

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

Preventing
the Return of
the Khmer-
Rouge

Volume 42, No. 4

April 1989

US POLICY IN CAMBODIA: ALL WRONG

US policy toward Cambodia is immoral, impractical and, above all, undesirable; our nation has probably never had a policy so unfortunate.

As our government and the Chinese government know full well—but prefer not to dwell upon—the Vietnamese were brutally and repeatedly attacked by Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge from at least September 1977 and tried for more than a year to get the Chinese to mediate and the U.N. to support a demilitarized zone. (On May 10, 1978, Phnom Penh radio was actually calling on the people to exterminate the Vietnamese race: “In terms of numbers, one of us must kill thirty Vietnamese . . .”) When Vietnamese efforts to negotiate failed, they dealt with these attacks as the US dealt with the Japanese after Pearl Harbor—overthrowing the Pol Pot regime and constructing a new and less hostile government. In the process, as all observers agree, they saved the Cambodian people from extermination.

Under these circumstances, it is an extraordinary tribute to the anti-Vietnamese feeling in Beijing and Washington, and the influence of these two superpowers, that the international community continues to call this Vietnamese action “illegal” when so many analogous cases are called “self-defense” and promptly recognized. (And the analogies go beyond World War II to such recent actions as the Tanzanian assistance to the Ugandan people to overthrow Idi Amin. Had the Thais overthrown Pol Pot and constructed a government based on the Western favorites, the Khmer Serei, there would have been, in the West, only applause and instant recognition.)

This policy is also immoral since it has led us, under Chinese pressure, to recognize the Khmer Rouge—who have committed the most genocidal actions of this century—as the legitimate occupant of Cambodia’s U.N. seat. This denied the survivors of the Cambodian holocaust access to the U.N. agencies such as WHO, UNESCO and UNDP. And it kept the Khmer Rouge in business killing civilians from their base camps in Thailand and committing the same atrocities they had before on all who came under their control. Our effort to give this policy a facelift by pressuring Prince Sihanouk into a coalition with the Khmer Rouge only cost still more

Khmer lives as innocent peasants were misled into volunteering for what they thought was a Sihanouk movement only to find themselves under Khmer Rouge control.

In a recent visit to Hanoi and Phnom Penh, it became clear also how impractical and undesirable our policy has been.

The Hun Sen government is not about to “dismantle” its ten-year-old government in return for the “dismantling” of the Khmer Rouge government, which does not control an inch of Cambodian territory but is simply a U.N. fiction.

The ASEAN governments, to whose policy U.S. policy has been blindly hitched, are reversing themselves rapidly. The Hun Sen government is being received in the “front-line” state of Thailand and is receiving Thai generals in return, as I witnessed myself.

Predictably, the less anti-Vietnamese ASEAN states are scrambling to open some kind of relations with Hanoi and Phnom Penh now that the political dam has broken. Even Prince Sihanouk has given up on the negotiations that are so often pressed by us in his name. Failing to attend the Jakarta talks, he called them a “cynical comedy acted out shamelessly by the Vietnamese colonialists and their valets in Phnom Penh.” In return, the ASEAN participants simply make no reference to this presumed leader.

But, above all, this policy is worse than a crime, it is a mistake.

No Khmer government will ever want less than



PRK's Prime Minister Hun Sen. “We say that we need a ‘hat’ of our own, but not anybody else’s hat. This is why so many people are amazed to see our economic system.”

Continued from page 1

independence from the Vietnamese. The perpetual triumph of nationalist feelings over ideology in that part of the world have been proven definitively by the tensions and fighting that broke out immediately upon the end of the Vietnamese war—with communists fighting communists. And as Prime Minister Hun Sen told me on February 27, his government wants its own "hat" and is not acting like other socialist governments. Free enterprise is fully accepted as is freedom of religion. And there is as much freedom of speech and action, I believe, as there was under Prince Sihanouk's regime.

Furthermore, according to all the foreign observers in Phnom Penh with whom I spoke, the Hun Sen government is as disciplined and devoted to the public needs as can be expected and more so than the Lon Nol and Sihanouk governments. It has brought the country from ground zero, with few educated persons left from the Pol Pot genocide, to the point where the government is running. And progress continues apace. Why are we against this government?

The horse we are backing, Prince Sihanouk, is as mercurial as ever, consults with no one, and never abides criticism—as befits descendants of a line of God Kings who grew up having their shoe laces tied for them. There is not the slightest sign that Prince Sihanouk would run a democratic government—he has always believed he was the father of his people, not their elected leader.

In Indochina, last month, I met with, among others, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach and General Giap as well as many observers in Phnom Penh. They all see clearly that the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces is going to leave the West with nothing to complain about while it continues to support, if it does, the Khmer Rouge coalition. In my opinion, they are right to think that this leaves the West and the Chinese in an intensely embarrassing blind alley.

Personally, I liked Hun Sen, and the survivors of the Pol Pot destruction that make up his government. And I believe that our government would find him, in the end, much more palatable than Prince Sihanouk, infinitely more reliable, and more likely to last. He wants, obviously, to have relations with us and has offered, through a representative who wishes to come here, to discuss, in particular, the American remains which his government has found.

Spooked by communism, as our country has been, and by the loss of the Vietnamese war, it is, perhaps, understandable that we did not recognize the PRK at the outset. But, really, there is little choice now. And the PRK is, it seems to me, running the best government that tortured Cambodia has ever had.

How long are we going to continue punishing the poor, punishing the Jews of this holocaust, in the name of a patently distorted application of international law? ■

Jeremy J. Stone

FAS

Chairman: ANDREW M. SESSLER
Vice Chairman: *ROBERT M. SOLOW
President: JEREMY J. STONE
Secretary: ANN DRUYAN
Treasurer: CARL KAYSEN

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), founded October 31, 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS) is the oldest organization in the world devoted to ending the nuclear arms race.

Democratically organized, FAS is currently composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers interested in problems of science and society.

FAS's four decades of work as a conscience of the scientific community has attracted the support of the distinguished Sponsors listed below.

SPONSORS (partial list)

*Philip W. Anderson (Physics)
*Christian B. Anfinsen (Biochemistry)
*Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics)
*David Baltimore (Biochemistry)
Leona Baumgartner (Pub. Health)
Paul Beeson (Medicine)
Lipman Bers (Mathematics)
*Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
*Konrad Bloch (Chemistry)
*Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat)
Anne Pitts Carter (Economics)
*Owen Chamberlain (Physics)
Abram Chaves (Law)
Morris Cohen (Engineering)
Mildred Cohn (Biochemistry)
*Leon N. Cooper (Physics)
Paul B. Corneley (Medicine)
Carl Djerassi (Organic Chem.)
*Renato Dulbecco (Microbiology)
John T. Edsall (Biology)
Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology)
*Val L. Fitch (Physics)
Jerome D. Frank (Psychology)
John Kenneth Galbraith (Economics)
Richard L. Garwin (Physics)
*Walter Gilbert (Biochemistry)
Edward L. Ginzton (Engineering)
*Donald Glaser (Physics-Biology)
*Sheldon L. Glashow (Physics)
Marvin L. Goldberger (Physics)
*Alfred D. Hershey (Biology)
Roald Hoffmann (Chemistry)
John P. Holdren (Energy/Arms Con.)
*Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry)
*Jerome Karle (Physical Chemist)
*H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry)
*Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry)
*Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
*Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics)
*Leon Lederman (Physics)
*Wassily W. Leontief (Economics)
*William N. Lipscomb (Chemistry)
*S.E. Luria (Biology)
Roy Menninger (Psychiatry)
Robert Merton (Sociology)
Matthew S. Meselson (Biochemistry)
Neal E. Miller (Psychology)
Philip Morrison (Physics)
*Daniel Nathans (Biochemistry)
Franklin A. Neva (Medicine)
*Marshall Nirenberg (Biochemistry)
Robert N. Noyce (Indus. Exec.)
*Severo Ochoa (Biochemistry)
Charles E. Osgood (Psychology)
*Linus Pauling (Chemistry)
*Arno A. Penzias (Astronomy)
Gerard Picol (Sci Publisher)
Charles C. Price (Chemistry)
Mark Ptashne (Molecular Biology)
*Edward M. Purcell (Physics)
George Rathjens (Political Science)
*Burton Richter (Physics)
David Riesman, Jr. (Sociology)
Walter Orr Roberts (Solar Astron.)
Carl Sagan (Astronomy)
*Arthur Schawlow (Physics)
*J. Robert Schrieffer (Physics)
*Julian Schwinger (Physics)
*Glenn T. Seaborg (Chemistry)
Stanley K. Sheinbaum (Economics)
*Herbert A. Simon (Psychology)
Alice Kimball Smith (History)
Cyril S. Smith (Metallurgy)
*Henry Taube (Chemistry)
*Howard M. Temin (Microbiology)
*James Tobin (Economics)
*Charles H. Townes (Physics)
Frank von Hippel (Physics)
*George Wald (Biology)
Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)
Victor F. Weisskopf (Physics)
Jerome B. Wiesner (Engineering)
Robert R. Wilson (Physics)
C.S. Wu (Physics)
Alfred Yankauer (Medicine)
Herbert F. York (Physics)

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

*Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry)
Bruce Blair (Policy Analysis)
Deborah L. Bleiviss (Energy)
Rosemary Chalk (Pol. Science)
Thomas B. Cochran (Physics)
E. William Colglazier (Physics)
Alex deVolpi (Physics)
Hugh E. DeWitt (Physics)
*Dudley R. Herschbach (Chem. Physics)
William A. Higinbotham (Physics)
Daniel O. Hirsch (Nuclear Policy)
Art Hobson (Physics)
Robert W. Kates (Geography)
Barbara G. Levi (Physics)
Francis E. Low (Physics)
Jessica Tuchman Mathews (Biochemistry)
Victor Rabinowitch (World Dev.)
Stephen H. Schneider (Climatology)
Andrew M. Sessler (Physics)
George Stanford (Physics)
Robert A. Weinberg (Biology)

Ex Officio: John P. Holdren, Matthew S. Meselson

*Nobel Laureate

FAS FUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501 (c)(3) tax-deductible research and education arm of FAS.

Frank von Hippel, Chairman	Jeremy J. Stone, President
Moshe Alafi	Matthew S. Meselson
David Armington	Rosalyn R. Schwartz
Ann Druyan	Martin Stone
William A. Higinbotham	Martin S. Thaler
Proctor W. Houghton	Alan M. Thorndike
Jessica T. Mathews	Robert Weinberg

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1989 by the Federation of American Scientists.

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FAS, 307 Massachusetts Avenue, NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

THE TRIP TO PHNOM PENH

In the Ho Chi Minh airport, as the weekly flight to Phnom Penh underwent its two-hour delay, I talked to a delegation of four American-Khmer returning to Phnom Penh. One, Sem Yang, had been Prince Sihanouk's representative in the United States until the Prince, under pressure from the West, had joined the Khmer Rouge in the "Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea". He had then resigned.

(The Chinese and the U.S. had put great pressure on Prince Sihanouk to join with the Khmer Rouge to make more acceptable their support of the Khmer Rouge "Democratic Kampuchea" in the U.N. They had in mind replacing Democratic Kampuchea with the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea which would include, besides the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk's forces and those of a former Prime Minister named Son Sann. This "non-communist resistance" had been told that arms aid would follow only if they joined the coalition. They agreed. The Khmer Rouge, however, insisted that the bylaws of the Coalition include the proposition that they could withdraw anytime they found the coalition "ineffective" and still have the U.N. seat belong to them.

Western enthusiasm for the Coalition waned shortly thereafter when it was revealed that this disingenuous maneuver was costing the lives of innocent Khmer. The Khmer Rouge were announcing that they were part of Sihanouk's forces and, when unwary peasants supported them, the peasants had found themselves trapped in Khmer Rouge camps from which they were not permitted to leave.

Sem Yang knew Sihanouk well and said that "supporting Sihanouk blindly could hurt the situation." It would be better for him to be the God-King but not operate the Government. But, unfortunately, Sihanouk would not accept this.

The delegation had just come from the Jakarta meeting where the various factions were meeting. They had talked to Prince Ranariddh, Sihanouk's son, and were amused and appalled to discover that, in Khmer, Prince Ranariddh was using the courtly language to note that "George Bush was asking his father for an 'audience'" in Beijing.

They felt that the PRK government was competent as compared with Asian governments. The U.S. government's rationale for supporting the Khmer Rouge coalition was to "bring the PRK to the bargaining table" but since the PRK was bargaining, why was the coalition continuing to get support?

Sem Yang said that Prince Ranariddh was not as bad as his father yet "but getting there" and "going to be like his father." People still tied his shoes for him. He was "intelligent but not wise" and "like Sihanouk, seems to care for people but doesn't." He agreed that the clandestine radio of the Khmer Rouge—which is in fact, based in China—coupled with the Coalition Government ploy had meant death for many in Cambodia. He felt that the U.S. enthusiasm for this ploy had declined after they saw how it had been used to kill innocent peasants, but that it was too late

by then. He said there were 180,000 Khmer in the U.S. of which the majority were confused about what to do.

On the plane, reading the June 1988 hearings of the Solarz Committee, one saw how the Vietnamese decision to withdraw had focused minds that, earlier, had never believed the Vietnamese would ever withdraw. Congressman Stephen Solarz said: "Vietnamese withdrawal has turned a theoretical nightmare" into a "frightening possibility;" now the focus, obviously, was going to be on the Khmer Rouge.

His witness, the famous Dith Pran, whose story was told in the *Killing Fields* said:


"countries have no concrete or operational plan to prevent the Khmer Rouge from again seizing state power. We are concerned that this is not even an explicit goal of the international community."

Another witness, Haing Ngor, who had played Dith Pran in the movie, warned that the Khmer Rouge were telling peasants ominously:

"When the water rises, the fish eat the ants. When the water recedes, the ants eat the fish."

He feared that, in operational terms, opponents of the Khmer Rouge would just start quietly disappearing and no one would be able to trace what happened to them. He said that the KR were "very clever and know how to brainwash the children." No U.S. personnel are permitted to visit site 8 and the Khmer Rouge prevents anyone from leaving the camp.

Committee Member Chester Atkins said: "There is not a single person to my knowledge—and I have spent a good deal of time looking at this—who believes that the Khmer Rouge is not going to return to power absent a strong and total U.S. commitment to see that this does not happen." He warned that "Our history is of the strongest rhetoric followed by the most timid actions." The U.S., he warned, has been "mute and has been immobilized" on the issue of persons being held in the refugee camps by the Khmer



Cambodia outside Phnom Penh

Rouge against their will and he estimated that 80% of the persons there were in that category.

Borrowing a *Herald Tribune* on the aircraft, one reads that the Jakarta meeting is being called a "complete failure" and that Prince Sihanouk, who did not bother to attend, called it a "cynical failure."

The plane lands in Pochentong airport after a short flight of a little over 100 miles. The airfield features a handful of large helicopters and about a dozen jets in metal revetments. But it was Russian pilots flying the Air Kampuchea plane.

The airport has an informal quality with Western members of voluntary groups coming out to greet the passengers even before they go through customs. Custom agents looking like 12-year-olds are practicing their new found skills. (When the Hun Sen Government began reconstructing Cambodia, there was not a 10-year-old in the country who could read and write since Pol Pot had stopped all schooling for his almost 4 years in power. And, using diabolic tricks, he had located and killed very large fractions of all those adults who had any foreign training or who spoke a foreign language. Thus the Government started from a most extraordinary ground zero.)

Accommodations are Spartan

The Monoram hotel, at which many of the Western volunteers stay is spartan and looks much like a run-down men's dorm in a U.S. college with flickering lights, no bellmen, a bathroom with only one faucet, no bathtub and an air conditioning machine that looks patched together.

My guide, Ly Sorsane, whose story appears on page 12, speaks English clearly but not lucidly. He appeared at the airport with a six-year-old son and works at the Foreign Ministry. He is the key operative for the American visitor.

Dinner is arranged on the river at a spot that reminds one of an idyllic South Seas thatched roof restaurant. Ly Sorsane is joined by his superior, Him Smoeuk, who speaks French rather than English. Fortunately, the visitor can remember some French from a year in France 38 years before and, when it fails, Sorsane speaks French also. (Cambodians put their family names first, as do the Chinese, but they refer to you and to each other by first names: thus I would be called Mr. Jeremy and they were Sorsane and Smoeuk.)

They have little confidence that the negotiations will work out and considerable confidence that they can deal, over time, with the Khmer Rouge. Smoeuk thinks that General Giap is right in saying the "criminals are never able to come back a second time."

They feel that Sihanouk was popular from 1941 to 1953 and, after he got the French out of Cambodia, popular from 1953 to 1969, except for the left. Widely called "Prince Papa," the Constitution of 1947 called his person "sacred and inviolate" except in cases of high treason.

Smoeuk thinks that, by September 1990, the international position will be clear. The Vietnamese forces will have withdrawn. The PRK will have decided whether to continue the negotiations or to stop. He said the PRK



Deputy Prime Minister General, Vo Nyugen Giap, with Stone in Hanoi. "I have never seen a case where the criminals came back a second time."

wanted peace. But it was not so weak. It had been fighting for ten years and controlled the whole country. The coalition was just a psychological gimmick. The PRK was a reality. They were sure that they could defend themselves. They had cleared out the border areas in 1984 and 1985 but had respected Thailand and had not used their rights of "hot pursuit." This patience was not unuseful and now was paying off in the beginnings of cooperation with Thailand.

If the fighting was to go on for 20 years, Pol Pot would be 80 and Sihanouk would be 86. But Hun Set would only be 57. So they could outlast their opposition.

Everyone Has a Tale to Tell

Both Smoeuk and Sorsane had survived by lying about their language skills. Smoeuk said that Cambodia was not just a world of 1001 Arabian nights but 10,000 stories and 10 nights with every survivor having a real tale to tell.

Well, even if they were operating from considerable positions of strength ("yes, we are.") could not the Khmer Rouge assassinate leaders etc. In fact, they had been unable to disrupt the 10th anniversary or other such occasions. Perhaps they were "lying low" and waiting for the Vietnamese to leave. "But the Vietnamese had been leaving, or claiming to leave, since 1982; could they have been lying low for seven years?"

The restaurant charged \$38 for the four of us (the driver was included) and when I expressed astonishment at the size of the bill—in a country where my guests were being paid about \$3 a month in currency and another \$10 in goods, they agreed to have it reviewed. The restaurant owner reduced the charge to \$30. (Later, at a restaurant that was state-owned, a similar dinner for three cost \$8.00 without drinks.)

At breakfast, some of the representatives of the volunteer agencies are willing to talk but others nervous. They have been misquoted before and their agencies provide humanitarian services on both sides of this war and this border; hence they are under wraps. But none says anything bad about the Government and this pattern contin-

ues throughout the visit. All have considerable sympathy for the fact that the Government started with nothing and is trying hard with reasonable competence to move the situation ahead.

Visit To The Prison

As is now well known, the Khmer Rouge turned the local high school into a torture chamber where they tortured and killed 20,000 people. Only seven emerged and then only as a result of the Vietnamese overthrow of the Pol Pot Government.

Manacled to their beds at the ankle, they were forced to give one confession after another. The rules under which the prisoners functioned were set forth on the wall.

The tortures were gruesome. According to two sources in Cambodia, these same tortures appear in wall carvings on the 700-year-old Angkor Wat temple. They show a side of the otherwise loving, gentle and docile Khmer that is hard to accept.

FAS members will be horrified to learn that this key torture chamber was run by a mathematician and a physicist both of whom were exceptions to the rule of the killing of intellectuals. Ly Sorsane knew the physicist in pre-Pol Pot Cambodia and said that he was known for the precision of his lectures as if he were copying texts from his mind onto the board.

This same fastidiousness was seen in the records kept by the prison which included negatives, later developed by the Vietnamese, of each prisoner brought in and the careful collection of hoards of confessions.

Successful efforts to cheat the torturers were rare. One man jumped from a second story window and was killed. Immediately thereafter barbed wire was placed along walkways so that nothing like this could happen again. The former Minister of Information Hu Nim, however, managed to cut his wrists with a broken spoon. Otherwise, all were broken and eventually killed.

After the prison, the visitor asked about Khmer working preferences. The books are apparently correct in saying that the Khmer like farming and working in the bureaucracy. But they do not normally become technicians or traders, e.g. they may fish for themselves but they not want to get into the business of fishing. In the past, these trades were taken over by ethnic Chinese or Vietnamese.

The society seems to be returning to these old patterns as it returns to normalcy. The relaxed life that the Khmer enjoy is attractive to the Vietnamese for tourism. The food is good by Vietnamese standards. (Indeed, in Hanoi, Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach explained to me that the Cambodians had 25% more rice per person than the Vietnamese.) Since the city is less crowded and the people friendly, many Vietnamese who can afford it, like to vacation in Phnom Penh.

Having given up on trying to stay in the Monoram Hotel, where I had hoped to meet more members of voluntary organizations, I returned at the insistence of the Government to their guest house. It was marvelously well-outfit-

Continued on page 6

Haing Ngor: A Cambodian Odyssey *Haing Ngor with Roger Warner* MacMillan \$19.95

This is the story of the medical doctor who won an Oscar for playing the role of Dith Pran in *The Killing Fields*.

A moving love story, it reveals the full horror of living under the Khmer Rouge. Of them, he says, they claimed they:

"wanted to eliminate everything that was not Cambodian. But they were hypocrites. Except for their dark skins, everything about the Khmer Rouge was alien, from China. They borrowed their ideology from Mao Tse-tung, like the concept of the Great Leap Forward. Sending the intellectuals to the countryside to learn from the peasants was an idea of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Their AK-47s and their olive green caps and their trucks were Chinese. Even the music they played from the loudspeakers was Chinese, with Khmer words." (pg. 201).

Interestingly, in the end, he blames the Khmer for the disaster.

"But sad to say, the country that is most at fault for destroying Cambodia is Cambodia itself. Pol Pot was Cambodian. Lon Nol was Cambodian and so was Sihanouk. Together the leaders of the three regimes caused a political chain reaction resulting in the downfall and maybe the extinction of our country."

On the outside these leaders were totally different. Sihanouk the royal populist. Lon Nol the right-wing dictator. Pol Pot the ultra-communist. On the inside they were all like Chea Huon, with fantasies about the development of the country. They also shared a typically Cambodian trait: an excessive pride in being Cambodian. I do not mean a normal, healthy patriotic pride, but a feeling of racial superiority over everybody else. Our neighbors look down at us for being dark-skinned, and sometimes we do feel inferior, but at the same time, secretly, on the inside, we Cambodians also feel better than them, and when we have a chance we try to prove it.

Sihanouk told us again and again that we were an "island of peace", the envy of the world. . . . [Lon Nol] blamed the Vietnamese for Cambodia's problems and believed the Vietnamese were racially inferior. That is why he allowed his soldiers to massacre Cambodians of Vietnamese origin. . . . Like Lon Nol, Pol Pot was a racist with fantasies of restoring Cambodia to greatness. . . . The Khmer Rouge boasted of their superiority. Others were 'beneath' them, like lower forms of life. That is why the Khmer Rouge didn't think twice about killing or torturing. That is why beginning in 1977 Pol Pot made the incredible mistake of attacking Vietnamese territory and massacring their civilians. Like Lon Nol before him, Pol Pot actually thought he could win. ■

Continued from page 6

ted with a beautiful room and tiled bathroom, elegant chairs, and mosquito netting on a cute four poster bed. The house looked out on the river and the hosts provided marvelous meals replete with meat, fish and chicken. These meals were served to a diner surrounded by three or four expectant cats with attentive waitresses pouring one's Pepsi cola whenever the glass seemed less than full. This was, one reflected, the kind of Cambodia known to Prince Papa.

Western members of voluntary agencies gave a good report on the Government. Hun Sen was popular. And the Government dared to arm the peasantry which the South Vietnamese were never able to do lest the weapons go to the Viet Cong. The young kids had been trained to do customs and register cars and, really, a Government was now working. The people were, in some ways, wealthier per capita than the Vietnamese and the Government functioned, in some ways, better administratively. One reason was that Vietnam, at least in the North, had not had, since 1954, contact with the West. But, except for the 4 year Pol Pot period, there had been continuous contact with Western ideas and people had some basis on which to know how a free enterprise economy would operate.

The Vietnamese were not, evidently, doing what they had tried to do in the 1830s when the Emperor Minh Mang put a puppet queen on the throne and caused a rebellion by trying to lead the people to civilization by forcing Vietnamization. At that time, a Mandarin said:

"In principle, our intention is not to take possession of this country: we wish, following heaven's example, to allow the population to live and exist in peace. We do not wish the loss of this little kingdom as do some other [he meant the Thais] whose hearts are full of malice.

The Cambodians are savages whose nature is bad and vicious. As often as they submit so often do they rebel but they constantly forget the rule and the law."

(When this quote was shown to an educated Vietnamese, she said immediately, "Of course, they are savages. Look at how they attacked and destroyed, without mercy, every person in our villages.")

At the high school, foreign teachers of language (Russian, Australian and French) are giving instruction in language not only to high school students, but to officials and deans. The interest in foreign languages is very high.

Visit To The Killing Fields

We visit the killing fields. Here the exhausted prisoners from the High School torture chamber were trucked to their death. Here the children were killed by bashing their heads against trees and the women were impaled three times, rather than two, because, it was explained they were stronger and could survive more thrusts. Here the people were forced to dig their own holes. Here the Pol Pot butchers boasted of how many they had been able to dispatch per hour.

Driving to and from the killing fields, the atmosphere is

BROTHER ENEMY: THE WAR AFTER THE WAR

Nayan Chanda

(Collier Books, MacMillan Publishing Company, 1986.)

By far the most readable and interesting book on the situation in Cambodia is *Brother Enemy*. Its author, an Indian-born journalist working for the distinguished Far Eastern Economic Review, has interviewed virtually all the many participants repeatedly and he merges skillfully the history of the region with quotations that bring the subject alive.

Here you will see why—despite its help to Hanoi during the Vietnamese war—China really wanted "two Vietnams or three Vietnams but not one" in its effort to keep the peripheral states weak. You will see the visceral hatred of Deng Xiaoping for the Vietnamese ("dogs") that led to "teaching them a lesson" when in fact, the Chinese knew full well that their genocidal proxy, the Khmer Rouge, had savagely attacked the Vietnamese.

You will see the efforts the Vietnamese made to find a superpower that would protect them when they sought to protect themselves from the Khmer Rouge—and the skill, and the mistakes, they made in trying to get either the U.S. or the Soviet Union to back them against the Chinese.

This is a book worth reading not just once but twice as the rich tapestry of the region is laid out. FAS will offer this book to members at a reduced rate of \$8.00. ■

idyllic. Pigs wait for handouts under houses which provide shelter from the sun, wagging their tails, as if they were dogs, at peasants seated on the ground eating. One passed

THE SECURITY REGULATIONS

1. YOU MUST ANSWER ACCORDINGLY TO MY QUESTIONS. DON'T TURN THEM AWAY.
2. DON'T TRY TO HIDE THE FACTS BY MAKING PRETEXTS THIS AND THAT. YOU ARE STRICTLY PROHIBITED TO CONTEST ME.
3. DON'T BE A FOOL FOR YOU ARE A CHAP WHO DARE TO THWART THE REVOLUTION.
4. YOU MUST IMMEDIATELY ANSWER MY QUESTIONS WITHOUT WASTING TIME TO REFLECT.
5. DON'T TELL ME EITHER ABOUT YOUR IMMORALITIES OR THE ESSENCE OF THE REVOLUTION.
6. WHILE GETTING LASHES OR ELECTRIFICATION YOU MUST NOT CRY AT ALL.
7. DO NOTHING, SIT STILL AND WAIT FOR MY ORDERS. IF THERE IS NO ORDER, KEEP QUIET. WHEN I ASK YOU TO DO SOMETHING, YOU MUST DO IT RIGHT AWAY WITHOUT PROTESTING.
8. DON'T MAKE PRETEXTS ABOUT KAMPUCHEA KROM IN ORDER TO HIDE YOUR JAW OF TRAITOR.
9. IF YOU DON'T FOLLOW ALL THE ABOVE RULES, YOU SHALL GET MANY MANY LASHES OF ELECTRIC WIRE.
10. IF YOU DISOBEY ANY POINT OF MY REGULATIONS YOU SHALL GET EITHER TEN LASHES OR FIVE SHOCKS OF ELECTRIC DISCHARGE.

English translation of security regulations posted in the torture chamber. 20,000 persons were tortured to death here by the Khmer Rouge.

thatched roof houses with occasional bullocks, herdsman, rice fields, streams and bridges and children everywhere. A visitor forgets and asks why the Pol Pot killers openly transported their victims past so many people; in fact, he is reminded, Phnom Penh and the outskirts were deserted at the time.

That evening, at the guest house, about a dozen waiters and assorted guest house workers assembled to watch the televised film from the Jakarta meetings. An excited murmur and laughter are heard when Prince Ranariddh appears. "Just like his father," they were saying, "in manner and speech."

The TV describes Hun Sen as "sober fair and firm" and notes that Prince Ranariddh, "just like his father has no firm position and spoke in English."

Reading Michael Vickery's *Kampuchea*, the difference between Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge and the Khmer Rouge of Hun Sen and Hang Semrin—who defected from the Eastern Zone—became clear.

"Because of the geographical distribution of Democratic Kampuchea factions, life in much of the Eastern Zone differed considerably from the conventional DK horror picture, and in many cases was as tolerable as could be expected in the conditions left by the destruction of the war of 1970-1975. The Pol Pot terror did not pervade the East until the latter suffered a concerted central government assault in May 1978, as a result of which the survivors retreated to the Eastern border region or into Vietnam and requested help from the latter to overthrow Pol Pot."

Saturday: February 25

A sociologist explained that Sihanouk wanted to be "Prince Papa" and wanted all to obey him. He wanted to be not only King but also father of the Khmer and father of the intellectuals, sportsmen and artists. The country people had loved him but the city people had not.

He felt that the Khmer were pragmatic but received, rather easily, other ideologies. They did not conform and preferred to find another solution to avoid things they disliked. He felt they engaged in passive resistance but were not themselves passive.

He considered Pol Potism to be the result of a foreign ideology and not the fault of Cambodia. And he felt that the Khmer people had overthrown Pol Pot by themselves! When asked what role the Vietnamese played (who did virtually all the fighting) he said that the "Vietnamese could not have done it by themselves."

Against Communism

A Khmer tells me of a fateful press conference when John Gunther Dean was asked: "Why are you supporting the corrupt regime of Lon Nol?" And he replied: "Because they are against communism." That was his complete answer.

The Khmer felt the Americans had abandoned Cambodia by leaving it to its fate. During the Pol Pot period, he had looked into the sky every day watching for the helicopters

WAR AND HOPE: THE CASE FOR CAMBODIA Prince Norodom Sihanouk Random House, 1980

This is Sihanouk's effort to parse his career and justify the many twists and turns. It is more revealing than he knows.

His approach to the Vietnamese overthrow of Pol Pot was that the "Vietnamese and the Khmer Rouge should be allowed to keep killing each other off . . ." and that the rest of the Khmer should flee the country: "The more Khmers there are outside Cambodia, the greater our chances of surviving as a nation will be . . ." He also, notes, that "bringing the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk-supporting Nationalists together in a common United Front, that would be tantamount to putting a starving and bloodthirsty wolf in with a lamb." But, of course, this is exactly what he subsequently accepted when he became the titular head of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

He argues that the Vietnamese were "in clear violation of the U.N. charter" when they took it upon themselves to "punish" Pol Pot and Ieng Sary's bloodthirsty army and government (in the name of the Khmer people) (In fact, the U.N. charter clearly permits actions in self-defense—this was obviously no effort simply to "punish" such as the Chinese effort to "teach Vietnam a lesson".)

Ironically, Sihanouk, having said this, goes on to say:

"Still, in defense of the Soviet block it must be admitted that many other nations also shed crocodile tears over the Khmer people's desperate situation. The proof of it is that these nations called for the total, immediate, and unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese armed forces from Kampuchea, yet they knowingly neglected to mention that once such unconditional withdrawal had taken place, Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and their "SS" would resume their horror show and once again transform all of Kampuchea into a vast gulag, an immense slaughterhouse worthy of Auschwitz."

So here was the real truth: the Vietnamese had saved Kampuchea and were continuing to save it while the Prince Papa of the country went on to ally himself with the genocidal killers to force them out. ■

which he felt would mean liberation.

But during the 75-80 period, there was no sign of Western opposition to the Democratic Kampuchea. If Americans had come in even small numbers, the Khmer could have overthrown Pol Pot, he felt. Incredibly, he found that, after the invasion, there were only complaints about the Vietnamese and nothing about the killing fields. So he had lost faith in American policy.

The people wanted Sihanouk back more as a sign that the crisis was over than as a desire to have his rule again. And they certainly do not want him back at the cost of taking the Khmer Rouge back. (Sihanouk has apparently said that he would like to return in October 1989 to celebrate his 67th anniversary.)

Wait Until the Coalition Collapses

Looking through some books, it appears that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach thinks that "the day must come when reality takes over and the diplomats come to terms with it." He is clearly waiting for the coalition of Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge to collapse. Apparently, Sihanouk had been told in Kuala Lumpur on June 22, 1982 that he would get no aid unless he formed a coalition government with the Khmer Rouge. But by August 9, 1985, the Bangkok Post was reporting from very high Khmer Rouge defectors that: The CGDK is something between Khieu Samphan, Son Sann [a second non-communist resistance movement] and Sihanouk. The other Khmer Rouge leaders have "nothing to do with it." In other words, it was a gigantic front.

The defectors, long-time Khmer Rouge intellectuals, were summarized this way: "Their feeling was that little had been learned from the dreadful experience of the Seventies, that the party still was not really interested in using people for their capacities, that ideological rigidity was more important than any quality one may possess."

Westerners Like Hun Sen

Some members of the Western volunteer community said that the Government has been "terrific" and that the "difference between now and three years ago, will knock your socks off." Three years ago, people were living outdoors. Now they were not and the area was much cleaner. Everyone felt very secure in Phnom Penh. There had been Pol Potists around Tonle Sap, the large lake, but there were fewer now. The Pol Pot people were very young, like the Palestinians who were recruited from the Palestinian camps, and they had no idea what was happening in the city.

The volunteers considered the Khmer to be very industrious people who had the motivation to learn foreign languages which took extra energy after work. Hun Sen rode around in a motorcycle, often without guards, proving his confidence in the public and theirs in him.

Hor Namhong

That evening, I dined with Hor Namhong, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to the Soviet Union and the leading foreign policy specialist in Cambodia to Hun Sen. (Indeed, in a matter of months, Ambassador Hor Namhong will move to Phnom Penh and take up duties as a Deputy Foreign Minister-level assistant to Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hun Sen.

With him at the dinner were two other Deputy Foreign Ministers, Long Visalo and Sok An.

PUNISHING THE POOR: THE INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION OF KAMPUCHEA

Eva Mysliwiec

Oxfam, Oxford, February, 1988.

This is, by far, the best summary of the situation inside Cambodia today and, also, the coolest and most complete summary of the fantastic ironies and confusions in the Western and Chinese treatment of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the survivors of the Cambodian holocaust that they represent.

Calling the policies of ASEAN and a majority of Western Governments "at best counterproductive", Mysliwiec notes that the West scented Pol Pot in the U.N. in 1979, in 1980, and in 1981 and that no Western country has ever voted against Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. Calling the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea a "cover-up" of Western embarrassment, she notes that these U.N. actions denied the Kampuchean people "the aid they need to rebuild their lives and their country." She notes that the Khmer people have paid "in lives, limbs and material resources" for the aid given those waging a guerrilla war against the PRK and Vietnamese forces.

Noting that foreigners assume that PRK is a mere Vietnamese puppet, she notes that "the PRK has an identity of its own, and has become increasingly assertive vis-a-vis Vietnam in recent years." Already, by 1985, of the 31 full members of the Central Committee, only five were Khmer trained in Vietnam, nine or ten were former Khmer Rouge and the more than half remaining were "mainly young professionals who had no association with either Vietnam or the Khmer Rouge but who were teachers, students, technicians or civil servants under Lon Nol or Sihanouk."

This book reveals, in particular, the enormous double standard which politics has produced in which aid is distributed to the refugee camps without regard to human rights or the ultimate disposal of the aid to support military operations, while no aid is provided to the bulk of the Cambodian people on the grounds that the Government created by the Vietnamese, who saved the life of the Cambodian nation, ought not be given help because it was not U.N.-approved. ■

Hor Namhong is a career diplomat who worked as a menial worker during the Pol Pot period. He is, perhaps, the highest career civil servant in the Government, speaks English well, is well respected internationally and quite

likeable.

These Cambodians considered Prince Ranariddh to be more intelligent than his father but very ambitious. Asked if there was, as rumored, a son of Sihanouk in the Khmer Rouge, they said yes, Norodom Narindarapong. We discussed the Elizabeth Becker article in which she had criticized Sihanouk by saying, he is "undermining his position as the key to a settlement by supporting the Khmer Rouge more than its patron, China."

One Cambodian expressed the traditional attitude that Khmer and Vietnamese would not be friendly in the long run. He thought that the Vietnamese were not frank, always looking for some advantage and burdened with their own problems.

Trip to the Temple

At breakfast at a brightly colored open air restaurant, we sit with a Vietnamese woman who sells tea in Ho Chi Minh City and who has brought her father for a vacation. Now that police have finally been trained security at the market is better.

En route to a temple, a twelve-year-old has trouble with 3x4 but a 10 year old knows the name of his country and the biggest city in it.

Some quarry workers are questioned. They have never seen anybody from Pol Pot since 1979, but "We are not afraid of them; if they come, we will surround them and capture them quickly."

On the Vietnamese, they said: "We don't want them to leave if there is a threat of Khmer Rouge. But here the Army and the local militia can protect us. We don't want to hear even the word or the name of Pol Pot; many people here are mentally disturbed from memories of this period."

In a temple, about 50 kilometers out of town, supporters of four monks are assisting them with lunch and discussing the repair of the temple. Life, they said, was about like 1965 now but 1969 had been the best year. The Government was largely open and, while it could give no money to the temple, it permitted any beliefs and they got some encouragement from the National Front. They were happy with the Government.

Was Sihanouk good or bad? If he cooperates with the Khmer Rouge he was bad because they don't want the KR back. Why does he cooperate with them? "We don't know." Were they treated well or badly by the Vietnamese? "The Vietnamese did nothing harmful." Had their opinion of the Vietnamese gone up or down? "They came at the invitation of our people and helped us strengthen our armed forces so they could gradually return. We are now more friendly to the Vietnamese because they are our savior."

Were they afraid that the Vietnamese would leave too soon? "We have some worries of a quick withdrawal because we are not self-sufficient in defense. And no one at all wants the return of the Khmer Rouge. The Khmer people want a peaceful life above all else."

WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER

Elizabeth Becker

(Simon and Schuster, 1986, \$9.95)

This is, also, a splendid and well-reviewed summary of Cambodia's dilemma. Here you will see Prince Sihanouk fronting for the Khmer Rouge from the beginning of their victory. At the U.N., in 1975:

"He knowingly repeated the lies Sary had told the U.N., that the evacuation [of Phnom Penh and the other Cambodian cities] had been carried out 'without bloodshed,' that the refugee reports of wholesale executions of former military officers were unfounded, that the revolution was 'self-reliant,' in no need of aid from abroad."

This lie, Becker observes, inspired many Cambodians to return to Pol Pot's Cambodia "many to an awful fate of arrest, torture and death."

See the strategy of support for the genocidal Khmer Rouge encouraged by America's National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski who said that he used the visit of the Thai Foreign Minister, in 1979, to press his plan:

"I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. I encouraged the Thai to help the D.K. [Democratic Kampuchea]. The question was how to help the Cambodian people. Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could."

See how China always made sure that the Khmer Rouge "held the lion's share of power among the resistance groups."

See how undemocratic Sihanouk's Cambodia was and how willing he has been to side with whomever and whatever would keep him, even nominally, on the throne. ■



Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, "waiting for the Sihanouk coalition with the Khmer Rouge to come apart."

Sunday Night

The Editor-in Chief of *Kampuchea* weekly, Khieu Kanharith, had just been turned down for a visa to the United States. Over dinner, he discussed his paper which sells 55,000 copies and had been founded in 1929.

He said the Government was pragmatic and more flexible. The newspaper was for a policy of freedom of travel. He felt that Hun Sen's good qualities were: clever; consults with people; a good speaker; relaxed; sometimes travels by himself (without guards) outside the city and is a good sportsman. His main problems are his health and an eye problem (an eye that sometimes tears from a war wound).

He said people supported the Government ("We don't have Kabul") and that the arming of the population showed it. The economy was very free even though putatively socialist. The Government wanted mainly to improve the economy. And it wanted to train the students in the West. People accused them of being a Soviet puppet. But "When we knock on your door and you don't open it, we have to turn to another house; we can't wait in the cold."

Not everyone in the Government is socialist; and they contribute to openness and add to the tolerance. He felt the U.S. had a very rigid point of view.

Why wasn't there more anger in the population and among the officials? "No one wants to recall the past; they just want to suppress and forget it." The official policy is to "forget and forgive" the past.


Monday Morning

Thon Hin, Deputy Director of the Department of America and Western Europe, asked me to convey to Haing Ngor that he was welcome in Phnom Penh.

An observer who was familiar with UNICEF said that the PRK cooperated quite well with that agency and was very committed. The PRK had done a miracle in terms of achievement in health and education. Of more than 1,000,000 illiterates, 90% could now read and write and it showed the motivation of the Khmer that they sought out these schools. The Government slogan was "All who know must teach those who don't."

People were insecure even if this was not always evident because of the non-recognition. It will be quite important when bilateral organizations come back. The Government was not too bureaucratized and worked about as well as the situation permitted. Since they had had to work with a tabula rasa, they had done "fantastically well." As one example, in six months, they had vaccinated all children under one year in Phnom Penh.

According to UNICEF material, the life expectancy in Cambodia was 49 years to that of Vietnam's 62 years. Infant mortality was 208 per 1000 in Cambodia compared to 91 per 1000 in Vietnam and 13 in the U.S. Daily per capita food supply was about 85% of requirements as compared to 97% in Vietnam and 140% in the U.S. Adult literacy was 85% for men and 65% for women as compared to 88/80 in Vietnam and 99/99 in the U.S.



Khieu Kanharith, Editor-in-Chief of the weekly, "Kampuchea", denied visa to the United States.

TO DESTROY YOU IS NO LOSS: THE ODYSSEY OF A CAMBODIAN FAMILY *Joan D. Criddle and Teeda Butt Mam*

This report on life under Pol Pot is a moving history of the despair of a family. But it tells more than that. It shows also that Pol Pot really welcomed a massive reduction in the size of the Cambodian people. According to this book,

"... on January 26, 1976, in Mongkol Borei District, a Khmer Rouge official stated, "To rebuild our Cambodia one million men is enough. Prisoners of war"—meaning those expelled from cities—"are no longer needed, and local chiefs are free to dispose of them as they please."

The killings were done especially in July, and the people were led away with false stories of where they were going.

"Eventually, we would learn that each July had been a variation of this same pattern. In 1975, our first July under the Khmer Rouge, high-ranking government officials, army officers, big businessmen, and outspoken villagers were taken away, to "build dams and reservoirs" or to be "reeducated." The following July, any known government employees and soldiers, plus the educated and affluent men, were taken. In July of 1977, families of those formerly taken, plus the Vietnamese, were ordered to relocate. The circle kept expanding. As "July" and "slaughter" became synonymous, we referred to July as "the killing season".

The authors believed that "eventually everyone over the age of twelve at the time of the takeover was ultimately scheduled to be killed—excepting, of course, top leaders. Then there would be left only pliable youth who did not remember the former way of life and who had no training or ability to organize resistance against Angka and its plans for a "perfect society". ■

The Khmer Rouge are Diabolic

Reviewing the Foreign Broadcast Information Services (FBIS), one sees that a written speech of January 6 attributed to Sihanouk, which was broadcast by the Khmer Rouge coalition over its clandestine radio station, informs its listeners that "all People's Republic of Kampuchea forces are really Vietnamese in PRK uniform." The purpose of this statement is, obviously, to encourage the KR forces to kill the PRK forces without any mercy. Does Sihanouk really say these things and/or does he permit them to be said by the KR without complaint? This is criminal.

On January 13, Prince Ranariddh is saying over the same clandestine radio, "If we look closely, we see that Hun Sen is not a patriot. Contrary to what he claimed, he wants the Khmer Rouge to return." What baloney.

On January 24, a long statement by Hun Sen shows that my original understanding of the bargaining significance of the Vietnamese withdrawal was wrong. In fact, the PRK thinks that the withdrawal strengthens its hand by removing the source of complaint about the Vietnamese. The PRK feels that time is running out for the other side politically.

Interview with Hun Sen

In a jacket and tie, I was politely warned that I was overdressed for the interview with Hun Sen and that he was in shirtsleeves. The Chief of Protocol gave an unobtrusive check to my camera case to check on any possible threat.

The Prime Minister said that, contrary to the request of his Foreign Ministry for a copy of planned questions, I could ask any questions. But, really, his answers were too long even for the six prepared. He wanted, they told me later, to be sure I understood and that was why he had spoken at length. The interview appears on pages 16 & 17. It was followed by some informal questions which I encouraged him to ask me.

He gave dates and places at which Prince Sihanouk had threatened him by telling him the U.S. was going to send Stingers to the resistance. Since Stingers are used to shoot down aircraft and since the PRK was not using military aircraft against guerrillas, this was a clear threat against commercial aircraft linking Phnom Penh to Vietnam. Was it true, he said?

[On March 16 in Washington Prince Ranariddh told inquiring reporters that he had *not* received any lethal aid so far but wanted it and wanted it to include Stingers. In Beijing, at the same time, Prince Sihanouk joined in a press conference with Khmer Rouge's Khieu Sampan to call for lethal aid.]

The Prime Minister's demeanor was like that of an earnest and friendly graduate student in an oral exam, reeling off answers and not unskillfully. He spoke in Khmer with translations done by a Khmer who had lived in London for a short time and, somehow, was overlooked by the Khmer Rouge killers. (He was sent, early in the period, to a very distant and unpopulated place.)

When I noted that these Western observers had spoken

BEYOND THE HORIZON: FIVE YEARS WITH THE KHMER ROUGE


Laurence Picq (translated by Patricia Norland)
(St. Martin's Press; New York, \$15.95)

This provides a unique insight into the attitudes of the Phnom Penh-based bureaucrats of the Pol Pot regime through the eyes of a French woman revolutionary who traveled to Phnom Penh to marry her Khmer Rouge husband—who is still working for the Khmer Rouge in the Beijing Embassy. The discussions among them were much like George Orwell predicted for "1984". When criticized she was told, among other things: "you were born and grew up in a country that exploited and murdered our people for over a century. You are, by your very nature, colonialist!"

And the racism was ever present: "It was taken for granted that the most beautiful and most heroic of all the peoples on the earth were the people of Cambodia. Nothing and no one could equal them. The Vietnamese were hypocritical and lazy, the Thais were loafers and gamblers, the Lao were too few to warrant an epithet. Whites were devils and blacks were vulgar savages." Meanwhile, the 16-year-old cadres had been distributed watches which they could not read and, without addition and subtraction, could not be taught to read. ■

well of his Government, he smiled shyly and said modestly: "Well, they have been living with us for a long time." He said they expect now to receive more refugees from Thailand. Asked if I could report that American-Khmer were welcome in Phnom Penh, he said that "Well, as an example, there are three here this week and In Tam, the former Prime Minister, had been in Cambodia for a month. We are opening the door wide and they are welcome."

Asked about separated families, he said: "We are prepared to let them go but we do not have visas for them." □



In the background, the palace in which Sihanouk was under house arrest while Chief-of-State of Pol Pot's Government.

THE STORY OF LY SORSANE

Ly Sorsane had been a literature student at the University when Pol Pot's forces entered the city in triumph on January 17, 1975. He had heard rumors, widely discounted by others, but brought by refugees to the city that the Khmer Rouge had killed intellectuals in the jungle and defrocked monks. Unlike many others, he thought the rumors might be true. And when the Khmer Rouge told people that the U.S. would be bombing the city so that the residents must all leave, his suspicions were aroused. After all, the Americans had had plenty of time to bomb the city before and had not and, anyway, he knew them better than that.

Accordingly, as he began to walk out of town, he changed his name and decided to explain that he had been a bicycle repairer. Along with some others, they tried to hide their city status by cutting their hair shorter, trying to hide the pale spots that revealed the past ownership of a wristwatch and, gradually, throwing away valuable books after deciding that it was too dangerous to explain them away as sources of cigarette paper, etc.

Sorsane secretly held onto a portable radio listening faithfully to the BBC and VOA in Khmer until the batteries wore out about the end of 1975. He had kept his real identity secret from absolutely everyone. But he had befriended a 72-year-old man, a former member of parliament, and advised him to falsify his identity. The man said he was "too old" for this and was killed.


Normally, a person eats about 750 grams of rice (1.6 pounds). At the start of the Pol Pot period, the Khmer Rouge were giving a third of that and, later, only 50 grams after which they switched to collective kitchens.

Trickery Preceded Killing

The Khmer Rouge often plotted their killings in a "tender atmosphere." For example, when Prince Sihanouk was being flown to Phnom Penh, they seized the occasion to unearth more intellectuals by inventing the story that they needed intellectuals to receive Sihanouk. They said that if people could describe their intellectual history, they could be sent to be part of the welcoming committee. Many fell for it and were led away and killed. Sorsane was too clever for that and simply asked whether a bicycle repairer would qualify. They brushed him off but, from his point of view, it was another step toward acceptance of his false story.

His story of being a bicycle repairer and of being third generation peasant was constantly being tested. Fortunately, he had had a flair for bicycles and could repair one. Fortunately, also, he remembered enough about such peasant mysteries as driving a water buffalo, cutting bamboo, replanting rice and catching fish to be accepted.

The Khmer Rouge also killed, sometimes, in the open to intimidate people. Sorsane remembers, while walking on the road, that a Khmer Rouge had fallen in love with a woman sitting on the roadside from the city. Such links were considered taboo. A kind of people's trial was organized and everyone was forced to denounce the petrified



Depiction of a prison camp scene for prisoners without separate rooms.

couple who were then publicly stabbed to death in front of one another and the crowd.

The popular slogan was: "Better to let 10 friends die than to let one enemy escape."

People who got sick or for whatever reason could not work hard were accused of having "spiritual illness."


In 1977, unbeknownst to Sorsane, there had been attempts to assassinate the man who hid behind the label of "Angkar"—the organization. Pol Pot had narrowly escaped at least one attempt to poison him when, by happenstance, a guard sampled his food and immediately died. He retreated to a safe place and began a purge of old Khmer Rouge. In the purge, his main opponent So Phim was killed and this led to the purge of the Minister of Information Hu Nim and, in turn, to the head of the Battambang Province chief.

Sorsane was by that time in a mobile work team whose status was somewhere between the oppressor "old people" (i.e. the Khmer Rouge who had marched on the cities) and the suppressed "new people" (i.e. those of the city). Pol Pot sent Ta Mok, perhaps the most murderous of the Khmer Rouge, to reorganize the Battambang Province. In the rush to reorganize, Ta Mok simply arrested everyone in positions of power. The mobile work team, with Sorsane, was sent to a local prison. There Sorsane was beaten for six weeks while chained at the ankle; he continued to maintain that he was only a bicycle repairer and, eventually, they tested him on this and believed him.

Repairing Locks In The Camp

He was one of six or seven who was ordered to help work in the camp. For a year, he lived there repairing, mainly, the keys and locks that were involved in locking up the prisoners. Asked how he could stand the constant torturing and screaming, he said that, at this prison, most people were just worked to death. They had not the strength to scream but mostly moaned and called for water or rice. They had nothing—no wife, no children, no watch, no belongings; everything had been taken from them and they were often semi-conscious.

When they got sick enough, the Khmer Rouge would tell



Ly Sorsane, English speaking desk officer at the PRK Foreign Ministry

them the lie that they were to be taken to a hospital or to some other better place. They would be fed as much rice as they wanted. Then, half-believing that something better was in the offing, they would be marched somewhere else and killed. The butchers who killed them would return boasting that they had killed 250 in two hours. Once they returned with an ax which they wanted Sorsane to fix for the next day's butchering.

Finally, in January 1979, Sorsane heard from another orderly that Phnom Penh had been liberated. But his prison went on as usual. He could not work and his mind started to malfunction. His brother came to the prison and, with others, warned him to keep working or he would be killed. He found the strength to continue.

At about this time, some fairly high ranking Khmer Rouge from the town came to the camp and warned, suggested, or ordered the camp leaders to discontinue what they were doing. They warned that the Vietnam were coming and that this would look bad. The reaction of the camp leaders was to seize the Khmer Rouge complainers and to kill them on the spot. (In Pol Pot's Cambodia, it was a popular saying that anyone who tried to stop the "wheel of history" with his hand would lose his hand and those who tried to stop it with their foot would lose their foot.)

Finally, Sorsane saw an opportunity to escape and managed to get away, but with a bullet wound that became infected in the jungle. By this time, the Vietnamese had arrived. But after so much propaganda about how they would kill all Khmer, he did not dare to come out of the jungle. Finally, after polling at least ten persons he passed on the road—persons of all types—he accepted their reassurance and found the Vietnamese soldiers so kind he could not believe it. And in their hospital his arm was saved. But 24 hours more in the jungle, the doctors said, and they would have had to amputate it.

Now he lives with wife and children in Phnom Penh with a motorscooter and a small farm managed by his uncle with a few chickens and pigs and some fruit trees. His parents were killed. ■

HOW BUREAUCRATS LIVE

An official may earn from \$3 to \$5 a month in cash. Thus when you invite him to have a Pepsi cola with you, which is available in the restaurants but imported and costs \$1, one is uneasily aware that you are inviting him to guzzle a week's salary—something more expensive than a wealthy gourmet's choice alcoholic beverage, in our terms.

On the other hand, officials are given goods as well: 20 kilos of rice for himself per month and 10 kilos for each child and for the wife. They get subsidized prices for kerosene, 2 bars of soap, 1 kilo of sugar, one or two tins of milk, firewood and scarves—which have multiple uses in the hot climate of Cambodia. ■

GETTING THERE IS HALF THE PROBLEM

With the exception of a weekly Aeroflot flight from Moscow, the only way to get to Cambodia's capitol, Phnom Penh, is by flying first to Bangkok, in Thailand, and then flying first either to Hanoi, or more conveniently, Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon). The normal procedure—and the only one which does not require Vietnamese visas—is to try to get on the weekly flight from Ho Chi Minh city to Phnom Penh on Air Kampuchea. Unfortunately, reservations on Air Kampuchea—like reservations on internal Vietnamese flights on Air Vietnam—cannot be made from the West through travel agents because of the U.S. embargo on trade with Vietnam.

The loophole which the traveler is encouraged to make is to visit or call the International Committee of the Red Cross in Bangkok and ask to be put on their "priority" list for the weekly Air Kampuchea flight. (This group can help Cambodia because it is not part of the U.N.—were it part of the U.N., it would have to back the Khmer Rouge coalition headed by Prince Sihanouk.) Then one books a connecting flight into Ho Chi Minh City and, after waiting in transit, is given priority for a place on the plane (which varies unpredictably from 55 to 85 seats depending on which plane is in use).

The problem of getting visas from the People's Republic of Kampuchea is even more complicated. Unrecognized by any Western Governments, except India, it has, of course, no embassy in Thailand. Visitors carry in the visa applications to Phnom Penh or try to work with the Kampuchean consulate in Ho Chi Minh City if they are already in Vietnam, or with the Embassy in Hanoi. Each has telephone links with Phnom Penh.

In our case, absolutely invaluable assistance was provided on more than one occasion by the Indochina Reconciliation Project (John McAuliffe) of Philadelphia and the Indochina Project's Bangkok representative, Linda Hiebert. ■

SOLARZ TALKS UP LETHAL AID TO SIHANOUK

In hearings held March 1, Congressman Stephen Solarz indicated that he was seriously considering pressing for lethal aid to the Sihanouk forces on the grounds that the Vietnamese were withdrawing. ("So at the end of the day the non-communist resistance may be the last best hope the Cambodians have of preventing a fate which could be worse than death.")

On its face, this is bizarre. All observers agree that the forces of the People's Republic of Kampuchea are the main bulwark, after the Vietnamese, against the Khmer Rouge. And, worse, the Sihanouk forces are in a coalition with the Khmer Rouge designed to overthrow that bulwark. The lethal aid is at least as likely to be used against the PRK as against the Khmer Rouge.

In order to make this position more palatable, Congressman Solarz, already a proponent of non-lethal aid to Sihanouk's forces, said "my own view is that this distinction between lethal and non-lethal assistance is a distinction without any substantive difference. It may have some relevance in a domestic political context [ed. note: i.e. to Americans] but I do not think it has any relevance in the theater." In other words, we already authorized non-lethal aid so what is the difference.

David Hawk, of the Cambodia Documentation Center, said he was not sure about lethal aid because "just last week, Sihanouk was wanting arms to fight Hun Sen."

Withdrawal Is Not Enough

In the beginning, the U.S. position was one of asserting that if the Vietnamese would withdraw, the U.S. would normalize relations with them without further negotiations except for the modalities of exchanging Ambassadors. When it saw that the Vietnamese seemed to be actually withdrawing, as requested, the policy apparently shifted to demand that the withdrawal be "in the context of an acceptable settlement." Thus, Deputy Assistant Secretary David Lambertson told the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs:

"... in the context of an acceptable settlement in Cambodia which includes the complete withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops, we are prepared to normalize our relations with Vietnam." In particular, "Hanoi must play an active and direct role in the settlement process, should talk directly to Prince Sihanouk, and has the obligation to ensure that the leaders it installed in Phnom Penh adopt reasonable positions in negotiations among the Cambodian groups."

But obviously, the Hun Sen Government wants Prince Sihanouk to talk to it and not to be permitted to take the view that they work for Hanoi. And, ironically, the complaint that Hanoi should force Phnom Penh to adopt "reasonable positions" admits that Phnom Penh has ideas of its own. Which is, after all, the goal of our policy, an independent Phnom Penh Government and an admission that it, increasingly, exists.

Lambertson explained that "we continue to urge Hanoi to issue a precise timetable" for the withdrawal of all

troops "without conditions." But it seems that the Administration is less certain now than before how much weight to put on the condition of "precise timetable" and how much weight to put on the condition of "acceptable settlement."


Lambertson was asked by Congressman Solarz: "Would there be a better chance of preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power if the Vietnamese withdraw in the context of a political settlement providing for the establishment of an interim Government in which the Khmer Rouge participate? Or would there be a better chance of preventing the Khmer Rouge from returning to power if the Vietnamese withdraw militarily without a settlement?"

Lambertson responded: "In my judgement, this is one that is impossible to answer." In other words, the Vietnamese are to be, as one observer put it, "damned if they do and damned if they don't." If they set a date for withdrawal and there is no settlement that is acceptable to all the parties—a virtual certainty since the parties are at such odds that Prince Sihanouk is calling the Jakarta talks a "charade" and boycotting them—then the Vietnamese withdrawal, on which we have insisted for so long, would be deemed insufficient and even condemned.


Asked about this contradiction, Lambertson said: "I do not think we are going to have to be in the position to urge the Vietnamese to stay in Cambodia in the absence of a political settlement. They are still going to be there."

But this is completely and clearly wrong. The Vietnamese are in the process of withdrawing and all interviews in Hanoi and Phnom Penh show that they believe that, with their complete withdrawal, their hand will be strengthened in international negotiations.

Asked by FAS what Hanoi thought about the new added condition of withdrawal with an "acceptable settlement," Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said: "The Americans have a rich imagination." □



American bomb lying in partially destroyed monastery 30 miles outside Phnom Penh; memories of the Nixon-Kissinger bombing of Cambodia



Depiction of a Pol Pot killing field

THE MILITARY SITUATION

According to March 1 testimony by the Department of Defense's Rear Admiral Timothy W. Wright, the situation is as follows:

The Non-Communist Resistance (Sihanouk and Son Sann) engage the Vietnamese in "only marginal, limited contacts." Sihanouk claims a force of "about 18,000" and emphasizes "the conduct of political activity in Cambodia's interior." Son Sann's KPNLF claims 12,000 men but continues to suffer "from a prolonged leadership crisis" and its operations consist of "shallow small-scale penetrations" of northwestern Cambodia.

The Khmer Rouge is much stronger than the non-communist resistance, with an estimated strength of 30,000 to 40,000 and "retains the potential to be the spoiler of any peace agreement." Armed "in excess of its needs" by the Chinese it could fight without further Chinese supplies "for more than a year." During the past year, it has "avoided large-scale attacks on Vietnamese and PRK forces." According to Admiral Wright, "weapons caches will be rendered irrelevant as ammunition and other basic necessities are consumed." But it could, through bursts of local isolated acts of violence threaten the life of a post-conflict Cambodian Government even if sanctuaries on Thai soil were withdrawn and the Chinese ceased to aid them.

The PRK army has "taken over increased border defense and manning responsibilities" from the Vietnamese and has "added substantially to the ranks of the provincial and district militia in such a way as to persuade local observers that they can play a role equal to the main force on local defense. The PRK army is composed of 40,000 to 45,000 inexperienced troops and largely unqualified officers."

Apparently, in early July, Khmer Rouge forces "intent on dramatizing the weakness of the PRK army and the alleged duplicity of the Vietnamese Army's plans for withdrawal" were able to force the Vietnamese Army to come to the PRK's assistance. The PRK Campaign to Return Patriots to the Fold attracted 300 more people than it had in the same six-month period a year earlier. □

BEFORE KAMPUCHEA

Milton Osborne

(George Allen, Australia)

This lucid and brilliantly written series of essays on life in Cambodia under Sihanouk was scathing about him. Osborne notes at one point:

"The whole thing was typical of Sihanouk's policies. He was ready to make sweeping decisions at a moment's notice but he seldom thought through the longer term implications." In 1966, Osborne reports, the Frenchmen around him were uniformly contemptuous of him and Sihanouk's private scribe said:

"Sihanouk's policies seemed to change from day to day. Was America an enemy or not? Nobody seemed to know."

Osborne reported:

The early years of court life in the 1940s, when he had been treated with the utmost obsequiousness, had left their mark and go far toward explaining Sihanouk's almost absolute incapacity to listen to contrary advice let alone criticism of his policies."

"Stated baldly, Cambodia's foreign policy was based on Sihanouk's belief that his country could only survive as an independent entity, dominated neither by Vietnam nor Thailand, if it were protected by a major external power."

The French had saved Cambodia in the 1860s by intervening. But they considered the Vietnamese "an intelligent and industrious race" and deplored the "decadence" of the Khmer. The Vietnamese filled all the jobs of clerks, messengers, postmen and telegraphists—roles the Khmer were "either unable or unwilling" to fill. There was not, in 1966, even intermarriage between Catholics of the Khmer and of the Vietnamese.

Osborne reports that the "factious nature of Cambodian politics in an elected parliament had been demonstrated time and again. Groups that called themselves parties formed and split, constructed political alliances and immediately reneged on the agreements that formed the basis for cooperation.

As far as Sihanouk was concerned, the elections, Osborne felt, were "part of a national ritual not part of a process that would greatly affect his determination of policy." And when he stopped handpicking the candidates, they were simply bought by the "most conservative forces in Cambodian politics."

Ironically, Osborne notes that, at that time, Khieu Samphan, who has long been the international front for Pol Pot was "incorruptible" and showed "genuine concern for the poor." It was only after Sihanouk threatened the left wing with execution that Khieu Samphan and others fled to the jungle to form the Khmer Rouge. ■

**TEXT OF INTERVIEW GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER (AND FOREIGN MINISTER) HUN SEN OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA TO JEREMY J. STONE, FEDERATION OF
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS ON FEBRUARY 27, 1989**

Assuming that agreement cannot be reached between PRK and the non-communist resistance, what does PRK need to be sure that it can defend the country against the Khmer Rouge?

This is a very important issue at this moment. The question of Vietnamese presence is no longer an issue. We have already declared a timetable to leave by 30th of February. But if one cannot find a political solution then we will see complete withdrawal by 1990.

So after the complete withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, the question of the return of the Khmer Rouge is an important question.

Therefore, at the Jakarta meeting, we raised some measures to prevent the return of the Khmer Rouge. Because everyone knows there are two key issues: Vietnamese withdrawal on the one hand and prevention of the return of the Khmer Rouge on the other in order to prevent a civil war.

Vietnamese withdrawal has been well discussed. But it is much regretted that many countries which are worried about the Khmer Rouge do not want to discuss it. Their activities encourage the return of the Khmer Rouge. I have raised and asked the question of who is going to be responsible for this.

The Vietnamese and the PRK are going to be responsible for the withdrawal. The question of the recurrence of the Khmer Rouge is one which should be answered by the countries who encouraged this threat. Therefore, we have appealed to the countries which assisted the Khmer Rouge, politically, militarily, and geographically to be responsible about this.

I have raised five measures to prevent civil war: 1). We have to abolish the military forces of both sides.

2). We must have an immediate cessation of all military aid to these groups.

3). We must condemn all the leaders who committed genocide.

4). We have to force them to reveal their military caches in the forest.

5). We have to prevent the Pol Pot from using the refugee camps for military purposes.

If the Khmer Rouge turns out to be more powerful than expected, does the PRK-Vietnamese friendship treaty permit the PRK to ask, and expect, a return of Vietnamese forces?

I want to assure you that the key point is to prevent foreign aid to these groups. We will not need international force to help us if this is done. Everyone knows how the Pol Pot forces survive. They function on behalf of China and use Thai territory. Removing this help to them is the key to solving the problem.

I want to assure you that, if there is an agreement concerning a political solution we will obey it.

But if there is no agreement on Pol Pot, then there is no

condition we need to respect. If others have the right to help Pol Pot, at that time, it will be necessary for us to take any necessary steps to protect ourselves. But if there is a solution, we should respect it and the other side should also.

So the question of grabbing power by the Khmer Rouge should not happen.

We have seen signs that, if there is a cut off of aid, there is no way the Khmer Rouge can turn out to be more powerful than expected. We don't want more forces to help us. That is the reason why we would like to have a political solution to prevent internal interference. But if there is no political solution, they cannot expect us to fulfill our conditions alone. And, if it happened that Pol Pot came back, we think that not only the Vietnamese, but the U.S. would come and help us.

Did you say "would" or "could"?

With regard to the U.S., I do know they are concerned about the Khmer Rouge returning but whether or not they now want to assist or not, I don't know.

As an example, if it happened, it is not only the Vietnamese but the international community that is worried about this. In the U.S. there is a group carrying out activities to prevent Pol Pot's return. I believe the U.S. wants to oppose Pol Pot.

In fact, while there are forces against the Khmer Rouge there are also forces inclined toward returning him. President Bush met with Prince Sihanouk. Bush has declared that the U.S. will support the Coalition. Is it Sihanouk or Pol Pot they think they are supporting?

The Coalition is like a boat steered by Pol Pot not by Sihanouk. To assist the non-communist resistance is to open the door for the return of Pol Pot. It is true that if one tries to weaken the PRK, it just helps Pol Pot.

I am sure you know about Sihanouk and Son Sann. The aid just helps them buy villas in the U.S. and France. There are parts of the non-communist resistance that fight against us. But I can assure you that these forces cannot fight against Pol Pot.

You have said that the Khmer Rouge force strength is exaggerated. How strong are they?

Concerning the exaggerated strength of the Khmer Rouge, there is a saying that "one is not afraid of tigers but of their footsteps."

Let's talk about Khmer Rouge before 1975 and Khmer Rouge now. The estimators seem to think of Khmer Rouge as in 1975. But I can assure you they are not like that. The main difference is the absence of popular support. One can compare the popularity of the Khmer Rouge with our forces during the last ten years. We have started rebuilding our forces from scratch.

You can't imagine how it was ten years ago. Only 70 persons, mostly women and children were in Phnom Penh to greet us then. Now three-quarters of the Vietnamese

forces are gone. And at this time, the Pol Pot forces cannot control a single part of the country despite ten years of struggle.

This situation reflects the relationship of forces. If there is a political solution and no outside help to the Khmer Rouge, they will dissolve. Pol Pot stays in business now only because:

1) Sihanouk and Son Sann are joining Pol Pot to hid the guilty faces of the Khmer Rouge and to help in the international arena and

2) China and Thailand and other countries are helping the Khmer Rouge.

In saying this, I don't deny the pressure of the Pol Pot forces. There are some and they can produce instability.

But Pol Pot forces planned, in 1979, three stages of military development. The first was "guerilla forces," the second was "tug of war" and the third was "full offensive". They wanted two zones: one under their forces and one under ours. They anticipated a zone along the border by means of using the refugee camps as a structure of government. And in early 1975, they did establish a number of zones.

How far can they reach now? Are they in condition 1,2, or 3? They are in 1 still! split all over and aiming at civilian targets.

Since 1985, when we crushed all their bases, they went to small units. The small units cannot solve any military problems. They can only bring destruction to civilians.

Pol Pot is now trying to avoid conflict with us. And this despite a 75% withdrawal of Vietnamese forces. They are still not in a position to hold territory. In such a situation, we only need to cut the border. Thus, it is the footsteps of the tiger that is frightening the international community.

Has Prince Sihanouk's increasingly close relationship with the Khmer Rouge—leading the coalition of which the Khmer Rouge is the main part—destroyed his usefulness as a leader in Cambodia or is he still respected by the people? What role is open to him here now?

This seems to be the logic of Sihanouk: when he comes closer to the Cambodian people, he moves further from the Khmer Rouge. But when he is closer to the Khmer Rouge, he is further from the people.

This is what the West misses. Many think he is the key to the settlement. But one should stand right in front of a mirror to see oneself.

Sihanouk followed a suicidal strategy through his association with Pol Pot. I clearly explained to him that I considered him as part of a solution. I told him that had I considered him an enemy it would be, for me, a good sign to see him so close to the Khmer Rouge. In that, Sihanouk offers me a vulnerability.

Just now, I have sent a message to my people telling them that Sihanouk is working with the Khmer Rouge to oppose us. Is he still loved and respected? I cannot categorically say if he has people loving him. But I would like to discuss some periods of history to illuminate this. In 1970, there was a coup here through the intervention of

U.S. forces. At that time, it was the beginning of two zones of separate control and a splitting of ideologies.

In the Lon Nol area, there were gatherings to react to Sihanouk. Whether this hurt Sihanouk depends on the person's agenda. But there were millions against Sihanouk at that time.

The Khmer Rouge used Sihanouk to fight against Lon Nol. But by that time, they established liberated zones and condemned feudalism (i.e. Sihanouk). At that time, everyone saw that he could not help the Kampuchean people while Chief of State of the Khmer Rouge. Although he resigned, he could not help save the Kampuchean people from the killing. This is useful for us as propaganda at this time. What had he done, after all, for the Kampuchean people from 1975 to 1978?

And third, after liberation, Sihanouk helped the Khmer Rouge. This is a very weak point which we can use against Sihanouk. It is true that, during talks with us, he moved away from the Khmer Rouge. And this helped his prestige.

But each time, he always returned to Pol Pot and supported military activities against the people.

I have been advised by many people not to conduct further talks with Sihanouk. There are even fears of a plot to kill me through Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge. Now that Sihanouk is back again with the Khmer Rouge, it is a strong case which they are making to me.

On his popularity, he has been gone now for 19 years. Now people under 30 do not know him. Please do not think that people under 30 support him. Many people are in this category and they will vote for Samrin. Sihanouk should see himself in the mirror.

Leaving out the military, there are 200,000 civil servants and their families, parents and relatives. They are not going to assist Sihanouk and reject their relatives.



Quarry workers and children. "If there were any chance of the Khmer Rouge coming back, we would prefer to have the Vietnamese stay."

The thing that is laughable was when Sihanouk said on the VOA that Khmer said that he would receive more than 80% of a vote. School children were laughing and saying "Are we going to support Sihanouk?"

I wish the West would stop seeing Sihanouk as a symbol of national unity or as a key to the political solution. We can consider him part of the solution and part of national reconciliation.

After all, since 1980, he has led the Coalition. But he cannot get unity even with his son. The forces of Ranariddh and another son, Sihanoni, are in dispute. Even among his entourage there is no unity. If you are getting deeper into this, you will see. Really, only three countries still support Sihanouk—China, U.S. and France.

Among ASEAN countries, they are reducing their support of Sihanouk. His changing moods and mercurial behavior lose him support. During the Jakarta talks, there were some strange things happening.

Previously, the ASEAN countries talked about Sihanouk. But at the last meeting, the ASEAN countries said nothing about him with the exception of Singapore. They are angry with him.

On the future role of Sihanouk, I can say frankly that I asked him to be head of State at the end of 1987 and he treated this offer as if it were a child's game. During 1988, I promised him that we would back him as Chief of State to the people. Again he considered it a game and thought we were weak and needed him. In a situation like this, we should revise our position.

So we decided to let his position depend upon the Kampuchean people. So everything depends now on his goodwill gestures.

In the recent talks at Jakarta, discussion turned to provisional governments under his leadership. I said we must leave this to the Kampuchean people for their decision. This is why in the consensus statement, there is a phrase—"differences exist on the provisional government"—because I objected to the idea.



Children everywhere

So he is either with Pol Pot or with us. If he continues to be with Pol Pot, there is no way to assist him. If he leaves Pol Pot, we will revise our position. For the sake of national reconciliation, we have plenty of positions.

What kind of economic system and political freedoms will PRK have if there is no settlement? What about rights to speak and to travel, for example?

If there is no political settlement, we have already paved the way to go forward without one. Right here, we belong to a socialist community, but we are not behaving like the socialist countries.

We say that we need a "hat" of our own, but not anybody else's hat. This is why so many people are amazed to see our economic system. You have seen that there is no political solution and yet there is trade in the market and we have: state economy, collective economic structures; family economies; private economies and joint ventures between state and private parties.

We are encouraging joint ventures. The main thing is to raise the standard of living. Concerning the collective economy, it is not like that of other countries. It is more like a corporation.

During the past week, we have amended some parts of the Constitution to help private agriculture.

Right now, the economy is much like that of the pre-1970 Sihanouk period. So we have chosen one particular path to encourage democratic politics and to boost efficient management. We are continuing to change some parts of the Constitution.

So the economic situation will evolve as the people get more educated?

Exactly!

Sihanouk wants a system like that of France. This cannot be determined, however, without the Kampuchean people.

People should have, also, the right to any religion.

If they want to coordinate their activities for greater productivity, they should be free to do so.

This is why I said we should have our own "hat". So we need that our hat should be chosen by our own people.


On travel and speech?

On these and religion, people have enjoyed more freedom now than they had in Sihanouk's time. In Sihanouk's time, who could raise a finger against feudalism. Khieu Samphan and others had to flee to the jungle because of their criticisms of Sihanouk.

Talking about journalism, they just write it and reflect what the people think vis-a-vis the Government. They have raised the questions of mismanagement of Government and officials as their right. No one is beyond the law.

But in Sihanouk's time, there were people beyond the law in the police and in the army. Among them was Sihanouk and Lon Nol did not respect the law.

This is why we created a military tribunal. Another one who was above the law in Sihanouk's time was the Presi-



School parking lot

dent of the Bank. Whereas with us, no one is above the law.

Anyone has the right, now, to sue officials who do not respect the law. Indeed, we have two institutions—a control commission and a tribunal.

These institutions have the duty of receiving all complaints of misdealing. If they cannot be resolved by the control commission, the complaints go to the tribunal. And they can even go directly to the tribunal.

On the right to travel, it is becoming chaotic and is too free. Although we don't have identity cards, people travel from the East to the Western border. They go to Thailand and we don't know even when they come back.

We have especially the problem of cars and motorbikes without registration plates. This is partly the fault of the authorities who don't have time to register the vehicles. But when some family has three bikes changed in a month, it takes time to catch up.

Thank you very much.



The Negotiations Over Kampuchea

The negotiations can be divided into "external" and "internal" aspects.

The Vietnamese are prepared to withdraw their forces as early as September 1989 if the external aspects can be resolved. For example, Nguyen Co Thach has said that the Chinese have agreed to terminate foreign aid to the Khmer Rouge the day the final Vietnamese troops leave Kampuchea. (However, the Chinese agreement with the Soviets is more vague on when the aid to the Khmer Rouge would be cut off.)

The Vietnamese would then permit the Kampuchean factions to sort out the internal problems by themselves. And if the Khmer Rouge began to gain the upper hand, the Vietnamese say that they would simply await the international community's handling of the matter—it being the international community that had insisted they leave.

Thus Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach said on February 21, "We will not allow the disagreements among the Kampuchean parties on the internal aspect of the Kampuchean problem to obstruct the settlement of the external aspect of the Kampuchean problem." And on February 22, ". . . if Pol Pot comes back again, it is the responsibility of the people who condemned Vietnam for being in Kampuchea."

In response, however, Prince Norodim Ranariddh said that Vietnam must be held responsible for both the internal and external aspects of the problem. The Khmer Rouge and the Sihanouk factions want the internal aspects to be agreed along with external. They now fear the unilateral Vietnamese withdrawal which they had earlier insisted upon.

After the second Jakarta meeting, the four Cambodian

parties were given four months to negotiate among themselves.

The insurgents want a U.N. international peacekeeping force to monitor the agreement to prevent any Cambodian party from monopolizing power and prevent civil war. The PRK distrusts the U.N. which, after all, recognizes the Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea. It prefers a much less-armed control mechanism. Foreign observers do not think that the U.N. would supply a force capable of preventing civil war and preventing any Cambodian party from monopolizing power—this requires real fighting in the jungle.

The PRK want the armed forces of the Kampuchean parties to remain where they are after the ceasefire. The Khmer Rouge want each faction to be represented by 10,000 persons so that all armies would be cut to the same size.

On the Administrative side, the differences turn on who runs the country between the time of the agreement and the time of the elections. The insurgents want the PRK Government bypassed, or even dismantled. They want an interim "provisional quadripartite government of national reconciliation" to run the country during that time.

The PRK, on the other hand, wants a Council of National Reconciliation to oversee the elections while its government continues to operate. The council, it says, would be presided over by Sihanouk with three vice chairmen. The Council would set up electoral rules, control elections and eventually draft a new constitution.

The PRK is willing to have a multiparty state (at present the People's Revolutionary Part of Kampuchea [PRPK] is the only party.) □

ILLEGAL OCCUPATION?

International legal experts advise FAS that the three elements of a right to "self-defense" are: 1) good faith attempts to resolve the crisis; 2) proportionality of response; and 3) actual need for defense.

According to scholars, (see for example, Chanda, pg. 193) Khmer Rouge attacks on Vietnam began in September 1977 launched, it is believed, by Divisions three and four of Cambodia's Eastern Zone. (Actually, Hun Sen, now Prime Minister of the PRK had received orders in early 1977 to carry out such attacks in May up to a distance of nine miles of Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province. He refused to accept the orders, retreated with his forces into the jungle and, later, went over to the Vietnamese side.) Rather than make the news public, the Vietnamese chastised a general who had given the information to a reporter, suppressed the report, and appealed to China to stop it. China did, in fact, arrange meetings between the two sides in October which were futile. (pg. 210). These are good faith efforts to resolve the crisis.

In later December, the Vietnamese counterattacked, as one Vietnamese observer noted: "... to make them realize that we are not passive as they have assumed and to tell them that they have to choose the other solution—negotiations." (pg. 206) This is proportionality of response.

To the Vietnamese surprise and embarrassment, Phnom Penh went public, denounced the attack, severed political relations and called for help. No doubt the notion of being at war with Vietnam helped Pol Pot's campaign to maintain his purges on the basis of a war-time footing with Vietnam.

The Vietnamese then proposed, on February 5, 1978, a three-point proposal calling for mutual withdrawal of approximately three miles, signing of a nonaggression treaty

and international supervision of the border." This was a further good faith effort, although undertaken, it appears, without any hope that the Pol Pot people would accept this or anything else.

On the contrary, as Ieng Sary later explained in Phnom Penh, the approach of Pol Pot was that because Vietnam had penetrated into Cambodian territory, "we must launch offensives to push them out and push them very far into their own territory."

The Vietnamese would thus seem to have a legal defense for their response to attacks on them and Pol Pot would seem to be the "root cause" of the problem in Indochina. ■

Sihanouk's Style Examined by Bangkok Post

Sihanouk, who has been described as "mercurial" and "unpredictable," boycotted last week's Khmer talks in Jakarta because, he said, his plan was rejected by Phnom Penh Premier, Hun Sen, and also because of his dissatisfaction with Hun Sen's recent quasi-official visit to Bangkok. . . . [the Prince] fell back on his old habit of parry-and-thrust diplomatic fencing. As the muddle of the Jakarta talks shows, this outdated politicking is no longer a valid form of resistance—not when the Vietnamese claim to be coordinating a troop withdrawal, and not when a figure like Hun Sen is finding greater acceptance among other countries. . . . The situation has changed, and the mercurial, unpredictable resistance leader must adapt himself to a new political climate."

(Bangkok Post, February 27, 1989.) ■

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300

307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

Return Postage Guaranteed

April 1989, Volume 42, No. 4

Second Class Postage
Paid at
Washington, D.C.

I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1989.
 I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.
 Enclosed is my check for 1989 calendar year dues.

\$25 Member \$75 Supporting \$150 Patron \$1000 Life \$12.50 Student/Retired

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:
 FAS Public Interest Report—\$25 for calendar year.

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____ Zip _____

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE _____