

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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## GENEVA, NUCLEAR WINTER, STAR WARS, AND SALT II

What follows are four of the most relevant arms control questions of the day—which the reader ought not fear to ask.

### (1) What Might Work At Geneva?

One answer is to start the process of percentage annual reductions (PAR) of the Salt II limits and sublimits, which FAS has long championed, on a continuing and open-ended basis. There would be the obvious understanding that these reductions would cease if it seemed that Star Wars field-testing or deployment of ABM systems or components had begun. Thus reductions would hold Star Wars hostage with an Arms Control Embrace (ACE). This, it is explained on page 3, may be the Soviet ace in the hole.

### (2) What Does Nuclear Winter Mean for Strategic Policy?

While Nuclear Winter may underline the long-run importance of major nuclear arms control reductions, these obviously cannot be achieved quickly. In the short run, the meaning of Nuclear Winter may be the new

self-interest each side will have in avoiding the targeting of the cities of the other side—if only to prevent still further climatic changes resulting from the smoke that the burning of those cities will produce. Happily such a proposal needs no agreement. Instead, the two sides need to be sensitized to the fact that “revenge” has become counterproductive.

### (3) Could the Arms Race Be Ended with a Star Wars Defense?

The answer lies in the analysis on page 5 that “Star Wars Once Was.” Here we reveal the startling fact that the U.S. once had the perfect Star Wars defense. But for the same reason it lost it then, it will lose it again. This is a quite serious and decisive case against the Star Wars program.

### (4) Who’s Against Extending the Salt II Treaty?

On page 6, we explain why, in our view, all of the major U.S. actors ought to be, by rights, in favor of extending this still-unratified agreement.

## SOME RELATED ISSUES

Besides dealing with the four key questions above, this Report contains a special inserted brochure describing the SALT II Treaty and the advantages of having both sides adhere to its terms at the end of this year (for the pros and cons see also our October 1984 Report).

On March 21, in answer to a question about this, President Reagan said we were “not going to do anything to undercut the negotiations that are going on” but seemed to suggest that our bumping up above one of the SALT II limits—which our submarine-based missiles are scheduled to do—could be compared with Soviet failures to observe “all the niceties of all the treaties.” SALT II may be unraveling even if it is not deemed to have run out.

Members are encouraged to distribute, xerox, or order more of these brochures (50 cents each).

### Congressional Travel

The Federation’s two-year project on encouraging parliamentary travel has been having some striking successes. A team of ten women volunteers has now visited about 250 of the 375 House and Senate offices whose members have not visited the Soviet Union. The team ar-

ranged two splendid lunches—one for 20 Senators and one for 55 Congressmen; at neither of these was anything said against the goals of our project.

On March 21 Tass reported that the Soviet Politburo had approved a report of the trip to the U.S. of Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky and said that some ties between the superpowers’ legislatures were “in the interests of consolidating peace.” Hopefully, the reciprocal visit planned for the second week of April by House Speaker O’Neill will advance these ties. FAS is urging exchanges between committees of the two parliaments rather than just exchanges between the parliaments themselves.

### Visit to Moscow

The Federation is sending a small delegation to Moscow in the first week of April to exchange views on arms control with the Soviet Academy of Sciences and to discuss issues of mutual interest. This is part of the traveling arms control school which it has agreed with the Soviet Academy to create, with lectures given alternately here and in the Soviet Union every six months.

## BAN ON NEW MIRVED ICBMS URGED

A dormant proposal for bartering the MX for the Soviet SS-X-24 was reinvigorated by the endorsement of Clark M. Clifford, Gerard C. Smith, and Paul C. Warnke—a former Secretary of Defense and two former SALT negotiators.

In a March 16 letter to the Washington Post, the three experienced defense analysts opposed the notion that the Administration was seriously interested in bargaining with MX and said of bargaining chips in general that "Once deployed, the chip is a weapon nearly impossible to halt."

The three urged that:

"If, in fact, the MX is to be regarded as a valuable bargaining chip, then it should be used seriously for bargaining purposes. Therefore any congressional approval of funding for further MX deployments should be conditioned upon an undertaking by the Administration to propose to the Soviets a ban on all new MIRVED ICBMs. The MX, under these circumstances, would continue only if this proposal is rejected by the Soviets."

It is entirely possible that this MX proposal will play a central role in the upcoming fight over MX when the 1986 authorization bills come up. With both Houses evenly divided over MX, an arms control solution to determining the vote is the usual Congressional solution.

The notion of swapping the MX for a counterpart missile surfaced in 1983 when FAS testimony to the Scowcroft Commission proposed that the two sides simply eliminate the SALT II permission for one new ICBM—something which, at one time, Paul C. Warnke had been authorized to negotiate as SALT negotiator. (See "Barter the MX," New York Times, Feb. 14, 1983, Jeremy J. Stone)

This was followed up by a Levin-Kasselbaum amendment in which these two Senators, with several other moderate co-sponsors, proposed to limit the swap to precluding new MIRVED ICBMs so as to permit the new single-warheaded Midgetman ICBM on our side.

Reinvented and somewhat redesigned, the Clifford-Smith-Warnke initiative promises some movement on this front soon.



Clark Clifford

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## A BEAR HUG TO AVOID STAR WARS?

The Reagan Administration says it wants, during the next 10 years, a "radical reduction" in offensive nuclear arms. Indeed, such reductions are increasingly admitted to be crucial to the success of the defensive weapons the Administration also seeks. Paul Nitze, the coordinator of Administration arms control policy, even said in a recent speech that "widespread deployments" of defenses would "accompany" the "global elimination of nuclear weapons" as a means of assuring against cheating.

Many observers have concluded that talk of radical reductions is just talk, unlikely to lead to any actual diminishing of nuclear arsenals. But the new Soviet leadership might be able to force such reductions if it played its cards properly.

The Soviets clearly see the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") as an enormous obstacle to new agreements. But what if the Soviet Union decided to try to preempt and preclude Star Wars deployment through an agreement on reductions of offensive weapons? For example, the Soviets might propose a program of continuing, progressively deeper cuts in offensive weapons that would continue only as long as the United States refrains from field-testing or deploying Star Wars systems prohibited by the 1972 treaty banning antiballistic missile systems. A well-designed program of annual reductions of 5 percent in each side's inventory of nuclear warheads would lead to substantial reductions in a relatively brief period of time and could politically tie up Star Wars. This might be the Soviet ace in the hole—a strategy of Arms Control Embrace (ACE).

### Soviets' First Instinct

Of course to make such a proposal the Soviets would have to overcome their first instinct, which was outlined in Washington recently by Col. Gen. Nikolai F. Chervov of the Soviet general staff. If the United States proceeds with Star Wars, Chervov said, the Soviet Union will respond by adding new capabilities to its offensive arsenal. It's not surprising that a Soviet general would think the best response to new American defensive measures is more offense that could overcome them. Indeed, this has been the traditional approach of both superpowers and explains why they adopted the 1972 ABM Treaty.

But the Star Wars defense will be a long time building, and to respond to it the Soviets will have to come up with new kinds of offensive weapons and new tactics anyway—so reductions of existing offensive systems could still be possible.

The ACE strategy is also consistent with the Soviet use of arms control to moderate U.S.-Soviet relations.

It is, of course, precisely this "bear hug" approach that is often feared by hawks opposing arms control, on the grounds that relaxation of tension will really mean relaxation of American vigilance. On the other hand, steady reductions over a long period of time would be an appealing idea, bound to find many supporters in this country, thus making it harder to reject.

Indeed, there has already been considerable support in this country for the idea of progressive, steady reductions. In 1979, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously supported a resolution urging Moscow and Washington to pursue "...continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the [SALT II] treaty so as to take advantage of the treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms..."

At the June 1979 Vienna summit—after six months of Pentagon studies of the proposal—President Carter suggested just such an agreement: a 5 percent per year shrinkage of SALT II limits and sublimits for five years. As he reported later on his conversations with Leonid Brezhnev, "We both believed that we might conclude a 50 percent reduction in nuclear arsenals on both sides even below the SALT II levels." This would suggest that the Pentagon signed off on at least several years of this percentage-annual-reduction shrinkage of SALT II limits.

### Shrinking SALT II & The Reagan Plan

FAS testimony has shown mathematically that shrinking SALT II by 50 percent would achieve most of the goals set by President Reagan in his 1982 Eureka College speech that called for, among other things, reducing ballistic missile warheads to about 5,000. And while the Reagan Administration called the SALT II Treaty "fatally flawed," the principal flaw now cited was the treaty's failure to include disarmament, which a proposal to shrink SALT II would repair.

Moreover, an agreement of this kind would be easy to negotiate—it requires agreement on only a single percentage. Proposing it would give the Soviets both the moral high ground in this round of negotiations and a real prospect of heading off the defensive arms race that certainly concerns them. Public opinion in Europe and America would surely be impressed by such an offer.

But a successful negotiation along these lines would not have to be seen as a victory for the Russians. On the contrary, it would give President Reagan an enormous triumph—he could describe it as just what he intended all along, real reductions. And he could keep his Star Wars research, provided it stays in the laboratories.

If, after far-reaching reductions, the two sides were willing to accept, wanted to purchase, and could figure out how to live with some kind of population defense, the President could get that too.

Finally, for those of us who believe that Star Wars puts us on absolutely the wrong road for national security, we would get preemptive arms control instead. With the idea of building a defense gaining momentum in America, there may be no better solution for the Soviets than to hold Star Wars hostage with a reduction agreement of unlimited duration.—JJS

*(This article is reprinted from the March 17 Washington Post Outlook Section.)*

## NUCLEAR WINTER: SELF-INTEREST IN AVOIDING REVENGE?

Does Nuclear Winter make any difference or is it, for policy, just catastrophic overkill? This was the question at March 14 hearings chaired by Congressman James Scheuer (D., N.Y.) and Morris K. Udall (D., Ariz.) to review a Congressionally-mandated report.

Carl Sagan led off with the view that major reductions were the main policy conclusion, with the objective of getting the nuclear armories below the levels that would result in Nuclear Winter. He urged, as a method, the proposal of Admiral Noel Gaylor in which fissionable material from warheads on both sides was traded in, first from the warheads least desired and later from the more relevant ones. (This requires, in particular, the fissionable material cut-off discussed in the FAS newsletter of Feb. 1985 by Frank von Hippel and Barbara Levi.)

Assistant Secretary Richard Perle responded that there is not "a shred of evidence" that DOD's policy is not better than any that could be "put in its place." DOD does agree that Nuclear Winter "would occur" at some level of nuclear war. But its solution was to continue doing what it was doing to prevent nuclear war. Perle accused Paul C. Warnke and Gerard C. Smith of having "brought us treaties that have brought us more (rather than less) warheads," whereas his administration had proposed the total elimination of such categories of weapons as intermediate-range nuclear warheads.

Testimony by FAS Director Stone may have brought up the only cost-free "new" policy issue raised by Nuclear Winter—the new incentive not to attack cities. It is the burning of cities that produces most of the smoke that causes the Nuclear Winter. The testimony argued that each side had a new and real reason not to fire at the other's cities, even *in extremis*. Nuclear Winter taught us the "self-interest in avoiding revenge." The testimony follows:

### CITIES ARE TARGETED

Notwithstanding the disingenuous comments in the DOD report, that the SIOP (i.e., the "war plan") "consciously does not target population," cities are certainly targeted. In October 1980, a directive abandoned the requirement that the destruction of 70 percent of Soviet economic recovery and war-supporting assets be the priority mission of American strategic nuclear forces, but Desmond Ball observes "...it still remains the case that the top 300 urban-industrial areas in the Soviet Union will continue to receive about the same amount of nuclear firepower and to suffer about the same amount of damage."

In other words, the United States, consciously or unconsciously, is targeting the Soviet urban complex. And while there are options for "withhold" of attacks on cities, there is no assertion in the DOD report that this "withhold" has been supported by the imperatives of Nuclear Winter or reviewed in that light.

### Testimony on Nuclear Winter

"The possibility of Nuclear Winter gives both sides a further incentive to avoid attacking urban areas, where the most inflammable substances are, in the case of nuclear war.

"For the United States, such attacks are likely to come only *in extremis*, when we are losing command and control of our forces and/or believe that the urban areas of the United States are already under attack.

"In both cases, Nuclear Winter is a good new reason to review the war plans to further inhibit such attacks. In effect, revenge—which would be termed by the Defense Department inhibiting Soviet economic recovery—would only make things worse for our survivors and for the world.

### Labeling War Plans

"It is very important to have these war-plan options heavily labeled in this way as hazardous to our own health because, by the nature of the case, we are not sure even who will be pushing this final button—it could be military commanders rather than the President. Conceivably the option of full-scale attack on Soviet urban areas should be removed. It is true that European cities, as well as an unknown number of our own, might well be burning already by that time. Nevertheless, adding hundreds of Soviet cities to the pyre will simply, according to Nuclear Winter theories, importantly add to the problem.

"It should be remembered, as President Reagan reminded us last week—in his comments to Politburo member Scherbitsky—that the Soviet citizens do not make policy. Why then should they be attacked?

"In a similar way, Nuclear Winter is a potentially important inhibition on Soviet decision-makers to avoid attacking U.S. cities. Quite possibly, the Soviet side does not now even have options that separate such attacks from attacks on forces. They are often behind in such war-game finesse. Nuclear Winter, if made persuasive to them, might induce 'withhold' options on U.S. cities—as we have 'withhold' options designed to protect Soviet citizens—and might, in the event, persuade some Soviet decision-



Chairmen Scheuer and Udall, Nuclear Winter hearings.

maker to give the world a break by sparing U.S. cities as the two superpowers reach a devastating climax.

"Accordingly, Nuclear Winter gives the Defense Department a new angle with which to persuade Soviet officials not to fire their missiles at our cities. They should welcome it and work on it. Meanwhile, it gives them a new reason to review their ultimate war-plan options, with a view to not using these options in our national interest—if nothing else. In both these matters, the Defense Department report is insufficiently enthusiastic about this Nuclear Winter theory and is mainly opportunist and complacent in saying that a number of things which it has done earlier (such as MIRVing) or says it wants to do now (such as Star Wars, disarmament, and weapon modernization) are marvelously consistent with Nuclear Winter theory. DOD's only references to the war plans are quite misleading (suggesting to the unwary that Soviet cities are not targeted) and do not suggest that it has reviewed them in this light.

"Lesser war plan options than attacks on Soviet cities might affect the climate as the Tambora, Indonesia volcanic eruption did—in producing a year without a summer in 1815—by changing the temperature one degree rather than the 10 to 25 degrees discussed in the NAS report. Obviously a year without a summer in the northern hemisphere would greatly complicate, if not prevent, recovery.

#### First Strike Options

"Thus it is useful to ask DOD whether attack options against Soviet forces, which require attacking perhaps 2,000 targets—many in populated Western Europe and many co-located with cities, such as bomber bases and submarine bases—might produce less than a Nuclear Winter but still an important effect. Such attacks are well deterred on both sides today by strategic forces, but additional deterrence is always valuable. And if both sides get into the unstable world of Star Wars defenses, such awareness of Nuclear Winter consequences could be more important still.

"Finally, it should be emphasized that Nuclear Winter is not the only theory of widescale collateral destruction arising from nuclear war. The 1975 study of the National Academy of Sciences, entitled 'Long-term World-wide Effects of Multiple-Nuclear Weapons Detonations,' talked not only of the possibility of 'a major global climatic change.' It also spoke of problems on the ground ('ionizing radiation could cause disease epidemics in crops and domesticated animals on a global scale') and in the oceans ('...irreversible injury to the sensitive aquatic species might occur during the year of increase of uv-B following the detonations.')

"All of these possibilities deserve further study because they are important, obviously, and because they add to deterrence.

"Nuclear Winter theories have increased the stakes in nuclear war, and Congress should insist that the Defense Department review the game. This means strengthening oversight of the war plans and getting a bit more deeply into war-fighting strategy. But, probably, Congress should have been doing more of this anyway." □

## STAR WARS ONCE WAS!

Administrative spokesmen are fond of defending the Star Wars program by asking rhetorically: "Why are the Soviets worried if it is so certain that it won't work?" History and a semantic analysis of the words "work" and "it" provide an easy answer.

In the first place, it is obvious that if "work" means the U.S. can reasonably rely upon the system carrying out its purpose, then it cannot "work." No system, based on any physical principles, can be reasonably expected to fulfill its function if that function cannot be tested repeatedly and realistically, and if it is to eliminate hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads fired against it with unknown tactics.

But "work" is the least of the obstacles; the real problem is "it." Star Wars proponents are fond of assuming that "it" is some system when, in fact, "it" is a "strategy"—the strategy of defending the United States against nuclear war. Such a strategy requires many systems at any one time and, even more serious, requires a series of systems over decades as each system is neutralized by new generations of Soviet scientists.

For example, let us assume the miracle that a U.S. system would shoot down all Soviet ICBMs and their warheads and, in addition, do it with complete reliability known to us in advance. Let us assume the further miracles that this system would do the same with Soviet nuclear-armed cruise missiles and Soviet nuclear-armed bombers. "Now," Star Wars proponents would say, "we're getting somewhere."


#### The Miracles Move Us Backward

In fact, we would simply have moved backward to the late 1940s when we had the atomic bomb and, because they did not, we had a perfect defense. What happened then?

Did we, as Bertrand Russell once suggested, launch a preemptive nuclear attack to prevent the contest from developing to its present deadly overkill? We did not. And certainly we would not do so now.

So what happened then would happen again. The Russians just waited—waited until they could assimilate the new technology. In a few years, they had the atomic bomb. Similarly, in a few years, appraised of the technology we were using for our Star Wars defense, they would find ways of neutralizing it.

*(Continued on page 6)*



*Bertrand Russell*

(Continued from page 5)

For a few years, in our miraculous scenario, we would indeed have a defense. But even in this scenario we would have purchased defense for a few years at the cost of an accelerated arms race for many more years with weapons that are likely to be ever more hair-trigger and dangerous.

This analysis explains why the Russians can be worried even though "it" won't work. "It" won't work precisely because the Soviets will hold up their end of a struggle to prevent the strategy "it" represents from working. And so, while we and they know quite well that no lasting total defense can work, it does require them to run a new round of arms race. They are right to oppose it—and indeed they are saying nothing more than was brought to their attention about defensive systems by American scientists in the period 1963-1972 when the present ABM Treaty was debated and accepted.

The Star Wars program is, really, a national hoax. As the then-Undersecretary of Defense, Richard DeLauer, put it with courageous candor, "With unconstrained proliferation of Soviet missiles, no defensive system will work." And there is simply no reason to believe that the Soviet Union would confront our defensive efforts with anything other than unconstrained proliferation of offensive weapons. Surely we would not!

It is embarrassing to see so many of the Washington fish explaining how grand it is to swim in this new direction when, one day before the President spoke, they were exclaiming how grand it was to swim in another offense-dominant direction—so long as they could have a bit more offensive firepower in the MX.

There is not going to be an end to technological history timed precisely to the day when we get our Star Wars defense. Never has the fallacy of the last move been made in such a grand fashion as it has been made by President Reagan. And rarely in this splendid democracy have so many failed to denounce what, in their hearts, they know is wrong.—JJS



Richard D. DeLauer

## SALT II: SOMETHING FOR EVERYONE

(The summary of the advantages of SALT II was prepared by FAS staffer Jonathan Rich.)

SALT II has been criticized by liberals and conservatives alike for its high limits and its failure to cap the buildup of nuclear arsenals. Six years after its conclusion in 1979, U.S. and Soviet forces have, as predicted, undergone significant expansion within the SALT II framework. Yet both sides are now close to, if not at, the most important limits. Thus, if extended in time, the SALT II limits will constrain the future arsenals of each nation, particularly those of the Soviet Union, which is better positioned in most areas to move ahead. This much-maligned treaty now offers demonstrable advantages to all sides of the arms control spectrum.

*For the Hawks:*

The Soviets have traditionally relied on larger missiles—and larger numbers of them—to offset American technological and operational advantages. SALT favors these American technological advantages, by restricting Soviet quantitative strengths. For example, an American decision to abandon SALT II in order to accommodate current Trident submarine and cruise missile programs would give the United States only a hundred or so additional SLBMs and cruise missile launchers over the SALT ceilings. For the Soviets, who are already up to the constraining limits on 308 "heavy" ICBMs and 820 MIRVed ICBMs, the abandonment of SALT would allow them to expand dramatically in almost every category of strategic comparison.

The Committee on the Present Danger, a conservative organization often credited with blocking SALT II's ratification, apparently shares our assessment of America's inability to compete in such an arms race. In the 1985 edition of their publication "Can America Catch Up," the Committee made the following observations:

"Over the past ten years, Soviet ICBM production and deployments have continued at much higher rates than in the U.S....Soviet SSBN and SLBM production and deployments continue to outpace that of the United States." Moreover, the Committee predicted that "The Soviets will continue their military buildup with no diminution of effort or determination." They also pointed out that "The Department of Defense forecasts no let-up in the rate of deployment of Soviet systems over the next ten years." Furthermore, "...the Soviets have the capacity to continue building warheads at their current rate."

Thus, the Committee concluded: "Even if the planned improvements to U.S. strategic forces are fully funded, the United States will be unable to restore strategic equivalence with the Soviet Union in the next ten years...Without a significantly increased and sustained effort, our Committee believes there is little likelihood that U.S. strategic forces will meet the officially established requirements for the maintenance of stability and essential equivalence at any time in this decade or in the early 1990s."

With the defense budget already under heavy scrutiny, it is highly unlikely that spending for strategic weapons will approach the levels advocated by the Committee. Rather than engaging in an unproductive, and unwinnable, arms race, the United States could choose to cap the arms race under extended SALT limits.

*For the Doves:*

The SALT II treaty is far from perfect. Yet, as an agreement that establishes limits on the most destabilizing weapons systems and provides a number of critical verification provisions, it provides an important base for future agreements. The treaty represents a major milestone in a decade-long negotiating process, initiated by President Nixon in 1969. As such, it offers a well-established and -understood framework from which to pursue either a Freeze or further reductions (as witness the proposal to shrink SALT II on page 3). Most important, SALT II is currently the only offensive weapons agreement available. As the U.S. and USSR renew the challenging and time-consuming task of seeking agreement on a range of arms control areas, it is essential that the old SALT limits remain intact.

*For the Strategists:*

The numerical ceilings enumerated in SALT II would preserve essential parity between the two superpowers while encouraging strategic stability. Specifically, these ceilings would prevent the Soviets from building a sea-based counterforce capability, with the eventual potential for simultaneously destroying both U.S. bombers and missiles, and thus reopening the window of vulnerability. By the mid-1990s, the Soviets will be in a position to deploy their own version of the Trident II, with sufficient yield and accuracy to threaten hardened American targets. Under SALT, it would be very difficult for the Soviets to deploy counterforce-capable SLBMs in numbers sufficient to permit the destruction of both American ICBMs and bombers. Without SALT, however, theoretically the Soviet submarine force could have the warheads and yield to perform both tasks.

SALT II would also preclude the Soviets from overwhelming a future American force of single-warhead, "Midgetman" missiles with an expanded arsenal of land- and sea-based missiles. The deployment of thousands of additional high-yield warheads would probably frustrate current American efforts to enhance the survivability of its land-based ICBM force through the deployment of the Midgetman in either mobile launchers or super-hardened silos.

*For the Star Wars supporter:*

A decision to abandon SALT would run at direct cross-purposes with the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). President Reagan and a number of top Administration officials have emphasized their desire that SDI lead the way to simultaneous deep cuts in both sides'

offensive forces. Indeed, many analysts, including the Administration's own Hoffman Panel, have argued that an umbrella population defense is feasible only in the context of sharp reductions in ballistic missiles. The Soviets are already concerned that the Administration's Strategic Defensive Initiative could eventually undermine their nuclear deterrent. The most obvious and effective response to the threat of an American anti-missile system would be a massive buildup of Soviet offensive missiles. Giving up SALT II would permit the Soviets to pursue this sort of expansion.

For those advocates of a more limited site defense, SALT II is also an imperative. Terminal defense of missile silos and other strategic assets is conceivable only against a restricted number of attacking Soviet RVs. Under SALT II, the Soviets will be able to increase their total number of ballistic missile warheads by only several thousand over the next decade. But in its absence, this number could jump from about 8,000 to more than 30,000 by 1995, a force capable of overwhelming any potential site defense.

*For the Senate:*

On June 19, 1984, the Senate overwhelmingly passed (82-17) a resolution asking the President to continue his policy of "no-undercut" in regard to SALT II and other arms agreements. Having eloquently argued for the continuation of SALT II through December 1985, the Senate should take the lead in efforts to extend the limits. Indeed, a strong pro-SALT majority in the Senate could exert strong pressure on the Administration to preserve the SALT II ceilings as it seeks to renew the arms control process in Geneva. The Senate will have an opportunity to endorse this policy by signing on to a recently-offered concurrent resolution—co-sponsored by Senators Bumpers, Leahy, Chafee and Heinz—which calls for adherence to SALT II through December 1986.

*For the President:*

On May 31, 1982 President Reagan stated that "As for existing strategic arms agreements, we will refrain from actions which undercut them so long as the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." During a press conference on January 10, 1985, he further indicated his willingness to extend the SALT II limits after the official expiration of the treaty in December 1985.

The President should fulfill his previously-expressed intentions to maintain the SALT II Treaty. More important, as a second-term President who has made arms control one of his highest priorities, he would not wish to preside over the unraveling of the arms control process that SALT's demise would probably incur. By reaffirming the SALT II ceilings, the President would take an important first step toward his avowed goal of achieving deep reductions in each side's missiles. And, as noted earlier, the President's dream of Star Wars will be far more achievable if the limits on strategic weapons are maintained.

*(Continued on page 8)*

(Continued from page 7)

*For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:*

The Joint Chiefs must assist the Administration in determining those American forces required to maintain our security and defend our vital interests. Assessment of these force requirements depends in part on projections of Soviet strategic systems. Under SALT II, these could be predicted with fairly high confidence. Indeed, the ability to anticipate the characteristics of the other country's military is an important aspect of the force-planning process, and one of the frequently-overlooked benefits of the SALT regime. In the absence of SALT, American force-planning must proceed on the basis of assessments of Soviet production capabilities, an uncertain process that is prone to overestimation and worst-case projections. Without SALT II, our military leadership will have lost an invaluable tool for force-planning and resource allocation.

*For the CIA and other Intelligence Agencies:*

SALT II facilitates the task of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, who regularly monitor a vast array of Soviet weapon activities. It affirmed and expanded several important verification provisions, such as banning interference with verification capabilities. More important, it contained a number of new provisions designed to identify, and thereby restrict, ambiguous or hard-to-monitor activities. Among these was the institution of externally observable or functionally-related observable differences (FRODs), which forced both sides to design certain planes and missiles with distinctive features to help discriminate between them and similar weapons. The work of our intelligence services will become more difficult and less precise if these verification provisions are allowed to expire, rather than be made effective in an extension of SALT II.

*For the Armed Services:*

The Reagan Administration's unprecedented military buildup has concentrated primarily on nuclear weapons. Between FY 1980 and FY 1986, outlays for strategic

weapons increased by more than 300 percent, compared to 50 percent for the entire defense budget. Last year, the Navy unsuccessfully attempted to defer procurement of one Trident submarine in favor of building more surface ships. Moreover, the Air Force is having difficulty reaching its target of deploying 40 fighter wings, in part because of the large outlays going to strategic systems, such as the B-1 bomber and MX. As defense growth is reduced, these systems will compete even more sharply with needed conventional weapons. SALT II would provide a stable framework from which to cut strategic spending, allowing us to focus on conventional forces without jeopardizing our nuclear deterrent.

*For those concerned with Non-Proliferation:*

During the upcoming review conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the non-weapons states intend to concentrate on the dismal status of U.S.-Soviet arms talks, and on the failure of the two superpowers to uphold their treaty obligations to seek significant nuclear disarmament. A failure at least to maintain the last remaining offensive limits, as codified in SALT II, will make cooperation or further progress on the non-proliferation front extremely difficult.

## SALT II EXTENSION

Three methods of extending SALT II exist. One, of course, is to use SALT II as a basis for reductions, as advocated on page 3, and to keep it in place while "shrinking" it.

A second method would be simply to maintain the "no-undercut" policy of the two sides; this is probably the simplest formula to achieve.

The third method would be to have the two sides reaffirm the key parts of the treaty while renegotiating the most troublesome issues.

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**WHAT CAN YOU DO?** Write or contact your US representative and senator, informing them of your concern about SALT II. Write a letter or op-ed piece for your local paper. Point out that the survival of the SALT limits is crucial for the prospects of any new arms agreements, such as the Freeze. Distribute this brochure. Write or call FAS for additional copies.

#### For More Information

Please contact:

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#### Publications on SALT II

FAS Public Interest Report on SALT II adherence, October 1984...\$2 each.

FAS Public Interest Report on Soviet compliance with nuclear arms control agreements, March 1984...\$2 each.

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) was founded in 1945 by atomic scientists of conscience and originally named the Federation of Atomic Scientists (FAS). The oldest group dedicated to controlling the arms race and avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, FAS has a membership of 5,000 scientists, including 50% of the living American Nobel laureates.

### Building Blocks For Future Arms Control

The SALT II Treaty is far from perfect. Yet, as an agreement that establishes limits on the most destabilizing weapons systems, as well as a number of critical verification provisions, it provides an important building block for future agreements. The treaty represents a major milestone in a decade-long negotiating process, initiated by President Nixon in 1969. As such, it offers a well-established and understood framework from which to pursue further reductions. Most important, SALT II is currently the only offensive weapons agreement available. As the US and USSR renew the challenging and time-consuming task of seeking agreement on a range of arms control areas, it is essential that the old SALT limits remain intact.

*"My own view is that this treaty and the process which produced it are extremely valuable contributions in our strategic deterrent posture, and that our defenses are clearly better served with SALT than without it."*

Harold Brown  
Secretary of Defense (1976-80)  
July 1979

### An American Initiative To Extend SALT II

In the interest of preventing a sharp escalation of the arms race—at a time when the US and USSR are renewing an arms control dialogue—the United States should:

• ASK THE SOVIET UNION to agree to a three-year extension of the SALT II limits, or until the two nations negotiate a new arms control treaty.

• PLACE A HIGH PRIORITY on resolving outstanding compliance questions. Where necessary, clarify and amend ambiguous treaty provisions.

• SEEK TO MODIFY SALT II to incorporate reductions in nuclear weapons of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

### The Senate Supports SALT II...

On June 19, 1984, the Senate overwhelmingly passed (82-17) a resolution asking the President to continue his policy of "no-undercut" in regards to SALT II and other arms agreements. Portions of the resolution's text are as follows:

**"The Congress finds that:**

...it would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to international peace and stability, for the last remaining limitations on strategic offensive nuclear weapons to break down or lapse before replacement by a new strategic arms control agreement."

**"It is the sense of Congress that:**

...the United States should continue to carry out its obligations and commitments under...existing strategic arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union continues to observe those provisions, or until a new strategic arms agreement is concluded..."

### But The Administration Is Ambivalent

Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has periodically affirmed its intention not to undercut the SALT II limits. But, as the following comments indicate, the President is not at all certain whether he intends to extend the treaty after it officially expires in December 1985. The Administration must therefore be educated on the requirement for continued adherence.

**Secretary of State George Shultz:**


"I don't want to say precisely what we will do [about SALT]. I do think that the SALT II provisions have time limitations on them. It's not forever." **March 28, 1984**

**President Ronald Reagan:**

"Well, we have been holding to that [SALT] and thought it would be helpful in now what we are planning, going forward with. We will continue on that ground...So yes, we feel that we can live within it." **January 10, 1985**

"We know that we're coming to a point in which we have up until now been abiding by SALT II...We'll have a decision several months from now to make with regard to whether we join them [the Soviets] in violating the restraints." **February 21, 1985**

## UNLESS THE SALT II TREATY IS PRESERVED...



These last remaining  
remnants of offensive  
nuclear weapons  
will expire on  
December 31, 1985.

**AN ENDANGERED TREATY** SALT II, the only existing arms control treaty limiting offensive weapons, will expire at the end of this year. Although both the US and USSR have pledged not to undercut this unratified treaty, the agreement is already in peril. The Reagan Administration has not committed itself to compensate for the introduction of the seventh Trident submarine next September. Unless offset by reductions in older missiles, this development will put the United States over the important SALT II ceiling on missiles with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). For their part, the Soviets are developing at least one new land-based missile, which, if tested or deployed, would also undercut the treaty.

### SALT's Crucial Limits

Signed by President Carter and Soviet Premier Brezhnev in June 1979, SALT II culminated a decade of increasingly restrictive arms control agreements. Specifically, SALT II:

- ESTABLISHED SUBLIMITS and ceilings on the most powerful and destabilizing weapon systems, large ICBMs and land-and sea-based MIRVed missiles. SALT limits both sides to a maximum of 1200 MIRVed missiles, of which no more than 820 can be land-based, while placing a ceiling of 308 on the largest Soviet ICBMs.

- LIMITED THE TOTAL number of missiles and bombers by imposing a ceiling of 2400 strategic launchers. Each side is also restricted to 120 bombers carrying cruise missiles above the 1200 MIRVed missile limit.

- PROHIBITED THE INTRODUCTION of more than one new land-based missile, and banned "heavy" mobile ICBMs and "heavy" Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).

- IMPOSED SEVERAL qualitative constraints, such as the number of warheads allowed on a given missile, and the size and weight of any new missiles.

- AFFIRMED AND ADDED several important verification provisions, such as banning interference with verification capabilities, and the establishment of warhead counting rules for MIRVed missiles.

### What Will Extending SALT II Do?

The numerical ceilings enumerated in SALT II would preserve essential parity between the two superpowers while encouraging strategic stability. Specifically, these ceilings, as shown on the brochure cover, would:

- PREVENT THE SOVIETS from building a sea-based counter-force capability, with the eventual potential for simultaneously destroying both US bombers and missiles.


- FORCE THE SOVIETS to dismantle existing systems to compensate for new missiles, rather than, as they are inclined to do, keeping both.

- PREVENT THE SOVIETS from overwhelming a potential future American force of small, mobile "Midgetman" missiles with an expanded arsenal of land- and sea-based missiles.

- PROVIDE A BASIS for future arms control reductions such as the proposals to "shrink SALT II" with percentage annual reductions (PAR).

### Soviet Missile Warheads

With and Without SALT



*"There is not even a marginal military reason for exceeding the SALT limits... If SALT II disappeared, there's nothing we would do differently."*

General David Jones  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
1981

### The World Without SALT: A No-Win Arms Race

The Soviets have traditionally relied on larger missiles—and larger numbers of them—to offset American technological and operational advantages. SALT favors these American technological advantages by restricting Soviet quantitative strengths. A decision to abandon SALT II in order to accommodate current Trident submarine and cruise missile programs would only give the United States a hundred or so additional SLBMs and cruise missile launchers over the SALT ceilings. For the Soviets, who are already up to the constraining limits on 308 "heavy" ICBMs and 820 MIRVed ICBMs, the abandonment of SALT would allow them a dramatic expansion in almost every category of strategic nuclear weapons:

- THE USSR, with its existing capacity for producing a high volume of ballistic missiles, could churn out hundreds of MIRVed ICBMs much more easily than could the US deploy comparable numbers of the MX.

- IN ADDITION TO A BUILDUP of their existing ICBMs, the Soviets could introduce a new generation of more powerful missiles, reportedly under development.

- WITH OPEN PRODUCTION LINES for two types of submarines, including the new Typhoon, the USSR could reverse America's substantial lead in sea-based missiles.

- ALTHOUGH THE SOVIETS could not immediately match the US in long-range bombers, they could deploy cruise missiles on hundreds of Backfire bombers, a dramatic improvement in capability now prohibited by the treaty.

- BY 1995, THE SOVIETS could field as many as 30,000 ballistic missile warheads and 8,000 bomber-launched cruise missiles.

### Are The Soviets Complying With SALT?

The Soviets have thus far observed all the important SALT ceilings on land- and sea-based MIRVed missiles. Soviet adherence to the SALT I and SALT II agreements has, in fact, resulted in the dismantling of more than 1,000 older land-based missile systems and 160 sea-based launchers since 1972. Recent reports by the Administration and other sources have raised questions as to whether the Soviets are observing other aspects of the treaty. Of the questions raised, only one—the coding of telemetry, the electronic signals sent from a missile test—appears to be a violation. The resolution of this activity, which poses little threat to U.S. security, has been hampered by ambiguous treaty language and the uncertain status of the SALT II Treaty.

*"I think there's no question the Soviets test the limits of any agreement, probe around for loopholes, and perhaps even operate in some ignorance of what the agreements are in various parts of their bureaucracy. The most serious part is to know what to do about it...but they're not really significant enough in themselves to renounce a treaty..."*

*"Yes, I think we should [comply with SALT II]. There are restraints in the treaty on the Soviets which, however modest, are better than having no restraints at all."*

General Brent Scowcroft  
Chairman of the President's Commission  
on Strategic Forces  
January 21, 1985

### SALT II And Star Wars

A decision to abandon SALT—at the same time we are renewing the development of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems—would amount to an open invitation for an unlimited arms race in offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviets are already concerned that the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative, alias "Star Wars," will lead to a full-scale ABM system that could undermine their nuclear deterrent. The most obvious and effective response to the threat of an American anti-missile system would be a massive buildup of Soviet offensive missiles. An increase in Soviet missile activity over the past year could indicate that the Soviet Union is already preparing for the potential breakdown of both SALT II and the ABM Treaty.