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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARMS CONTROL FAILURES RECOUNTED

Strobe Talbott is an invaluable, and a superb, chronicler of the affairs of the arms control and national security communities. *Deadly Gambits*—the story of how the Reagan Administration has failed in arms control—is even more engrossing than his *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II*.

In this account of inside wheelings and dealings, Paul Nitze, the negotiator for intermediate-range forces, comes off as heroic, if tragic. Richard Perle, the Pentagon's Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy, comes off as victorious. And Richard Burt, the State Department's Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, and later for European affairs, comes off as frustrated.

Richard Perle's consistent and immutable plan was to sabotage arms control, which he considered a "soporific" that "does violence to our ability to maintain adequate defenses." With the full support of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, he spent his time devising unworkable arms control proposals and bullying participants, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to support them.

Nitze Turnabout On Arms Control

Paul Nitze's consistent and immutable purpose was to get an agreement, and to this end he was indefatigable, creative and courageous. Without much support from anyone, he spent his time trying to get the nation off the zero-option proposals favored by Perle and into an area of potential agreement. Finally, in desperation, he put forward his own proposal in the famous "walk in the woods" episode.

Deadly Gambits
by Strobe Talbott
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Richard Burt, meanwhile, spent his time trying to get Senate confirmation over the opposition of Senator Jesse Helms and, after this necessarily slow start, soon settled down to a kind of trench warfare with Perle.

Talbott attributes part of Perle's success to his being "as personally charming, intellectually brilliant, and politically well-connected as he was ideologically self-assured and therefore unyielding." But Perle's "near dominance" of the process for the critical first year and a half of the Administration was due to the "partial vacuum of experience, expertise and interest" in arms control on the part of Weinberger and Reagan.

In his congressional testimony, Richard Perle explicitly denies that there are so-called bad guys who are "secretly opposed to arms control and block it at every turn but go through the motions in a false show of seriousness." In-

stead, he states, "I confess that I believe we set a higher standard than our detractors." But whether or not Perle has persuaded himself of this, no reader of the book can do other than consider it disingenuous. And we who have heard Perle in off-the-record conferences find the "soporific" quotes absolutely consistent with his dominant view.

Richard Perle is the primary exponent of that usually unstated right-wing view which considers the Executive Branch to be involved in two key internal struggles: to keep the defense budget up, and to keep NATO together. In this view, both of these internal struggles take precedence over the allegedly marginal benefits of arms control agreements with the external enemy. Moreover, they attribute all Soviet motivation for arms control to a "peace-offensive" effort to undermine the West on those same two fronts.

Paul Nitze started his professional life with interests in disarmament that were considered so suspect that they made it difficult for him to be confirmed as Secretary of the Navy. An economist by training, he puts more faith in systems analysis and numerical calculations than either deserves. But the result, combined with a tenacious and hard-driving personality, is to produce a precise and diligent negotiator.

Walk In The Woods: A Sweetheart Deal

The walk-in-the-woods formula showed all this to good advantage. The United States would have been permitted to build up a force of cruise missiles in Europe while the Soviet Union would reduce its force so as to bring about a putative equality. And, along the way, America was to get a number of side benefits, such as more warheads than the Soviets and a limit on Soviet deployment of SS-20s outside Europe. Had it been successful, Nitze would have had a "sweetheart" deal and been able to testify brilliantly on the agreement's many advantages. (Giving up Pershing II, he had discovered, could be easily justified by U.S. Army doubts about whether it really preferred Pershing II over permitted improvements of Pershing I.)

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Strobe Talbott

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During the Carter Administration, Washington insiders had seen a less congenial side of Nitze's approach. He was the main opponent of SALT II, but in innumerable private and public appearances, he was never really able to explain why the Joint Chiefs of Staff were incorrect in considering SALT II something for nothing—or, as they put it, a treaty that would have only "nominal" effects on the U.S. program. At the same time, he was putting forward wholly absurd results of his own method of analyzing stability, calling for 5,000 fixed-silo, single-warhead ICBMs in an era in which the nation had no interest in building any more at all.

One concludes that Paul Nitze is the sort of person who can be depended upon to make our arms control negotiations succeed if he is permitted to lead them, and fail if he is not. Put another way, the United States may be safer if he is deployed in Geneva rather than in Washington.

Richard Burt, an ambitious and able specialist in national security affairs and European politics, lacked Perle's weapons. His cabinet officers—first Alexander Haig and then George Shultz—were, each in his own way, weak. State has never had the clout of Defense in this area. And Richard Perle, being further to the right, had a political base that was much more assertive than Richard Burt's. It is now rumored in Washington that Burt will become National Security Advisor in a second Reagan term. This Administration has done worse.

The Book Provides Revealing Glimpses

Talbot effectively gives the reader a sense of the personal character or lack of it among the Reaganites and a real idea of what is going on:

- Michael Pillsbury—who this fall will go to work for Weinberger—tries to blackmail Lawrence Eagleburger into suppressing a paragraph in a communique by threatening to ruin his chances with conservative senators when his confirmation comes up.

- White House National Security Council staffers say that Haig has been "co-opted by the softies."

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are told that if they don't support Perle and Weinberger against the State Department, Perle will put on the negotiating agenda aircraft that the Chiefs wish to retain. (Perle tells colleagues that the Chiefs are "push-overs and patsies for whoever leans on them the last, the longest and the hardest.")

- Reagan tunes out of conversations unless one talks in terms of speeches, and comes to believe whatever has worked in a speech.

- Fred Ikle is described as having "an unerring instinct for the capillary," his supposed formal authority over Perle having not the slightest effect on Perle's behavior.

- Ed Rowley, now the START negotiator, is described as having "ended up being almost as much of an obstacle to the achievement of a new [START] agreement as he had been to the ratification of the old [SALT II] one."

- Edwin Meese says strategic arms control "will be lucky if we let it get away with benign neglect."

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, "acutely aware that the Soviets could add warheads to their missile force far more

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rapidly and menacingly than could the U.S. if the SALT limits were to go by the board," say in interagency meetings that they "want a continuance of the adherence regime rather than deal with breakout on the Soviet side."

• A Soviet negotiator advises that the two rules in the Kremlin are: "The boss is always right and...if you come to doubt the first rule, reread the first rule."

The dominance of political over military realities is everywhere. Burt says of the Pershing II that while it is not ready for deployment: "We don't care if the goddam things work or not...After all, that doesn't matter unless there's a war. What we care about is getting them in." Consider, also, Talbott's overall summary: "In the

Reagan Administration, only when arms control was a political exercise, either within the U.S. or within the alliance, did it capture the President's attention."

Indeed, the White House and the Defense Secretary seemed very slow to learn the most elementary things about arms control. At a National Security Council meeting, Talbott says, the Defense Secretary and the National Security Adviser both asserted that SALT II was obstructing U.S. weapons programs. But when asked by a skeptical Chairman of the Joint Chiefs which ones, they could not specify. The Chairman, General David Jones, said to a colleague later: "These guys have got a lot to learn." And they still do. □

—Jeremy J. Stone

TIME TO GET OUT OF NUCLEAR ARTILLERY?

For the last several years, defense analysts from across the political spectrum have been writing uncomplimentary things about NATO's nuclear stockpile. Critics have charged that the short ranges of most of the Alliance's nuclear delivery systems make these weapons either unusable (because they will land on territory and people they are supposed to defend) or too likely to be used when no one wants them to be used (because they are likely to be overrun or attacked by invading forces before the political decision to use them is made.)

Largely for these reasons, NATO has moved to de-emphasize short-range nuclear weapons such as nuclear land mines, nuclear anti-aircraft guns, and nuclear artillery. From 1979 to 1983, the Alliance withdrew 1,000 nuclear warheads, mainly of the short-range variety, from Europe, but over 2,000 of the remaining 6,000 warheads still have ranges of less than 20 miles. In 1983, NATO announced that it would pull another 1,400 warheads out of Europe during the rest of the 1980s. Much of this net reduction will again be in the short-range category.

Nuclear Artillery Being Retained

Any hopes that NATO might eliminate these weapons altogether, however, will be disappointed. Even after all presently-planned withdrawals are completed, there will still be over 1,000 short-range nuclear weapons left in NATO stockpiles, and recent Congressional decisions have opened the way for a modernization of the nuclear artillery stockpile as it is reduced in size.

Attempts last year by the Administration to obtain money for an enhanced radiation (neutron) shell of the 155mm size with a range of about 15 miles were unsuccessful, as the Senate cancelled the program. The production of 8-inch (203mm) neutron shells, under way since 1981, continues. These shells cannot be deployed in Europe as a result of the 1977 political furor surrounding production of the neutron bomb, so the estimated 500 shells produced thus far are stockpiled in the United States.

Senate cancellation of the 155mm program last year left U.S. military planners in a dilemma. They would much rather have the 155mm nuclear shell than the 8-inch shell. The reason is that 70 percent of NATO's artillery is composed of 155mm guns, mostly firing conventional muni-

tions. Accordingly, 155mm nuclear shells could be disbursed among a much greater number of launchers than 8-inch shells, ensuring a higher degree of invulnerability to preemptive attack.

"I would like to see this country stop producing the 8-inch round...and start putting its resources into the 155mm round," said General Bernard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe in testimony before Congress in May. "And I do not want it deployed in an enhanced radiation mode. But I would like to have it enhanced radiation 'capable'."

Congress has given General Rogers what he wanted. In July of this year, the Senate added an amendment to the Defense Department Authorization bill which allowed the Pentagon to produce a new generation of 155mm nuclear artillery shells to replace the present 155mm nuclear shells deployed with NATO forces in Europe. The new shell will extend the range of the artillery from under 10 miles to 18 miles and incorporate modern bomb design features.

With the exception of \$50 million for production facilities, no new appropriations are authorized by the amendment. The money for the 155mm shell, up to \$1.1 billion, will be taken from previously appropriated funds for the 8-inch nuclear artillery shell.

Enhanced Radiation Prohibited

This Senate amendment, which was accepted by the full Congress in early October, will allow the Defense Department to stop production of the 8-inch shell, if it desires, and shift the remaining funds to production of a 155mm non-neutron nuclear shell, as long as the total money spent after enactment of the act does not exceed \$1.1 billion. The amendment set an upper limit of 925 shells to be produced in both 8-inch and 155mm versions. Since an estimated 500 8-inch warheads have already been produced, between 400 and 500 additional nuclear shells of the 155mm variety could be produced and deployed under the legislation.

The amendment did prohibit further production of either shell in the enhanced-radiation version. A standard nuclear shell can be converted to an enhanced-radiation weapon rather easily, however, with addition of a component containing tritium.

This is what General Rogers meant by "neutron-
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WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO AUTOMOTIVE FUEL ECONOMY?

It was only a few years ago that the large "gas-guzzling" American car became a symbol of this country's oil vulnerability, and chastened U.S. leaders and car manufacturers vowed to convert quickly to a fuel-efficient fleet. But it might well have been a century. For as the oil glut continues and real gasoline prices drop, new car buyers in this country are returning to larger automobiles in droves. Last year, sales of automobiles with large V-8 engines—engines once expected to disappear completely by 1985—actually increased, accounting for almost a third of all domestic sales. Furthermore, recent statistics reveal that on average, car buyers bought the same size car in 1984 that they had in 1978, despite the memories of the intervening oil crisis.

These recent trends have caused the pace of progress on new-car fuel economy to slow considerably. Both General Motors and Ford Motor Company, which banked on continuing consumer demand for small cars in order to meet the federal fuel economy standards enacted in 1975, failed to meet those standards for 1983 and 1984 and expect to repeat this performance for 1985. As a result, they are actively pressuring the federal government to roll back the 1985 standards to spare them any financial penalties. Complains a Ford spokesman, "The buying public, not the auto makers, is out of step with fuel economy regulations."


Chrysler Committed to Small Cars

But not all domestic auto manufacturers are agreed on this issue. The rollback request has been vehemently opposed by Chrysler Corporation which, frightened by its near-bankruptcy when consumers were clamoring for small cars it could not provide, has spent millions of dollars to upgrade the fuel economy of its entire fleet of vehicles and, having done so, has met and will continue to meet the U.S. standards.

The trend back to gas-guzzlers is disturbing, to say the least. As Chrysler's Vice President of Engineering, Robert Sinclair, put it at a recent Congressional hearing, "Are we really ready to backtrack to the gas-guzzling days of the '70s, and set ourselves up for a third energy crisis?" Analysts now believe that, barring an oil-price shock, there will not be any substantial increase in fuel economy among new American cars over the next decade beyond the 1985 fuel economy standard of 27.5 miles per gallon (mpg).

Are the same signs being seen in the rest of the world? I recently attended an international conference on automotive fuel economy held in London to determine the answer to this question among others. The answers I found were mixed: yes, consumers are less interested in fuel economy, but no, the situation is not nearly as bad as in the United States.

Many European nations, in the wake of the 1979 oil crisis, made informal agreements with their domestic car manufacturers to improve the fuel economy of their car models anywhere from ten to twenty percent by 1985. These targets, which brought fleetwide fuel economies close to 30 mpg, were already being exceeded by 1983, the very point when the American public had begun to turn away from fuel economy altogether.



This graph explains in part why consumers today are buying cars as large as those they bought before the last oil crisis. Real gasoline prices have been declining steadily since 1981. Although consumers still pay more for gasoline than they did in 1978, when real prices per gallon hovered between \$.90 and \$1.00, they have also gotten used to paying more. Moreover, the fuel economies of the larger cars they are purchasing today are better than those of their 1978 counterparts.

Nevertheless, European car manufacturers are seeing what they refer to as a "power wave" from their customers. Demand for the more efficient diesel engines has fallen dramatically in new cars. Automobiles delivering rapid acceleration and high speeds—generally through turbocharging—are selling well. Moreover, the introduction of some new fuel-efficient technologies, such as electronic shut-off controls and smaller diesel engines, has been postponed due to fears that consumers will not be willing to buy them.

And superimposed on the reduced consumer interest in fuel economy is an environmental crisis whose resolution will also affect European improvements in fuel economy. Europe is presently experiencing an acute dieback of its forests. In Germany, alone, it is estimated that half of the trees in its forests are now dying. Blame for the crisis has been placed on the hydrocarbon and nitrogen oxide emissions from the growing passenger car fleet in Europe. In

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response, the European Economic Community has agreed to tougher emission standards. But West Germans, fearing the potential loss of their forests, have found these standards insufficient, and have proposed to adopt by 1988 the more stringent standards presently in place in the U.S. This short timeframe means that automobile manufacturers will have to turn to "off-the-shelf" emission control technologies to meet the proposed pollution standards—namely catalytic converters, which are known to reduce fuel economy. Furthermore, for the next few years, research and engineering efforts will be focused on meeting emissions standards rather than higher fuel economy. Furthermore, for the next few years, research and engineering efforts will be focused on meeting emissions standards rather than higher fuel economy. As a result, cars either manufactured or sold in West Germany are expected to decrease in fuel economy through the rest of this decade, perhaps by as much as ten percent. Should the West German standards expand to the rest of the European community, this effect will be even more pervasive.

European manufacturers have not forgotten the trauma of the oil crisis of the 1970s, however. In his keynote address at the conference, F.W. Lohr of Adam Opel of Germany reminded his listeners, "The world's supply of oil is diminishing and our industry has a responsibility to develop vehicles that use it sparingly." Several manufacturers have designed their production lines so that they could rapidly convert from gasoline to diesel powered vehicles, should the need arise. In addition, some have developed highly efficient pilot vehicles that can be put into production relatively quickly.

Japanese Still Want Fuel Economy

Compared to Europe, Japan seems to have suffered relatively little loss of consumer interest in auto fuel economy, perhaps because over ninety percent of its oil is imported. Following the U.S. lead, the Japanese government enacted fuel economy targets in the 1970s that sought to achieve a fleetwide fuel economy for new cars of about 30 mpg by 1985, a 40-percent improvement over fuel economy in 1975. Auto manufacturers were able to meet these targets three years ahead of schedule. And this progress was achieved despite an increased demand by Japanese car buyers in recent years for "higher grade" cars, which often prove to be less fuel efficient; for example, virtually all new vehicles sold in Japan are now equipped with fuel-guzzling air conditioners. Not resting on their laurels, Japanese manufacturers are vigorously pursuing further fuel economy improvements.

What does all this mean? Once again, it appears that American consumers are setting themselves up for considerable trauma when oil supplies grow tight and prices rise. Worse still, American manufacturers, in rushing to meet today's big-car boom without planning much for tomorrow's travails, are setting themselves at a competitive disadvantage with their overseas counterparts. The nation seems destined to repeat its worst mistakes once again. □

—Deborah Bleviss

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capable." "What I would like to have, if we could start all over again, is a 155mm modern round which can be put into action very quickly...that would be developed and produced in such a manner that it could become enhanced radiation capable by the insertion of a module, so that it could be deployed to us in Western Europe....Keep the modules here and when the time comes that it's decided we'll make it enhanced radiation, and the allies have no gas pains over that, then we can send the modules over," Rogers told Congress in May.

Whether the new 155mm shell will indeed be constructed in such a way that it could easily be fitted with a tritium insert, making it a neutron weapon, could not be determined without access to classified information on the design of the weapon.

This decision by Congress to proceed with the new 155mm nuclear shell has been given little attention, despite the implication of another deployment of nuclear weapons to Europe. At least several hundred warheads will eventually be deployed in Europe under this Congressional authority—and even more if the Administration is able to convince Congress to lift the production limits and provide more money. As new artillery shells are deployed in Europe, NATO's planned withdrawal of 1,400 warheads during this decade could look more and more like a nuclear modernization process rather than an effort to reduce the Alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons.

The reasons for getting rid of short-range nuclear weapons in the front lines of a potential European battlefield are good ones. Even with the new shell's improved range, it will still come under attack from rocket artillery, tactical missiles, and aircraft long before its presumed targets are within range. The only place where these weapons can conceivably be used is in the front lines, where they do run the risk of being overrun, so that commanders and political authorities could be rushed into using them precipitately and unleashing general nuclear war.

Despite NATO's evident willingness to reduce the number of its nuclear artillery warheads, it has refused to confront the issue squarely. Instead, it has proposed to withdraw many of these weapons, simultaneously replacing them with a smaller number of new warheads. Although the new shells are modern and improved, they still suffer from the same basic defects as the old ones. The end result will be an Alliance just as dependent on these weapons as before. Moreover, after just spending many billions of dollars on new, modern artillery rounds, NATO will be even less inclined to take the necessary measures to eliminate this ill-considered dependence on short-range nuclear weapons.

All this raises an obvious question: Do we really need any short-range nuclear artillery? If not, the time to make that determination is now. □

—Dan Charles

ARMS CONTROL AND THE COMPLIANCE MAFIA

Six years ago, as the debate over the prospective SALT II treaty began in earnest, a series of damaging leaks about alleged problems of verification and Soviet arms control violations found their way into several papers and journals. Although denied, the leaks were widely believed to have originated from the office of Senator Henry Jackson who, with the assistance of his aide Richard Perle, was then emerging as SALT's most forceful critic. That same year, CIA analyst David Sullivan was fired from the CIA after admitting that he had leaked copies of a secret report to Richard Perle. According to then-CIA director Stansfield Turner, "I fired the man for the way he handled classified material. He did a disservice to the country."

Prepared by Sullivan himself, the secret report consisted of a compilation of over 40 instances of alleged Soviet deception and cheating. Material from this report provided ammunition for the attack the Committee on the Present Danger and other conservative groups were then waging on SALT II. Sullivan's long list of violations, as well as the network that successfully propagated the charges, still exists today. Preaching a gospel of deceit and deception, a group of conservative Senators, staffers and Administration officials are pursuing a concerted campaign to obstruct and discredit any form of arms control agreement, both past and present.

Hawks In Charge of Chicken Coop

Coming to office on a strong anti-SALT platform, the Reagan Administration elevated many of arms control's most ardent critics to high positions within the national security apparatus. Among them were Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, and General Rowny, who was appointed chief START negotiator. Early in 1981, Lehman spearheaded an effort to convince the Administration to formally renounce any obligation to the two SALT treaties. He was supported by David Sullivan, who in his new position in ACDA was then busy distributing articles and congressional testimony detailing alleged Soviet arms control violations. Luckily, reason and hard lobbying by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department prevailed, and a policy not to undercut SALT was established.

In April 1981, Sullivan and his associate Michael Pillsbury were fired from ACDA, where they had reportedly run around like "loose cannon." In retaliation for the firings, Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and James McClure (R-Id.) reportedly blocked the nomination to Deputy Director of ACDA of Robert Gray, a moderate who had reportedly fired Sullivan and Pillsbury. Sullivan subsequently took a position with McClure, from whence he has coordinated the efforts of the right-wing's "compliance mafia" to obstruct and discredit arms control, largely through the dissemination of innumerable charges of Soviet cheating.

These efforts appeared to pay off when, following a

THE GAC REPORT

The GAC report found 17 "material breaches" by the Soviet Union of nine treaties and four international commitments. Of these, seven involve SALT and the ABM treaty. In contrast to the initial Compliance Report, which was the product of intensive interagency analysis, the GAC report was not "scrubbed" by any intelligence agencies. Indeed, in the letter accompanying the unclassified version of the GAC report, the President explicitly states, "Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the U.S. government."

The GAC study resuscitates at least three issues that were raised and resolved in the Standing Consultative Commission during former administrations. Furthermore, it raises old issues that were never deemed important enough for discussion by the SCC. The legitimacy of allegations that were never taken seriously by three previous administrations, two of them Republican, must be questioned.

The credibility of the report is further undermined by the inclusion of several allegations based on factual inaccuracies or what appears to be unsubstantiated evidence. On at least four occasions, the report misinterprets or misrepresents various treaties and commitments, often blurring the important distinction between the letter and the so-called spirit of an agreement. The latter is obviously open to varying interpretation, and should not be relied upon when negotiating with the hard-bargaining, and self-serving Soviets.

Four of the allegations involve ambiguous or suspicious activities that at this point can not be determined with certainty. Of the 17 allegations, only three classify as definite or probable violations. Of these, only one, the encryption of telemetry, represents a violation of a bilateral agreement.

flurry of reports on possible arms control violations in early 1982, the Administration seemed poised to formally accuse the Soviets of violating SALT. But at a press conference in early April, the President stated that "It is difficult to establish and have hard and fast evidence that a treaty has been violated." Unable to persuade the President to charge the Soviets publicly, Senator McClure repeated his claims that the Soviets were clearly violating SALT at a special press conference on April 26, where he also urged Reagan "...to avoid being pushed into a corner by overly cautious advisers."

As the Administration veered closer towards the twin evils of accommodation and moderation, the conservative

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coalition decided to take matters into its own hands. Led by McClure, Helms and Steven Symms (R-Id.), Senate conservatives increased their pressure on the Administration to reveal publicly the record of alleged Soviet violations through the fall of 1983. On September 22, a McClure amendment requiring the Administration to prepare classified and unclassified versions of a report on Soviet violations of existing agreements passed the Senate. This report was released by the Administration on January 23, 1984.

Administration Report Has Little Effect

However, the Administration's report, which listed only four "definite" violations, did not satisfy the demands for a fuller disclosure. Nor did it reduce growing Senate support for continued U.S. observance of the unratified SALT II treaty. On the contrary, in a historic reversal, a Bumpers-Leahy Amendment asking the Administration to maintain its no-undercut policy passed the Senate by 82 to 17 on June 20. While Senators John East (R-N.C.) and Symms barraged the President with letters opposing SALT II, Senator McClure arranged several hearings on Soviet compliance, in which Richard Perle and other leading lights of the Right, notably Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and William Van Cleave, were asked to testify. During these hearings, Perle made it clear that the January compliance report represented only a fraction of the sum of Soviet violations, thus providing more ammunition for the right wing's demands for a "full disclosure."

During the summer of 1984, Senator McClure and Representative Jim Courter also sponsored amendments requiring the Administration to release classified and unclassified versions of a report completed by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament (GAC) the previous December. Billed as a highly credible, independent analysis of Soviet negotiating and compliance behavior over the past 25 years, the creation and propagation of this report represented the compliance mafia's most blatant attempt to discredit arms control.

Members of the General Advisory Committee have traditionally consisted of distinguished public servants, diplomats and businessmen who collectively represented a broad range of interests and opinion. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the Reagan Administration appointees constitute a sharp departure from past practice and "would for the most part represent a focused ideological viewpoint." Seven of the 12 members are on the Committee on the Present Danger, while many had close political and financial ties to the 1980 Reagan campaign.

A committee peopled by some of arms control's most ardent opponents was not likely to produce an objective, balanced assessment. It didn't. While some of the allegations cited in the GAC's final report represented legitimate, serious concerns, many of the 17 examples of Soviet violations could be found in the same conservative hit list first circulated by Sullivan during the SALT II debate and have much less relevance or substance.

Mafia Presses for Release

Although both the House and Senate had passed amendments requiring the release of the GAC report, the stalemate over the Defense Authorization Bill prevented the mandate for release from going into effect. In a continuing effort to force the release of the study, summaries of the GAC report were leaked to a number of conservative newspapers and journals in July and August, 1984. By September, Senate conservatives were openly at loggerheads with the White House, which had lobbied discreetly against the disclosure amendments.

The struggle, which split the Administration in clear lines, reached its zenith over the scheduled meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko with Secretary of State Schultz on September 28. Hawks within the Senate and the Administration believed that the best antidote to Democratic criticisms of Administration arms control policy, as well as political pressure to demonstrate new flexibility, would be the release of the GAC study and other compliance reports. In a letter to the President on September 8, Senators Symms and East stated that "unless the GAC report covering 17 Soviet SALT violations and Phase II of the originally mandated Presidential report covering 12 more SALT violations are released by September 15...we may be forced to propose additional amendments requiring these reports." The Senators also threatened to propose an amendment prohibiting the deactivation of Poseidon submarines to comply with SALT II.

Meanwhile, the Administration remained disorganized and divided, with heated infighting reported between a coalition of the President's political advisors and the State Department, which hoped to turn the Gromyko meeting into a new arms control initiative, and the Pentagon, which remained adamantly opposed to such efforts. On September 10, the White House press office, in what later appeared to have been an unauthorized statement, said the GAC report would be released the following week. Four days later, reportedly at the personal request of Schultz, the Administration postponed the release until after Gromyko's visit. According to Senate staffer Bruce MacDonald, the right wing in the Senate and the Administration was clearly trying to create a "stampede effect" to force the report out.

With the re-election of both President Reagan and Jesse Helms, the same network of conservative arms control critics will certainly continue to operate within the Senate and the Administration. As both Congress and the Administration confront the crucial question of whether to extend the SALT II limits after it expires at the end of 1985, the issue of Soviet compliance is bound to figure heavily in the decision. The success of any future arms control initiative will also hinge largely on whether the White House can successfully resolve this question. If it confronts these decidedly troubling problems and ambiguities in Soviet behavior in a serious, dedicated fashion, progress is certainly possible. But if it continues to allow a dedicated coterie of conservative activists to subvert any confidence in either Soviet compliance or American verification capabilities, the prospects will be bleak indeed. □

—Jonathan Rich

PROGNOSIS FOR MX

With the election results in, MX opponents calculate that the new Congress will vote against the missile by a margin of 218 to 216 in the House, and by 51 to 49 in the Senate. These figures are based on previous votes and campaign pledges and do not take into account vote switches by incumbents.

A core of six congressmen stepped in to save the MX last year in return for Reagan's promise to work toward strong arms control agreements. The President assured moderate Congressmen Aspin, Gore, and Dicks and Senators Nunn, Percy, and Cohen—dubbed the “gang of six”—that ICBM modernization and arms control were “integrally related,” but that he needed the MX to carry out the arms control objective. As House Speaker Tip O’Neill said, this bargain “saved the MX from defeat,” resulting in House and Senate votes freeing \$625 million for the MX.

Reagan’s opposition to previous nuclear arms control agreements and the lack of movement at the START talks led many people to question the President’s sincerity and the wisdom of the Congressmen who had switched their votes. Rep. Aspin responded for the group, “...our votes in future years depend on deeds, not words.”

Will Gang of Six Provide Deeds Or More Words?

A year and a half has passed and Reagan has failed to produce an arms control agreement; will the “gang of six” and other Congressmen now withdraw their support for MX and vote it down in the spring?

In April Congress will vote on the release of \$1.5 billion for 21 new missiles. In order to free the money both the Senate and the House must vote affirmatively twice: once on the Defense Authorization bill and once on the Defense Appropriations bill. According to Rep. Dicks’ defense aide, Terry Freese, the critical Congressmen will be looking for a commitment on arms control from the Administration, perhaps signified by renewed arms control talks, a “shake up of staff or the appointment of (Gen. Brent) Scowcroft as arms control czar.” The State Department quickly qualified a recent trial balloon from the

White House about a “czar” by stating that the position would be for “a high-level, experienced, technically qualified expert” assisting George Schultz in carrying out arms control discussions.

With the MX up for possibly its last vote, Congressional moderates will be scrambling for a position between a popular President and a powerful anti-MX coalition. The Administration will be looking for something new—anything new. “Bad news” like increased confrontation in Central America or Soviet testing of yet another ICBM could rally supporters through patriotism. “Good news,” on the other hand, like substantial movement toward an arms control agreement, could rally some critics of the arms control process.

Vote splitting will play a role. A vote on aid to Central America will occur at about the same time as the MX vote. Members of Congress who barely won their seats in this year’s election will be tempted to give Reagan at least one of the two votes. □

—Kathleen Hancock

MX: The Perils of Pauline: five years of MX Votes

House			Senate	
Against MX	For MX		Against MX	For MX
—	—	1979	11	77
201	207	1981	—	—
209	212	1982	46	50
245	176	1982	—	—
207	220	1983	39	59
208	217	1983	41	58
212	218	1984	41	55
199	197	1984	48	48
(Tie broken by Vice Pres. Bush)				
218?	216?	1985	51?	49?

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