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REAGAN ADMINISTRATION CONFRONTS THE FREEZE AND A RISING POPULAR CONSCIOUSNESS

The Reagan Administration must receive the ironic credit for creating the preconditions for a popular revolt against the arms race. But it is Senator Edward Kennedy and Senator Mark Hatfield who have shaped the vehicle. The Reagan Administration did all it could: bizarre rhetoric about nuclear war; totally unrealistic estimates about budget deficits; the ordering of every weapon system in sight, including those most obviously unneeded; the appointment of arms control officials dead set against arms control; and so on. But it was left to these two Senators to sense the popular uprising that was brewing, and to endorse the Freeze movement.

Where, before, few indeed could be found in Congress to endorse arms control agreements so far-reaching, now 19 Senators and 122 Congressmen have made this a mainstream movement. Now arms controllers will have to scramble to catch up. What treaties could they construct if they had the base of American popular support that can now be projected and if the Russians were willing to make efforts toward agreement commensurate with the enormous achievements possible? This is a whole new ball game. One can see consciousnesses being raised all over town.

The very proposal of a Freeze can be expected to have tangible effects. The prospects for a Freeze agreement—out there somewhere—could have the effect of en-

couraging bilateral compliance with SALT II. (Why disturb the SALT limits if a halt to the arms race is in the wings?) And it can be expected to have important political effects. In particular, the Freeze movement has the potential to become a kind of “nuclear right to life movement” in which legislators who stand in the way suffer the same electoral punishment. If the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution is brought to a vote in September, and if the sentiment for a Freeze continues to rise, there would be some related rearrangement of Congress by next year. The 1,000,000 persons who have already endorsed the Freeze by petition can be expected to be a far larger body by then.

It is hard to see how the Administration can cope with this new attack on its seriousness in the arms control arena. President Reagan is expected to come out with some kind of proposal to equalize ICBM megatonnage as a precondition to major reductions. In effect, this would mean unilateral Soviet cutbacks in heavy missiles before bilateral disarmament would begin. It isn't very realistic and it isn't going to seem so. Also, obviously, the Administration will not support a Freeze when it is supporting so many new systems it considers necessary to re-achieve the parity it thinks it has lost. And so

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IS YOUR CONGRESSMAN OR SENATOR ENDORING THE KENNEDY-HATFIELD RESOLUTION? FAS HAS!

On January 3, 1982, at its annual meeting, the Federation endorsed the freeze “in principle.” Subsequently, the Council voted by mail to endorse an FAS-generated proposal of January 4, 1982, that turned out to be quite similar in substance to the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution of March 10. Accordingly, the Federation has endorsed the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution as the best freeze legislative vehicle extant. Members are invited to advise their Congressmen and Senators of this fact directly. A list of those already endorsing the Freeze appears within (page 6).

On another matter, the Federation is opposing the Administration's crisis relocation program as impractical and counterproductive—an instrument in the Administration's war game rather than a prudential effort to cope with residual survivors of a nuclear war. But it is believed that the program can be quite educational and members may wish to encourage their local civil defense board to hold public hearings on this program.



Senators Kennedy & Hatfield at American University Press Conference.

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whatever it proposes will be vulnerable to the charge—to which Freeze supporters are quite sensitive—that it will not halt “everything.” If this were not enough, the initial Administration complaints that a Freeze would, in particular, freeze the European situation have made it politically impossible for the Administration to adopt and co-opt the Freeze.

At the Kennedy-Hatfield press conference of March 10, a number of religious leaders argued that the 1980s would see a massive struggle against the arms race comparable to that of civil rights activities in the 50s and 60s and the struggle against the Vietnamese war in the late sixties. This does appear increasingly likely.

In historical retrospect, we are witnessing a last effort on the part of a right-wing and intensely anti-Soviet Administration to “win” the arms race by regaining some kind of fading advantage of the past. But the weapons needed, and the war-fighting tactics threatened, strike so many people as anachronistic and hopeless that they just erode political support. Indeed, if the Administration figures on Soviet spending are to be believed, the Russians will win the arms race in the absence of a negotiated halt because, despite their economic performance, they are spending far more than we would ever bring ourselves to spend. While Congressmen supporting defense spending tend to focus on the limited rate of U.S. GNP needed to close the gap, the same Congressmen have given away so much revenue that it can hardly fit in even the defense expenditures necessary for business as usual.

In Vietnam, America learned, to its regret, that it was not foreordained that America would win every military contest to which it put its hand. In the arms race, the public has similarly assumed, until lately, that it could certainly outspend and outinvent the backward Russians. But no contestant in any contest can be sure of winning every round, ad infinitum. In that context, this does seem the time for all Americans to join together to see whether or not a comprehensive agreement to choke off the 33-year-old contest in arms is not possible.

ARMS CONTROL SUPPORTERS

One complaint of Congressmen declining to endorse the freeze is that it is not a workable proposal. In this connection, it should be recorded that the following persons with arms control experience have specifically endorsed the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution.

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HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE FREEZE

Although the freeze seems to be a unique determined agreement ("stop everything"), the proposal can, in fact, take many different forms and will require a good deal of reflection and negotiation. What follows are some educated reflections, by no means controlling, on what might in fact happen:

DURATION OF THE FREEZE: The freeze is likely, in the end, to be agreed to as a kind of "negotiator's pause" for a period of about five years. This is because the pressures to halt the arms buildup are likely to outpace the ability to negotiate specific terms for halting the contest for longer periods. As important, the purpose of the freeze is, after all, to serve as a prelude to reductions rather than as a permanent halt anyway. Five years is likely to be the time because any treaty of this magnitude would be reviewed, in any case, each five years. The five year review would, also, serve the function of putting pressure on the two sides to agree to the subsequent reductions as well as to the prolongation of the freeze.

Five years also has the advantage that it is sufficiently short as to make somewhat irrelevant concerns about hard-to-control aspects of the strategic environment which move slowly with time. Thus submarine modernization might be difficult to control indefinitely if no limits were put on anti-submarine warfare but, over five years, this would not be a compelling objection to the freeze. Similarly, bomber force modernization might be impossible to control if, in time, no restraints were put on Soviet air defenses; again, five years would not, perhaps, be a period too long for this problem to go unattended. No doubt, in time, these problems would have to be addressed and they would be on the agenda of the five year freeze.

Perhaps most important, the rules for maintenance, replacement and dismantlement would not, presumably, be totally resolved before the freeze was agreed. For example, in some cases, weapons might, by mutual agreement, be left simply to wear out (or be dismantled by agreement in disarmament) without permitting one-for-one replacement. This could be the case in which production lines were closed down, as with the heavy bombers of the two sides (B-52s, Bisons and Bears). For a five year "negotiator's pause," this might not have to be decided in advance since the missiles and bombers would last through the five year period.

SCOPE OF THE FREEZE: The freeze is limited to what can be verified and, even within the confines of a five year first agreement, much would have to be discussed in that connection. But the major issues would be:

- The Comprehensive Test Ban
- The production of fissionable material for warheads, its fabrication into warheads, and the stockpiling or deployment of the resultant warheads.
- The halt to production and deployment of strategic bombers, ICBMs and missile-firing submarines (except for one-for-one replacement).
- The control over ground- and sea-launched nuclear

armed cruise missiles which might be deployed on vehicles of many different kinds and the problem of distinguishing them from conventionally armed cruise missiles.

- The control over other tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles.
- The control over dual purpose aircraft.

VERIFICATION OF THE FREEZE: The freeze will require more verification than has been necessary in the past in order to deal with such problems as "production" and the testing of cruise missiles. In this connection, the Soviet Union will have to be ready to offer "cooperative methods" that go beyond the "National Technical Means" (NTS) that are used as a euphemism for satellite observation, electronic surveillance and seismographs. In some cases, this will involve "black boxes" that are on Soviet and U.S. soil but whose readings, whether of underground disturbances or missile-firing telemetry, would be available to the other side in a form that could not be tampered with. Such methods have been agreed by the Soviet Union, in principle, in *Comprehensive Test Ban negotiations*.

Other kinds of cooperative means include FRODs (functionally related observable differences) that permitted the two sides, in the SALT II treaty, to distinguish different types of bombers, for example, by the device of attaching observable differences to them. It is believed that, with adequate cooperation and ingenuity, inspection and verification can go further than has ever been imagined before. One crucial synergism will arise from the fact that with production, deployment and testing controlled, a violation of the agreement, to be meaningful, might have to escape controls at all three stages and hence be correspondingly unlikely.

In the end, however, there will obviously have to be the right of on-site inspection when uncertainties arise; since the Soviet Union has agreed to on-site inspection in at least one treaty already (that dealing with peaceful uses of nuclear explosions) and had agreed to it for the Non-Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is believed that this will be possible.

REDUCTIONS AND AFTER THE FREEZE, WHAT?

The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls for "reductions" to follow "proceeding from the freeze" and to do so in accordance with "annual percentages" or "equally effective means," to be carried out in a fashion that "enhances stability." What all this appears to mean is this.

Disarmament would go forward in annual increments in which, within agreed limits, the two sides would have "freedom to choose" what was thrown away. In effect, the two sides would agree on some percentage by which their existing forces would be reduced year after year (e.g., 5% or 7% or whatever). This percentage would be applied to one or more categories of weapons, e.g., overall warhead totals of deployed warheads. It could be applied, *in addition*, to numbers of MIRVed missiles and perhaps in further addition, to heavy missiles.*

The categories chosen would be designed with an eye to

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encouraging stability and the two sides would, presumably, use their "freedom to choose" with a view to reducing the vulnerability of their force. Thus, in the process of reductions, the two sides could shift the balance of their reliance on the various legs of their strategic triad. Each would see, or even be told in advance, what the other was doing on a year-by-year basis and so, to some extent, each would or could choose its reductions with an eye on the reductions of the other side.

*In 1979, the full Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate agreed unanimously to a McGovern-Chafee resolution that looked toward a similar method in which *all* of the limits of SALT II would be reduced in this fashion.

HOW THE DEBATE ON THE FREEZE IS GOING

- President Reagan has advised that the "freeze isn't good enough, because it doesn't go far enough"; to this, of course, the answer is that, indeed it does not—and this is why the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls for subsequent *reductions*.

- Reagan has argued that it "legitimizes a position of great advantage for the Soviet Union"; to this the answer is that the two sides are at an effective state of parity with both having the ability to destroy the other in a retaliatory strike. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the strategic situation will *improve* for the U.S. with more arms race; on the contrary, the Soviet Union is probably better positioned to bolt ahead if the SALT II limits are exceeded. At the moment, the U.S. has a warhead advantage of about 9,000 to 7,000, a better bomber force, and a more invulnerable sea-based force, and a better anti-submarine warfare defense.

- Columnist George Will complained that a freeze would prohibit new sub-launched ballistic missiles but not new attack submarines that hunt SLBM submarines... eventually giving the Soviets a destabilizing capability for destroying the U.S. sea-based deterrent." In fact, the two sides are hardly going to take the trouble to negotiate a general halt to the arms race without negotiating such collateral restraints on attack submarines as are necessary. And the "eventually" is quite long in this case, giving ample time for such adjustments. Moreover, a freeze could, and would, permit the one-for-one replacement of newer (perhaps quieter) missile firing submarines which is the main response to Soviet ASW at this stage, rather than longer range missiles. Will complained also that the B-1 would be prevented; this depends upon whether it was treated as a one-for-one replacement for the B-52. But the agreement would have, in any case, comparable effects on the Soviet Union. What is wrong with stopping Soviet bombers?

- George Will and analyst R. James Woolsey complained that unconstrained Soviet air defenses would eventually overcome bomber penetration capabilities. Whether there will be any functioning Soviet air defense by the time U.S. bombers arrive is quite uncertain since several missile salvos will have taken place before they do (it is part of U.S. planning to "corridor" Soviet air defense). So it is

not clear whether any of this really matters. For deterrence our bombers can never be counted out. In the context of a general halt to weapon deployment—and remembering the U.S.-Soviet agreement to anti-ballistic missile defenses—it is hard to see the Soviet Union wanting to redouble its efforts with air defense. A collateral agreement could, in any case, preclude it. And both sides would know, anyway, that such improvements could destabilize the overall halt.


- George Will, R. James Woolsey and a New York Times editorialist all leaned heavily on the fact that production (or cruise missile deployment) could not be verified without on-site inspection. Whether or not this is so is unclear, and depends upon the state of intelligence. But some on-site inspection is highly desirable, if not even completely necessary, and the U.S. should insist on it. The Soviet Union has begun to agree, in principle, to on-site inspection in nuclear test ban negotiations. If it is not willing to permit adequate verification, then, of course, the freeze may not be negotiable. But this is no reason not to try. With regard to cruise missiles, we are the only ones ready to deploy small and hard-to-verify cruise missiles, and Soviet verification methods need not be so demanding as ours are in an open society.

- Edward L. Rowny, Chairman of the U.S. strategic arms reductions talks delegation, complained that "freezing now, while the Soviets are ahead would eliminate any Soviet incentive to reduce *to equal levels*." (italics added) Indeed, if one wants unilateral Soviet reductions, as Rowny has long urged, then, true, one should not agree to a freeze. But it is only General Rowny and the Reaganites who harbor hopes for, and feel the need for, such one-sided reductions. Freeze supporters are unconcerned with the megatonnage differences, or the land-based missile throw weight differences, which preoccupy General Rowny. (Other critical commentators have complained that a freeze would preclude leverage for subsequent reductions generally and have left the readers mystified as to why this would be so since, as one Washington Post reader responded—the offer of a freeze is in return for a freeze, and the offer of subsequent reductions is in return for subsequent reductions!)

- Roger Molander, who directs "Ground Zero," complained that "It's not good to encourage people to think that nuclear holocaust can be avoided by simple technical fixes." But the freeze is not a "simple technical fix." Rather it is a whole class of complicated proposals which would be carefully and painfully negotiated to find one that worked.

INDICTMENT OF ENERGY POLICY

On March 24, FAS joined fourteen other environmental, scientific, and consumer groups in releasing a report to Congress sharply critical of the Reagan energy policy. Entitled "The Reagan Energy Plan: A Major Power Failure," it criticized the sharp cuts in energy conservation and renewable energy programs, and the dangerous changes in nuclear policy that the Administration has proposed. The report is available from FAS for \$2.00 per copy.



FAS Staffer Christopher Paine Addresses Second Annual Freeze Conference in Denver, Feb. 19, 1982.

ADMINISTRATION EFFORT TO CO-OPT THE WORD 'FREEZE'

You can't tell the players without a score card! And so it is with Congressional resolutions, artfully drafted as always. What exactly is the difference between the Jackson-Warner resolution and the Kennedy Hatfield resolution?

In effect, the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calls for a freeze first, and reductions subsequently, while the Jackson-Warner resolution calls for the reverse. The reason is, of course, that the Jackson-Warner resolution wants what Eugene Rostow, ACDA Director, recently called "unequal reductions to equal levels," after which a freeze could commence. Thus its only real substantive clause says:

The United States should propose to the Soviet Union a long-term mutual and verifiable nuclear forces freeze at equal and sharply reduced levels of forces.

The stated purpose of the resolution does not even refer to a "freeze" at all but calls for the two sides to engage in "substantial, equitable and verifiable reductions" of nuclear weapons. And, in a whereas clause, the resolution asserts that "the current nuclear force imbalance is destabilizing and could increase the likelihood of nuclear war." This whereas clause would therefore commit co-signers to the view that, without larger Soviet cutbacks than U.S. reductions, the present situation would be dangerous. Nor is the Jackson-Warner freeze spelled out with regard to what would be frozen.

By contrast, the Kennedy resolution asserts that "as an immediate strategic arms control objective," the two sides should "decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear weapons, missiles and delivery systems." It goes on further to suggest that subsequent "major, mutual, and verifiable reductions" would be achieved through "annual percentages on equally effective means." Thus Kennedy-Hatfield seeks to reduce haggling both at the level of the freeze and with regard to subsequent reductions while Jackson-Warner is looking toward a struggle over some kind of equalizing of ICBM throw weights, after which some kind of freeze would be proposed. Thus it represents a concession to the freeze movement only in holding out the specter of a freeze after a kind of equalizing reductions had taken place.

KENNEDY HOLDS FREEZE FORUM

On March 22, Senator Edward Kennedy held a "forum" on the freeze that drew Hiroshima survivors, religious leaders, peace groups, and former government officials. These "forums" are, in effect, Congressional hearings without recorded testimony. They arise because the Senators who wish to hold them may not have appropriate subcommittees in the Republican-dominated Senate. But they are non-partisan and have the advantage of featuring House members as well.

Senator Cranston noted, *a propos* the question of who was ahead if things were frozen, that "there is no responsible military expert today who would trade the U.S. arsenal for the Soviet arsenal." Congressman Ed Markey said the freeze movement was "telling our leaders to get off Fantasy Island" with regard to fighting limited wars. A Hiroshima victim volunteered that "Senator Kennedy is doing this from the heart and not just as a Senator" so whatever she could do to help, she would. Senator Hatfield, who had been in Hiroshima a week after the bombing, told of seeing the shadows etched in the road that were cast by the concrete balustrades in the light of the atomic blast. Bishop Mahoney called for a "moral about-face on the nuclear arms race" and said that 30 bishops had released relevant statements. Asked by Senator Kennedy whether these matters should be left to the experts, one witness said: "The experts have gotten us where we are."

Former Undersecretary George Ball denounced the "logic-chopping" of theoreticians and called for "phased across the board percentage reductions," as in trade negotiations. He said that this would, of course, upset the metaphysicians but that it was workable and could have minor adjustments. Herbert Scoville quoted Paul Nitze that "verification capabilities should be tailored to the seriousness of any possible violations" and said that the freeze could pass that test for verification.

Randy Kehler, National Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, told the forum that the freeze was now active in 43 states and 279 Congressional districts (64% of the total). Endorsed by more than 60 national and international organizations, it had won the support of 23 city councils, 250 town meetings and one or more state houses of 9 states. Efforts to put the freeze on the ballot were underway in New Jersey, Delaware, Michigan, and California.



*Randy Kehler
National Coordinator of the
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign*

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SOME FREEZE PRECURSORS

Lyndon Johnson and Secretary McNamara
Proposed Freeze in 1964

The freeze was first proposed 18 years ago when the U.S. strategic buildup of 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 41 Polaris submarines was nearing completion and the Soviet buildup was not yet underway. At Geneva, U.S. representative, Adrian Fisher proposed that:

"The U.S., the Soviet Union, and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles."

Here is what was said about it on January 31, 1964, at Geneva by ACDA Director, William Foster:

First, the freeze should, we believe, include strategic missiles and aircraft. The categories of weapons affected should be defined along lines of range and weight. For this measure, the categories suggested in stage I of the United States outline of 18 April 1962,² should be adjusted, we think, for several reasons. For instance, there have been changes in technology since those earlier categories were proposed. Moreover, the freeze would include only strategic categories; and it could be implemented before agreement on general and complete disarmament.

Secondly, the United States believes the freeze should also include antiballistic missile systems. A freeze on strategic delivery systems without a freeze on anti-missile systems would be destabilizing and therefore unacceptable.

Thirdly, the immediate objective of the freeze on numbers should be to maintain the quantities of strategic nuclear vehicles held by the East and the West at constant levels. As we see it, the agreement should provide for a suitable number of missile tests without warheads to ensure that missile systems continue to be reliable over a period of time. For this and related purposes, it should also provide for production of replacements on a one-for-one basis: one missile produced for one destroyed. This should not, of course, permit any increase by either side in the constant level which it is the purpose of the agreement to maintain.

Fourthly, the objective of the freeze on characteristics should be, the United States believes, to prevent the development and deployment of strategic vehicles of a significantly new type. Like the freeze on numbers, this should apply to defensive as well as offensive vehicles. The significance of this provision might well be greater than that of the freeze on numbers. It would halt the race to produce better strategic vehicles to carry bigger warheads. It would mean an end to the qualitative as well as to the quantitative strategic arms race.

Fifthly, as I have already indicated, we have singled out strategic vehicles partly because we believe that the verification requirements would be less onerous than for a production freeze on the entire range of major armaments included within our general and complete disarmament plan. One possible means of verifying the freeze would be to monitor significant existing production and testing facilities which each side would declare, and to provide for a special number of spot checks to guard against possible undeclared facilities. That is an example of the kind of verification requirement we have in mind. Additional problems would remain. However, we believe verification can be effective without being burdensome. We hope that a system acceptable to all concerned could be worked out.

Freeze Resolution Passed by Senate 73-6 in 1970

On June 17, 1969, Senator Brooke and 39 co-sponsors introduced a resolution urging the U.S. to refrain from additional flight tests of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles so long as the Soviet Union did also. The Nixon Administration being reluctant to make such an initiative and the Foreign Relations Committee being unsure whether the resolution should pinpoint this particular aspect of the arms race, it substituted a broader version at the initiative of Senator John Sherman Cooper which read:

“Resolved: That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should urgently propose to the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics an immediate suspension by the United States and by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the further deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons systems, subject to national verification or such other measures of observation and inspection as may be appropriate.”

This resolution actually passed the Senate by a vote of 73-6 on April 9, 1970.*

ACDA Director Gerard C. Smith Considered Freeze in 1969

It appears likely that Senator John Sherman Cooper had been, at the least, encouraged by Gerard C. Smith, Director of ACDA under President Nixon. Smith had met, in classified session, with the Foreign Relations Committee on February 2, 1970, to discuss the Brooke resolution and it was subsequently, on March 20, 1970, that Senator Cooper proposed his “substitution.” We see in Gerard Smith’s book on arms control, *Doubletalk*, that Mr. Smith was also moving in 1969 from considering flight test bans of the kind Brooke wanted to considering a general freeze, at the instigation of Sidney Graybeal. He says there:

My MIRV ban proposals soon merged into a broader position called SWWA, “Stop Where We Are,” which involved not only stopping MIRV testing but cessation of Soviet ICBM and SLBM launcher construction programs. This proposal stemmed from a suggestion made by an Arms Control Agency official, Sidney Graybeal, who was a member of the SALT delegation and later the U.S. commissioner on the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commis-

SOVIET FREEZE-RELATED PROPOSALS

The U.S.S.R. proposed a prohibition on the development and manufacture of nuclear weapons and new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction in September 28, 1976 (in conjunction with a ban on nuclear weapons tests, and reductions of warhead stockpiles and their means of delivery). A call to halt production of nuclear weapons and a ban on nuclear weapon testing was repeated by President Leonid Brezhnev on November 2, 1977, to the 25th Party Congress.

A halt to production of all types of nuclear weapons was repeated on May 26, 1978, to the U.N. General Assembly, and was effectively repeated, with a call also for reductions, on February 6, 1979, to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

In April, 1980, a letter from Andrei Gromyko to U.N. Secretary General called for the same goals including qualitative limitations, and quantitative reductions of ICBMs and SLBMs.

sion set up by the 1972 agreements. SWWA was based on a simple concept that the way to stop arms competition was to stop strategic construction programs on both sides. Both now had sufficient strategic forces to deter nuclear war. Instead of trying to elaborate agreed levels for strategic forces and other complex arrangements, why not just freeze things at the 1969 level? At the suggestion of Henry Owen, a former colleague on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and later its director, I recalled for the President the worldwide support which the United States received when Charles Evans Hughes proposed such a plan for strategic naval forces at the Washington Naval Conference in 1921. It was not at all clear that the U.S.S.R. would accept such a proposal, but by proposing it we could take the “high ground” psychologically and, if necessary later, move to something more modest if that was the most the Soviets would accept. I considered SWWA the best way to start the negotiation.

*The Senate Committee Report commented on verification in a way that could have been written today:

The question naturally arises whether a suspension of the deployment of all offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems, which the resolution as reported urges, can be verified. The committee is inclined to the view that a general halt in the deployment of all strategic weapons is more secure against significant evasion than a more limited suspension would be. First of all, it is easier to monitor the strategic activity of an adversary in the context of a general freeze on the deployment of all new weapons than it is to monitor a situation characterized by constant change in the types and numbers of strategic weapons systems involved. Second, given the rough parity which now prevails between the United States and the Soviet Union, far more evasion would be required to provide one party with a significant advantage within the context of a general suspension of the further deployment of all weapons than would be required in the case of a more limited suspension.

FREEZE INDUCES CALLS FOR START TALKS

The pressure of freeze supporters has led a number of outstanding Congressional supporters of arms control who do not wish to support the freeze at this time to find shelter in a fairly innocuous call for the initiation of START talks. (Congressional Record, March 17.) Thus, Congressman Clement Zablocki said:

"In an effort to bridge the gap between Administration critics who have called for a freeze on further nuclear weapons production and the Administration's position that a U.S. military buildup is necessary as a way of forcing the Soviets to accept meaningful agreements, I am today introducing a joint resolution calling for an immediate beginning of the START talks."

Oftimes, the freeze proposal is criticized as not going far enough—as when Senator Charles Mathias explained why, despite many requests to do so from constituents, he had not endorsed the freeze:

"The answer is simple: It does not go far enough. I do not oppose it, but it does not do the job that needs to be done; and, quite possibly, it will impede getting that job done."

He introduced the same resolution. Senator David Durenberger, who joined him, said:

"A freeze is easy to grasp. It is dramatic. It is simple. But the issues involved in nuclear arms reductions are not simple, and ready-made nostrums can do us more harm than good."

Those comments were made in conjunction with the sub-



Participants at Denver Freeze Conference.

mission to the Congressional Record of a Washington Post article by R. James Woolsey of the same day which had mocked the freeze. Jeremy J. Stone and Herbert F. York responded to this article in the Washington Post op-ed page of March 19 two days later, but too late to prevent a certain amount of Congressional confusion over the freeze's feasibility.

Another supporter of arms control, Senator Gary Hart, had earlier introduced a measure with a number of provisions featuring a call to open talks on the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons. He also adopted the posture that a freeze "did not go far enough" although, in fact, a freeze would, quite obviously, be much more far-reaching as an arms control measure than anything for which his resolution called.

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