet Union has been engaging in one deliberate, unnecessary, provocation after another with the presumed goal of intimidation.

In fact, it is the special political alchemy of the American hawk to turn Soviet weakness into strength that is swaggering.

If the Soviet Union builds big, vulnerable, and slow-reacting missiles, it is not a failure to have the solid-fuel technology to which the West has already passed, but a conscious desire to intimidate us with size.

If the Soviet Union has an ineffective missile defense around Moscow, our extremists give it the benefit of every possible technological doubt—the better to inspire us to leap-frog it into something much better—and they predict political challenges. And yesterday's example in ABM is, really, today's example in antisatellite weapons.

If the Soviet Union is cautious, extremely cautious, about saying it can win, or even survive, a nuclear war, the caution is interpreted as a suppression of real Soviet feelings, and as an incitement to read ever more closely between the lines of Soviet military doctrine. In short, even Soviet caution is, really, transmuted into devilishly clever aspects of a diabolic peace offensive. Few Americans pause to thank their lucky stars that our adversary is so cautious and so unsure of herself that she denounces claims that *she* is ahead in the arms race as provocations and lies!

### Detente in the Soviet Interest

No doubt the long and consistent Soviet interest in detente has a major component of realpolitik. The Soviet Union is the weaker power and it wants, and needs, decades of respite from struggle, the better to catch up. As things now appear, it is, indeed, falling behind and not catching up at all. (Twenty years ago, in the late Herman Kahn's "On Thermonuclear War", it was projected that the Soviet Union would have 75% of the U.S. GNP by 1970 and be rising in relative terms; this is yet another of the defense alarms that never came to pass. The Soviet

GNP is still 50% of ours.)

In short, one doesn't have to love the tortoise to say that it has a healthy respect for the ability of the hare to bolt ahead. So the tortoise does not usually call the rabbit names. And the rabbit has forgotten, for the most part, that such impudence could actually occur!


But it may now be coming. The Soviet Union is obviously looking for some dramatic way to "get even" for the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. Preferably, they would like something which they could offer to withdraw if the West would withdraw the missiles in Europe. And, best of all, it would be something that would drive home to the West the sense of vulnerability which the Soviet Government feels when faced with the Western intermediate range missiles.

This is why Valentin M. Falin and Lieutenant General Viktor P. Starodubov told the Washington Post's Don Oberdorfer that they were convinced that the U.S. would "begin serious talks" once it feels "the weight of the weapons countermeasures" recently ordered by the Politburo. (Washington Post, January 23, pg. A18)

A few months ago, when Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John W. Vessey was asked what response he expected to materialize on the Soviet side, he said:

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A comparison of the estimated growth of the Soviet and United States economies 1950-1970



1960 Graph shows Soviets GNP increasing rapidly.

(Continued from page 1)

"Look for the bizarre."

My guess is that they will put intermediate range missiles on surface ships and station them off the East Coast. Americans would not like this visible reminder of the speed with which their capitol could be destroyed, even though it can be done by submarines today. And the Russians would find it easier to keep these missiles on station than to mount them on submarines. (There are, however, recent reports of increased stationing of submarines).

Of course, the ships would be vulnerable to attack—but so are the Pershing and cruise. Both the U.S. and the Soviet deployments would be "first-strike" deployments of the "use them first or lose them quickly" kind.

Falin, a prominent commentator for the Government newspaper Izvestia, predicted the deployment as being "perhaps the next year or the year after", but Vadim Zagladin, of the Central Committee said it would probably be well before this year is out.

Meanwhile, on the same day, Yuri Andropov gives an interview saying:

"...before it is too late, the United States and NATO should display readiness to return to the situation that had existed before the commencement of the deployment of the Pershing 2's and cruise missiles. We are raising this question before the United States and its NATO allies because we want to avoid yet another spiral of the arms race, this time on a new, still more dangerous level that leads to a growth of tension and instability in Europe."

Despite the Soviet record of caution and unwillingness  
(Continued on page 3)

### JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECEIVE FAS MILITARY ADVICE

On December 21, alarmed by one interpretation of a telephone threat in Beirut, FAS sent the telegram below to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John W. Vessey, Jr.:

"The Beirut anonymous telephone caller reference to generating a real earthquake under their feet suggests that there may have been tunneling under U.S. positions or installations and explosions emplaced; please ask Marine security to consider this possibility."

On December 23, we received the admirable response following from General Vessey:

"Thanks for the information. We are taking it seriously and have forwarded the possibility of tunneling to the Marines. Again thank you. Merry Christmas."

So at least the top military command system was working rapidly, and in a non-bureaucratized fashion, taking ideas from wherever they might come and acting on them. Would it not be something if Government always operated like this!

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*(Continued from page 2)*

to provoke us, this statement should not, I think, be taken lightly.

Of course, America has persuaded itself that the deployment of the SS-20 was an aggressive act designed to destabilize the European theater and to produce a politically intimidating lead in intermediate range missiles of 600 to zero. But all informed observers know that the Soviet Union had that "lead" for 20 years and that the SS-20 was simply the third and latest Soviet attempt to modernize that long-overdue-for-modernization missile force of SS-4's and SS-5's.

Predictably, once the West moved to emplace the cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe for a number of unilateral reasons, our own agit-prop went into action, giving one million and one reasons why it was a response to Soviet (SS-20) actions. (This first article of a series being run currently in Science Magazine by Jeffrey Smith on this subject was splendid and relevant.) In that atmosphere most of the public will see any new Soviet response as a gratuitous "topping" action rather than as a retaliation.

Thus we are at the beginning of a political escalation of military deployments. And most explosive of all the ingredients of this escalation is a latent double standard arising from past Soviet caution. We have come to assume that the Soviets will blink first in an eye-ball-to-eye-ball crisis.

The West considers the Cuban missile crisis to be the model for confrontations—one in which Soviet adventurism is followed by Soviet capitulationism, as the Chinese put it at the time. But the Soviet Union may no longer be willing to capitulate so easily. It may be weak economically, culturally, politically and in virtually all other ways, but it has, after all, built strategic forces comparable to our own in the last two decades. It may think that it has a right to have its ships proceed unimpeded on the high seas or whatever.

If war comes from this, therefore, it will not be over the issue of cruise and Pershing missiles directly, or about the Soviet response. It will have to do with what might be called escalation dominance in the realm of politics. Or, put another way, with a game of political chicken in which the players' interest in the outcome has long transcended the initial stakes and become a question of future escalation dominance.

U.S. and Soviet relations oscillate within a fairly narrow range. When they get too bad, the fear of war drives them closer, and when they get too warm, various defense mechanisms on both sides see the relaxation of tension as threatening—either to political control (on the Soviet side) or to loss of vigilance (on the Western side)—and one or both sides move to close it off.

We are now near the height (one hopes) of the backswing. On the upswing to a more normal part of the range, we can expect to achieve a new measure of arms control. But it obviously will require another Administration and so we must wait, nervously, for one to five years. Meanwhile one must hope that no crisis triggers an effort to change the international pecking order. □

—Jeremy J. Stone

## FAS RESEARCH ARM EXPANDED

In January, three FAS officials took responsibility for various parts of the FAS Fund research program while continuing their current full-time positions.

FAS Chairman Frank von Hippel, whose term as chairman expires in June, will become Director of Scientific Research. In that capacity he will be responsible for reviewing and overseeing FAS Fund efforts to resolve various scientific issues. Armed with a small research budget, which the Fund hopes to increase in time, he is authorized to defray, in particular, relevant short-term investigations. Von Hippel, a physicist, and one of America's most experienced analysts of science and society issues, has been filling this role for the last four years, among many other roles, as FAS Chairman, and this appointment ensures his continuation as the arbiter of many FAS technical issues.

FAS Council Member Morton H. Halperin has agreed to become Director of Studies: Arms Control, with a view to his overseeing an evolving set of policy papers.

Dr. Halperin, a political scientist, is uniquely qualified for this position. The author and editor of a dozen books on arms control before he was 30 years of age, he has been the Pentagon's Deputy Assistant Secretary of Arms Control and Director of its Policy Planning Staff under Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Clifford. Later a senior staffer on Henry Kissinger's National Security Council staff, he has worked, in recent years, as Director of the Center for National Security Studies on issues of national security and civil liberties.

Council Member Harrison Brown has agreed to become Director of Studies: Global Development. He will also be preparing an FAS Fund monograph on what scientists can and should do to fulfill their responsibilities in this area.

Dr. Brown, who was for twelve years the Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, is also uniquely qualified for his position. The author of such path-breaking books as "Must Destruction Be Our Destiny" (1946), "The Challenge of Man's Future" (1954) and "The Next Hundred Years" (1957), he has long been a role model for FAS scientists. Dr. Brown has been President of the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the highest world scientific office. Recently retired from the East-West Center in Honolulu, he will work with FAS from Albuquerque, New Mexico.

All three of the above positions have on-going needs for funding for related staff or investigations; persons interested in assisting should contact FAS Director Stone.

In the meantime, FAS has made, in recent months, these additions to the staff:

Will Hathaway, who is a special assistant to the Director fulfilling a wide variety of tasks;

Steven Green, who is assisting John E. Pike on the Space Policy Working Group;

Dan Charles, who will be working on issues of arms control and NATO.

The Federation also has, as Guest Researcher and Research Associate, David Albright, who is working on issues of the nuclear fuel cycle and proliferation. □

## ARMS CONTROL: THE YEAR BEHIND AND A YEAR AHEAD

This time last year 1983 looked pretty good for arms control efforts: the MX Dense Pack proposal had just been defeated by Congress in December 1983; the freeze had been endorsed in over 35 states, cities and counties all over the country; and a new pack of liberal democrats had been elected in the 1982 mid-term elections. However, by December, despite a victorious House freeze vote and the defeat of chemical weapons, the general tenor of east-west relations had darkened dramatically. The tragic shooting down of Korean Airlines Flight 007, the end of all operating negotiations with the USSR, the beginning of Pershing and cruise missile deployments in Europe, "Evil Empire" speeches by President Reagan, and congressional authorization of the production of 21 MX missiles all contributed to deepening US-Soviet tensions.

This article looks at what happened in Congress in 1983 to four arms control issues: the military budget, the nuclear freeze, the MX missile and chemical weapons. They represent the political ups and downs of one of the most significant years in recent arms control history.

Last year President Reagan asked for \$273.4 billion for the defense budget, a 10% increase over Fiscal Year 1983. In the end, he received only a 5% increase, or \$249 billion. The Democratic House and even many Senate Republicans thought the original figure was much too high in light of the ever-increasing federal deficit, which has jumped from \$59.6 to an estimated \$207 billion in the three years of the Reagan Administration. Senator Domenici (R-NM), Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, recognized that the 10% figure was unlikely to pass the Senate, and tried to negotiate a more "reasonable" figure with the Administration. The Administration was intransigent in its refusal to compromise, so Domenici was forced to turn back to the Senate in search of an internal agreement. Senators Jackson and Nunn proposed a 6.5% increase, which was defeated in a tie vote. A new group of frustrated conservative Senators, including Charles Grassley (R-IA), Mark Andrews (R-ND) and Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), pushed through a number of waste, fraud and abuse proposals, including a law requiring warranties on equipment supplied to the Pentagon. The Senate and the more liberal House finally decided, in conference, on a 5% increase from FY 83.


This year the Pentagon has proposed a whopping 22% increase over last year, or an FY 85 budget of \$322.5 billion. Secretary Weinburger has been up and around the Hill trying to sell the idea, once again astounding even the Senate Republicans with his sky-high defense figures. Domenici has commented that a figure of this kind would not be taken seriously in Congress, while the father of build-down, Senator William Cohen (R-ME), has talked about cutting out some weapons systems in an effort to balance the budget: "We're going to have a real crunch in the next two years...I think Congress has got to define a way to kill weapons systems." Democrats are likely to suggest deep cuts in the overall military budget, while Republican reform efforts in the Senate will include a

"Creeping Capitalism" resolution, to be introduced by Senator Grassley, which would require increased competition in all Pentagon purchases. Recent reports have indicated that head of OMB David Stockman may be arguing for only a 15% increase, but even this is 5 percentage points above last year's unsuccessful Administration proposal. The budget may be one place where we can catch both Republicans and Democrats where it counts on the defense issue.

The freeze was one of our big victories in 1983, passing 278-149 in the House on May 4th. Though its purity was dulled by a plethora of amendments, the final passage of the freeze, after the frustratingly close loss of 202-204 in 1982, was a significant victory for the grassroots, and for the Washington arms control community. The path to final passage however, was fraught with leadership difficulties and an initially disorganized and unsophisticated group of Democratic supporters. In addition, the late House Foreign Relations Chairman Clement Zablocki was unprepared for the long, detailed, and emotional battle, and was unable, initially, to build a strong coalition in the face of right-wing attacks. After the first difficult session in early March, however, the freeze forces regrouped, the initial problems serving to unite the Democrats in a final forceful, and successful, group effort. The members mastered the strategic aspects of the freeze over the Easter break, taking the offensive away from the Republicans in the floor debate with a series of hard-hitting questions on the Reagan military build-up.

In the Senate, the freeze faced major opposition from Majority Leader Baker (R-TN) and Foreign Relations Chairman Percy (R-IL), the latter of whom, as a build-down supporter, agreed to bring the freeze up from the Committee to the Floor only under intense pressure from Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and the grassroots. The final vote occurred with only a weekend's notice, tacked on to the debt ceiling bill at the very end of the session. The November 30th vote was a quite respectable 40-58 loss, significantly up from the 17 co-sponsors in 1982 and from the 34 committed co-sponsors in early 1983. The switches included Senators Spector (R-PA), Mathias (R-MD), Andrews (R-ND), Dixon (D-IL), Randolph (D-WV) and Sasser (D-TN), all of whom voted unexpectedly for the freeze.

In 1984, the freeze campaign will be pressing Congress to enact immediately parts of a comprehensive freeze on the testing of nuclear warheads and the testing and deployment of ballistic missiles, provided the Soviet Union halts the same activities. Congressional suspension of authorization and appropriation funding for testing and deployment could make the freeze legislatively binding, rather than subject to Presidential action. A total freeze on production would then be negotiated in talks between the US and the USSR. The freeze campaign, and others, will use the freeze as an educational tool this year, pushing for legislative action only if it looks as if a first-round Congressional victory might be possible. Freeze Voter 84, the electoral arm of the freeze movement, will be working for the election of freeze-conscious Congresspersons in November 1984, hop-



ing to put the freeze over the top in both the House and Senate in 1985.

The MX was the major disappointment for arms control efforts in 1983. FY 84 appropriations funding for 21 missiles was approved by 9 votes in early November. Despite the final vote, opponents of the missile were heartened by the narrowing margin, from 53 to a meager 9 in the last appropriation vote. The MX was used as a bargaining chip by some House Democrats, led by Les Aspin (D-WI), Al Gore (D-TN) and Norm Dicks (D-WA), who hoped to lock the Administration into the Midgetman and see some progress on the START talks. Unfortunately, in exchange for the vulnerable, first-strike MX, all that Congress received were empty Presidential promises, and hostile US actions against arms control efforts.

In the last few weeks before the final vote on the Addabbo amendment to delete \$2.2 billion from the appropriations bill for the MX, it was evident that the margin in favor of the MX was *very* narrow (even after the Korean Airlines incident). The arms control lobbying community increased the pressure on these very few, yet essential offices through field work in the districts, inventive radio ads, and Washington lobbying efforts. We endeavored to find a new angle for every swing member, trying to get President Carter to call Southern Democratic Congressman Steven Neal, who felt he could not vote down a missile system that four past presidents had supported, and working with the conservative Cuban community in Florida to influence Congressman Pepper. In the end, we gained three important votes that we had not had before: Olin (D-VA), Pepper (D-FL) and Petri (R-WI); lost three (one of whom pushed the wrong button); and were missing four MX supporters who possibly seriously underestimated how close the vote was going to be.

In the Senate, the final appropriations vote was an expected 37-56 in favor of the MX. However, the vote on the Kassenbaum/Levin amendment (sponsored by FAS), to suspend flight tests on the MX if the Soviets did likewise, was a surprisingly strong 42-50. Eight pro-MX Senators voted with us: Armstrong (R-CO), Bentsen (D-TX), Chiles (D-FL), DeConcini (D-AZ), Dole (R-KA), Johnston (D-LA), Kassebaum (R-KA), and Pressler (F-SD). Unfor-

tunately, seven of our friends were absent, and two anti-MX Senators voted against the amendment. With their support, flight tests of the MX might have been suspended with a vote of 51-49.

Nerve gas was a final year-end victory for arms control. For two years the House rejected chemical weapons, while the Senate voted them in. Finally, as this year's session ran to a close, the joint House-Senate authorization conference committee voted against nerve gas. The House had forcefully defeated chemical weapons every time, even coming surprisingly close to rejecting the first appropriations conference report altogether because of the chemical weapons funding. In the Senate, for both the authorization and appropriations votes, Vice President Bush was forced to cast a final tie-breaking vote in favor of increased production of the Bigeye bomb and 55-millimeter artillery shells. In the second vote, with tensions riding high after a rousing defeat of nerve gas in the House for the second time, even Jesse Helms, the conservative Senator from North Carolina, was seen voting against the weapons. He was stopped just as he walked off the floor by anxious and agitated Senators Stevens and Tower, who induced him to change his vote. The final Senate-House conference committee removed the \$124 million that had been proposed for nerve gas production.

In 1984, the primary legislative foci of the Washington arms control community will be Space Weapons and the MX. In FY 85, upwards of \$4 billion is proposed for the production of 37 MX missiles. Clearly other issues of concern such as the nuclear freeze will receive the concerted attention of the community if legislative vehicles are found and the timing is right.

As of this writing, the Freeze Campaign may bring the freeze to the floor in three separate, bilateral proposals: a testing moratorium on ballistic missiles, a comprehensive test ban and a testing moratorium on antisatellite weapons. As Congress moves into an election year, and the President is even further away from any arms control agreement than he was last year, we hope to convince some members to vote *against* dangerous and destabilizing weapons systems such as the MX, and *for* efforts to improve US-Soviet relations.

—Anne E. Gorsuch

## A LETTER TO MY SCIENTIFIC COLLEAGUES

From: **Andrei Sakharov**  
Gorky, November 1983

Dear Friends!

Two years ago your support played a vital role in resolving the problem of my daughter-in-law Liza Alexeyeva's departure to join her husband. I turn to you once again concerning a matter of critical importance which could have tragic consequences. I ask your help in securing permission for my wife to travel abroad for medical care. (Treatment for her life-threatening cardiac condition is the first priority, but she also needs treatment and an operation for her eyes.) She would like to see her children and grandchildren after a five-year separation. She could visit her mother and possibly bring her back to the Soviet Union.

We believe that medical treatment of my wife in the USSR would be dangerous. Believe me, this is not a case of unjustified "nerves" or of a search for confrontation. My wife has suffered for many years from an unprecedented campaign of slander and from intense pressure exerted directly on her as well as on her children and grandchildren. Threats were made to kill her grandchildren. Six years ago we were forced to the decision that it would be better if the children and grandchildren emigrated. This has brought about the tragic separation of our family with an almost complete lack of communication adding to our sorrow. After the departure first of our children and then of Liza Alexeyeva two years ago, my wife Elena Bonner became the sole hostage for my public activity. The whole responsibility for my statements has been shifted onto her. But that is only a part of the problem as I see it. The KGB appraises Elena's role in my life and public activity very highly and seeks to eliminate her moral influence and, I have reason to fear, her physical presence as well. A unique and unbearable situation has been created. In thinking and speaking about the Sakharov case, you should keep this major complication in mind.

A campaign of slander has been mounted to discredit my wife. Soviet propaganda depicts her as the instigator of all my statements and as a Zionist agent of the CIA. That assertion, spiced with scandalous and sophisticated slander about my wife's moral qualities and mythical past behavior, was repeated in 1983 by three publications so that millions of people have read that sensational lie: N.N. Yakovlev's book *The CIA Against the USSR* (200,000 copies) and Yakovlev's articles in the magazines *Smena* (1,170,000 circulation) and *Chelovek i zakon* (8,700,000 circulation). The appearance of Yakovlev's articles coincided with publication in the newspaper *Izvestia* of a letter signed by Academicians A.A. Dorodnitsyn, A.M. Prokhorov, G.K. Skryabin, and A.N. Tikhonov which deliberately and outrageously misrepresented my views on nuclear war, peace and disarmament. In violation of common sense, my wife was saddled with that burden as well. It has been used to incite popular hatred and denunciation. Thousands of letters, passers-by on the street, passengers sharing her compartment on the train savagely accuse my wife of being a Zionist, an agitator, a traitor to the



*Elena Bonner*

motherland, a murderer.

Elena was subjected to all this shortly after suffering a heart attack on April 25. The infarct was extensive and severe. Later attacks damaged more heart tissue. My wife's condition is still not stabilized and remains life-threatening. Her most recent attack, a severe one, occurred in October.

We attempted during May and June to secure our joint admission to the hospital of the USSR Academy of Sciences. That would have alleviated at least some of the fears which I have mentioned. Our effort failed, even though a commission of physicians visited me in Gorky and confirmed that my health problems require my hospitalization. My wife has not, in fact, received medical care. Policemen are stationed at the door of our Moscow apartment just as in Gorky. Doctors hesitate to visit her, fearing the consequences. The telephone in our Moscow apartment was disconnected in 1980, and the nearby coin telephone was disconnected right after Elena's heart attack. This is certainly not sheer coincidence. In case of a sudden attack, she cannot even call an ambulance.

I fear—and I believe the fear is justified—that if Elena were to be hospitalized, some means may be found to bring about her death. The risk would be greater if she were alone, but it would not be completely eliminated by my presence. (The danger, of course, is there at home as well.) Even if I am exaggerating the danger, the public harassment and constant KGB interference preclude any possibility for serious medical treatment. When my wife was a patient in the Moscow Eye Hospital in 1974, she was advised in confidence to sign herself out immediately for the sake of her life and health. The situation has grown many times worse since then! Now the only acceptable solution is for my wife to go abroad. That is the only way to save her. Elena applied for an exit visa in September 1982 when an eye operation became an urgent necessity. Elena's eyes still require treatment. But since her infarct, treatment for her heart disease has taken priority and cannot be postponed. Her application has not been answered despite the regulations in force. I sent a letter on November 10 to the Soviet Head of State Yuri Andropov requesting permission for my wife's trip.

I appeal to my colleagues abroad and in the USSR, to public figures and government officials in all countries, to our friends everywhere. Save my wife, Elena Bonner!

## MINNESOTA: REACHING FOR ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

At a time when energy elicits barely a yawn from the federal government and little more than handwringing from most cities and states, it would seem logical to conclude that the heyday of innovation and activism on this issue has come and gone. Yet, at least one state remains a noticeable exception to the rule. Instead of following the national lead, Minnesota has declared solving its energy dependence problem to be one of its top priorities and critical to its economic development. And providing the leadership for this Herculean effort is the present governor, Rudy Perpich.

In the one-plus years of the Perpich Administration, a record number of energy bills have been signed into law, and many have already been implemented. These are premised upon the concept of a public-private partnership in which state appropriations are combined, where possible, with private capital to form large loan or loan insurance pools.

Among the programs that have been enacted has been a \$5 million "loan of last resort" for lower income homeowners, a program so popular that all funds have already been expended. A \$2.5 million loan insurance program for rental buildings has also been established. A statewide Energy and Economic Development Authority has been created to offer loans or loan insurance to small businesses that want either to invest in conservation or to produce alternative energy. An energetic and respected director was found for it in the former Senate candidate Mark Dayton. General obligation bond authority has been provided to offer loans to municipalities for conservation improvements to their schools and development of district heating systems. Utilities have been directed to develop energy conservation investment plans. Community Energy Councils have been set up in communities throughout the state to draw up local conservation and alternative energy development plans. To assist in the development of all of these programs, research projects have been established in building energy efficiency and alternative energy development of Minnesota's indigenous energy resources: peat, wood, and crop residues.

The record is indeed staggering, particularly when it is compared with that of our most energy-activist national leader, President Jimmy Carter. Even with the assistance of an acute energy crisis, Carter had to wait four long years to get most of his energy policies enacted into law, and several of those programs have yet to be implemented. Of course, the Perpich program is far from complete. Among those issues still needing to be resolved is how the poor can have access to affordable energy, particularly the growing number whose utilities have been turned off for non-payment of bills. Nevertheless, for a one-year effort, Minnesota's accomplishments are laudable indeed.

Why, at a time of national apathy on energy, has Minnesota accorded the issue such high priority? The answer is rooted in the state's plans for economic revitalization. The state that Rudy Perpich inherited was one in the throes of economic disaster. Unemployment was at a record high,

particularly in the northern part of the state. The state government was crippled by record deficits. Economic activity was declining. And much of the blame for these problems could be traced back to Minnesota's dependence on expensive energy sources imported from outside of the state, which account for 99 percent of Minnesota's energy supply. Says Governor Perpich, "I really believe the cause of our economic problems began in 1973 (with the Arab oil embargo) and was exacerbated in 1979 (with the Iranian revolution)." He adds, "For every barrel of oil or cubic foot of gas that flows by pipeline into Minnesota, dollars flow out. And with those dollars go economic activity and jobs." Moreover, Minnesota's exports have not enjoyed the same price inflation as its energy imports. In 1970, 100 pounds of Minnesota wheat flour could buy about 1¼ barrels of oil; today, they can only buy about ⅓ of a barrel. Thus, Minnesotans see the need to reduce their energy imports—through conservation and indigenous resource development—as critical to solving their economic problems. From their viewpoint, investments in energy programs today will reap multiple dividends in the future by reducing the flow of capital out of the state.

But the economy alone does not explain Minnesota's aggressive energy record; many of its neighbors suffer similar problems, yet their energy programs are not nearly as comprehensive. Frank Altman, a long-time expert on Minnesota energy policy, believes that much of the credit for Minnesota's present program goes to the governor himself—"Leadership is critical to making any policy a reality." In addition, there is a longstanding tradition on the part of Minnesotans of facing up to and solving their problems on their own, what Tony Perpich—the governor's brother and director of energy programs for the state—refers to as "our Protestant ethic."

Can the Minnesota example be copied by other states and perhaps even the federal government? Governor Perpich sees a great potential for those states suffering from many of the same ills as Minnesota; he just co-hosted a conference attended by 15 northeastern and midwestern energy-importing states to discuss the possibilities of working together. But considerable skepticism is expressed by Minnesota's officials about the potential for the federal government to follow their lead. Until the federal government is willing, first, to recognize that its economic well-being is tied in with its energy future and, second, to invest today in assuring that energy future, little hope is held out for the country to learn from Minnesota's example.

—Deborah Bleviss



Governor Rudy Perpich, recently awarded the "Energy Conservation Advocate of 1984" Award by the Energy Conservation Coalition.



## STALIN'S REACTIONS AT POTSDAM RECOUNTED

*The famous Texas oilman J.R. Parten was, it turns out, at Potsdam with Stalin, Churchill and Truman. A reader of the FAS Public Interest Report, he wrote to comment on the FAS Moscow trip report. "J.R.," as he is known to friends, has now reached the age of 88!*

I went to Moscow on a commission, in 1945, where we joined the British and the Russians on German reparations. I confess that on my return I felt that we had accomplished very little. I felt that we were not really trying very hard to get along with those people. I accompanied Ambassador Pauley, who was the head man on German reparations in Washington, and Averill Harriman, the Ambassador, to Potsdam. I was present as an observer through the total conference.

While at Potsdam, President Truman received the cable reporting that the bomb tested in New Mexico was a success that exceeded all expectations in its indicated destructive capacity. Naturally, President Truman was greatly pleased with the success. It was at Potsdam, in July 1945, that President Truman, in company with Prime Minister Churchill of England, first revealed the development of the atomic bomb and its successful test. Among the members of the U.S. delegation, a great deal of talk went on privately, and the key note of every conversation was that now we had something with which to control the Soviet Union. I was shocked at this talk, revolted by it, and did what I could to stop it.

I observed Premier Stalin's change of attitude as the meetings went on after the revelation that we had the bomb. I always thought it was unfortunate that President Truman discussed this matter with Stalin in the company of Prime Minister Churchill, because I had known for a long time that there was a great deal of enmity between the British and the U.S.S.R.

Of course, I felt certain that the attitude prevalent among the members of the delegation would get to the Russians. Therefore, I am not surprised at the statement by Mr. A.A. Gromyko, in the third paragraph of the right

column on page 7 of your report: "It is common knowledge that the bombs used against Japan were designed to threaten the U.S.S.R." I have always felt that the cold war between the U.S.A. and Britain and the U.S.S.R. which followed World War II really had its beginning at Potsdam.

I observed that Secretary Stimson was as uncomfortable with this talk as I was. The record shows that on September 11 following this conference, Secretary Stimson wrote a very well prepared memorandum to President Truman recommending that the U.S.A., alone, should meet with Stalin and propose a joint agreement between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. to control further development and use of this destructive weapon. Practically all of the scientists who took part in its creation had resolved that it was too destructive to be used as a weapon of war. Stimson said the U.S. should agree to make all facts and tests relative to the development of the bomb available to the U.S.S.R. in consideration for their joint action in the implementation of a program that would control and outlaw the use of this bomb as a weapon.

—J.R. Parten



J. R. Parten

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