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ON SUMMIT

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## SUMMIT: NO RESULTS BUT GOOD PROSPECTS

Arms race habitués may laugh but the preconditions of an end to the arms race are now in place. Far more important than the total and complete absence of concrete results at the Summit was the interactive behavior of the principals and what they now represent.

The American champion of the right wing reported that the leader of the "evil empire" was, to his professional actor's eyes, as "sincere" as he was. The latter reciprocated by admitting that he could understand how the President was "caught up" in the idea of Star Wars. They agreed to exchange visits, to stay in private touch and to ignore disputes between their foreign ministers. On disarmament per se, they are obviously ready for an agreement as soon as they can figure out what to do about Star Wars/SDI.

The domestic preconditions are equally positive. The President's defense buildup—mostly a throwing of money at the problem anyway—has run out of money. He has nowhere to go now, in his second term, but into history. Ending the arms race is the only achievement left for this already enormously popular President.

The Secretary-General has already made it crystal clear that he wants to work on domestic problems and is eager to sweep off his desk those troublesome foreign problems: the arms race and, perhaps, if some Summit reports are credited, even Afghanistan.

So the personal chemistry and the political motivation exist. It remains to point out that each has unprecedented power to achieve his goal. If a President who is further to

the right of all American post-war Presidents does not have the influence to end the arms race, who does? If a new, young, intelligent and vigorous Secretary-General with anticipated long tenure cannot keep the Soviet bureaucracy in line for an end to the arms race, who can?

Finally, objectively speaking, the arms race is now in a potentially final spasm. The Star Wars program exists precisely because, at this stage of arms race, nothing less grand and fantastic can be held out as worth doing—nothing less grand can change the balance. Star Wars is an exception that proves the rule that the arms race is ready to collapse through saturation of the strategic environment.

On the other hand, obviously, if the Star Wars impasse is not resolved, nothing less than a full fledged new round of the arms race will result as the Soviet Union moves to strengthen its deterrent against whatever Star Wars threats seem likely and, at the same time, moves out of the ABM Treaty itself. Moreover, other offensive weapon production that does not make a strategic difference, and thus does not make sense, is likely to continue pouring out of both superpowers unless some disarmament agreement is reached.

With this in mind, readers should excuse us if we succumb to the temptation to propound what we would like to advise each of these leaders on the perennial questions of high level contacts and resolving the Star Wars dilemma. Will the arms race, now 40 years of age, reach 50? Stay tuned to this station.

## A Disarmament Czar?

A presidential decision to seek agreement with the Soviet Union would not, in and of itself, make much difference. The inertia in the bureaucratic machinery alone requires an attention to detail, a concentration span, and a consistency that is inconsistent with the Reagan presidency in this field.

Moreover this Administration has far more opponents of arms control than supporters.

Accordingly, nothing serious is likely to happen unless someone is put in overall charge that wants to reach an agreement.

The most obvious candidate, perhaps the only candidate inside the Administration, is Ambassador Paul Nitze, the State Department special adviser to the Secretary. If Newsweek is correct in saying that national security affairs adviser Robert McFarlane is planning to resign, this would provide an opening for a new senior player.

From the beginning of this Administration, President Reagan insisted on a certain ideological purity in hiring, and

on avoiding Government holdovers. Personnel directors were given little wallet cards listing the requirements of conservatism, support for the Administration program, loyalty to the President and so on. The net effect has been to produce an Administration which cannot be shifted easily from the "evil empire" line to the line of peaceful coexistence. Only the accident of Shultz's appointment—a President of Bechtel does not have to suffer the ideological scrutiny which would have been required of others—prevented the Department of State from being staffed by allies of Richard Perle.

In sum, new policies always require new players. And government being what it is, no results can be achieved unless someone is put in charge. As a result, notwithstanding the positive portents listed above, if the President cannot bring himself to appoint some kind of disarmament czar, we cannot expect that he will find the energy to see the disarmament process through by himself. And that, considering the structure of his Administration, is the alternative. □

## ACDA DIRECTOR URGES SPOTLIGHT OFF ARMS CONTROL

*Nothing shows more clearly the low priority which this Administration puts on arms control than the following paragraphs from nothing less than the director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He insists no less than four times, in fewer paragraphs, that arms control ought to be less in the spotlight and is, in general, less important than is commonly believed. A person with this point of view should never have been confirmed for this position:*

**"Today arms control must be part of a broader policy and framework—the broader policy to stop aggression and spread human rights and freedom. The rivalry between East and West is not the result of personalities, of simple misunderstandings, of arms buildup or of economic competition. That rivalry stems from fundamental moral and political differences that are reflected in differences over a wide range of international, regional, human rights, defense and other problems. Weapons are the symptom of this struggle, not its cause. Weapons do not bring war. Aggressive policies do.**

Thus, arms control cannot be the sole element in the East-West dialogue. The Soviets would like to make it so since highlighting arms control plays into their strong suit—military power—and allows them to put themselves, in this realm at least, on an equal plane with the United States. Putting the spotlight on arms control serves the Soviet interest in increasing pressure from the American public, Congress and Allies to make unilateral concessions, while the Soviets themselves face no such pressures since they have no such free publics, parliament or Allies.

Keeping the spotlight on arms control also serves the Soviet interest in keeping the light off human rights issues and regional issues—particularly, Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and their direct or indirect aggression in Africa, Central America and South Asia. Arms control is the sole area where they can reasonably expect the U.S. to give up some gains, whereas in human rights and regional issues, the world reasonably expects the Soviets to give up their repression of their most creative citizens and their conquests of the 1970s—in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Laos, Cambodia, etc."

—Kenneth Adelman, Oct. 31, 1985 □

## REAGAN-GORBACHEV LETTERS

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## LETTER TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

Dear President Reagan:

Your timing, as always, has been superb. Your decision to move toward dialogue with Soviet leaders came at a time when there was, finally, a real person with whom to discuss these issues. We all appreciate the civilized and sober way in which you conducted the exchange. This sort of thing makes America look good.

When, in due course, you visit the Soviet Union, you will learn what all American visitors learn. Your every hawkish instinct will be tranquilized and your every dovish instinct disillusioned. So it has been for hundreds of years for western visitors to that strange country.

The hawks see the fear of war, which is very real and permanent indeed and accounts for the sincere fervor you saw in the Secretary General when he spoke of war. And they see the poverty; the Soviet Union has the standard of living and services that Americans would expect of a backwater like Bulgaria—which, in fact, has a higher standard of living. All this and much more will persuade you, when you get there, that toughness and prudence can co-exist in the Soviet soul.

On the dovish side, you will see a society that, by our lights, is truly suffocating in its absence of free information, in its state controls, and in its traditional authoritarianism. But if you scratch the surface, you will find much less interest on the part of Russians in changing these aspects of their society than you would imagine. Above all, they do support Soviet foreign policy and not just because the information available to them is controlled. Their problem is the need for a spiritual revolution, not a human rights one—and the most perceptive Soviet emigres understand this quite well.

### Basis Exists for Arms Control

All things considered, the basis exists for arms control agreements with them every bit as much as it would exist for deals with Iran or Iraq, with Asian countries or the military dictatorships in other parts of the world we see so often. They are not, on the whole, either harder bargainers or more prone to violation of agreements undertaken. The point is that, in all cases, all the parties to such treaties are wise to be vigilant. And your Administration is.

We had had hopes that you might produce an immediate agreement. We preferred the shrinkage of the levels and sublevels of SALT II at some fixed percentage rate until they had reached the 50% level that has become so popular, and beyond. Some former Chief Executives had agreed to raise it with you at our request, and some of your friends in the Senate as well as some of your officials had agreed to encourage it. Because it is relevant to your discussions at the next Summit and to the question of Geneva guidelines, we want to raise this issue here publicly.

You and Secretary General Gorbachev have agreed to shrink "appropriate categories" by 50%. We consider the SALT II categories, including the category of heavy missiles, to be the most appropriate and the most accessible such categories. They alone require no further definition or negotiation. Their shrinkage is also, we believe, neutral as regards subsequent bargaining—because, after all, the SALT II structure was the result of years of bargaining to produce a "fair balance." What could be wrong with shrinking it?

This method was, indeed, approved by the Carter Administration Defense Department and endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously in late 1979. Everyone recognized that drawing down the levels and sublevels of SALT II was the natural way to go into SALT III. If, indeed, you want to "accelerate" the negotiation process, the creative use of SALT II—the control offensive weapons agreement being observed currently—is unavoidable. Moreover, it is very desirable as a way of using SALT II, especially if you intend to extend it (as we strongly urge) and want to remove its "fatal flaw" of not embodying reductions.

In fact, we believe that on-going shrinkage of the SALT II levels and sublevels could go forward while the Geneva talks continue over other issues. Our calculations suggest that shrinkage of these limits by 7% a year could go forward for four or five years before the resultant force levels would reach limits already proposed by your Administration.

Our calculations also show that such reductions would importantly help resolve the issue of land-based missile vulnerability by making the world safe for Midgetman missiles. Now, but not after a 50% reduction, the Soviets can barrage the military reservations on which Midgetman would be deployed.

### ABM Treaty Reaffirmed?

Would the Soviet Union agree? We believe it might if the United States would reaffirm its commitment to the ABM Treaty, and if the Soviets made their reductions contingent on observance of that treaty. This would, of course, permit you to maintain the research on SDI which you desire.

It was, after all, "trial ballooned" before the Summit that a few hundred Soviet missiles might be destroyed to get the process started. This is an exception to their rule against reductions before an agreement on Star Wars. It should be built upon.

*(Continued on page 4)*



Photo by Pete Souza

President Reagan

(Continued from page 3)

We believe your uniformed military will accept this approach—they have in the past. And we think that it produces the results for which you called in your Eureka speech (at least 2 and  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the 3 Eureka conditions specified). We would appreciate some indication that you had instructed the bureaucracy to study the concept.

### **An Openness and Human Rights**

Russia has never had a tradition of openness or human rights, and long after our own slaves were freed, their citizenry remained in effective serfdom. It should not be a surprise that most citizens of the Soviet Union think that they are already enjoying "liberty."

They are, after all, enormously better off than heretofore. From their point of view, and that of the Eastern European states also, the best further improvement you could provide to their freedom would be to improve relations and begin disarmament. It is the cold war climate there, as here also, that has been used to justify infringements in freedom. The cold war plays into the hands of everything in the Soviet Union to which we ought to be opposed. Only detente can begin to dilute the heavy authoritarian hand of government in that country. Certainly confrontation works in the opposite direction.

We support the people-to-people exchanges which you endorsed, but these exchanges will have little effect so long as the decision-makers continue to have so little contact with the nation about which they are making so many critical decisions.

### **Visits of Officials Needed**

Most of your intelligence analysts (in CIA and DIA) have never seen the Soviet Union. Most of the Congressmen have not either. And most of your cabinet officials and even, for a time, your own NSC expert on Soviet affairs had not been there. Can you help us rectify this?

As part of the problem, only about 5% of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union has been here. And that Supreme Soviet contains a much higher percentage of all important Soviet political figures than does our parliament—including 85% of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. We are working to help promote these exchanges of truly

### **STING OF THE CENTURY?**

"A former Administration official credits the idea of a trade to McFarlane who he said viewed the SDI proposal as the "sting of the century." He meant by this description that the United States would be swapping a missile defense plan it does not have and which many scientists say would never work for existing Soviet strategic missiles with proven destructive capability."

Washington Post, A18, November 18, 1985.

influential people. Your White House has been kept informed of our activities—but we could use more active help.

Soviet visitors here will be, we think, much more respectful of our GNP (they see the wealth immediately) and much less suspicious of our intentions—even as you helped, no doubt, disarm the Secretary-General. In this connection, you could do more to disarm the Soviet Union with a few hundred invitations to their parliamentary figures than in any other way.

The point is that visits by officials are much more important than people-to-people visits, especially in the Soviet Union, where people do not vote in our sense.

We recognize that you see your role as one in which leadership calls for major new departures and the holding out of visions. This is an honorable approach which we can support. We simply observe that putting the world on the road to permanent reductions in nuclear weapons, through percentage reductions year after year, is consistent with that role. And educating the political elites of both sides with visits to each other's nation is also. Either action, much less both, would have you long remembered. Unlike Star Wars, both can be carried out at once and neither requires you, now, to give up on the Strategic Defense Initiative research. □

### **PAR**

#### **Shrinking Currently Observed Offensive Weapons Limits (SALT II) Through Percentage Annual Reductions (PAR)**

- Permits "neutral" reductions to go forward immediately (within the boundaries of existing proposals) while negotiations continue
- Requires agreement on only one number—the percentage—and provides 50% reduction in due course
- Already approved in past by DOD, the Executive Branch and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- If projected to 50% shrinkage, PAR would:
  - Cut Soviet heavy missiles in half
  - Regain land-based ICBM survivability—by making world safe for Midgetman
  - Provide 2  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the 3 Reagan (Eureka Speech) conditions
- Provides, in principle, a solution to Star Wars confrontation (no U.S. concessions except ABM Treaty) but some Soviet political protection
- Makes a perfect Summit gambit for President Reagan because it permits him, in the light of world-wide interest in disarmament now, to propose a wholly feasible way to begin at once

## LETTER TO SECRETARY GENERAL GORBACHEV

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

In the final televised session from Geneva, your glance toward President Reagan appeared to reflect an appraisal of him many Americans share—a decent, genial, amiable man at the mercy, from time to time, of intellectual or ideological enthusiasms.

You confirmed this in your subsequent press conference when you said about Star Wars:

“...we felt that he himself was so caught up with that idea, as a human being, as an individual we could sort of understand it. But we could not understand that he as a political leader would adopt that position...”

We share this view. Star Wars is a theory that is not even wrong. For example, in the President's speech to Congress yesterday, as in his initial speech on March 23, 1983, he equates defense against “missile attack” with escaping from the balance of “mutual terror.” Like a layman who urges his doctor to discover a pill against all disease at once—and once and for all—the President seeks the ultimate in permanent Maginot lines. History records that, toward the end of other past arms races, similar escapist fantasies cropped up and won public interest.

### Public Opinion Trapped

No doubt the President's own views of this are more complex and shifting than his public comments indicate. Just as he has trapped public opinion in this effort, so also has he been trapped—by his expressions of commitment, by all of the military-industrial interest in this proposal (at a time of otherwise declining defense budgets in prospect), and by the strong interest of those who hope the proposal will prevent U.S.-Soviet agreement on arms control.

In this regard, your Summit was a replay of the 1955 Summit in which Khrushchev and Bulganin sought earnestly to explain to President Eisenhower why “open skies” could not be accepted. In Eisenhower's subsequent memoirs, he expressed two quite different views on that proposal. One put it forward as sincere and the other recognized that it could never be accepted. It emerged, in fact, from his department of cold-war propaganda!

President Reagan, like President Eisenhower, is fully capable of recognizing in his mind the force of the statements you made about “shields” and “swords” being interchangeable for war, while still holding to his heart's desire for something more.

The question is what to do about it. So far, you have handled this skillfully. American conservatives, of which President Reagan is certainly one, relate to people they know far more readily than to ideas. Your emphasis on personal contact, respect, and civilized discourse has taken the American political system unawares and provided an oblique attack on the arms race where no direct confrontation could succeed. Certainly, for your interest in negotiations, your last hope in the Reagan Administration is Reagan himself. The only tool available is to recognize that he is, above all, a nice person. The obvious fear of those here who want the arms race to continue was that you would do exactly what you have done. In this regard, your approach was eminently successful.

All of this is a prelude to a discussion of how to handle the Star Wars issue. As you know, our Federation, founded by the original atomic scientists, has been working against the arms race for 40 years. And some of its officials have been working on the ABM Treaty since 1963, long before the Soviet Union understood this problem correctly. We completely agree—and have said for more than 20 years—that the world cannot proceed down the Star Wars road and still have the disarmament that all seek.

But what you must understand and come to accept is the “flip-side” of this: that a world which moves down the disarmament road will never find the time, money, or interest in building Star Wars defenses. It is understandable that your Nation has said that it will not agree to disarmament until the United States gives up on Star Wars. But, in fact, a much greater defense against Star Wars is to start disarmament at once—in a way that proceeds steadily to some long-range goal.

### Steady Reductions Called For

The President is ready for this. His speech of November 15 calls for “steady reductions,” and the notion of 50% reductions in even “the most threatening nuclear weapons” (November 21) would require years to take place, e.g., 10 years at 7%-a-year reductions.

If there were agreement on such reductions over a decade, the Soviet Union could point out that when and if the ABM Treaty were breached, the reductions would stop. This would be perfectly understandable and completely credible. And the existence of on-going progress in disarmament would be the best possible (political) bulwark against the deployment of Star Wars defenses.

In sum, the United States is prepared, we think, to reaffirm the ABM Treaty, and we think that this should be taken by your Nation basically as enough—if you can persuade your colleagues to accept it.

*(Continued on page 6)*



Photo by Pete Souza

Secretary General Gorbachev

*(Continued from page 5)*

After all, the Star Wars issue is a long-term one that goes beyond President Reagan's tenure. Most of us doubt that enthusiasm for this approach will be maintained thereafter—except as research. As you yourself noted, it is unusual for a political leader to put forth a doctrine of this kind. And, as scientists, we have seen the initial enthusiasm for such scientific possibilities fade rapidly as real problems arise and as the dimensions of the problem unfold.

In your society, and in the tradition of bolsheviks, great store is placed on "maintaining one's nerve." This is what we are asking. People here ask why the Soviet Union is so worried if "it won't work." We recognize, of course, that the answer is that, while it won't work, it will not work precisely because your nation will have to spend resources to ensure its failure. Nevertheless, the stridency of the Soviet reaction gives the Star Wars project appeal to all of those in our Nation who have been caught up in the Cold War.

Obviously, American political leaders never "recant"—certainly President Reagan will not. It is an axiom of political life that one need never recant to change position. And President Reagan's approach to Star Wars is largely irrelevant to the problem of what happens after his presidency ends, when defensive systems are ready to be deployed. Your course, therefore, should be one of working around his position. Maintaining a dialogue with him is the first step, as you have, and the second is to find a way to start disarmament.

#### **Star Wars Statesmanship**

In this connection, there is enormous political opportunity for your system in handling the Star Wars issue in a statesmanlike way. For those of us in the West who are used to thinking of the Soviet Union as being on the wrong side of issues, the Star Wars dispute is one that shows the Soviet Union can be right. No doubt some of your advisers would love to see you exploit this awareness by keeping the issue alive for as long as possible—and continuing to assert that it is only because the United States has this "wrongheaded" policy that disarmament is held up.

Even from this point of view of narrow propaganda advantage, however, the Soviet Union could do better, by the next Summit, by grandly agreeing to reductions while maintaining

its insistence that the reductions were hostage to a continuation of the ABM regime. By then, if not already, the world will have assimilated the Soviet position and, we think, largely accepted it. Most observers consider the idea of a complete defense to be an example of the "wish being father to the thought" and the whole thing to be science fiction. That these defenses could never be relied on is obvious. That they would give birth to countermeasures is also clear. Done properly, the Soviet concession to permit disarmament to begin—contingent on its position on Star Wars—would provide the world with an example of Soviet generosity of spirit, and competent political maneuver, which would win it a respect not now existing.

Since you are likely to be dealing with a succession of American Presidents, you must handle this situation in a way that protects your ability to deal with them as well. Handling this smoothly, with the kind of intellectual jujitsu sketched above, will do it.

#### **"True" Peace Called For**

The President, true to his conservative attitudes, always emphasizes "true peace" rather than just "peace," meaning by that a settlement of more than arms control issues. No doubt, taken literally, this "true" peace is not going to be forthcoming for a very long time; taken literally, it requires a change in the Soviet system and a settlement of all world regional disputes present and future.

But taken politically, it requires much less. Just as Sadat's going to Jerusalem took most of the air out of the balloon of an overblown conflict, so also your handling of Star Wars can puncture an overblown U.S.-Soviet quarrel. The reason the hawks are so upset by the possibilities of your dialogue with the President is precisely because they sense that the West is more vulnerable to a peace offensive than they would like—and they see in all Soviet actions aimed at detente only political calculation.

You are the first Soviet leader since Litvinoff whom the West sees as one that it can, in Margaret Thatcher's words, "do business with." Your skills as an advocate, and the admiration they are winning in the West, should give the Soviet political system confidence to give you the leeway necessary to take unusual steps. We hope this will be applied first to the arms race.

As you noted in your press conference, the "old approaches" have failed and a "new policy" is necessary. It is sad but true to say that nothing would be newer than to start the process of disarmament; in the 40 years that our organization has watched this issue, not a single nuclear weapon has been dismantled through a disarmament agreement. In America we say, "Nothing succeeds like success"; perhaps starting disarmament is the key to having disarmament!

#### **On Human Rights**

As your advisers will no doubt inform you, our organization has been, from time to time, very much in the forefront of those complaining about Soviet human rights practices. We defended the rights of scientists who were not being used as scientists to leave for other countries so that their science would not be wasted. And we befriended, and tried to help, that honorable individual who has done so much for your Nation, Andrei Sakharov.

### **SOVIETS READY FOR "STARTER" REDUCTIONS**

The Washington Post noted on November 18 that General Nikolai Chervov, the leading arms control official of the Soviet General Staff had cited a Soviet readiness to "reduce their land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles by between 200 and 300 in the immediate future as a sign of good faith in the search for deeper cuts." (pg. A21)

There has been no reply from the United States to this proposal and some comment from Secretary of State Shultz that it was not advantageous to the United States. But its significance lies in the fact that it shows the Soviet Union is ready, despite its protests, to have reductions, at least initial ones, before the solution of the Star Wars issues.



But we recognize full well that the human rights attitudes of our own nation are very importantly biased by the anti-communist fervor that is part and parcel of the Cold War, and by the fact that one group of Soviet citizens with complaints, Soviet Jews, are closely related to an important segment of the American population. Just as our Eastern European policy is shaped by the American descendants of Eastern Europeans, so also is the human rights policy shaped by the ethnic connections.

This problem is even more intractable than the arms race, and it requires even more thoroughgoing efforts for any kind of complete solution. Part of it requires the recognition of Israel and a solution of outstanding problems. In this regard, we welcomed the rumored steps being taken in Paris toward a Soviet-Israeli accommodation; we hoped that a detente in that area would lead to a combination of better treatment of Soviet Jews and of permission for more to leave if they wished.

#### **Emigration A Stopgap**

We recognize that there is a limit to how far the Soviet Union can go in giving its Jews special treatment with respect to emigration. The real answer is to open up the Soviet Union. And here we would like to advance some ideas that may be as romantic as Star Wars but which have seized our imagination.

Just as Premier Khrushchev accumulated great political power from opening up the Stalin-era camps, so also some new Soviet leader will, someday, open up the Soviet Union and win the admiration of Soviet and non-Soviet citizens alike.

Traditional Russian fears that valuable elements in the citizenry would leave your country, if permitted, are wholly inaccurate. Even feted defecting Soviet spies are returning. The adjustment problems of those who go to the West or to Israel are not easy. And if many were to leave, these adjustments would be still more difficult because the West cannot absorb more and more Soviet citizens and because many are not well trained for our system. And if people knew they

could travel to the West and return, they would return rather than uproot themselves.

In any case, what would be lost in permitting some to leave would be overcome by permitting much greater and richer contact between the scientific communities of the two systems and other communities? The Soviet Union can no longer go it alone or expect to keep up alone.

The invigoration of Soviet life would be matched by a related invigoration in Eastern European nations. The net effect would be to improve vastly the ability of the Soviet Union to learn from, and keep up with, the West—and we too would learn from you.

#### **Openness The Answer**

In short, the answer to human rights complaints and to the invigoration of the Soviet economy lies in the same goal: openness.

Here also, however, as in the arms race, the goal cannot be reached without the self-confidence to take new departures. But here also, your own self-assurance and competence may provide the confidence necessary.

Because Western leaders pass along the world stage more rapidly than will you, and because they preside uneasily over democratic states that have relatively little freedom of maneuver, it is an irony of history that a Soviet political leader may now have a special key to the end of the arms race and a key to the cold war. It goes without saying, of course, that we prefer our own system enormously. Nevertheless, for breaking out of the 40-year deadlock, you and your system may have the flexibility we lack. It goes without saying that whatever leader turns a key in the lock of the arms race will win for his nation esteem and affection that can be won in no other way.

FAS has never written a Soviet leader in this vein or tone in 40 years. Never in this period has the Soviet leadership seemed to us so ready for this kind of advice or so competent to understand it. We are looking to you for leadership on the arms race quite as much now as we look to our own political system. □



*Reagan and Gorbachev Engage in Fireside Chat.*

### SCIENTISTS IN ELECTORAL POLITICS

The Federation of American Scientists is non-partisan and, in particular, it does not engage in electoral politics. But in response to inquiries from members, we can endorse the work of the Council For a Livable World (CLW).

Just as the Federation began as the action arm of the scientists' movement, CLW is the electoral arm. Founded by the famous physicist Leo Szilard, it is based on one of his characteristically powerful insights.

He observed that Senate elections in low-population states could be influenced with less money than elections in such populous states as New York or California. What if the peace movement supported Senate candidates in the smaller states? Since all Senators had an equal vote, this seemed cost-effective indeed. And what if donors were encouraged to provide their support in just those (small) states in which a very good candidate opposed a very bad one. This, he recognized, could be a highly leveraged way to use what support existed.

From this insight, the Council has developed to the point where it has supported over 60 Senators of which more than 20 are now in office—some clearly the result of CLW activities.

Like the proverbial horse that can be brought to water but not made to drink, Senators will, in the end, vote their personal views, or the pressures on them, notwithstanding the blandishments of even the most persuasive public-interest lobby. This is why it is so important to elect Senators whose personal views and integrity predispose them to the conclusions of the scientists' movement.

Persons interested in getting the Council's information on crucial elections for the Senate (and the House) can, thereafter, send their campaign contribution directly to the candidate of their choice—but through the Council thereby enhancing its influence for subsequent use. Its national office is at: 20 Park Plaza, Boston, MA 02116; (617) 542-2282. □



Jerome Grossman, CLW Chairman

### CHALLENGE GRANT: \$10,000 REMAINS

After the assistance of several hundred Federation members, and a small foundation, the Federation still requires \$10,000 to complete the fulfillment of a \$60,000 challenge grant related to the problem of first-use of nuclear weapons. The Federation is seeking to require that a leadership committee of Congress give approval before a President could authorize first-use in undeclared foreign wars.

A successful two-day conference of constitutional lawyers on this subject was held on November 15-17 and will be the subject of the next newsletter. Members with advice for the Federation on how to fulfill the challenge grant should telephone or write the FAS Director. □

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