

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

Volume 42, No. 10

December 1989

FAS SCOOPS NEW YORK TIMES TIMES WON'T PERMIT IT!

On November 8, FAS President Jeremy J. Stone sent the New York Times a highly unusual op-ed piece containing "hard news" on the extent of US involvement in the Cambodian fighting and the extent of Thai involvement.

Op-ed Page Editor Les Gelb was able to satisfy himself that the "informed sources" quoted by Stone knew what they were talking about and was prepared to run the piece. But, under New York Times rules, he was obliged to give the news editors time to "catch up" with a piece of their own which would run the same day.

Accordingly, the Times Washington reporter Robert Pear, and its Bangkok reporter, Steven Erlanger, were both given advance copies of Stone's op-ed and told to confirm it and write their own stories.

In Washington, Pear came up with his own scoop—the intelligence committees were trying to limit the CIA's ability to fund the war. This ran a day ahead of Stone's piece. In Bangkok, Erlanger, presumably confronting his sources with the inevitable, got them to do what PR men always recommend—let the bad news out themselves. Accordingly, on November 16, as Stone's piece ran on the op-ed page, Erlanger ran a piece confirming the details about CIA involvement under the benign title "Aid to Cambodia Non-Communists Is Detailed."

Deflating the News

According to a Washington Post article on Secretary Baker's Department of State, run the same day, these approaches to news manipulation are standard and have been applied to deflating Soviet peace initiatives by leaking them first.

Stone's piece, which had been entitled "US is Allied with the Khmer Rouge" was changed to "Secret US War In Cambodia." But with Erlanger's story as confirmation, the "secret" was a lot less secret.

Meanwhile, the State Department is lying low, which is not hard nowadays. According to the same Washington Post story, policy is made by just five people and even assistant secretaries have become errand boys. Torn between past policy momentum and rising—and accurate—fears that it will be blamed if the Khmer Rouge take over, the State Department appears to be letting the next holocaust just happen.

SECRET US WAR IN CAMBODIA

The US is waging a secret war in Cambodia against the Hun Sen government—knowing full well that none other than the genocidal Khmer Rouge are likely to be the ultimate beneficiaries.

Even as White House officials shed crocodile tears over signs of the growing military strength of the Khmer Rouge, they are continuing to use US financial and intelligence resources to weaken the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen government, the only faction capable of preventing a military takeover by the Khmer Rouge.

And the Administration is pressuring Thailand to refrain from pulling the rug out from under the war itself, something that Thailand—as the main conduit of arms to all the resistance forces—is uniquely able to do.

According to well-informed sources, the non-communist resistance—composed of forces loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to a former prime minister, Son Sann—has a joint military command that makes requests for weapons, material and aid through Thai operatives and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency on the Thai border.

CIA in Cambodian Working Group

Those requests are taken to the Cambodian Working Group, a highly secret unit in Bangkok that coordinates every move of the non-communist resistance. Working with the group are CIA operatives from the US embassy in Bangkok and officials from the highest levels of the Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean governments.

The Working Group is the conduit for lethal, material, and financial aid to the non-communist resistance, except for that coming from China. It reviews battle plans, approves specific weapons, disburses direct cash payments and reimburses resistance leaders. While Thailand and Malaysia train the resistance and Thailand provides logistical support, Singapore provides the weapons through a quasi-private weapons company in Singapore. And the US pays for virtually everything.

For example, a "general offensive" launched last month by the non-communist resistance was carefully planned and organized by the Working Group with highly secret "need to know" rules giving everyone plausible deniability. The US pays \$24 million annually to support the resistance, and the Son Sann group is getting \$150,000 a month for operating expenses alone.

Newspaper reports even suggest that CIA operatives are providing intelligence assistance from US reconnaissance satellites to the non-communist resistance.

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Now that these non-communist resistance are beginning to fight, there can be no denying that US support for them is helping the Khmer Rouge, albeit indirectly, by forcing the Hun Sen government to cope with three battle fronts rather than one.

Meanwhile, the US government is intervening in Thai politics by backing its hard-line foreign minister, Siddhi Savetsila, against its prime minister, Chatchai Choonhavan, to keep the war going. Secret details on Thai involvement in the war shed new light on the importance of supporting the peaceful initiatives of the Thai prime minister, whose visit to the US, originally planned for this week, has been deferred.

Through a large Thai intelligence entity called 838, the Cambodian guerrillas receive weapons, food and other support. These officers are integrated into the daily life of the resistance bases. They provide weapons and material that are stored in secret warehouses well inside Thailand, and monitor everything.

Weapons for the Khmer Rouge are sent to Thailand by China, and Khmer Rouge leaders are given full freedom to travel from their jungle bases in Thailand to offices in Bangkok to deal with securing them.

Thailand Could Stop the War

Thus, Thailand has the ability to stop the war and, indeed, to determine the winner. Under these circumstances, Thailand could, by gradually reducing support, weaken the Khmer Rouge enough to prevent them from taking over Cambodia once again. This is exactly what the Thai prime minister wants to do.

And why doesn't he? One major reason is that Washington currently finds his initiatives unacceptable. He is, after all, arguing for a step-by-step settlement that would relieve pressure on the Hun Sen government.

The Administration, which says it opposes Khmer Rouge involvement in a future Cambodian government, also says—startlingly—that it will go along with such involvement so long as Prince Sihanouk insists on it. The prince, in turn, had already said he would insist on including the Khmer Rouge as long as the Chinese insist on it—leaving the US, in effect, following the Chinese line.

In accordance with this convoluted policy, the US Embassy in Bangkok is happy about the recent success of the non-communist resistance, which puts further pressure on Hun Sen to accept the unacceptable—a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. And it regularly protests any peace initiatives by the Thai prime minister.

So the irony is exquisite. We are redoubling our efforts to overthrow Hun Sen even while we announce that such a result would produce a Khmer Rouge takeover. Hun Sen is supposed to save us from this contradiction by organizing a wholly implausible, four-party coalition government with the Khmer Rouge.

From every objective point of view, we are allied with the genocidal Khmer Rouge. —Jeremy J. Stone □

The following page begins a list of the major anomalies of US policy toward Cambodia.

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The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1989 by the Federation of American Scientists.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FAS, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

A DOZEN ANOMALIES IN US POLICY TOWARD CAMBODIA

1. Grandstanding— The US announces at Paris that it is adamantly opposed to having the Khmer Rouge in any future Cambodian government and will even decrease its support to any such future government in such proportion as the Khmer Rouge are, indeed, represented in such a future government.

It makes these statements knowing full well that the Chinese Government wants the Khmer Rouge represented and that Prince Sihanouk—as he advised Vice President Quayle at Jakarta—will insist on Khmer Rouge representation if the Chinese do.

So when the US government adds that it will reluctantly support Prince Sihanouk in his desire to have the Khmer Rouge involved in the future government if he insists on it, how can such statements be understood except as grandstanding?

2. Reneging— Not much more than a year ago, the Department of State was explaining that it would normalize relations with the Vietnamese government if only that government would remove its forces from Cambodia. US intelligence reports confirm that this was done in late September. But the US now says that it is no longer planning to normalize relations with Vietnam without a full settlement in Cambodia.

3. Scapegoating— In the interim, the Department has changed its line to insisting that the Vietnamese withdraw “in the context of an acceptable settlement.” And in light of our reluctant support of Sihanouk, what this really means is that Hanoi has failed to insist that Phnom Penh accept the Khmer Rouge in an interim government—something we declared at Paris we did not really want! So Hanoi is to be blamed, and an embargo maintained on Vietnam (and the Cambodian population) for Hanoi’s not pressing its ally in Cambodia to accept an outcome which we say we don’t want. This seems to reflect anti-Vietnamese feelings more than it does any plausible use of political power to achieve desired goals.

4. Double-standard— The US Secretary of State says that he is following the ASEAN line in justifying many attitudes which are anti-Hun Sen. But, in fact, Thailand—the front-line ASEAN state—has been much friendlier to Hun Sen than has the US. For example, Hun Sen has been invited to Thailand three times, and by the Thai prime minister, while the US—a second line state in this matter—does not permit Hun Sen’s chief foreign policy assistant, Ambassador Hor Namhong, to speak to private groups in America on a private visit.

(This double standard is kept in place through the double-talk of ASEAN, which maintains a far more hawkish declaratory policy than it follows. And this, in turn, reflects the fact that the Thai prime minister cannot fire his super conservative foreign minister, or even permit him to resign, lest the prime minister’s coalition government collapse. The foreign minister is the head of one of the ruling coalition’s key parties.)

5. Follow or Lead ASEAN?— In fact, some members of

the Department, and US officials in Bangkok, have been trying to get the Thai prime minister to follow the line of the Thai foreign minister, i.e. the US has become the enforcer of the ASEAN line rather than a follower of it and has tried to toughen the Thai line.

6. Congressional Double-talk and Violations of Law— US law prohibits any aid to the Khmer Rouge directly or “indirectly.” Yet the US gives military aid (military equipment and advice) to two anti-Hun Sen factions allied to the Khmer Rouge—the Sihanouk forces and the Son Sann forces. But this is indirect help to the Khmer Rouge since all three factions are all fighting against a common enemy and the successes of one help the others.

In addition, although often denied by the State Department, the newspapers repeatedly show informal coordination in fighting at the same time against Hun Sen forces. The US is trying to have it both ways. Unfortunately, if the three factions overwhelm Hun Sen, the Khmer Rouge will certainly prevail since they are stronger, by all estimates, than the so-called non-communist resistance of Sihanouk and Son Sann put together.

7. See No Evil— The US has condemned the Khmer Rouge for its genocidal policies for many years. Yet it refuses officially to assert that the Khmer Rouge were, in fact, guilty of genocide, lest it be required to cite them under the genocide convention, or admit the Vietnamese invasion to have some justification, or prohibit the Khmer Rouge from holding the UN seat.

8. Former vs Actual Khmer Rouge— While refusing to cite the Khmer Rouge for genocidal practices, US officials have no hesitation in condemning the Hun Sen Government as “former Khmer Rouge.” Thus it lumps together those who continue to follow the Khmer Rouge line with those who quit in revulsion or fear and proceeded to construct a government that does not follow Khmer Rouge practices!

Ironically, US officials also try, sometimes, to claim that those who are still Khmer Rouge might be acceptable in a new government. Thus it follows a naive line on *current* Khmer Rouge members while following an absurdly hard line on *former* Khmer Rouge members.

9. Prince Sihanouk Now And Then— In fact, these former Khmer Rouge, like most Khmer Rouge of all kinds current or former, joined the Khmer Rouge at the request of Prince Sihanouk in 1970.

After all, the Khmer Rouge had few supporters until the CIA overthrew Prince Sihanouk in 1970. It was then that Prince Sihanouk appealed to all patriotic Khmer schoolboys and farmers to join the Khmer Rouge to put the prince back in power. Accordingly, almost all Khmer Rouge recruits joined at Sihanouk’s request. Yet we condemn those who quit for being “former Khmer Rouge” communists while supporting Prince Sihanouk, the former leader of the Khmer Rouge as “non-communist.”

10. Prince Sihanouk pro-or anti-Khmer Rouge?— While the “former Khmer Rouge” such as Hun Sen left the Khmer Rouge in 1978 or thereafter, the prince remained

the head of the Pol Pot state of Democratic Kampuchea and still signs letters in this way. He supported the Khmer Rouge at the Paris Peace Conference even on such niceties as whether to use the word "genocide" in referring to their past practices. And he consistently gives interviews saying that the Vietnamese are more dangerous—even after their withdrawal—than the Khmer Rouge. All this is after—long after—the world had full knowledge of the 2,000,000 Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge.

It is hard for the West to understand but, in the prince's thinking, the Khmer Rouge can be forgiven for their past genocide but the Vietnamese cannot be forgiven for having overthrown the Khmer Rouge—even though the Khmer Rouge would, otherwise, have completed the destruction of the Cambodian people. The US has hitched its policy to a person of extraordinarily warped judgement.

11. Musical Chairs on Verification—Originally, the US insisted that the Vietnamese military withdrawal be adequately verified. Now that the Vietnamese are, in fact, withdrawn, we insist that it not be verified unless the verification is in the context of a comprehensive settlement.

Meanwhile, at the Paris peace conference and thereafter, Hun Sen agreed to UN verification of the withdrawal. In other words, the US is part of a coalition against Hun Sen that does not want to take "yes" for an answer, lest it give credibility to the Vietnamese withdrawal, the Hun Sen government, and that government's new openness.

12. US Real Interests Are With Hun Sen—The practical effect of the US policy is to try to maintain pressure on the Hun Sen government: denying its officials visa, denying it recognition, denying its 6,000,000 people reconstruction aid from the UN, maintaining an economic embargo on its people, giving military aid and advice to its enemies, and so on.

Yet the goals of the two governments, ours and Hun Sen's are quite similar. Both agree on little or no Khmer Rouge involvement in the future government. Both agree that Hun Sen and Sihanouk should get together. Both want to prevent a Khmer Rouge takeover. And both realize that only the Hun Sen government can prevent this. Why are we so against this government?

Meanwhile, it is Prince Sihanouk who is resisting agreement with Hun Sen sans Khmer Rouge involvement. It is Sihanouk who is allied with the Khmer Rouge. It is Sihanouk who wants the Khmer Rouge to be part of the interim government. This anomaly can only be accepted on the assumption that Sihanouk knows best how to deal with the Khmer Rouge. But since they have duped him so often over the last 20 years, it is hard to see why we should believe this.

The Source of the Anomalies

Although the Vietnamese overthrow of the Khmer Rouge was devoutly welcomed by Cambodians and all who care about them, it horrified the regional antagonists of Vietnam.

The Thais were afraid they had lost the Cambodian buffer between them and the Vietnamese, and the Chinese feared Vietnamese hegemony in Indochina. Accordingly,

Vietnam's neighbors declared the invasion illegal—despite the fact that the Khmer Rouge had attacked not only Vietnam but also Thailand. Most countries were ready to go along. All states have an interest in denouncing invasions lest they be invaded. The US went along with its regional allies then and later as the crisis developed.

During the ten years of Vietnamese occupation, the policy-makers in the governments involved came really to dislike Vietnam—if, indeed, they had not already, which in many cases they had. And the policy became driven not by concern over the poor Cambodians or by fears of a Khmer Rouge return but by a desire to teach Vietnam a lesson.

The Chinese consider that the Vietnamese will not have been taught a lesson if the Hun Sen government the Vietnamese left behind is still in place. They feel the Vietnamese will still be "cocky" despite the fact that the embargo on Vietnam bled the Vietnamese white. The Thais are divided on whether to terminate the "lesson." The small state of Singapore, which is mostly ethnic Chinese, agrees with China. But the Indonesians and the Malaysians would just as soon change the policy if this could be done without rupturing the declaratory policy and declared unity of ASEAN.

America is also divided; its policy makers consider the Chinese and relations with them the key issue in the area and relations with ASEAN second only to those with China. So long as both of these actors seem to be against accepting Hun Sen, the State Department finds it hard to break with the policy of supporting regional allies—even after Tiananmen and after peaceful overtures from the Thai prime minister to Hun Sen.

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, few congressmen care about the issue and fewer have the time to follow it. None want to say the obvious: that the Hun Sen government is better than the Khmer Rouge and that, accordingly, we should help the former fight over the latter.

Instead, fearing to take a "lesser evil" position, which might require explanations, they put forward suitably hawkish bargaining maneuvers ("lethal aid," etc.) or international panaceas ("UN peacekeeping forces and UN trusteeships) that do not require explanations from the public (but only from the experts who do not take the proposals seriously but who do not have to be taken seriously, in turn, by the congressmen.)

The immobilization of the State Department reflects a decision at the top to subordinate moral concerns to felt US political interests. But it also reflects an uncertainty as to what to do. And part of this uncertainty is uncertainty as to whether the Khmer Rouge can be bought off by being put in the government.

It is ironic and absurd, but true, that self-styled hawks testify on this situation and conclude that we should "test the sincerity" of the Khmer Rouge. The notion that the Khmer Rouge have changed or have sincerity that can be tested is an illusion so absurd that a dove would be destroyed forever for entertaining it publicly. But the Administration is trying, under diplomatic pressure, to some

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SOVIET-AMERICAN COLLABORATION ON GLOBAL WARMING

A recent seminar in Moscow, "Global Energy Development and Associated Ecological Problems," produced promising proposals for Soviet-American work on the greenhouse effect. Soviet scientists have played a large role in Soviet arms control activities, and now promise to play a similarly large role in Soviet responses to global environmental problems. As before in arms control, communication between Soviet and American scientists at meetings like this one may help shape Soviet policies on the environment.

The October 1989 seminar was proposed by Academician Yuri N. Rudenko during the annual joint meeting of the Presidents of the US National Academy of Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Irvine, California in December 1988. Rudenko is a member of the Presidium of the Soviet Academy, and as Academician-Secretary of the Department of Physical and Technical Problems of Energetics, is responsible for the major non-nuclear research laboratories addressing energy problems. The memorandum summarizing our two weeks of discussions was co-signed by Rudenko and our delegation leader, Alvin Trivelpiece, Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory.

The Soviet Union and the United States have ample reasons to engage one another in programs addressing the greenhouse effect, since each is such a large contributor to the problem that either could be tempted to shy away from serious action on the grounds that the other will not do its share. Out of roughly 5.4 billion metric tons of carbon lofted into the atmosphere in 1986 as carbon dioxide following the combustion of fossil fuels, roughly 1.2 billion metric tons originated in the United States and 1.0 billion in the Soviet Union (the remainder being divided roughly equally between developed and developing countries). Moreover, the enormous reserves of coal in the Soviet Union and the United States (rivaled only in China) represent twin threats to our descendants, almost surely requiring coordinated agreements during the next few years to constrain their exploitation.

The blossoming of Soviet scientific interest in the environment is part of a more general "greening" of the Soviet

Union. Before describing a few of the collaborative projects which took shape during the two weeks of joint discussions, I must try to communicate my sense of this "greening," for which I had been unprepared, in spite of seven previous trips to the Soviet Union.

Environmentalism in Siberia


The symposium was preceded by eight days of barnstorming through five cities of Siberia, on the part of nine Americans and about a dozen Moscovites, a tour designed to help us all become acquainted with the political and technological dimensions of Soviet energy resources.

We saw two of the great dams, at Krasnoyarsk and at Bratsk, 6000 and 4500 megawatts respectively, which are part of a multi-decade hydrological engineering project on the northward-flowing Angara-Yenisey river system. From some exposure to the official culture of the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union I was not surprised to find reverence for such engineering monuments. But I was surprised to encounter, coexisting with such reverence, the ecological critique that large dams are expressions of human hubris which create monstrous, poorly understood distortions of crucial natural systems. These dams have come to represent, in the minds of many Soviets, the mentality of an earlier era, an era of "gigantism," of huge projects planned with little or no input from the local population. The political opposition has apparently been strong enough to stop the construction of what was to be the next dam in this series, the Middle Yenisey Dam. Familiar territory for anyone acquainted with the controversies over dam building in the American West!

The Kansk-Achinsk coal fields, the second focus of our itinerary, contain huge reserves of brown coal, or lignite, accessible by surface mining, low in sulfur, high in moisture content, and located far from load centers—in all these respects similar to the reserves in Wyoming and Montana. On the books from pre-Gorbachev days is a plan for eight centers for *in situ* electrification, each providing 6000 megawatts of electric power. There is a strong message from greenhouse concerns to go very slow, to use just about every other form of primary energy first.

We learned in Siberia that there is another strong anti-development pressure coming from the local population and its politicians, expressed as a concern for the despoliation of Siberia's soils, air and water, and augmented by a distress at the absence of financial benefits for Siberia when Siberian resources are extracted.

The movement for local autonomy has most often been presented in ethnic terms, focusing on Republics like Estonia and Georgia. But the ethnic composition of Siberian cities like Krasnoyarsk, Novosibirsk, and Bratsk is similar to Moscow's. There is a broader movement, one that seeks a new Soviet federalism. Throughout our travels in Siberia we were questioned intently, by politicians and scientists alike, about American federalism: What is the role of state government in enforcing environmental controls? How is a state government compensated financially when its resources are extracted and consumed elsewhere?



Annual Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel consumption.

CURRENT STATUS OF US-SOVIET COOPERATION ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Two US-Soviet intergovernmental agreements that came into effect as part of the Nixon-Brezhnev detente are the subject of current discussion and bear directly on mitigation of the greenhouse problem: a 1974 non-nuclear energy agreement of the Department of Energy (DOE) and a 1972 environmental agreement of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Starting in November 1985 at the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva, the Soviets began raising the issue of reactivating the non-nuclear energy agreement, which the DOE had allowed to lapse in 1983. Last May's agreement signed by Baker and Shevardnadze contained the statement that the two sides will "consider . . . negotiations on an intergovernmental agreement in the field of energy on the basis of detailed proposals." These negotiations appear to be an appropriate vehicle for developing robust collaborations addressing the greenhouse problem.

The non-nuclear energy agreement will be the principal subject of discussions in Washington planned for January 1990 between DOE and a Soviet delegation expected to be headed by Ranit Margulov, first deputy of Lev Ryabev, head of the Bureau for the Fuels-Energy Complex and one of ten deputy chairmen (in effect, cabinet ministers) under Council of Ministers Chairman Ryzhkov. Interestingly, the proposed Soviet delegation does not contain representatives of the traditional ministries of oil and gas, coal, and electrification and power—arguably a manifestation of Gorbachev's broad plan to place the previously all-powerful government ministries under the direct control of new institutions.

EPA's parallel environmental agreement, renewed in 1977, 1982, and 1987, currently involves 35 projects—one on climate change, others ranging from wildlife conservation to pollution control to environmental law and policy. In 1988, 167 Americans went to the Soviet Union and 134 Soviets came to the United States under this agreement. New projects will be added in January 1990 during a visit to Washington of a Soviet delegation led by Vorontsov, the head of Goskompriroda, the Soviet Union's new organization roughly modeled on EPA.

To date there has been little coordination between DOE and EPA to harmonize their nearly simultaneous receptions of Soviet delegations. Coordination is essential if advantage is to be taken of the obvious synergisms between the two programs.

Coordination is also overdue between DOE and EPA negotiators and our National Academy of Sciences, which has five pertinent cooperative projects with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR: a standing interacademy Committee on Global Ecology and, under the purview of this standing committee, projects in biodiversity, nuclear reactor safety, energy efficiency research and development, and global energy and associated environmental problems—the project under which the Trivelpiece delegation visited the Soviet Union. The National Academy of Sciences has yet to receive financial support from the US government for any of these projects (all support having come from private foundations), and substantive Academy-government coordination has been minimal.

—Robert Socolow ■

The current weakness of Soviet federalism was made clear to us in discussions with party leaders in Nazarova, a small city built around a large coal-fired power plant, now twenty-five years old. They told us of investments to extend the life of the plant another fifteen years, but when we asked whether a new power plant would be built nearby, to take advantage of Nazarova's labor force, they said that such decisions were not theirs to make—"We do not plan, we are planned upon." The cutoff for expenditures planned locally is reportedly three million rubles (about five million dollars at the official exchange rate, or five hundred thousand dollars at the new tourist rate). One could decide locally about a playground and maybe a neighborhood school, but not about a new factory or bridge. It is as if Canada had no political subdivision west of Ontario, and all decisions affecting Winnipeg or Vancouver were made in Ottawa.

A Blueprint for Joint Work

By the time we returned to Moscow for the seminar, we had begun to appreciate the seriousness and self-awareness of our Soviet counterparts and the unique, revered place that we Americans occupy in their model of nations and cultures. Our principal concern in the last days of our trip

was to frame proposals for joint work. Given the substantial set of proposals in the area of *end-use* efficiency already formulated in a memorandum resulting from the October, 1988 meeting in Yalta of a parallel interacademy cooperative project, our attention was focused primarily on aspects of non-nuclear energy *supply*. Of the most promising areas for cooperation, I will mention four here:

Methane releases to the atmosphere—Joint studies to assess releases of uncombusted methane—a potent greenhouse gas—from the natural gas system (venting, capture, transmission and distribution), from deep coal mining and landfills, and from deeply buried clathrate ice under the bogs in the arctic tundra.

Advanced gas turbines for stationary power—Exploration of gas turbine-based stationary power for the European part of the Soviet Union, where the construction of new nuclear power plants has encountered formidable political obstacles. Multi-billion dollar contracts with Western companies are at stake. Collaborative projects would emphasize the incorporation of aircraft engines into stationary power systems, using advanced cycles for pollution control and high efficiency—cycles with steam injection, intercooling, and reheat—which are not practical for aircraft, but

may make sense on the ground. Swords will be beaten into plowshares if Soviet factories producing bomber and fighter engines turn their attention to ground-based civilian electric power.


Alternative energy strategies for urban centers—Coordinated economic and environmental comparisons—district heating versus ground-based heat pumps and solar collectors; central station electricity versus fuel cell, wind-mill, and photovoltaic technologies. Such comparisons would be integrated with the projects on energy use in buildings underway in the parallel interacademy project on energy research and development.

Coordination in the production of energy data bases—Making data sets in the two countries more compatible; acquiring and making available greater data on energy prices, on consumption by end-use category, and on environmental emissions.

Next Steps

Admiral Watkins and Administrator Reilly, heads of the US Department of Energy and the US Environmental Protection Agency respectively, should provide leadership during the planned visits of high-level Soviet delegations to Washington in January 1990 (see box). A new Soviet-American agreement on energy, described in a substantive protocol, ought to result from these meetings. The protocol ought to declare its support for a vigorous collaborative program along the lines of the Trivelpiece-Rudenko and Yalta memoranda. The Bush administration should then seek new funding to promote this collaboration.

Assuming that the Bush administration becomes committed to a substantial collaborative program, there remains the issue of how to organize the activity within the United States. On the Soviet side, the Ministry of Fuels and perhaps other ministries are likely to fund a program run by their Academy of Sciences. Our National Academy of Sciences, however, is not a twin of the Soviet Academy: it does not run large programs, nor does it fund or coordinate research. The closest US analog to the Soviet Academy is the system of DOE and other national laboratories.



Seminar memorandum is signed by ORNL Director Alvin Trivelpiece as cosigner Academician Yuri Rudenko looks on. Robert Socolow stands directly behind Rudenko.

I recommend that the DOE establish a lead office within one of its laboratories, with instructions to acquire funding from both public and private sources, to sponsor and coordinate specific projects, to manage the exchange of personnel, and to become a source of specialized expertise. Our National Academy could be charged with certain oversight and quality control responsibilities. The program, to be sure, would have to be conducted in a way that would reassure the skeptics; each program element would have to be defensible as genuinely beneficial to the United States, and COCOM restrictions on technology transfer would be faced squarely.

Needed most is a clear signal from the Bush administration that 1) the US intends to get down to work to achieve a much better understanding of the greenhouse problem and of the most promising approaches to its amelioration, and 2) that the US intends to emphasize international collaboration. Given such a signal, a vigorous Soviet-American program can then be designed and nourished—a program that is matched to the urgency of the problem, the propitiousness of the current moment, and the excitement of the projects currently envisioned. —Robert Socolow □

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Anomalies of Cambodia Policy

Continued from page 4

how countenance this possibility.

And the diplomatic pressure comes, of course, from countries who could not care less about the Cambodians, but are interested only in further defeats and humiliations, if possible, of the Vietnamese. (Some in the State Department are so anti-Vietnamese that they believe everyone concerned for the Cambodian people are, somehow, trying to "give the Vietnamese a win." This is the kind of grudge fight between neighbors into which the Cambodians have, somehow, been trapped.)

The peoples of Southeast Asia, and China, are highly political, skilled in diplomatic manipulation, and have populations that are largely disinterested in the specifics. As a result, these governments maneuver with considerable freedom to maintain contradictions and shifts.

The US is plagued with anomalies that arise, in part, from following the circuitous line of regional "allies." But part of the problem is the simple failure to be willing to take a lead in an area so far from us on which the regional actors were, at least recently, quite unified.

Conclusion

The president of the United States and the secretary of state must decide whether they are willing to confront China over the issue of the Cambodian people suffering a second holocaust. They must decide whether the moral element in our policy outweighs the politico-strategic tendency just to do nothing lest we offend a major Asian country which is backing genocidal killers to pursue a regional feud even after the capitulation of its adversary and the consequent withdrawal of the Vietnamese army. —Jeremy J. Stone □

A US HEALTH CORPS AS A FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE

The United States needs a Health Corps to provide international medical assistance—an extension of the Peace Corps ideal. It could be a division of the United States Public Health Service, dedicated specifically to this mission, or an independent agency modeled on the Foreign Service.

While attention focuses on the bankers' dilemma of third-world debt, starvation and disease advance at a steady pace in this poorer world. Malaria has rebounded, as fewer dollars go into control measures. Millions of children die of preventable diseases. AIDS is a growing menace which in some areas has reached Plague proportions.

Health, sanitation and medical care measures are urgently needed in themselves, as well as for promotion of development. There are multinational organizations with these aims, but their endeavors are limited by governmental entanglements and rivalries, bureaucratization, inadequate budgets and managerial inefficiencies.

Make Health a Priority Over Geopolitics

Binational aid efforts already exist. But these, like the US assistance program in the Agency for International Development, for example, have often been guided by "geopolitical" concerns. Countries have been selected for assistance not on the basis of health need, but in pursuit of foreign policy aims. All too often, the poorest countries have benefited the least, or not at all, because they offered little in the way of strategic advantages. Nor have health and social services—except in emergencies such as drought, famine or earthquakes—ranked high in such aid.

Should the US want to transform its efforts and expand realistic health assistance, in the new era of lessened great power antagonisms, logistical problems would arise. As a donor nation, the US would need a staff of trained professionals with knowledge of the countries—language, literature, culture and politics—along with medical and public health expertise. The US currently has no internationally-oriented career service of health professionals. A Health

Corps modeled on the Foreign Service would be needed to work directly with the health ministries of target nations, join in establishing priorities of need, collaboratively work out plans for meeting these needs, and help with supply of infrastructure and professional staff.

Organizing such a service, developing training programs in university medical centers to prepare professional staff for such a career, shepherding the legislation through the Congress and cutting through the political rivalries for its location in government, will take time. Ad hoc appointments do not serve long-term interests. Professionals in practice cannot serve more than a few months. University faculty resist extended assignments because they lose their place on the tenure track. Without a "mother house" in government, there is no career line for the professionals. A national Health Corps, federally supported, is what is needed.

Experience shows that the best results in international collaborative enterprises come when the experts assigned are willing to be employed by and work within the framework of the nation requiring help. In the field of health and sanitation, especially, cadres of trained people will have to be made available to be employed by the host countries—not as emissaries of the donor states, arriving with preconceived notions of design and implementation. They must be knowledgeable health workers putting their skills at the service of the poor states, fulfilling *their* national health objectives.

With the unraveling of the Cold War, the climate is now more favorable for us to adopt something other than geopolitical strategies in dealing with the countries in the impoverished two-thirds of the globe. Creating a beneficent health and medical policy focused on the real needs of these poor countries may win us the friendship and alliances we once sought, not too successfully, with military aid.

—George A. Silver, M.D. □

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