

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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RECIPROCAL VISITS  
BY U.S.-U.S.S.R.  
POLITICAL LEADERS

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## CONGRESSIONAL TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION: LET OUR PEOPLE GO

Although the Federation was founded by atomic scientists and has pursued arms control indefatigably for a third of a century, we well recognize that human factors are as much at the bottom of the superpower arms race as technological ones. And as the essay provided below indicates, there is nothing so human, and so absurd, as the failure of the U.S. and Soviet political leaderships to visit the country that opposes them.

We have raised this issue twice before, at five-year intervals, and we are going to try now to raise it again. We shall be consulting with other organizations who might help us in various aspects of it, and we call upon all readers to help us, at the least, with their local editorial writers. (See page 9 for a petition that they could use in this effort.)

Some organizations can help us, if they wish, in resisting the cry of "junketing." Here we need groups like Common Cause that support good government. Others can help arrange such visits in both directions; here we need help from such organizations as Former

Members of Congress, and others, who can arrange suitable seminars for political leaders here, and there. Some foundations might give fellowships to fund the travel of the legislators—some of whom fear to travel on the public dole.

Groups of all kinds can help pressure their Congressmen or Senators to make this trip. It is now presumed that such trips will be called junkets. What we want to do is to shift the presumption to one that asserts that a failure to make such trips is dereliction of responsibility. Legislators who profess to have a Soviet policy should be derided for their ignorance and dogmatism if they have not taken the trouble to make even one such trip. Ask them this question in letters or in public meetings.

For your use, we have listed (on page 10) the names of Senators who have not made such a trip. And about 80% of the members of the House of Representatives have not also. The chance is overwhelming that one of

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## A MARTIAN VIEW OF A HUMAN QUARREL

If a Martian sociologist came to Earth and reviewed the U.S.-Soviet arms race, now one-third of a century old, what would he find most surprising? It might well be the startling fact that a majority of the ruling political bodies of the two sides have never visited the country of the other.

He would see no physical or legal barrier to their doing so. Substantial number of lesser folk would, in fact, be seen traveling back and forth from the Western side, sportsmen, scientists, tourists, etc., and a not inconsiderable number of Soviet citizens of lower rank.

On the Soviet side, he would see the most intense curiosity about the West in general, and the U.S. in particular. On the U.S. side, he would see Senators giving speech after speech about Soviet intentions and the Soviet threat. After the speeches, they would proceed to vote the most enormous expenditures for "defense." And the Soviet leadership would be overheard doing the same. Why, he would wonder, have only about 40% of the U.S. Senate and only about 30% of the Soviet Politburo taken the trouble to see firsthand the source of their anxiety?

He might begin to study the psychological, bureaucratic and political obstacles to these visits—and their benefits with regard to ending the arms race and moderating the quarrel. In the end, incredible though it may seem, he might find in this quiet, little-noticed statistic a key to the dilemma. He might begin to understand why President

Ronald Reagan did not go to Leonid Brezhnev's funeral, despite the urgings of his Secretary of State. And why Yuri Andropov—who is intensely interested in the West and speaks English—has never been here. Whatever else he learned, he would begin to realize that the U.S.-Soviet quarrel is a very human quarrel; Martians would not have gotten themselves into this fix.

An episode in 1969 reveals the depth of the problem. A

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## PRESIDENT FORD WRITES FAS (January 10, 1983)

During my twenty five years in the United States House of Representatives, I strongly favored well-planned and properly focused Congressional travel by members of the Senate and House. From my own personal experiences on such committee trips, I benefitted greatly and, as a result, was better able to handle my legislative responsibilities. One such trip included a visit to the Soviet Union.

Based on the above observations, I believe members of the United States Congress should visit the Soviet Union, providing they have an objective of specific information relating to their legislative responsibilities, are fully briefed in advance and are organized to carry out the purpose of the trip.

Best regards,

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your Senators or your Congressman needs this prodding. Write them and give us their response. If you wish, send them a copy of this newsletter.

The case for these trips is made below, but common sense makes it also. If you have ever traveled to a foreign country, you will understand it well. However you understand it, you will share our feeling, we think, that there is no cheaper, easier, and surer route to injecting more reality into the foreign policy of both superpowers than to give their leaders a firsthand glimpse of the country they most oppose and fear.

So write your legislators, your newspaper and your favorite groups—on both the left and right of the political spectrum—and invite them to join with us. Send us any editorials which you may induce in the local press. And make any suggestions you may have for us on ways and means of accomplishing our goal. You are spending now about \$4,000 per American family on defense each year, and these trips might cost about one-half of one cent per family annually—if that. It seems well worth the cost. So, at the least, write your local editorial writer. Tell him to let our people go.



A Moscow Hotel Room

## SENATOR STUART SYMINGTON

I agree with all six reasons why Members of Congress should visit that country PROVIDED it is not a junket trip with family, excess staff, etc.

My late father-in-law, United States Senator James W. Wadsworth of New York, a conservative Republican and a great American, who was consistently critical of most Government spending, nevertheless agreed that Members of Congress should visit countries in which we were putting billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money. I always agreed with that; and now, in this nuclear age, we have additional problems that should be discussed with the Soviet Union.

I have always felt that an interchange of people, not just Government people, could well prevent the increasing possibility of a holocaust. As Mr. Churchill once said, "Jaw, not war."

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new United States Senator of liberal inclination happens to pass through the Soviet Union on a world tour. Seized with the absurdity of his colleagues not having the first-hand impressions of Russia he has just gained, he promptly introduces a relevant bill in the U.S. Senate. It proposes sending, on short trips of their choice, not only those Senators who had never been to Russia, but also Congressmen, Governors and the Mayors of leading cities. For the price of one-fifth of a missile, he observed, the political ruling elites could replace their stereotypes with some vivid and up-to-date impressions.

Hearings are held. Such men of experience and learning in Russian affairs as former Ambassadors Harriman and Kennan testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (Harriman calls the effect on American officials "useful" and the effect of having Soviet officials come here in return "extremely desirable.") Information is provided to assure the Committee that such visits are entirely healthy. Indeed, information is presented to show that the normal reaction of Americans to Russia has been, perhaps, to "trust them less but fear them less too"—a conclusion guaranteed, if anything would, to produce universal political support.

More than 75% of the public officials involved respond favorably in a poll and only 5% are opposed. *Izvestia* carries an article reporting favorably on the bill. The Committee approves the bill. Predictably, the right wing in American politics begins attacking it as "junketing." (Since Moscow has no night clubs worthy of the name, and is not renowned for either its cuisine or climate, it was quite unclear why any junket-minded Congressmen would seek it out.) On the floor of the Senate, a U.S. Senator who had taken on the assignment of defending the (Nixon) Administration's positions attacks the bill unexpectedly and harshly. The new Senator is startled. But a respected Democratic majority leader speeds to the Senate floor and, when the dust settles, the bill has passed by a vote of 38-32. So far so good.

In the House of Representatives, however, something goes wrong. Invisible pressures are applied to prevent a hearing on the bill; the Department of State, in delphic terms, announces that, if Congressmen really want to go, State would be happy to oblige but the bill is unnecessary. State would take matters in hand if only this bill were killed. In the end the bill is killed and, predictably, in the end, nothing is done by the State Department. (Bilateral cultural exchange agreements with the Soviet Union normally include the provision that each side will facilitate visits by legislators and public officials of the other but this doesn't, of course, catalyze them.)

Four years pass and, in 1974, the then-President Nixon has himself traveled not only to Moscow but to Peking. A catalyst for the original bill thereupon wrote the President's National Security Advisor asking, in effect, now that the President has visited our Communist adversaries, why not "let my people go?" A week later, traveling to work, he hears on his car radio an interview in which Henry A. Kissinger is intoning: "We are all in favor of having scientists, sportsmen, tourists, artists and other

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE POSITION

**"At the highest level, the President has indicated that he would favor a 'serious' summit, which would yield concrete results as opposed to being simply a meeting for its own sake"...**

**"Parliamentary exchanges, which provided a formal reciprocal framework for Members of Congress and their Soviet counterparts to travel to each other's country, were suspended in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Executive Branch nonetheless continues to facilitate the travel of Members of Congress to the Soviet Union. Indeed, in recent months the level of such Congressional travel has increased significantly."**

*Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Director,  
Office of Soviet Union Affairs,  
letter to FAS, January 11, 1983*

non-political persons travel to the Soviet Union." In short, the political persons were still to be given no encouragement.

What can our Martian sociologist learn from this? His investigation would reveal bureaucratic political and human reasons. On the Western side,

- Presidents and National Security Advisers did not want the Congressmen to complicate, somehow, their management of foreign affairs by getting any more involved in it, or knowledgeable about it, than necessary; as far as they were concerned, it just meant more opinions, more coordination, more unexpected conclusions.

- Senators and Congressmen were, indeed, afraid of the charges of junketing. It turns out that the most popular report that was then being put out by Congressional Quarterly to subscribing newspapers, each year, was its report on Congressional travel. Local newspapers were taking this report, looking for the name of their Congressmen and highlighting, for local interest, where he had gone and at what expense. Pandering to local cynicism about their Congressmen's desire to travel, these reports could turn off enough voters to influence elections. This was one reason why 28 Senators voted against an otherwise seemingly innocuous bill. It was a potential time bomb in a future election with some demagoguing opponent asking them to explain "why?"

- In general, a very-human approach to enemies was to break off or restrict communication with them for a variety of reasons. As his human psychiatrist counterpart, Jerome Frank, wrote in *Sanity and Survival in the Nuclear Age*:

"Since an enemy is untrustworthy, if we let him communicate with us, he may trick us, learn things about us that we do not want him to know, or reveal some good features that might undermine our will to resist him. Any increase in communication is therefore resisted by both parties. For example, in 1959, the Senate Internal Security Committee vigorously objected to Soviet-American cultural exchanges: 'Soviet hoaxers are playing us...for suckers'; 'This is a poisonous propaganda offensive which, if successful, could well be a prelude to sudden military attack.' At virtually the same time the Chairman of the USSR

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## FORMER SENATORS COMMENT ON SENATORIAL VISITS

*Senator Wendell R. Anderson:* "Should be strongly encouraged"; they should be "required for service on certain committees."

*Senator J. Glenn Beall:* "Visits very useful"; we need to "develop outside encouragement for Senators to make the trips."

*Senator James Buckley:* The best way to encourage these visits is "to make sure there would be opportunities to speak to dissidents and others outside the Governmental structure, as well as to speak to officials."

*Senator Frank Church:* Commended FAS efforts as a "worthy initiative" and thought fear of association with communism and lack of an opportunity to be the main reason why these visits do not take place.

*Senator Joseph Clark:* Best way to encourage the visits is through leadership at the executive branch level; problem is also lack of interest by Senators and insecurity in the Executive Branch as well as junketing, etc.

*Senator Richard Clark:* "Obviously it would be advantageous to get a firsthand view and to talk with a variety of Soviets (but) I could make only so many trips without being accused of junketing and I was Chairman of the African sub-committee."

*Senator Robert P. Griffin:* The best method of encouragement would be to "get the media to be half-way fair and objective. There is little or no recognition by the media that such visits are useful and important."

*Senator Harold Hughes:* "I believe that personal contact and discussions with Soviets will reduce tensions

and improve opportunities for negotiations and understanding."

*Senator Jacob Javits:* Endorsed emphatically all reasons provided on the questionnaire for such visits.

*Senator Eugene J. McCarthy:* Best way to encourage the visits was to "change attitudes"; junketing and fear of association with communism were the main problems.

*Senator Gale McGee:* The Administration should sponsor more such trips as official missions; the Senate should officially sponsor more; it was "time for Senators to lead public opinion rather than cringe from it."

*Senator George McGovern:* The visits could best be encouraged "by having those who have been to the Soviet Union speak and write about the value of their experience."

*Senator Frank E. Moss:* "I believe in maximum interrelations."

*Senator Adlai E. Stevenson:* Such visits might be encouraged by "sponsorship by prominent business and farm associations to discuss trade issues with Soviet cooperation and the chance to tour USSR off the 'beaten track'"

*Senator John Tunney:* (who has made many such trips to the Soviet Union since his retirement but who had not been there during his Senate service or before) he answered, "Oh, absolutely," when asked whether it would have helped him in his Senate work to have gone earlier.

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State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries accused the United States and other Western countries of regarding the exchange program as a 'Trojan Horse' whose stomach could be filled with anti-Soviet material."

What, the Martian might wonder, would have been the effects if the visits had taken place? Here the evidence is clear and consistent. And, in retrospect, at least to a sociologist, the consistency is not surprising. The two societies are sufficiently different that the only slightly varying political and social perspectives of foreign observers from a specific country are irrelevant to their conclusions. He would find first that:

- Americans of liberal and left inclinations are typically turned off, disillusioned, or discouraged to see the intellectual suffocation of Russian life. Western observers feel themselves "in a profoundly different and strange civilization," as one U.S. Ambassador put it.

- At the same time, observers from those political circles most concerned about Russian strength have seen, immediately, both the internal weaknesses and the fear of war which so dramatically characterize that civilization. No one returns from Russia thinking the Russians are "ten feet tall."

For example, in 1839, DeCustine's reaction was simple. He said he went to Russia "to find arguments against

representative government and came back a partisan of constitutions." His deep understanding of the differences between Western and Russian civilization was summed up in his statement: "I do not blame the Russians for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be what we are."

In 1937, the French sympathizer with the Soviet revolution, Andre Gide, returned to observe that "Three years ago I declared my admiration, my love for the USSR." But he returned complaining that "in the USSR, everybody knows beforehand, once and for all, that on any and every subject there can be only one opinion..."

In 1948, a Soviet bureaucrat with whom John Steinbeck had to deal was quoted as saying:

"We are very tired of people who come here and are

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## A NEGATIVE VIEW

*Senator Thomas J. McIntyre:* "had no interest in going"; "from all reports trips to the Soviet Union were not particularly pleasant or fruitful. A closed society. I have listened to their 'parliamentarians' at meetings outside Russia—just full of propaganda. I never heard a Senator who had visited say or report anything particularly interesting or helpful to understanding."

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violently pro-Russian and who go back to the United States and become violently anti-Russian. We have had considerable experience with that kind."

In 1970, a journalist couple, Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, wrote: "Looking back on our journey, we were more troubled by the closed secretive nature of Soviet society than anything else we saw or heard."

Of course, by looking among those who, in the 20s and 30s, were most devoted to the Soviet revolution and/or most unwilling to say in public what they felt (and often said later) one can cull statements that suggest the Russian intourist structure somehow "took people in." Thus a recent book "Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, 1928-1978" derides statements made in communist states by the far left. In fact, these observers were often deeply affected also, as their later statements and positions often revealed. But, of course, political officials are not, in any case, "political pilgrims." Their specialty, as politicians, is sizing people up and, normally, they are far more reliable in their person-to-person impressions than they are in interpreting written material.

But even with intellectuals, a key summary of the effect of Soviet-American academic exchanges by Robert F. Byrnes found that the academics returned "more critical of the Soviet system than when they arrived" but their views were "less abstract and doctrinaire" and "more realistic and humanistic" than they would have been. One of the principal consequences of the exchange programs, it was concluded, had been "the humanizing of Western observers, who had been paralyzed by great slogans and written generalities."

And what of Russian strength? In 1964, Isaac Dov Levine concluded his book "I Rediscover Russia" by saying: "So, as I bade farewell to Russia and to her anguished, gifted people who for fifty years have known nothing but grief and privation, my mind went back to Khrushchev's portentous boast that Communism would bury us. That boast, against the realities of the poverty-stricken land, seemed like a grim piece of buffoonery."

In 1976, Robert Kaiser reviewed his three years in Moscow as foreign correspondent at the *Washington Post* and concluded that the Russians are "less formidable than we have imagined, more vulnerable and more nervous. Their ambitions, I think, are less grand than even their own words suggest." After summarizing their inability to compete technologically and economically, Kaiser says:

"And this is the country which has frightened us for nearly 60 years, which convinced us to invest billions in an arms race without end, which established itself as the second super-power and a threat to peace in the minds of several generations of westerners. That this has been possible, given their egregious weaknesses, is a great tribute to the men who have ruled the Soviet Union. But it is also a tribute to our own foolishness....In other words, we have given the Russians more than their due credit for military prowess, and ignored their failings in economic and technological development, social organization and the rest. We have defined strength and power in purely military terms—the terms most favorable to the Soviet Union—and

then exaggerated Soviet power."

But these were journalists. What about the Senators? Not long after the Soviet Union opened up to tourists, Senator John Stennis of Mississippi went in 1958 and reported:

"Frankly, I was not prepared for what I saw."

He doubted that "Russia now plans a direct military attack upon us" and talked of "old Russia" being slow, backward and inefficient but shifting to the New Russia.

Senator William Roth saw weakness and concluded, in 1974, that:

"If the current economic condition of the Soviet Union is any indication, communism is a highly inefficient economic system."

Senator Sam Nunn saw the fear of war in 1978:

"It is difficult for Americans to grasp the terrifying slaughter and suffering that befell the Soviets during World War II which left a permanent and indelible scar on the Russian psyche."

It may not be true of Martians but it is true of humans that they have trouble seeing things from the other person's perspective unless they step into the other fellow's shoes in some way. Western observers often comment on the effect of a visit to Moscow in doing just that. And more experienced visitors may even learn to "put on a Russian hat" and see things, in a limited fashion, as the Russians might. Stephen Rosenfeld concluded in "Report from Red Square" that:

"Americans speak of a Soviet wish to 'expand the sway of communism around the world' as though there were no American wish to extend the sway of democracy....If one believes that only the United States or only the Soviet Union has the right to promote its values and interests abroad, then it is a simple matter to condemn efforts by the other country to extend its sway."

Sometimes such visits put Soviet military measures in some perspective. It is easy, after all, to announce blandly that the Soviet military buildup is far greater than is justified by its defensive needs—until one stands on Russian territory, surrounded by countries which wish it ill, and experiences that sense of military vulnerability and friendliness which is the Russian experience.

And, perhaps as important, visitors see the extent of

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### SENATOR PIERRE SALINGER

I feel very strongly that people who reach a certain level in decision making in government should visit the Soviet Union. It is very difficult to participate in a debate on our relations with the Soviet Union unless you have been there and can see firsthand the way their society and government are run.

The trouble with most visitors is that they are severely controlled and the chances for research, the direct contact with policy makers are quite limited.

However my 1962 visit to the Soviet Union as the guest of Alexei ADJUBUEI, then the editor of *Izvestia*, remains useful to me even today, twenty years later.

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Soviet internal problems and the very low standard of living. Until the occasion arises to focus on it, perhaps on an arriving plane, many American politicians will not be conscious of the fact that there are many different ethnic and linguistic groups in Russia still imperfectly assimilated; that the ethnic Russians feel besieged by Asiatic birthrates (in their own country); that cars per capita are 50 years behind our own; that outhouses are the way of life in rural areas, and so on. Only then do they begin to realize why Russian visitors here refuse to believe that Watts in Los Angeles is being shown them as an example of a poor area ("Blacks driving cars! Slum dwellers living in individual houses!")

Once, testifying before a Senate Foreign Relations Committee, a Senator asked me rhetorically and with some asperity: "And have we ever attacked the Soviet Union?" The point was clear—why should they fear us? He was startled at the response. Indeed, we *had* attacked the Soviet Union and they remembered it so clearly that they had a museum in Moscow devoted to showing young Soviet citizens how badly the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, had wanted to "strangle Bolshevism in its cradle." The Senator, like most Americans, had completely forgotten, or more likely never learned, that an Allied Expeditionary Force had invaded Russia in 1917 as part of an effort to keep Russia in World War I. The Russians had not forgotten.

There is also a human side to meeting of which, of course, diplomats are well aware. Yuri Andropov is said to have interrupted an ideological argument with an Austrian diplomat by saying:

"Look, I am a Communist. You represent the opposite world view, but that does not prevent us from understanding each other on a human level."

And Leonid Brezhnev is said to have advised the Politburo, after meeting Zbigniew Brzezinski, that "Brzezinski is not such a bad guy, after all." These human attitudes toward separating personalities from politics and the tendencies for humans to find unexpected respect or appreciation upon personal meetings are too universal to require emphasis. But with regard to the U.S.-Soviet arms race, they do appear to have been forgotten.

#### The Extent of Senators' Travel to Russia

If our Martian sociologist turned to "counting," he would see the following revealing statistics about Senatorial travel. During the last quarter century of arms race, after Russia was open to travel in 1956, there have been about 95 Senatorial visits or an average of four a year. (During this period, the Senate has had 284 different members.) But, because of fear of travel without colleagues, more than half of these visits (57 of them) arose out of 8 group visits that averaged seven Senators each. Typically, they were going to interparliamentary conferences in Moscow or somewhere in that direction (e.g., New Delhi).

Our Martian would see that leading Presidential candidates from the Senate *would* normally feel it incumbent upon themselves to be photographed touring Moscow at four-year intervals. Senator Hubert Humphrey visited



*Newlyweds Sign The Marriage Register*

twice, as did Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Edmund Muskie, and Senator Walter Mondale. Moscow is on the campaign trail.

But if one subtracts visits by political aspirants, SALT II treaty investigations, and interparliamentary union visits, there were only about 25 Senators in the last 25 years who took the trouble just to go and look around. And, of course, the group visits are much more controlled, and lend themselves much less to getting a feel for how the Soviet Union operates. During this period perhaps 30 to 60 Senators would go to Western Europe each year. Usually more travel to the Caribbean or the Far East than to the Soviet Union. And in the 8 years after China opened up, there were 57 Senatorial visits to the People's Republic of China.

As to which Senators go, there is a bias in favor of liberal rather than conservative Senators. In 1977, the Federation analyzed the voting records of the 40 Senators who had been to the Soviet Union at that time, and who were still in the Senate. Using votes on such issues as the B-1 bomber, the confirmation of Paul C. Warnke as SALT negotiator, and the Jackson resolution on missile parity, we concluded that:

55% of the 33 Senators voting dovishly all of the time had

*(Continued on page 7)*



*Images In A Moscow Grave Yard*

(Continued from page 6)

visited the Soviet Union;

40% of the 44 Senators with intermediate voting records had done so;

but only 22% of those 23 who voted hawkishly all of the time had visited the Soviet Union.

In effect, those most concerned about the Soviet threat are the least inclined to investigate it. Sometimes they are the most absurdly ill-informed as well. One famous conservative Southern Senator told a colleague in 1979 that of course he could not travel to the Soviet Union because he was so well known to be anti-Communist that they would put him in jail!

#### What Is To Be Done?

Most politicians elected to the Senate, much less the House of Representatives, have never traveled much and, usually, not to such an out-of-the-way place as the Soviet Union. Accordingly, they need encouragement. It needs also to be a constant stream of encouragement because, unless the problem is dealt with on a continuing basis, the percentage of politicians who have traveled to the Soviet Union will stay low simply because of electoral turnover. Some suggestions are:

- Editorial writers, in local newspapers, need to commit themselves publicly, in suitable editorials, in favor of visits to all adversaries with nuclear weapons pointed at us (or some such formula). This will help free the local Congressmen from fear of subsequent political attack.

- Congressional Quarterly has got to stop doing these summaries on Congressional travel.

- Groups interested in ending the arms race, or in sensible foreign policy more generally, have got to lobby their representatives to travel. The presumption has got to be changed from one of "travel to the Soviet Union is a waste of money" to one of "a failure to travel to such an important country is a confession of self-imposed ignorance." Talk shows should talk the issue up.

- In an ideal world, there should be resolutions in the Congress endorsing such travel and even, if it were possible, funding it.


- The Russians should reiterate their long-standing position on the receiving of Western parliamentarians. But as Senator George D. Aiken put it in 1970, "My goodness, Russia has been asking for this for the past 15 years. They have been begging us to go over there."

- Special conferences of parliamentarians and political officials, first organized in one country and then in the other, might get political officials together and in each other's country in a trip away that could be collectively justified.

- Indeed, organizations might be constructed to facilitate travel contacts between the two sides much as the American Council on Germany facilitates such contacts between Germany and America. There is no doubt where we need contacts more.

#### On the Soviet Side

The ruling Soviet Politburo has 12 full members currently and about 13 candidate and secretariat members. Of these, only four Politburo full members (Gromyko, Kunayev, Shcherbitskiy and Tikhonov) have been here



*Bolshoi Theater*

(30%) and, in total, only eight of the 25 (32%). Andropov has been to Eastern Europe, North Korea and North Vietnam. But the nearest to the West that he has come is Yugoslavia.

These and other Soviet officials are even more cautious about travel to adversary countries than U.S. officials. In interpreting these statistics, remember that Soviet Politburo members are typically in high office for long periods and that the Russian desire to see the West is at least ten times stronger than the desire of Westerners to see the Soviet Union. And yet they don't come.

Our Martian sociologist would wonder whether:

- they fear that some kind of (inspired?) incident might occur that could be used against them by their colleagues and hurt their career;


- their mere presence in the West may, subsequently, make them seem less reliable to their colleagues, as if they had become potential "moles." (One is reminded of the refusal of mother birds to accept back into the nest babies which, on falling out of the nest, have become impregnated with human smells.);

- they consider it unpatriotic to give in to the notion of traveling to the West as when the late Mikhael Suslov asked Svetlana Stalin why she wanted to travel to India; his own family was "too patriotic" to travel abroad;


- their leadership within the Politburo is not any more anxious to let its members, and other officials, secure a basis for new political ideas than are American presidents;

- in such travels, everything has to be carefully arranged, and it isn't easy to arrange.

(Continued on page 8)



*GUM Department Store*



*Chess On Deck*

*(Continued from page 7)*


On the positive side, the Martian would see that, for most of the time, the Soviet side is engaged in a peace offensive. It is they who protest, at all meetings, that they want peace and better relations. (It is the Western statesmen who constantly profess skepticism.) And with this in mind, it should be possible to arrange ways and means in which Soviet statesmen accept invitations to the West.

One approach the Martian might come up with, consistent with human and political logic, is for the United States to insist that, for example, one Politburo member or candidate member visit the United States for each four Senators who visit the Soviet Union. Then Senators could claim that their trips were busily prying Soviet leaders into the light of Western day. Some insistence on reciprocity would, perhaps, make everyone happy. Nothing for nothing is a human approach even if humans want the trips anyway.

What effect would it have on the Politburo? One might venture to predict that exposure to America would lead them to like us better and fear us more. For one thing the freedom we represent is, after all, when seen up close, attractive the world round; it represents, in fact the great revolutionary force which Soviet communism would like to be but is not. And, at the same time, face-to-face contact with the extent and depth of American wealth and technology can hardly fail but give the Soviet leaders pause.

In any case, with lower-level Soviet officials, we do have some information. A book-length analysis by Morton Schwartz on the perceptions of Soviet americanologists suggests a number of favorable conclusions. These "America watchers" have grown in their "tolerance of ambiguity" with ever greater familiarity with the American scene and have learned that White House policy is, "in some measure, open to influence." They have developed, moreover, "a particularly acute appreciation of the advantages which a relaxed international atmosphere holds for Soviet diplomacy."

Moreover, as one researcher in human psychology (Franklin Griffiths) concluded, "the more perceptive an individual's stated view of the adversary, the less hostile his apparent feelings toward it, the more he was inclined to urge policies of conflict limitation and agreement"; so knowledge has a tranquilizing effect.



*Red Square*

### **Times Are Changing**

On both sides, times are changing and new attitudes are emerging. In 1978, Senator Sam Nunn came back from a meeting to Moscow and said:

"I believe that meetings between leaders of the executive and legislative branches of our countries on a regular basis can help both nations understand each other better. I hope that these meetings can be expanded to include direct, informal conversations between top military officials and top intelligence officials (sic) of the U.S. and USSR."

Now the top intelligence official of the Soviet Union has secured its top political office and he may well feel the same way—with these reports of his strong interest in Western culture, and for other reasons.

Letting some fresh air into the U.S.-Soviet quarrel may not cure all that afflicts it. But the history of that quarrel and the grotesque excesses of the arms race suggest that without new perspectives, nothing can be fixed.

—Jeremy J. Stone



*Moscow University*



### A CALL FOR POLITICAL REALITY

**NO NATION CAN BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT SEEING IT—NO POLICY BASED ON IGNORANCE CAN BE JUSTIFIED**

American and Soviet political leaders should visit each other's Nation to get firsthand impressions of the people, leaders, political, economic and social conditions. A majority of these political leaders have not done so despite a third of a century of confrontation; they are defaulting on their responsibility.

- We urge whatever programs of reciprocal visitation are necessary to provide political leaders with the experiences that have long been available to scientists, tourists, sportsmen and other non-political persons.
- We raise questions about the credibility of statements made about the opposing superpower by those who have never visited it and shall urge that policies be based on much more personal contact by decision-makers with the realities they seek to shape or control.
- We pledge to support those political leaders who engage in such exchanges against charges of "junketing," and to prod those who do not to do so.
- We urge local editorial writers to voice the community feeling that Congressmen engaged in the important business of sizing up a nation as important in our foreign policy as the Soviet Union are not "junketing."

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NAME	ADDRESS (print carefully)	Occupation, Title

Petition-circulators are urged to secure whatever further signatures besides their own they think would be most influential with local newspaper editorial writers or publishers and to send this petition to their local newspaper, with a copy to us. We ask them to continue their efforts until a suitable editorial is printed and then send their legislators, and ourselves, a copy of that editorial. Nothing is more important in liberating your Congressmen to make this trip than these editorials.

**Federation of American Scientists**  
307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002

## PETITION POINTS FOR PETITION CIRCULATORS

The petition at issue can be justified in myriad ways to myriad points on the political spectrum; do not hesitate to secure your support from *all* points of view. Arguments that can be used include:

*For the far right:* Exposure of Soviet and U.S. leaders to the other Nation can only have a useful effect on the Soviet regime since it thrives on secrecy and on maintaining ignorance (even among its leadership) about the West. Exposure of American leaders to the Soviet Union will show them the weaknesses of the Soviet system. The Soviet leadership will not dare to engage in their reciprocal visits and we should therefore challenge them to do so.

*For peaceniks:* Peace will not come about unless and until the two sides know each other far better than they do now. It is a sign of the human condition that an arms race can go forward for a third of a century with a majority of the political leadership of the two sides not taking the trouble even to see what they are talking about.

*For conservatives:* Exposure of Westerners to the Soviet Union (and Russia before it) has always had a disillusioning effect upon the West in general and liberals in particular. It will be entirely healthy to have American leaders see how Russia is run, with its suffocating intellectual atmosphere, badly run economy, and characteristic readiness to assert when necessary that white is black to sustain an argument. Few Americans will trust the Soviet Union more after visiting it.

*For liberals:* The know-nothing attack of the anti-junketing crowd must not be allowed to blind America's leaders to the reality that the Soviet Union is not spending all of its time planning a nuclear attack upon us; the Soviet Union has problems of its own and is populated by human beings, not ciphers. A key to the endless proliferation of nuclear warheads is some non-stereotypic reasoning by American (and Soviet) politicians. Only firsthand experience can provide it. Soviet fear of war and economic problems will tranquilize the right as it has always done.

### Senators who have not been to the Soviet Union: (58)

Abnor, James	Inouye, Daniel
Andrews, Mark	Jepsen, Roger
Armstrong, William	Johnston, J. Bennett
Baucus, Max	Kassebaum, Nancy
Bingam, Jeff	Kasten, Robert
Bentsen, Lloyd	Long, Russell
Boschwitz, Rudolph	Matsunaga, Spark
Chaffee, John	Mattingly, Mack
Chiles, Lawton	Melcher, John
Cochran, Thad	Metzenbaum, Howard
Cohen, William	Mitchell, George
D'Amato, Alfonse	Murkowski, Frank
Denton, Jeremiah	Nickels, Don
Dixon, Alan	Packwood, Bob
Dodd, Christopher	Proxmire, William
Durenberger, David	Quayle, Dan
East, John	Randolph, Jennings
Exon, J. James	Riegle, Donald
Ford, Wendell	Rudman, Warren
Goldwater, Barry	Sarbanes, Paul
Gorton, Slade	Sasser, James
Hatch, Orrin	Simpson, Alan
Hawkins, Paula	Symms, Steven
Hecht, Chic	Thurmond, Strom
Heflin, Howell	Trible, Paul
Heinz, John	Tsongas, Paul
Helms, Jesse	Weicker, Lowell
Huddleston, Walter	Wilson, Pete
Humphrey, Gordon	Zorinsky, Edward

### LACK OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND SOVIET OFFICIALS

I think that one of the basic difficulties that we are having with the Soviet Union, and have had over the years, is the lack of understanding of the United States on the part of Soviet officials. Very few of them have traveled in the West.

I also found, if I may say so, some lack of knowledge on the part of some officials on this side that has also contributed to our difficulties. So that I heartily welcome the idea that more elected American officials in American life should go to the Soviet Union, particularly with their wives, and see the country firsthand. They won't learn everything but will get an impression which will be useful, and if we can induce the Soviets to send some of their officials in return I think it would be extremely desirable.

—W. Averell Harriman, 2/6/70

**CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:  
Washington, Friday, November 7, 1969**

*What follows is the speech of Senator Mike Gravel (D. Alaska) in which he introduced the Gravel Exchange Bill calling for visits to, and from, the Soviet Union, not only of Congressmen but governors, leading Mayors and the leadership of State legislators—1,000 visits were anticipated.*

**S. 3127—Introduction of a Bill to provide for the exchange of Governmental Officials between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.**

Mr. Gravel. Mr. President, the time has come for the American political leadership to visit the Soviet Union. And the time has come for the Soviet political leadership to see what the United States is really like. The time has come to do what perceptive political observers have long proposed. We should expose each country to the observation of the political leadership of the other side.

I propose that we make it possible for 1,000 leading American elected officials in local, State, and National Government to go to the Soviet Union with their wives for up to 2 weeks at Government expense. And I propose that we facilitate the travel here of 1,000 members of the Soviet leadership with their wives, should they choose to come. This proposal has potential for improving relations, and for providing a political climate in which the arms race can be slowed. Certainly, relations between our two countries will become more normal when such visits become an accepted state of affairs.

There are two aspects of my proposal and both deserve support on their merits alone.

First, there is the enormous desirability of having our political leaders visit the Soviet Union. Consider what a strange state of affairs now exists. Since the Second World War \$1 trillion has been appropriated principally for our defense against the Soviet Union. Yet most Congressmen and Senators who cast their votes have never been there. Appropriations continue at such a rate that in the next 10 years, we will have spent an additional trillion dollars. No Senator or Congressman spends one-millionth of that sum without going to see the site of the dam or airport for which the money is being spent.

Every Congressman bears direct responsibility for decisions affecting the conduct of defense and foreign policy. Each must consider his vote on defense matters to be among the most important votes he casts.

In our political process decisions are not only made in Congress. Elected officials at the State and local level also shape national policies through their influence on candidates and issues. How many mayors, Governors, and leading members of State legislatures have been to the Soviet Union? And how many of these officials will be tomorrow's national leaders?

Everyone who has been to the Soviet Union—everyone who has traveled anywhere—knows the importance of a visit in understanding another culture. Sociologists, specialists in cultural exchange, political and social scientists will tell us that there is no substitute for travel as an educational and cultural addition to the perspective of our

political leadership. Some believe we are entering an era of educational and cultural relations which by itself must be better understood by our political leadership.

Every year since 1958, we have sent to the Soviet Union between 500 and 3,000 scientists, sportsmen, doctors, educators and specialists of other kinds. Has not the time come to send political leaders who must, after all, make the decisions upon which our future depends?

In recent years, between 10,000 and 20,000 American tourists have gone to the Soviet Union annually. In time, an informed portion of our American Society will have a clearer mental picture of the Soviet Union than that held by most American political leaders.

In the beginning of the cold war, travel to the Soviet Union was difficult and hedged with restrictions. But since the middle fifties, and increasingly in the sixties, many cities have been opened up for even nonofficial travel.

Mr. President, I returned in August from a short visit to Moscow. I can tell you what many thousands of Americans can now report first hand. It is possible to walk the length and breadth of these many cities. It is possible to see the way people dress, the homes they live in, the newspapers and posters they read, the monuments they visit. One can see how they treat one another, the courtesies they show the visitors and the emerging and disappearing styles of behavior.

We in the Congress are politicians. We are good ones, or we would not be here. We know the importance of seeing, feeling, touching, smelling reality. We know what reaching out to people is like. We know how much can be learned and gained from experience. And we know how important it is to let others see us, and hear from us, what we stand for. Why, then, have we failed to apply this rich instinct for human relations to foreign affairs, our most important problem?

There is no good reason. Some Congressmen and Senators have already traveled—some more than once—to the Soviet Union. And they can testify, as I testify, to the importance of such travel in their thinking and perspective. But many other Congressmen and Senators have never found the occasion. Some are inhibited by shortages of time. Some are inhibited by fear of the charge of "junketing." They do not wish to ask a committee for funds for travel when that travel is not imperative to that particular committee assignment.

This is a sensible proposal. And it is an idea whose time has come. The proposal can be justified in many different ways and does not assume an improvement in United States-Soviet relations. Some may wish to be certain that their perspective on Soviet development is accurate and up to date. Some may believe that one should "know one's adversary."

This is not a proposal to brainwash the American political leadership. Historically, those most sympathetic to the Soviet Union have been disillusioned by their visits. In 1936, Andre Gide's report on his trip "Return from the U.S.S.R." created a sensation. Three years before, Gide had declared his "admiration," his "love" for the Soviet

*(Continued on page 12)*

(Continued from page 11)

Union. He returned deeply troubled and said:

Good and bad alike are to be found there; . . .the best and the worst.

He was not the first. In 1939, a contemporary of De Tocqueville, Nicholas de Custine, produced an extraordinary report on his visit to Russia. His insight into Russian character is as valuable as De Tocqueville's analysis of our own. De Custine reported that he went to Russia "in search of arguments against representative government" but returned a "partisan of constitutions." These observers were far more sympathetic to what they set out to see than our political leadership would be.

Our political leadership cannot be fooled. It is true that the Soviet leadership, and Soviet society both, will try to show visitors only the best, much as a housewife insists upon tidying up the home before guests are received.

And of course, for traditional social and political reasons, the Soviet Union wants to make the best possible impression on foreign visitors. But this makes no important difference. Many differences between American and Soviet ways of life are so visible that they cannot be hidden from the traveler for even 30 minutes, much less 2 weeks.

It is not only the political left that is traditionally disillusioned by contact with the Soviet Union. The far right will also be startled. The Soviet Union is far behind us in living standards. They will see that the Soviets are not 10 feet tall.

There is much evidence that the more conservative the American politicians are, in economic and political philosophy, the more favorably impressed they are likely to be by the Soviet Union.

In other words, some of our political leaders with exaggerated stereotypes will lose them. This is not brainwashing. This is broadening. This is education. People

often fear and often they idolize what they do not know. That is what Dr. Harold Lasswell meant when he said: "Saints and devils thrive on distance."

My proposal that we arm ourselves with information, is something we ought to do in our own interest. We should do it regardless of the Soviet response. But obviously, it is just as important for Soviet officials to see our country as it is for us to see theirs. We should not forget that only one group in the world has the power to destroy us and this is the ruling group in the U.S.S.R. Whether we communicate well with that group could, quite literally, determine whether we and they survive.

The best way to improve such communication is to remove Soviet stereotypes about us and permit this group of leaders to see us as we are. An important study, entitled "How the Soviet System Works," lists typical Soviet opinions and the effect of contact with the West on those opinions. Soviet citizens thought Americans were aggressive and bent on world domination. But contact with the West decreased the force of that belief. Soviet citizens respected America for its technology and its material power; contact with the West reinforced this view. Soviet citizens thought capitalism was decadent, surviving only by exploitation of workers, and the artificial stimulation of armament production. This notion has been pretty well destroyed by contact with the West. Finally, our standard of living was underestimated. The magnitudes of difference that did exist surprised Soviet citizens who came here.

But perhaps most important of the impressions that visits to America will leave in the minds of Soviet officials is the impression that an arms race with a country so rich is so futile. This alone is reason enough for the passage of this bill.

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