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GERMAN SECURITY: POST DISARMAMENT DEMONSTRATIONS & POLAND

Wherein the author journeys to Munich, Bonn and both Berlins to provide the Federation with some feel for the security debate within the Federal Republic of Germany in the light of the European disarmament movement (discussed in the December PIR) and the Polish martial law. The ten days in Germany began immediately after Chancellor Schmidt's luncheon with President Reagan, and ended two days after his own trip report to the German parliament. Accordingly, German policy and German thinking were all being reviewed, if not revised, during this exciting period.

This report reflects and contains interviews in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with newsmen, churchmen, scientists, generals, strategists, parliamentarians and their assistants, defense ministry policymakers, party officials, ordinary citizens, and American officials. In addition, three meetings were held in East Berlin, capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), on the last day. And, in the end, a seemingly fresh arms control idea is developed and sketched, and named "vertical disengagement".

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 6: ON THE PLANE TO MUNICH

The only non-stop flight from America to Munich leaves Washington at 5:00 P.M.

The night before the flight the Federation had hosted a relevant workshop on nuclear war at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS). Speakers had included leading activists of such groups as Physicians for Social Responsibility, Ground-Zero, Union of Concerned Scientists, the Bilateral Nuclear Freeze Campaign, and the FAS Nuclear War Education Project. It was the first time these groups had shared their plans with a public audience, and about 100 activists attended. But most of the groups were without a program except that of "education" (the Freeze Campaign was an outstanding exception). We were all a long way from either a program or a mass movement. The situation was different in Europe — so different that it provided the possibility for new thinking about what was possible. And few of us had any up-to-date sense of what the European situation would permit or the personalities with whom we would be dealing. Germany was, of course, the heart of the security problem. And this was the point of the trip.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 7: AN FAS COUNTERPART?

The plane arrived at 9:30 A.M. and, after a short nap, I proceeded on the extremely efficient commuter train to the home of Dr. Carl-Friedrich von Weizsacker in the suburb of Starnberg. (The morning papers read enroute showed that Schmidt, while in Washington, had blamed the Russians for Poland but refused to join in economic

sanctions.)

For our movement, born of atomic scientists of conscience, Dr. von Weizsacker can be thought of as the most prominent *German* representative. A wartime member of the German team that had sought an atomic bomb (with monies 1,000 times smaller than the U.S. finally spent), he turned his attention, after the war, to preventing the use of nuclear weapons and to peace. Until recently, he had been the head of a Max Planck Institute for the Study of The Conditions of Peace.

After the war, he had been pessimistic, and expected several more wars, but gradually changed his mind in a more optimistic direction. The German public, on the other hand, did not take the possibility of war seriously in the twenty years of the 60s and 70s; they would say "Of course, there will be no war." Now there is more awareness of the danger, which was good. But, on the other hand, the things the peace movement wanted to do "could make nuclear war more likely". While he was not sure that we could "deter war in the 80s", the present situation had some stability and could be worse. He would be prepared, hesitantly, to continue with the present situation. His overall conclusion was that the important thing was to have a "consistent" program based on a "consensus" in the society.

On the question of theater nuclear weapons, he had urged that the cruise missiles be placed on ships. Would the missiles ever be deployed? "Who knows?" As an example of the dangers, he gave as a scenario the possibility that, if Geneva failed, a parliamentary majority might support the Pershing missiles. But 300,000 people might move against the bases in demonstrations. And of these, 5,000 persons might force the police to kill them. And as a result, the missiles might be stopped.

While not believing in Brezhnev's benevolence, he did



Professor Dr. Carl-Friedrich von Weizsacker
Physicist and Philosopher

consider Brezhnev sincere about wanting a halt to the arms race. And he thought Soviet leaders sincerely afraid of the U.S., and of unpredictable changes in its mood.

On arms control, he had been brought up to be pessimistic because his father, Ernest von Weizsacker, had had the portfolio for arms control in the German Government and had seen little progress. But now, for the first time, he felt some optimism because he saw a "strong and genuine European interest in disarmament based on a popular movement". But if the effort failed, he saw turmoil ahead.

The Remnant of the Max Planck Institute

A short taxi ride away, one could find the remnants of Professor von Weizsacker's Max Planck Institute. It now consisted of peace researcher Dr. Horst Afheldt and a secretary, joined for the moment on an unpaid basis by a retired lieutenant colonel, Alfred Mechtersheimer, who had recently been expelled from the local Christian Socialist Union (CSU) for his participation in peace demonstrations.

The two were in the throes of trying to figure out whether to continue the Institute in the face of the disinclination of the Max Planck Society to continue funding peace research, or to apply to the Government for funding. Or should they become the nucleus of a European group based on independent funding, perhaps by America? Colonel Mechtersheimer is, in particular, worried about the problem of German anti-Americanism and its effect in America; he wants all the American connections he can get.

Dr. Afheldt, whom I had met at Pugwash meetings and at meetings of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), is always bubbling over with new ideas and analyses and is not an easy man to reduce to paper. But the thrust of his remarks, and of some reprints he gave me, was that

"With all the money NATO has, it has the ability to achieve conventional defense superiority if it uses the money properly."

He waxed enthusiastic about the advantages of the defense, and felt there was insufficient exploitation of the new defensive technologies. But the defense would have to be mobile; it could, for example, be based on "techno-



Col. Mechtersheimer (left) and Dr. Afheldt (right)

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commandos". From one of his papers, he summarizes approvingly the ideas of Lieutenant-Colonel Brossollet in "Essai sur la Non-Bataille":

"Commandos, each consisting of twenty men, form the basis for the concept of this model. These commandos are equipped with anti-tank weapons (rockets), mines and light infantry weapons. Their technical equipment should be optimal for the specific purpose of repulsing the enemy's mobile heavy equipment (target-seeking missiles, semi-automatic and fully automatic means of destruction). This makes the term 'techno-commando' appropriate...."

If we consider the effectiveness of the network of autonomous techno-commandos as outlined, then the assumptions of Brossollet indicate that even with the *present* technical equipment (Milan) each techno-commando will destroy three enemy tanks on average in his region, if it is attacked. For the whole territory of the FRG, approximately 10,000 such techno-commandos are required."

FRIDAY, JANUARY 8:

THE FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE AND POLITICS

A second suburb of Munich, that of Ebenhausen, houses the Federal Republic's largest foreign policy research institute, the Foundation for Science and Politics (Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik). It houses about 60 academics, of whom 35 to 40 are actively writing papers.

The Foundation reminded me, in its semi-rural setting on a large estate, of America's Hudson Institute. These two institutes were founded at about the same time, in the early 1960s. Both work the corridors of power. But the Foundation is larger and funded directly through Government appropriation, rather than by contracts.

The Foundation Director, Klaus Ritter, complained that ACDA Director Eugene Rostow was not sufficiently supportive of arms control which was, after all, an "undismissable part of the game." Also, Reagan seemed to have an "anti-Kissinger complex" which led him to suspect any conceptual scheme for Government policy. He felt something had to be done about the military balance. He was pessimistic about the cruise missile negotiations unless they were accompanied by SALT talks. The Germany peace movement was "in some ways strong but not very competent." He felt Mechttersheimer was a demagogue, and Afheldt a man who pushes logic too far. In particular, we were all too euphoric about precision-guided munitions 10 years ago; now we should see that we need nuclear weapons to "complement conventional weapons."

On Detente

We began to discuss detente. For Dr. Ritter, ultimately, "Detente is really just the continuation of politics with the Soviet Union."

But it had different meaning in different camps. For the West, detente was the stabilization of strategy, whereas for Germany it was part of an evolutionary policy. As he took a call, I examined relevant press clippings of the last few days.



Dr. Klaus Ritter

The day before I had left Washington, the Post's Bonn Correspondent Bradley Graham had written an article entitled: "West Germany's View of Poland Shaped by Its Position in Europe". He noted that Helmut Schmidt had described his own role in the East-West talks as that of an "interpreter" between the two superpowers — thereby artfully permitting him "to pursue his country's preoccupation with arms control and detente while at least appearing to be performing a valuable service for the United States".

The next day, after Schmidt's luncheon with the President, the Post editorial writer had been more critical:

"...The Chancellor has sometimes seemed to be listening to a distant voice, one suggesting that, for the purpose of strictly German goals, Atlantic solidarity may not be the ultimate German interest after all."

Indeed, Peter Jenkins had reported to the British Guardian that:

"...some influential Germans have made no bones about their view that even in the event of a Soviet invasion of Poland which would have brought a sharp freeze to East-West relations, it would not have been long before West Germany's overriding interest in detente would have reasserted itself."

Returning from his call, Dr. Ritter reported that Karl Kaiser had just returned from Washington and had advised him that "...the question marks in Washington on German policy were growing".

Ritter felt that the "zero-option" was nonsense. Brandt had gone to Moscow and brought back this idea about which Schmidt was ambivalent. On return from his own trip to Moscow, Secretary of State Haig had called the option "ridiculous" [i.e. unreasonable for the Russians and non-negotiable] but Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had first urged him to condemn the option and then succeeded in getting the U.S. Government to propose it. Dr. Ritter felt we needed a small invulnerable theater nuclear component "below the level of the SIOP (strategic war plan)" and he feared that, at present, our "nuclear component was being neutralized". He felt we could not continue to let the Soviets neutralize our strategic forces, so long as we retained a conventional vulnerability. Asked whether the cruise and Pershing

would really be "invulnerable", he said that, at least, they would be more invulnerable.

He developed the theme of "extended" deterrence much as one would have heard it at Hudson Institute; the West needed more than parity because it was defending territory (Europe) which was not the United States.

In fact, however, the issue appeared to be political. After all, he felt there was "no chance for a war in Europe". What was at stake was the Western perception of Soviet force. The peace movement "doesn't realize that it is already acting out of fear of Soviet superiority". A better balance was necessary from a political point of view.

(For myself, the notion that the peace movement was acting out of an unconscious fear of Soviet superiority seemed the last refuge of the weapons addict.)

SATURDAY, JANUARY 9: GENERAL JOCHEN LOSER

One hour's train ride out of Munich, in the direction of Salzburg, lies the town of Prien at the foot of the Bavarian Alps. There I was met at noon, in a driving snow storm, by retired Major General Jochen Loser, who drove me to his winter home overlooking a (fully occupied) ski run.

General Loser had resigned his position as division commander at the age of 56 in 1974 out of disagreement with the Government defense policy; he was actively engaged in a stream of writings about how conventional defense might be improved. A captain in World War II, he had lost part of his right hand at Stalingrad. Now he worked with the new thinkers, and the new generation.

He said there were four schools of thought. The first school, the peace movement, involved the "greens" (i.e., the ecological party), politicians like SPD delegate Eppler, and analysts like Mechttersheimer and Afheldt. A second school of thought sought to provide a military alternative closer to the likely-to-be-acceptable range. A third school championed the official NATO philosophy. The fourth wanted a military buildup (Reagan).

Loser wanted *no* tactical nuclear weapons, and wanted the medium-range nuclear weapons based only at sea and in the air — and not in Germany. Nuclear weapons were needed only as "political weapons" anyway. The key to making all this possible was a very strong conventional defense. And this could be had only if it were based on "new concepts", and on methods which had the support of the population — which threatening first use of nuclear weapons did not. He supported an explicit renunciation of first-use.

General Loser is starting a European research institute in Luxembourg of which he will be the President, with the famous Belgian General Close as deputy. There, with other military officers, he will look for new military methods and try to produce a common global strategy. In particular, politically, he looked toward a stronger European sovereignty to make Europe a better partner for the U.S. (In arguments with Professor von Weizsacker, he would talk of a "pontoon bridge to the U.S.," where Weizsacker would talk of a concrete "Golden Gate" Atlantic bridge.)

Loser thought the Mediterranean was the geopolitical center for Europe — not the Atlantic. Germany needed



General Jochen Loser

Europe, obviously, and America needed Europe, without which it would not be a world power. So a partnership was needed. And one reason to reinforce the European defense (in line with the new concepts he had in mind) was to free the American forces for use elsewhere. At present, by contrast, the Americans had to intervene "too early" and with "too much risk" if war broke out.

In the two-and-one-half hour discussion we had, General Loser touched incisively on a number of issues, of which the following gives the flavor.

The Soviet conventional strength was militarily dangerous to the West, especially if used with short warning; even a 25,000-man maneuver, announced and permitted under the Helsinki accord, could be used to spearhead an attack (a la the Egyptian attack on Israel in the Yom Kipper war).

Nuclear weapons were not the answer for killing tanks; computer studies had shown that it was better to handle the tanks conventionally, even if the first echelon had 15,000 tanks and the second 6,000 tanks.

NATO's strategy should be based on detente, which was "the most insidious defense", leading, as it would, to the kind of uprisings which we saw in Poland, and these, in the end, would keep the Russians back. (Before my leaving the States, Colonel John Collins of the Congressional Research Service had similarly advised that the chances of a Soviet attack in the next few years was virtually zero since it would take them that long before they could rely upon the Poles again.) Thus General Loser's strategy would be: 1) political stabilization in Europe, coupled with 2) emphasis on human rights as part of a political offensive.

He saw no prospect for German reunification but only the goal of preserving the German Nation as a cultural entity. The Germans, he said ironically, "being always perfect in their carrying out of duties", had inevitably become indispensable military cornerstones of *both* blocs. Still a "new European feeling was coming" in which Germany could be more critical of its American champion. He felt that the "Germans were bonded to the Americans by their help in Berlin, and help after the war, but they still could be, and should be, *critical* friends". In general a

"balance of interest was more important than a military balance", and a book he had coming out was entitled "The Killing Strategy is Over". In the new thinking, "strategy was a cooperative effort to protect both one's own people and one's opponent's peoples jointly".

This, I said, was like arms control. He understood but said that "reductions" was not the "right way" to proceed because to make progress, one had to change the conceptions and the thinking. One had to operate from the heart, not the body, and to do more than effect the details, but rather to change the principles. How could this be done in the conventional field? The first thing to do was to build up reserve units in areas close to the active brigades, using a "cadre" system in which the brigade was manned at a skeleton level and filled out by reservists when the signal was given. There would be 12-20 more brigades in the forward defense using this method, with the highest priority given to the border. The terrain would be reinforced with mines and trenches.

There would be de-emphasis of mechanized units, since 50% of the terrain was forest-covered area in which much mechanization was superfluous; perhaps 50% of the units would be "sword units", with the others being "covering units tied together in a common net". The main principle would be "fire, not movement", in contrast to World War II where movement had the main emphasis. Now, with the new technology, fire had priority, giving the defense a new chance and making it possible to base it on smaller and less expensive weapons. (One hundred to two hundred anti-tank systems could be purchased for the cost of a tank.)

One major advantage of this method is that it would "reduce" the threat to the East since, while it was stronger as a defense, it would be weaker offensively, being less mechanized. The strategy would be coupled with civil defense methods and the proclamation of cities as "open" and not to be fired upon.

SUNDAY, JANUARY 10: GENERAL GERT BASTIAN

I decided to travel by train to Bonn and to break the 5-hour trip at Wurzburg, with a view to there looking up Major General Gert Bastian, if he should suddenly show up, or at least glancing at the town center. Bastian had visited FAS's headquarters on December 2 along with the spokesperson for the Green Party, Petra Kelley. He was evidently the most active general in the peace movement, and he had struck me as very acute indeed in his analysis of the military implications of the cruise missile. He felt at that time that "the West was stronger than the East in all respects except for conventional balance and that NATO was superior in the Navy and in the Air and had better trained soldiers". General Loser had shown me a letter from his colleague Bastian expressing general agreement with Loser's new tactical ideas, I wanted to discuss this, among other things, firsthand.

In the end, General Bastian did not return to his home until after I had reached the end of my visit to Bonn. But he confirmed by phone his support of General Loser's ideas ("though not in all details, of course," in particular, he did not believe we needed *more* conventional forces).

He called our attention to the November 25 "Memoran-

dum to NATO" released by six retired Generals and one retired NATO Admiral (and distributed by the Komitee Fur Frieden, Abrüstung Und Zusammenarbeit, Gottesweg 52, 5000 Koln 51, FRG). They said:

"Pershing II missiles are able to destroy Soviet political and military command centres and their lines of communication within five or six minutes. Thus, any Soviet response could be suppressed at least for those crucial thirty minutes which are needed by approaching U.S. ICBM warheads. In this way, Pershing II missiles make a "limited nuclear war" possible. They have nothing to do with a response to Soviet SS-20 missiles."

On the neutron bomb, they said: "It would be self-deceiving and hazardous to believe that Soviet tank formations could be destroyed like killing insects with insecticides".

The 20-page memorandum attacked many NATO premises, arguing that "more security can only be obtained through less armament", that NATO was drifting toward expanding "the area of NATO influence" into the third world, and that:

"NATO must consider herself a political alliance which guarantees security by means of policy." NATO should accept "moratoria on the production and deployment of new mass destruction weapons and negotiate".

NATO also should "impose on its European member states the obligation for the future to dispense with any nuclear weapons in their armed forces, to abolish all opposing NATO directives and ask the U.K. and France to remove their nuclear forces". The Warsaw Pact should be called upon to "announce a similar renunciation for its non-Soviet armed forces".

The U.S. should be urged to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union to conclude a treaty in which both superpowers would take their nuclear weapons home.

In the wake of this, a strategy for defense of Western European states should rest on the "development of land, air and naval forces which are clearly committed to the defense of their own territory and can dispense with offensive long range weapons."

Finally, it called for European states to establish a "veto right and an effective control of nuclear systems deployed in Europe" so that the initiation of a nuclear war on European soil would not rest with a Washington Administration.

Back on the train to Bonn, a young woman in her twenties commented:

"If I have chocolates, I eat them. If I have cigarettes, I smoke them. If I have weapons, I would use them." She found my work inexplicable and asked, seriously, whether I would behave differently if I believed in an after-life.

This drove me back to examining public opinion polls.

The Institut fur Demoskopie has polls which, on some important questions, go back almost three decades! Reading its recent book of polls, I wondered whether in West Germany, as the saying goes, "less was happening

than met the eye”.

- The number wishing American withdrawal from Europe had dropped from 51% in 1956 to 11% in 1979. The percentage saying NATO had more advantages than disadvantages had been stable for 20 years at about 47% to 7% at least up to the last 1979 poll

- The number wishing to work “Most closely with” the U.S. rather than the Soviet Union had risen from 36% in 1973 to 56% in 1981 while the percentage wanting “equal cooperation had dropped from 54% to 32%. Only 1% chose “more closely” with the Soviet Union.

- America was far and away considered Germany’s best friend, (the percentages thinking so had not changed from 1965) and majorities said they “liked” Americans and checked off many complementary phrases.

- The “better red than dead” choice between “avoid war above all” or defend democracy” showed 36% versus 33% in 1955 and much the same (41% versus 31%) in 1980. This approach had peaked in 1976 (52% versus 44%)

- The “No one will risk world war” view seemed the same in January, 1981 as in 1979 and 1967. It had been slightly higher in 1975 (63%) but, of course, lower in 1961 (45%).

- It was surprising to see how many thought the “East more powerful” (46% to 6% for the West with 31% saying “equally powerful”) but the results were little changed for the last five years and were better than in 1976. Predictions about the period 50 years off gave a slight edge to the Russians, but one which had been declining since 1975!

This was now early 1982 and these polls were one to three years old: But, besides their stability, they served as a useful reminder of how current stirrings of one kind or another should be compared with feelings in the 50s and 60s when, seemingly, greater changes occurred (e.g., as in fear of war or “greater red than dead” sentiment).

MONDAY, JANUARY 11: DR. KARL KAISER

Germany has a precise equivalent to the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations called the German Society of Foreign Affairs, with 1200 members. I met with the Director of its Research Institute, Karl Kaiser, who had been a colleague almost 20 years ago, when we were both at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs. Now an influential adviser on foreign policy to the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and to the Chancellor, he was employed also as a professor at the University of Cologne.

He deplored the exaggerations about German trends, saying that the “majority was quite sensible” and was indeed on the 1970s policy line that one needs defense *and* arms control. Because West Germany disagreed on a single combined point “detente, Poland and relations with East Germany”, the U.S. seemed to think the Federal Republic was “falling apart”.

He strongly supported the Reagan arms control proposal, which had “shifted the blame to the Soviets” and “taken the momentum out of the peace movement” even



Prof. Dr. Karl Kaiser

more than had Poland. (Of course, as noted above, the SPD had been deeply involved in formulating, and gaining acceptance for, this proposal.)

Dr. Kaiser was part of an emerging European Security Study which was to evaluate conventional forces in Europe and to seek to decrease dependence on nuclear strategy within existing budgets; its first full meeting was to be in June. The nuclear weapons involved, which he said were in Britain, Germany and the Mediterranean, were mostly in Germany and even comprised (“fantastically”) large numbers of artillery shells which were totally superfluous. Many could be withdrawn. But he did not “want to remove the most important part of the strategy — “the uncertainty”.

He felt that “Germany could not escape its geography — that was fundamental”. No German Government could escape three goals:

- 1) to maintain a sufficient defense in collaboration with the U.S.;
- 2) to keep tensions in Europe as low as possible;
- 3) to seek to make the division of Germany somewhat bearable.

But as a consequence of this situation, America and Germany were on different philosophical tracks, and most Americans thought Germany was now floating away toward Moscow”. Americans were simplistic about Germany and thought its policy based either on trying to “make a buck” or on Germany’s becoming “finlandized”. The West Germans did not like the Russians either but did not seek to isolate them.

In the end, the “greatest lack in America was an absence of a long-term conception for dealing with the Soviets comparable to the view here based on detente”. (But the trouble was that the Soviets were misbehaving so often and, in particular, we had to get them out of Afghanistan.)

The Defense Ministry: Walther Stutzle

Dr. Walther Stutzle reminds one, in style and manner, of America’s Henry Rowen. As Director of the Defense Ministry’s Planning Staff he is, in effect, what we used to call Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His approach was cagey — the product, no doubt, of his position. And I was asking difficult questions.

Could the Federal Republic ask the U.S. to remove its nuclear weapons if it came to want to? "The question was hypothetical and required study of international law". (In this and some related remarks, I began to appreciate that, while the Federal Republic is a sovereign power in some senses, it is keenly, if quietly, aware that its sovereignty is subject to the fact that no peace treaty has writ finis to World War II. And I sense that there may have been secret agreements involving status of forces, arrived at in 1955 when the occupation ended.)

Could the German Government prevent, legally, U.S. first use of nuclear weapons from German soil in the event that it wanted to? This he said he would not discuss on or off the record! Was the German Government offered a two-key system on the Pershing and cruise missiles, and if so, why did it decline it? He said that it was not offered and would not have been accepted. Why not, since there already are two-key systems in which Germans and Americans share responsibility for unlocking the nuclear weapons? He denied it! His explanation was that only "NATOized soldiers, not German ones" had this responsibility, i.e., it would involve German soldiers only after they had been activated into the NATO status. So what? A Colonel in attendance, saved him by observing that this two-key system was used only with weapons that involved German equipment, which the cruises and Pershings did not.

He strongly defended the need to maintain the threat of use of nuclear weapons ("to deter war was the goal, not just nuclear war") but went on to argue that a no-first-use declaration would lead the Russians to expect a beefed-up conventional defense and, accordingly, to increase their own conventional forces. This, however, would not be true, it seemed to me, if the beefed-up conventional defense were based on new defensive principles a la General Loser. He responded that he had no difference with General Loser "except on tactics and organization" and on whether it would be wise "to declare" non-use of nuclear weapons. (But this seemed to me to be everything!) He appeared to have no confidence that nuclear weapons once used could be controlled, but seemed to feel obliged to maintain the threat of their use.

(Even while Dr. Stutzle was defending the traditional NATO posture, including forward defense, the International Herald Tribune was carrying an article, "NATO's Forward Defense Strategy Questioned", which argued that a Soviet infantry thrust "could lead to encirclement"; analysts were worried, however, that a new dispute over conventional tactics would overburden the NATO debate and kill the Theater Nuclear Weapons program.)

History was Unchanged

That evening, reading material compiled by CRS's Charles Gellner almost 25 years ago, I realized that no one's apprehensions had changed. John Foster Dulles had said in 1959 that it would not be wise to demilitarize and neutralize a united Germany because the Germans were too strong:

"On the contrary, we take the view that Germany and the German people are too great, vigorous, and

vital a people to be dealt with in that way and that that way is fraught with very great danger for the future."

And Walter Lippman was worried that division would not work because the Germans would not stay divided: "I belong to the minority who have long argued that German national feeling will not accept the partition of Germany, that some day and somehow the West Germans will come to terms with Eastern Germany and the Soviet Union in order to reunite their country."

Meanwhile, also in 1959, Henry Kissinger was sounding a note of force inadequacy which could have been made today:

"It is no doubt correct that we need not match the Soviets in every strategic category. But we are reaching a situation where we are not keeping up in any category."

Nor had the French position changed. As Karl Kaiser had explained to me, and as a churchman subsequently emphasized also, the French were currently worried that Germany was growing "soft" and might no longer be a satisfactory buffer between the Russians and themselves. Here is what President Charles de Gaulle had said in 1959 about a neutralized Germany:

"As regards turning Germany into a neutralized territory, this "extrication" or "disengagement" in itself says nothing to us which is of value. For if disarmament does not cover a zone which is as near to the Urals as it is to the Atlantic, how will France be protected? How, then, in case of conflict, prevent an aggressor from crossing by a leap or a flight the undefended German no man's land?"

I was beginning to see why A.W. DePorte's book *Europe Between the Superpowers* was subtitled *The Enduring Balance* and why DePorte concluded that the new European state system was "no mere transition to a restoration of the old order, now irrevocably gone, but a firmly established and probably long-lived successor to it". In sum, geography, enduring fears, and the heavy weight of superpower influence were immobilizing European trends and, as someone had put it, "decelerating history".

TUESDAY, JANUARY 12: THE CHURCHES AND THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (CDU)

The Catholic Bishops inexplicably failed to confirm an appointment. I had been told there had been some stirrings in the Church about disarmament; I knew there was interest in the Vatican, since some FAS scientists were working with the Pope. Since the German Catholic Bishops often make known their views through a Central Committee of German Catholic laymen, I secured the Committee's statement of November 14 "On the Current Peace Discussion". It was pretty hard-line!

The Soviet Union was "expansion-oriented" and had a "well-nigh insatiable, outward oriented craving for security". In the GDR, it had militarized society and people there were being "systematically taught to hate". In the light of all this, Catholics were justified in *threatening*

nuclear use and, even, *in the use itself* in some cases:

... While this policy is aimed at never having to make use of the deterrence potential it must, in order to be credible and effective, still be ready to use it if the worst comes to the worst. To weight the various factors involved is one of the most complex tasks in the fields of politics and ethics. There is no simple yes or no answer in the many situations which might conceivably arise...

Most startling, the Church Committee felt the Soviet Union had "decisively tipped the scales in its favor" in the military balance and that, "If peace is to be preserved, therefore, it is at present absolutely vital to work for and restore a balance of forces."

The Bundestag Committee on Defense

I had an interesting 90 minutes with the Secretary of the Bundestag Committee on Defense, Mr. Jurgen Frings-Ness. A civil servant, unlike our Chiefs of Staff of comparable Senate Committees, he maintains an impartial and, of course, an off-the-record stance. But, among other things, he called my attention to that morning's *Die Welt* in which America's "father of the neutron bomb" Sam Cohen was seen expanding upon new bomb possibilities. Cohen was advocating the "Gamma bomb" which he called the "Nothing Bomb". He proposed laying down a radioactive carpet which would be life-threatening to those who crossed it. It could be put down in a few days and would, he felt, revolutionize military history by defending without threatening. (One does not realize how much stimulation the peace movement gets in Europe because, not having such a movement, our papers don't give people like Cohen that much play.)

Afterwards I went to the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) headquarters and met with a middle-level organizer for the party named Hans-Jurgen Kaack. Mr. Kaack, just back from debating with some protestants, said they were giving him a hard time and they seemed to have "an approach outside the political context".

He felt the politicians had failed to do a good "public relations job" on the necessities for a defense policy and on what was being defended. He quoted a communist author who came West as saying: "My first impression is that the people who live here don't know what they have."

The basic difference in foreign policy between CDU and its ally, the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and SPD was really only the SPD's emphasis on detente. Detente was for the CDU/CSU only one of a number of foreign policy means but for SPD, he felt that "Foreign policy equals Detente". For CDU, the comparable basic premise was "balance of power".

The Protestant Church: Hermann Kalinna

Starting at 4 P.M., I spend almost three hours in a delightful conversation with Oberkirchenrat (something between a reverend and a bishop) Hermann Kalinna. I had forgotten the pleasure of discourse with benevolent church intellectuals. But, in the end, I failed to fully divine an answer to the basic question: what exactly was it that the Protestant Church was doing that had so many people excited? (For example, 10 generals had resigned from the

Church within the last week.)

Reverend Kalinna is the Deputy Envoy of the Protestant Church to the FRG Government in Bonn and had been, previously, the representative of the Church to a number of international religious meetings on disarmament.

He began by explaining that in the last century the Protestant Church had been state-subsidized and hence had not criticized state policies. Moreover, it had not been ready to use its post-1918 freedom from such subsidies under the Weimar Republic in time to oppose Nazism. Consequently, it suffered a "deeply felt guilt" and, in 1945, those Protestants who were, in fact, the least guilty made public professions that they had failed by "not praying enough", "not loving enough", "not being firm enough" and so on.

From the resultant debate, three issues arose for Christians: could the rearmament of Germany be supported; could the military have chaplains; and could Germany participate "directly or indirectly" in having atomic weapons on German soil?

A Commission was finally convened in 1959. One point of view said the buildup of weapons would lead to war, while a second "realist" point of view said that, in response to our being threatened, we needed to threaten back. The Commission concluded that both positions were "still necessary" and that, in this historical time period, they complemented each other along the analogy of complementarity in physics.


The meaning of the word "still" was that a transitional moment of grace "still" existed during which Christians were obliged to work for a world in which this complementarity did not exist, and in which only the more idealistic point of view existed.

Then came Vietnam, Third World issues, and the German policy of detente with the East ("Ost-Politik"), and the issue disappeared. But in 1975, there was a World Council of Churches meeting in Nairobi to which Reverend Kalinna went. There the German Church pressed for disarmament with positions second only to the Dutch. The Conference concluded that:

"Christians should declare themselves to be ready to live without the security the state can provide with weapons."

The main consequence was a rise in the demand for alternative service in hospitals rather than the already-permitted non-violent alternative service within the military. But the neutron bomb and cruise missile debates produced a wave of feeling similar to the fifties. The arguments were the same as the 50s, but the new generation did not know them. As a consequence, a new conference was held in 1979 and it was decided that the thesis of "still necessary" was still relevant.

Since this seemed to me (perhaps incorrectly) somewhat pallid, I asked why, in the light of this complementarity, the Generals had recently resigned. He said the military felt isolated and had lost a formerly privileged status. It felt the heart of the church was for conscientious objection. Was it right? "Yes and no". The top Protestant Council believed in balance, and at the bottom there was a tilt toward both



Oberkirchenrat Hermann Kalinna

military necessities and the Generals' point of view. In between, there was a vocal minority of ministers that were outspokenly against the cruise missiles and had similar positions on other issues. The 60-page paper the Church had recently released had, apparently, been a last straw for the Generals. It said, in particular, re weapons of mass destruction:

"For a soldier of an atomic armed army, whosoever says A must reckon with the fact that he must say B. And woe to those who act recklessly."

He said that, in America, the inner development of Germany was not well understood, and he gave the New York Times' Bonn correspondent, John Vinocur, as an example. He said Vinocur thought the peace movement was "resurgent anti-Americanism but there was never anti-Americanism here." The new movement is socialist and hence anti-capitalist; for it, America is just another word for capitalism. The terrorism against the American General was just general terrorism."

Our Chairman's Relatives

Chairman Frank von Hippel had given me the name of cousins in Bonn: Manfred and Li (nee von Hippel) Seidler. In a pleasant evening at home, Manfred Seidler, who is the principal of a gymnasium — indeed of the famous three-hundred year-old Beethoven Gymnasium — gave some insights into German life.

As in America, students had stopped reading for pleasure because there were too many distractions. Students were also demoralized by the number of doomsday threats. They were however not dumb, and while they might not know so many facts as heretofore, they were more sophisticated. But teachers had no authority beyond that due to their personalities.

There was currently a subterranean movement in the Federal Republic to organize volunteer shipments of food for Poland. Germans were trying to redeem their sense of World War II guilt over Poland and were organizing truckloads of material which were then driven directly across the GDR to Poland. It was an "opportunity for restitution".

I learned that the von Hippels had been distinguished academics and scientists for four generations at least and that our chairman was the grandchild of a Nobel Prize

winner (James Franck). When I mentioned how desirable it was for our movement of conscience to have a chairman who was "pure of heart", they understood and laughed, and said that it was "the same way with all the von Hippels".

Later that night, reading documents picked up from SPD headquarters en route to the CDU meeting, I saw how fundamental detente was to SPD thinking. In December, 1979, the SPD had passed a resolution on "security policy as part of our peace policy" which said:

"The long term process of confidence-building, in spite of existing political, military, economic, social and ideological antagonism, should be continued unswervingly even if irritations and set-backs had to be faced."

So for SPD policy, Poland was nothing but an anticipated setback — and the Chancellor's position seemed more predictable.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 13: GENERAL LOTHAR DOMROSE

The leading military adviser to the CDU appears to be the recently retired deputy commander of NATO, General Lothar Domrose. He received me, in the universal style of high-ranking flag officers, in an elegant immaculate apartment, with his gracious lady pouring tea.

He compared the current pressure for peace to the period after the Franco-Prussian war, at the end of the last century, when there was a comparable affluence. In his view, a generation used to affluence, "being satisfied by a remarkable increase of living standards, leads it to the perception that all you need to do is 'ban the bomb'".

He called General Bastian an "idiot" but promptly admitted that he had not really talked to him. He said Bastian had been "sacked" but then admitted there was "some truth" to Bastian's saying he had left on principle. (The Government had evidently searched for a formula and used "health reasons").

General Domrose complained that even the Pope had forgotten that the goal was to prevent "all war" and not just the "nuclear war". People forgot that the conventional air attacks on Tokyo killed more people than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. He admitted that the danger of nuclear war was incalculable, because of radiation (!) — I had expected he was going to talk of escalation.

He also surprised me with his solution to the public's attitudes which, he said, he had successfully explained to Georgia's Senator Sam Nunn the day before. The solution was that NATO had not done enough to tell people about its strategic objectives, but only talked about such details as crises, contingency plans and so on. By contrast, the Soviets spoke of their fundamental objectives and we should do the same! This struck me as carrying a bucket to a four-alarm fire.

He was for parity of strategic nuclear arsenals followed by reductions. The reductions were vital to win back the confidence of the European public. We had room for reductions because we needed only 1500 to 1700 strategic delivery vehicles, "not more", rather than the 2150 we

had. We did need all the 572 cruise and Pershing missiles. Of this number, he was the prime architect. But with these, we could reduce the 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons by about 50%.

The theater weapons, he said, were necessary to target theater command and control installations — “nerve centers”. Startled by this admission, which seemed to fit so well with Soviet complaints, I asked whether the Russians were not then justified in worrying about a paralyzing surprise attack by Pershing missiles followed 30 minutes later by an ICBM attack. His answer was that the Russians had 23 ICBM fields, many out of range. The command posts he had in mind were theater posts in western Russia. Well, could the Pershing hit that most important command post, Moscow. His answer was “maybe barely if moved right to the border” but that, if necessary, NATO should negotiate a somewhat shorter range to reassure the Russians. All of this seemed quite revealing.

General Domrose counted himself a friend of General Loser with whom he is often paired in debate. But Loser was “understating the role of nuclear weapons” in adding credibility to the policy. Indeed, we should extend the range of the Lance missile from 100 kilometers to 200 and give it a neutron warhead. With 1,000 to 1,500 nuclear bombs for tactical aircraft, and with the 572 theater weapons, one would have the needed total of about 3,000 nuclear weapons.

When General Domrose said that the theater missiles depended, of course, on arms control, I asked “Why?”. What did his rationale about theater command posts have to do with the SS-20? He said that, after all, with the SS-20 they could destroy SHAPE headquarters. But could they not have done this for the last 20 years? “Good point, but they would have had to destroy the adjacent cities as well”. Would the Russians have cared? Well, such damage would have triggered U.S. use of ICBMs. (I strongly doubt that America would distinguish, in its difficult task of deciding whether to launch ICBMs, between the destruction of SHAPE headquarters with and without the destruction of Mainz. Indeed, in the time allotted, Washington probably would not know the difference. And the radius of destruction of a single warhead would only diminish by 50% if SS-20 were substituted for SS-9.) At this, he turned to arguing that, under parity, all the components of the balance were changing their weight.

At this point, General Domrose confirmed, perhaps without knowing it, the cynics’ appraisal of all this. I asked whether the SS-20 program was not really just a modernization program. He said that SHAPE had indeed seen the initial reductions of the older single-warheaded SS-4s and SS-5s as the three-warheaded SS-20s had been introduced; this is “why we hoped that it would be a modernization program only”. But in 1978, we saw “they were not removing” all the SS-4s and SS-5s and so had decided otherwise.

In sum, it seems that a complicated, inconsistent and dubious rationale was developed for the cruise and Pershing missiles because the Russians, squirrels that they always are, could not bring themselves to throw away all



General Lothar Domrose

the SS-4s and SS-5s. Had they done so, would General Domrose still be telling us that the SS-20s could destroy SHAPE more efficiently and needed a counterpoise, or would he not?

So as not to prejudice the reader, I have withheld, until this point, an observation which I cannot completely suppress. Within five minutes of this interview, it suddenly dawned on me that, as far as Americans were concerned, General Domrose had been destroyed politically ten years ago by the actor Peter Sellers. In depicting Dr. Strangelove, Peter Sellers gave his character the same intense gaze, the same gesticulations, the same tones, and the same style of interjecting between phrases the utterance “neh” (“yes?”). Combined with the subject matter and the side which General Domrose takes in this debate, I honestly believe that a substantial fraction of Americans old enough to have seen the film (Dr. Strangelove or How I Came to Love the Bomb’) would have made my same identification.

The Defense Committee: Mr. Erwin Horn

Mr. Erwin Horn is the ranking SPD member of the Defense Committee and would be the Chairman had the ruling SPD party a clear majority of the Bundestag. He said that Germany was in a paradoxical situation. It needed a credible defense more than anyone, since the other side had 2,000,000 hostages (i.e., in Berlin). Germany, which was only the size of Oregon, had 10,000 nuclear weapons on its soil — 6,000 in the Federal Republic and 4,000 in the GDR. [In fact, it is West Germany alone that is the size of Oregon; East Germany is the size of the state of Virginia.] If America had so many nuclear weapons in the Philadelphia-to-Washington area where comparably many live, all America would be going crazy. [In fact, while it may not matter, the two Germanies have a combined population of 76 million, or one-third of that in the U.S. and hence that of the entire East-Coast-bordering states.]

He said that big empires always had imperial interests, and all the Federal Republic could do was to influence and modify the superpower policy. As far as security was concerned: “The future lies with the defense”. But the generals were very conservative and were replaying the last



Mr. Erwin Horn

Ranking SPD delegate; Bundestag Defense Committee

war. He developed the theme of exploiting the new defensive technology in a fashion worthy of General Loser. But, on inquiry, it turned out that the Committee has not yet heard testimony from General Loser or other critics.¹ As with our Armed Services Committees, it is not enough to have a case to have it heard.

What if America began to withdraw — perhaps in response to anti-Americanism or economic need, or just a desire to reorient priorities and require more European efforts in defense?

“It is impossible. Europe needs America; without America, our freedom and maybe our peace is in danger and Berlin would be lost.

“And America needs Europe. America has otherwise no military *glacis* as a world power that borders the Communist system. It needs the GNP of Western Europe and could not, without Western Europe, stay in Southern Europe or the Mediterranean or, perhaps, keep Israel.”

But in our nuclear strategy, he did feel we needed more balance between nuclear and conventional forces.

“Today we have nuclear dominance in middle Europe. For the foreseeable future we must have a mixed system of nuclear and conventional weapons. I would like to see change in the next ten years to a parity between the two forms of weapons and, in the still further decade, a dominance of conventional systems.”

That evening I walked to a nearby hotel where the Washington Post is headquartered and had an extremely pleasant dinner and conversation with Bradley Graham, the Post's young (29-year-old) Bonn correspondent. We exchanged ideas for stories and observations. A foreign correspondent has a difficult assignment, but he seems to have all the necessary qualities. The only unfortunate aspect of the evening was that, in walking the short

distance to and from my Am Tulpenfeld Hotel in sub-zero weather, I finally succumbed to a cold beyond the capacity of vitamin C to fully subdue.

The Foreign Affairs Committee Staffers

In the morning, I called on the Secretary of the Bundestag Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. Herman Jung. He provided useful background on the Committee and since he personally favors the CDU, he was able to provide some perspective. From there, I called on the Secretary of his Subcommittee on Arms Control, Mr. Peter von Schubert, who works directly under its Chairman, SPD deputy Egon Bahr. Bahr, who is sometimes called the father of Ost-politik, is an interesting and enigmatic figure. The right wing mistrusts him and he even gets anti-semitic mail from the neo-Nazis because they know (and print) that he is one-quarter Jewish (i.e., under the Nazi Nuremberg laws, he was classified as a “hybrid” person permitted to stay within the society but not to serve in the army — although he did for a time.)

As I met with his staff, he was meeting with the Ambassador from the GDR; it was the morning before the Chancellor's speech to the Bundestag reporting on his meeting with President Reagan and German policy was, no doubt, in more than ordinary flux. It was decided that I should return to meet with the main arms control adviser to Mr. Bahn, Dr. Uwe Stehr.

Die Grunen — The Green Party

Almost in between the towering two buildings that head-quarter the CDU party and the SPD party is an incongruous private home now rented by the Green Party as its headquarters. If the CDU were the Republicans and the SPD were the Democrats, this would be the Citizens Party of Barry Commoner. Started only a few years ago, and still with only 22,000 members paying between \$1.50 and \$15 a month, it was nevertheless having noticeable electoral impact. In 1979, 3.2% of the electorate (viz., 900,000 voters) had voted “Green”. In 1980 when the elections were for the national parliament, the number was lower, but still 1.5% (or 568,000 people) had supported Green delegates. Parties in Germany receive about \$1.50 for each vote they get and so the Green Party had earned more than \$3,000,000 in these two elections and it used it for its national headquarters (where I was) and for four or five regional offices.

One such regional organizer, Dr. Wilfried Skupnik, had come to help interpret for Director Lucas Beckman and had brought his child, Jan Christoph, for whom he was that morning baby-sitting.

To get a member into the Bundestag, the Greens would need 5% of the vote, or about three times what they got in 1980. But they had members in the regional parliaments, including Berlin's autonomous parliament. They had counterparts in the Western European countries and some connections with Czech and Polish activists. The Greens were, Mr. Beckman said:

“To a certain extent for unilateral disarmament but they did not consider the Soviet Union a peace-loving country as would orthodox communists.”

They wanted to break up the two blocs and their main



Beckmann (left), Skupnik with Jan Christoph (on right)

goals were "ecology and peace". The established parties were trying to block them (with the 5% rule that had long been used to exclude minor parties from Bundestag representation) and even the mass media discriminated against them. One paper even refused to carry their advertisement!

The Green did not want money from America — not even from foundations, which Mr. Beckman said were a capitalist invention. (I pointed out that he had just advised me that they had set up an Ecological Foundation to do their ecology work; he said, well, that was true and maybe they would think about it. But it was obvious to both of us, and discussed briefly, that his constituency was so suspicious of America that taking money from the great capitalist power was pretty well out of the question.)

What would happen if the cruise and Pershing missiles were brought in? First, he said you "couldn't exclude violence" but, cautioned by his interpreter, he said that the Green were interested only in "non-violent direct action". Mr. Beckman went on to say that "most of the radical actions are the result of agent provocateurs in the German FBI". Besides other evidence and press reports, he himself had felt this was confirmed when the Green were negotiating with the Bonn police for the October 10 demonstration. He had advised the Police Chief that any violence could be the work of the police and the police chief had allegedly said:

"I can guarantee on the 10th of October that no member of the establishment is interested in violence."

This had tended to confirm Mr. Beckman's suspicions.

I asked whether German society was falling apart, and they denied it vigorously and sincerely; it was "a deeply conservative society and very stable". Asked how many Germans affected an alternative life style, Mr. Beckman said that "3,000,000 West Germans put distance between themselves and society in some fashion". (This is about 7% of the voters.)

Back at the Bundestag

That afternoon, Chancellor Schmidt made his report to a raucous parliament. He was accused of having embarrassed Germany and having destroyed its relationship with America. Even long discredited charges were repeated of

his involvement in the sentencing of those who had sought to assassinate Hitler. One could see, on television, how much more partisan were the various supporters of CDU and SPD than would have been those of our own quite similar two parties.

In the evening, the main arms control assistant for the SPD, Mr. Uwe Stehr, drove me to the airport so as to provide time for discussions which the busy parliament period had not made possible. He said:

"What is new here is that the weapons themselves have become a danger. One single nation can decide the fate of the world; this is all right so long as the nation is sensible. But once it shows its muscle, this is frightening."

I was instantly reminded of an article, "The Europeans' Image of America", in which Wolfgang Wagner had written:

"The fundamental difficulty in the European-American relationship consists in the fact that the United States has to demonstrate power to protect its European allies, but these demonstrations, which are intended to deter Soviet expansionist desires, inevitably evoke feelings of inferiority in those protected."

And, he could have added, "nervousness".

I urged on Stehr the sensibility of a number of FAS proposals, including percentage annual reductions in which SALT levels or a freeze would be reduced by small percentages each year.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 15: IN WEST BERLIN

Berlin is nearer to Poland than to West Germany and it takes an hour to fly there from Bonn. I arrived late Thursday night, and the Berlin taxi-driver told me the city had a declining population, made up only partly through non-German emigrants. It had a problem with squatters in empty residences and a serious problem with dope and crime. For the first time, as a result of the weakened economy, the price of land had not gone up. Berlin was surrounded by 82 kilometers of Berlin wall. (While the Russians complained of their being surrounded in a worldwide containment program, they had — as if in gigantic game of "Go" — surrounded a piece of the West in turn. Of course, the purpose of the wall was to prevent the escape of East Germans into the city and hence to the West. But for purposes of pressure, it could be a useful nerve center to press upon.) The Mayor being too busy, I met on Friday morning with the leader of the Berlin SPD party — in effect, with the Deputy Mayor — Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel. Dr. Vogel is also a member of the SPD National Executive Committee. Asked whether his citizens were nervous after Poland, he said:

"People are concerned, but since the quadripartite agreement, the situation in and around Berlin has stabilized."

(The quadripartite agreement was the solution, in 1971, to the problem of regulating access to the city. A centerpiece of the Ost-Politik SPD policy, it had made possible travel to the city from West Germany without unexpected delays and had also regulated the contacts between the two

halves of the divided city.

In the introduction to a 1978 survey of the effectiveness of the four-nation agreement, the American negotiator, Ambassador Kenneth Rush, had written:

“It must be recognized, however, that the actual practical effects of the Agreement will be directly dependent on the over-all status of East-West relations, primarily American-Soviet relations, at any given time.”

Was it true that he and Mayor Richard von Weizsacker (brother of Professor Carl-Friedrich von Weizsacker) were quite close in their approach to city policies. It was true but unfortunately, some of the CDU, like Strauss, wanted to cut off the arms talks; this, he felt, could affect the city! So here it was again, the tremendous sensitivity of the Germans to detente—the temperature of which they see as directly affecting the life of their state and the well-being of their 2,000,000 Berlin hostages.

Dr. Vogel had been giving rather formal answers, and seemed busy, so I simply asked whether there was anything special he wanted to communicate to the Americans. He said, without hesitation:

“It is very important that Americans understand that concern about armaments and the arms race, and about peace, is not anti-Americanism”.

His aide gave me a speech on this point, which Dr. Vogel had been giving in America.

Lunch with Ulrich Albrecht

I had been advised that Professor Ulrich Albrecht of the Free University of Berlin was extremely knowledgeable on European disarmament plans, and he had agreed to lunch with me. While waiting, I was advised by his assistant that Berlin seemed to be suffering the fate which Treasury Secretary Morgenthau had once advocated for post-war Germany — de-industrialization.

Over lunch Professor Albrecht noted the discomforts of living within a walled city; one would hear over the radio that parking was full at the park where one was about to go and, by the time one got ready to leave, one would hear over the radio that the roads were closed because people had not obeyed the injunction to go elsewhere.

Berlin, which was not in NATO, was a good example of how more subtle means than armaments could get results. It was true that the vast majority of the peace movement wanted the nuclear weapons out of Germany, but it was equally true that a majority of the peace movement was working under the assumption that the country would remain under the nuclear umbrella and hence it was not an anti-American movement.

On conventional armaments, he said that there had been enormous improvements in such weapons, especially within the Germany military which, being prohibited from nuclear work, had concentrated on these possibilities. They included cluster bombs, fuel-air explosives which could have the power of small nuclear weapons, remote-controlled area weapons, weapon dispensers that fired barrages, and, of course, anti-tank weapons.

There were six main categories of disarmament proposals:



Professor Ulrich Albrecht & Assistant Gorgia Tornow

- 1) Disengagement schemes, particularly nuclear ones;
- 2) Neutralist proposals, e.g., following the Scandinavian option of seeking security through a power balance;
- 3) Defensive options such as emphasizing territorial defense;
- 4) Social defense (or passive defense) a la Gandhi;
- 5) Unilateral disarmament.

He promised me a wealth of material on this at dinner the next night and advised me to leave my briefcase at the hotel before going East Berlin lest the guards take all the printed material!

Checkpoint Charlie: Entrance to the Other World

There are seven passages to East Berlin but only the famous Checkpoint Charlie (and one other) for the non-Germans. I have been to Russia but, of course, only by long plane journey or by ship. Never had I walked! Here I felt like Alice walking through a looking glass into an Orwellian world in which the most important words mankind knows have been destroyed by inverting their meaning.

At the third of five gates through which one is processed, the existential meaning of the transit became clear. The guard found two copies of our December publication in my pocket and was thereby induced to search every pocket and even the minute recesses of my complicated wallet. After much discussion, and waiting for almost an hour, it was decided to “escrow” the documents rather than condemn them. I was advised that documents against the “social life” of the GDR could not be admitted, and since there was not time to determine whether these were such, I could pick them up on my way back.

Walking through the late afternoon gloom to our U.S. Embassy to the GDR — which is a 15-minute walk on the other side of Checkpoint Charlie — I felt truly in a different world. It even looked like Moscow, with broad streets, some decayed old buildings, and drably dressed people, and, as in Moscow, one could feel their awareness that I was “western”.

I had come mainly to thank the Embassy for helping arrange a meeting the next day with an East German official,

Dr. Klaus Montag, and after paying my respects and chatting with low-level officials about the political situation, I spent a few hours wandering around the streets in bitter cold. When I approached the center of the city, I could see my error. The city was much richer than Moscow and the people much better off.

One is required to change \$12.50 into GDR marks to pass through the Checkpoint, and I looked for places to spend mine — a dinner in a cafeteria, some cake in a kind of farmers market, and candy and cookies for the rest. One resident told me that a Soviet visitor from a town other than Moscow had exclaimed that it was wonderful in East Berlin because, in every store, one could find bread! East Germany is far and away the wealthiest nation in the bloc, and official western statistics show that, counting socialist amenities, the average standard of living is now higher than in Great Britain!

I passed back through the Checkpoint at 8:00 P.M. but pretended to have lost my receipt and told the guard angrily that he could keep the documents. (Frankly I preferred to keep the receipt as a souvenir of that Kafkaish little episode and so I have done.)

Conversation in East Berlin

Returning at 10:00 A.M., I walked again through that black hole from which light cannot emerge and which, I now knew, shredded printed materials in passage. This time it took only a few minutes, which left me with the time to browse for an hour in an excellent rare book store. I spent my \$12.50 on a handful of old english-language books, e.g., an 80-year-old copy of Louisa May Alcott's *An Old Fashioned Girl*.

At noon, I lunched with Dr. Klaus Montag and his disarmament specialist, Dr. Heinz-Joachim Switalla. Montag had been described to me as the "Georgie Arbatov" of the GDR, in terms which meant more than his Directorship of an institute specializing in the study of the U.S.A. It meant also that he was flexible, could explain the line in ways which the West could digest, and was interesting to talk to. And all of this he proved to be. Unfortunately for the reader, he had been badly burned by the press, not too long before, when Tad Szulc had quoted him, he said, as saying the Russians would invade Poland. All he had said was that Russia would use "all available means" to hold onto it. As a consequence, he preferred that the discussions be off-the-record. [Mr. Szulc advised FAS that Montag was not quoted by name and not quoted so flatly.]

At 2:45, at the same Hotel Den Linden, I met with the GDR's most famous peace dissenter, Stefan Heym. Born in 1913 Mr. Heym was a German Jew and communist who had fled Nazism to come to America in the thirties. A journalist, he had edited an anti-Nazi weekly publication in the U.S. and, in 1943, had joined the U.S. Army. But after the war, he had returned to the GDR. Recently in the news for his participation in an East Berlin peace conference, he had surprised the participants by saying that:

"Today, there is no just war as there are not just atomic bombs. The SS-20 is as unjust as the Pershing II."

Later, he had asserted that he would join a:



Stefan Heym

Spokesman for the silent peace movement of the GDR

"peace demonstration on the Alexander Platz in East Berlin if the Government would permit one and I am certain that the silent majority in this country would take part."

Typed transcripts of the conference, taken down from West Berlin TV, were circulating through the country. He had later appeared on West Berlin TV. The results were obvious as we sat in the corner window of the hotel and children and passersby stared, and even pointed!

At first Mr. Heym had seemed to have no apprehensions about an interview but, on reflection when I asked for final confirmation, on a point, he decided that most of what he had said probably ought not be within quotation marks. He did feel quite strongly that "Socialism needed democracy to make it work". People over 65 have the right to travel out of the GDR, and Mr. Heym may have had special understandings, in addition, that permitted him to travel lest he otherwise simply ask to leave. In any case, he was on his way abroad, to Israel and elsewhere in the coming days. His position, however, appears to be quite unique in the GDR.

The GDR Academy of Sciences

At 4 P.M. I appeared at the GDR Academy of Sciences. Some weeks before, the leading specialist in relativity of the GDR, Professor Treder, had sent a petition on cruise missiles, signed by five scientists, to his friend Professor Peter Bergman, who being a former FAS Chairman, had sent it to me. I had thereupon arranged this meeting.

I was quick to see and to sense that, as with the controls at the border, the controlling of meetings with foreigners was even tighter than in Moscow. The combination of German thoroughness and closeness to the bloc boundary seems to have immobilized all political contact.

For example, the readers will all have witnessed a waiter offering the host a taste of an about-to-be-dispensed wine.

But have you ever played the role of the wine? I was "shown", by the young man who escorted me upstairs, to an unidentified man in a room who looked at me and nodded to the guide, before I could be taken further.

There then began one of those discussions in which all concerned are only too well aware that everything is, for one purpose or another, on the record and that no real contact will be permitted even in the hallways. Worse, I discovered at the outset that one of the five signers of their petition was not just any old Klaus Fuchs but the atomic spy Klaus Fuchs! "Atomic spy", a Mr. Krober observed, "was not a very nice word". I agreed. I asked what in the hell was I supposed to do with a petition so absurdly endorsed.* (The petition called for an international consensus on "no-first-use" and for a NATO-Warsaw Pact moratorium on stationing and modernization of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. It had not yet been published in the GDR but was to appear, they said, in the Academy's journal.)

As the conversation wore on, it became apparent that Professor Treder presents himself as so affable and loquacious as to make him seem, frankly, a bit tetchy — almost like a southern black in the 30s trying to cope with the problems of white authority. Only once did this mask seem to slip. That was when, in despair over the uninformed quality of the discussion, I told this famous relativist who had never met Albert Einstein of an exchange I had had in Einstein's home in 1953. From this anecdote, I drew the moral that Einstein would have wanted peace discussed not only from "firm principles", as they were urging, but also from "informed knowledge of details", as I was urging. Seizing this moment of sobriety, I proposed the following bargain. FAS would send Professor Treder's Einstein Laboratory a set of books giving information on disarmament issues if the Laboratory would write assuring FAS that the material would arrive and be used, and if the Laboratory would set some of its members to studying the problem. I was promptly assured that the material would arrive; time will tell about the rest.

Perhaps two points of interest arose. The GDR has adopted the posture of a non-nuclear country although, at the least, it has thousands of nuclear-capable delivery systems waiting for the warheads to come from Russia and, at the worst, many warheads are already there. (Indeed, some of my interviewees have intimated that many of the warheads are already there and at least *some* of them are widely believed to be there. If so, it may someday have the impact of the Soviet nuclear-armed submarine in Sweden.)

To give some sample of the discussion, when I raised the problem of warheads being flown into the GDR, Professor Treder referred to this as "a hypothetical problem akin to whether one might bring an atomic bomb into West Berlin

*At the same unusual conference in East Berlin, referred to above, Klaus Fuchs, who served 9 years in Britain for espionage, had rebuked a request by one delegate for social, rather than military, alternative service for conscientious objectors, by saying this would amount to "unilateral disarmament"!



Professor H.J. Treder

in a paper bag."

Second, I asked about a Financial Times article of January 13 which said that East Germany was "beginning to suppress a growing peace movement" and was forcing the removal of car stickers popular in West Germany that said "make peace without weapons" ("Frieden Schaffen Ohne Waffen"). Teachers were ordering young Christians to remove emblems from their jackets depicting a sculpture, the U.N. symbol, and the words "swords into ploughshares" (these emblems were made by the Protestant Church).

Earlier I had been told that only the Protestant Church had a chance of launching a peace movement, and then only a one-in-five chance. It is the only organization in the GDR permitted to speak, and then only because it is not state-subsidized. Even young people who do not believe in God find it an intellectual sanctuary. And much like the Quakers in America, the GDR Protestant Church will give any persons out of favor an audience. So this crackdown boded very ill.

My discussants denied that peace demonstrations were being hampered and pointed to the next day's planned demonstration commemorating Rosa Luxembourg!

I raised the question of scientific exchange and learned that the GDR would be permitted a total of only 10 man-months — down from 22 man-months. They were obviously feeling pretty badly about it but, presumably because it was not on the planned agenda, they said that it was "not convenient" to discuss it.

Once, when the FAS was looking into animal rights, I had asked the animal activists which animals suffered most in the zoo. Walking back to the Checkpoint from the Academy, which is only four blocks away, I remembered the answer: the primates, because they know what is happening to them. So, it seemed to me that, must it be true of the East Germans. The Russian people, and the many peoples in the USSR, know little of freedom. But the Germans in the GDR know, and they see western television all the time from Berlin, and all of this is tinged with the regret that they themselves brought on the war which caused their intellectual imprisonment. How they must suffer, those who still think! When I passed by the guard who had relieved me of our publications, I vented my feelings, to his

annoyance, by insisting, that he take back my GDR change rather than keep it as a "souvenir".

Vertical Disengagement: An Idea

At dinner with Ulrich Albrecht, I told him of an idea which had come to me while talking to Montag at lunch that day. In the past, I told Montag, I had dismissed the meaningfulness of such trades as the West giving up 1,000 tactical nuclear weapons for the Soviets giving up 1,000 tanks and some men. It had seemed "nothing for nothing", since both kinds of weapons could easily be brought back, and since both were already in place in excess. And it seemed a trade of apples for oranges. But now, I told him; after traveling through Germany and getting the feel of things, it seemed much more meaningful and promising, and not at all the trade of incommensurables!

Why? Because it was, of course, conventional surplus on the Eastern side that induced the West to threaten nuclear weapons. Reductions in Soviet conventional superiority — even just reductions in the speed with which the Russians could mount an offensive — could and should lower the extent to which the West needed to have, and needed to threaten to use, nuclear weapons.

In the end, if the East had removed all Soviet troops to within the Soviet border, or just reduced its *offensive* capability to a level that did not threaten the West's conventional defense, the West could adopt a *de facto* or even an explicit no-first-use policy and complete the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from Western Europe. In sum, the policy made sense if extended. And there were rich surpluses of material on both sides to give the process some early momentum.

Montag had not been immediately sympathetic to this but had made some constructive comments, and the idea was growing on me. I asked Professor Albrecht if this idea had been developed in the peace literature that he knew so well. He came up with a number of references. But none really touched on this because the disengagement to which they referred was disengagement of forces by removing

them from a geographical area as a prelude to, for example, neutralization. This idea I realized, should be called "vertical disengagement" as opposed to that "horizontal disengagement."

Conclusion

The West must, as one suppressed voice put it, "avoid walking on one leg" by demanding a real peace movement in the Eastern zone even if this is unlikely to be fully achieved.

Although conventional war has rapidly become, in the NATO West, a lost art, there still remain German generals with fresh ideas that might cut the Gordian knot. They could improve conventional force effectiveness so as to make less necessary the reliance on that nuclear threat which, increasingly, is so upsetting to a new generation — and ought to be. These military officers are a most valuable Alliance asset and need to be cherished rather than suppressed.

German attitudes and interests are distinguished from our own by their desire to drag us into anything that happens; as SPD deputy Karsten D. Voigt put it:

"I don't want either side to start the war without being involved on their own territory and quickly."

It is disturbing to hear the persistent symmetry with which this view is stated — as if the U.S. would be starting a war when next we tried to keep open the Autobahn and needed, therefore, to be deterred. But, most important, there is a reminder in these statements of the great danger to our Nation of leaving this confrontation unresolved.

Our Founding Fathers must be restless in their graves at the imminent danger to our Republic that has sprung from our involvement in European politics, and from our global aspirations. If we want to continue playing this role in Europe, we must move expeditiously to defuse the resultant time bomb. And that bomb, ticking away, is our reliance on nuclear first use, and the political repercussion this reliance has on the minds of new generations.

—Jeremy J. Stone

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