

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Journal of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS)

ARMS CONTROL
OFFICIALS CONFIRMED

Volume 34, No. 7

September 1981

THE GOALS OF ARMS CONTROL

Rather than opposing motherhood, politicians normally redefine it. The Reagan Administration has already applied this rule to human rights and to environmentalism. We who champion arms control should have anticipated no less.

During the summer, FAS wrestled with the Reagan Administration approach to arms control in the form of confirmation hearings of Eugene Rostow (for ACDA Director) and of General Edward Rowny (for SALT negotiator). Each effectively redefined arms control.

Professor Rostow, who is after all a former law school dean, sought to subordinate arms control to international law. He gave the impression (see page 3) that arms control would not work unless and until the Soviet Union obeyed rule of law. Thus he reversed the notion of arms control between adversaries needed because the adversaries did not trust one another's international activities. Instead, he would wait, it appeared, until the Soviets ceased to be adversaries. In effect, he elevated "linkage" from a subsidiary consideration to the dominant priority. This testimony was so extreme in its linkage of arms control to Soviet actions in other areas that it may have overstated even Professor Rostow's real approach. But it provided one clear way to avoid arms control in the name of motherhood, which the Administration may or may not seize upon.

General Rowny's approach to arms control did not feature linkage and did not discuss international law. He *does* presume that arms control will take place between adversaries. But he wants to use the arms talks to ensure equality in the arms race rather than to end the arms race. As soon as the Russians agree to cut back in the categories in which they are ahead (mainly heavy missiles and throw-weight), he is prepared to negotiate an agreement and, even, to engage in reductions in nuclear weapons. From a negotiating point of view, he is driving a bargain unlikely to be agreed. From an intellectual point of view, he is re-

defining arms control as the arms control community knows it.

Our community has always had, as its first priority, the ending of the arms race. The terms on which this contest was to be ended were much less important primarily because of the excesses in weaponry which existed on both sides. We have always been "anti-arms race" arm controllers.

General Rowny's point of view was born of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for which he worked, and the Pentagon. This point of view sees no autonomous danger in the arms race. It seems danger only in the Russians. And it sees the Russians becoming dangerous only if they are—or seem to be—ahead. The Geneva arms talks become a place to try to secure an equality which the Defense Department either cannot achieve unilaterally, or does not want to secure unilaterally. Thus, rather than build the heavy missiles we did not want to build (and still do not want to build) we will send General Rowny to Geneva to tell the Russians to dismantle theirs. Because this approach to arms control never discusses the arms race but only the Russians, FAS dubbed it an "anti-Russian" arms control point of view (as contrasted with our own traditional "anti-arms race" arms control stance).

Later, in July, Secretary of State Haig addressed "Arms Control of the 1980s". One of his two "fundamental" conclusions was that the "search" for arms control agreements was an essential aspect of policy. (The less hardline part of this Administration increasingly emphasizes "searches" for, rather than "securing," arms control. It means by this to argue that, from a political point of view, it is good politics to try to negotiate and bad politics to seem unwilling.) The second fundamental conclusion was that the agreements could be reached only if they were not dominated by "pious hopes and simplistic solutions." His escape hatch for avoiding arms control was that the task was "enormously complex." He provided six principles

(Continued on page 2)

REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND SOVIET BUILDUP SPURRING GRASS ROOTS ACTIVITY

FAS skips two newsletters in the summer; accordingly, it is reporting on the July confirmation hearings of Rostow and Rowny, and the Haig arms control doctrine in the September newsletter. But these appointments are only a symptom of the problem. Indeed, as a result of the Administration's decision to go ahead with medium range

ballistic missiles in Europe and the neutron bomb, a new Bomber, and some form of the MX, and as a result of ongoing Soviet procurement, a ground swell of popular interest in arms control appears likely in America in 1981-82 and FAS is organizing a grass-roots network in response (see page 7). □

ROSTOW, 3; ROWNY, 5; FAS MORTGAGE DRIVE, 7; FOIA, 8

(Continued from page 1)

some of which could only make it more so. (See page 5).

What should be the goals of strategic arms control? From a practical point of view Administrations normally throw their SALT position together in their first few months, without much consideration for where they are going, and then find themselves stuck with it for the rest of their four year term. Notwithstanding the Haig survey of principles, the time is especially ripe now for exploring goals during the initial months of the Reagan Administration because the Administration must soon put forward some kind of SALT proposal.

No doubt the Administration will have its own negative appraisal of the attitudes that traditional arms controllers bring to arms control. They will want to know what the purpose is of reductions—except to bring the two sides into equality. And quite apart from reductions, they have to be persuaded that the arms race can really be frozen. And why is the arms race an autonomous source of danger greater than that of deliberate surprise attack? This is an Administration that will force us to debate our premises, and it is the Administration whose premises we should challenge. The time to do it is now, especially if an appropriate forum can be found.

Above all, this Administration will want to know how arms control can save it money. Our community must redouble its efforts to show that arms control can do more than reduce the probability of war, and save lives in some future war, but that it can also help the fight against inflation and stagnation. JJS□



Christopher Paine

CHRISTOPHER PAINE TESTIFIES ON MX

On July 30, 1981, FAS staffer Chris Paine appeared before the Proxmire Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee on "Economics of Defense Procurement: the MX Missile and Strategic programs." He had earlier prepared, and sent to the Townes Committee a 60 page summary of the problems involved with both MX basing and the MX missiles. In a cover letter with which this was sent to FAS Sponsor Charles Townes, FAS Director Stone wrote "I very much doubt that your Committee will find anything against MX that is better worth reading than the attached memorandum from our staff assistant, Christopher E. Paine."

FAS COUNCIL ELECTIONS

The spring elections for FAS Council members produced these new Council members: Rosemary Chalk, Morton Halperin, Victor Rabinowitz, Eugene Skolnikoff, Robert Socolow, and Dorothy Zinberg.

Votes on membership interests showed that most members wanted arms control and national security emphasized first, energy and conservation second, human rights third, and world development issues fourth.

Chairman: FRANK VON HIPPEL

Vice Chairman: JOHN HOLDREN

Secretary: GEORGE A. SILVER

Treasurer: ROBERT M. SOLOW

Director: JEREMY J. STONE

FAS

The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 5,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 24 members, FAS was first organized in 1945 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than a quarter century.

SPONSORS

- *Philip W. Anderson (Physics)
- *Christian B. Anfinsen (Biochemistry)
- *Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics)
- *Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry)
- *David Baltimore (Biochemistry)
- Leona Baumgartner (Pub. Health)
- Paul Beeson (Medicine)
- Lipman Bers (Mathematics)
- *Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
- *Konrad Bloch (Chemistry)
- *Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat)
- Anne Pitts Carter (Economics)
- *Owen Chamberlain (—ysics)
- Abram Chayes (Law)
- Morris Cohen (Engineering)
- Mildred Cohn (Biochemistry)
- *Leon N. Cooper (Physics)
- *Carl F. Carl (Biochemistry)
- Paul B. Cornely (Medicine)
- *Andre Cournaud (Medicine)
- Carl Djerassi (Organic Chem.)
- *Renato Dulbecco (Microbiology)
- John T. Edsall (Biology)
- Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology)
- *John F. Enders (Biochemistry)
- Adrian Fisher (Law)
- *Val L. Fitch (Physics)
- *Paul J. Flory (Chemistry)
- Jerome D. Frank (Psychology)
- John Kenneth Galbraith (Economics)
- Richard L. Garwin (Physics)
- *Walter Gilbert (Biochemistry)
- Edward I. Ginztion (Engineering)
- Marvin L. Goldberger (Physics)
- *Donald A. Glaser (Physics-Biology)
- *Sheldon L. Glashow (Physics)
- *H.K. Hartline (Physiology)
- Walter W. Heller (Economics)
- *Alfred D. Hershey (Biology)
- Hudson Hoagland (Biology)
- *Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry)
- Marc Kac (Mathematics)
- Henry S. Kaplan (Medicine)
- Carl Kaysen (Economics)
- H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry)
- George B. Kistiakowsky (Chemistry)
- *Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry)
- *Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
- *Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics)
- *Wassilky W. Leontief (Economics)
- *Fritz Lipmann (Biochemistry)
- *S.E. Luria (Biology)
- Roy Menninger (Psychiatry)
- Robert Merton (Sociology)
- Matthew S. Meselson (Biology)
- Neal E. Miller (Psychology)
- Philip Morrison (Physics)
- *Robert S. Mulliken (Chemistry)
- *Daniel Nathans (Biochemistry)
- Franklin A. Neva (Medicine)
- *Marshall Nirenberg (Biochemistry)
- Robert N. Noyce (Indust. Exec.)
- *Severo Ochoa (Biochemistry)
- Charles E. Osgood (Psychology)
- *Linus Pauling (Chemistry)
- Gerard Piel (Sci. Publisher)
- George Polva (Mathematics)
- *Edward M. Purcell (Physics)
- George W. Rathjens (Def. Policy)
- *Burton Richter (Physics)
- David Riesman, Jr. (Sociology)
- Walter Orr Roberts (Solar Astron.)
- *J. Robert Schrieffer (Physics)
- *Julian Schwinger (Physics)
- Herbert Scoville, Jr. (Def Policy)
- *Glenn T. Seaborg (Chemistry)
- Stanley K. Sheinbaum (Economics)
- *Herbert A. Simon (Psychology)
- Alice Kimball Smith (History)
- Cyril S. Smith (Metallurgy)
- Robert M. Solow (Economics)
- *Albert Szent-Gyorgyi (Biochemistry)
- *Howard M. Temin (Microbiology)
- James Tobin (Economics)
- *Charles H. Townes (Physics)
- *George Wald (Biology)
- Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)
- Victor F. Weisskopf (Physics)
- Jerome B. Wiesner (Engineering)
- Robert R. Wilson (Physics)
- C.S. Wu (Physics)
- Alfred Yankauer (Medicine)
- Herbert F. York (Physics)

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

- Harrison Brown (Chemistry)
- Earl Callen (Physics)
- Barry M. Casper (Physics)
- Rosemary A. Chalk (Pol. Science)
- Britton Chance (Chemistry)
- Hugh F. DeWitt (Physics)
- Herman Feshbach (Physics)
- Lee Grodzins (Physics)
- Morton H. Halperin (Pol. Science)
- Denis Hayes (Environ. Policy)
- John P. Holdren (Energy Policy)
- Henry C. Kelly (Energy Policy)
- Leonard Meeker (Law)
- Robert Pindyck (Economics)
- Victor Rabinowitch (World Devel.)
- Peter Raven-Hansen (Law)
- Patricia Rosenfield (Environ. Health)
- Andrew M. Sessler (Physics)
- Martin L. Sherwin (History)
- George A. Silver (Medicine)
- Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Pol. Science)
- Robert H. Socolow (Energy Policy)
- Archie L. Wood (Defense)
- Dorothy S. Zinberg (Biology)

*Nobel Laureate

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$25/year. Copyright © 1981 by the Federation of American Scientists.

ROSTOW TESTIMONY REVERSES FAS POSITION

On June 22, FAS prepared to hear the confirmation testimony of Eugene Rostow in a spirit of resignation and accommodation. FAS had earlier exchanged letters with him describing felt differences in point of view but acknowledging that, after all, the FAS national security point of view had not won the election. Opposition to specific nominees seemed to have little point.

Indeed, the Foreign Relations Committee had decided two days before the hearing not to have testimony from other witnesses (outside groups like ours in particular) on the expressed grounds that the Israeli raid on Iraq had absorbed all their time. It was widely assumed that, in fact, the Committee felt it had used up much freedom of maneuver in opposing the Lefever human rights nomination, and did not want to waste time permitting an uprising on a nomination unlikely to be defeated. Rostow was, after all, a democrat and so even the minority was unlikely to oppose him. As for the majority, Rostow was a key leader of the hawks' Committee on the Present Danger. And the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Percy (like FAS), had expended a good deal of political capital trying to ensure that General Edward Rowny was not appointed Director of the Agency. As a consequence, neither was in a good position to complain about subsequent nominees.

An FAS observer was, however, startled to hear Rostow's remarks. We had not been fully prepared for the line Professor Rostow took although it certainly had been clearly foreshadowed in his earlier remarks and in his wholly consistent correspondence with us.

On hearing the testimony, FAS renewed its request to testify. It cautioned the Committee staff against the scheduled Committee confirmation vote the next morning, warning that the Committee should read the transcript and ponder the significance of Professor Rostow's assertions. While they sounded fine in supporting "rule of law," they actually blindsided arms control by focusing on Soviet violations of rule of law. And, in consultation by phone with the Executive Committee, which agreed completely, it decided to formally oppose Rostow as unqualified:

"by reason of his insistence in linking nuclear arms control to the resolution of those lesser conflicts between the superpowers involving force or the threat of force and because of his insensitivity to the enormous danger to our Republic, and to the world, of leaving these weapons in place and letting the arms race fester until that millenium in which such conflicts are at an end."

Repairing to the FAS office, FAS prepared overnight 2,000 words of analysis of what, in fact, Professor Rostow had said. With the help of a staff member who came in at 5 a.m. to type, we were distributing this analysis to Senators the next morning before the Committee vote. Senator Alan Cranston, democratic whip—who incredibly still maintains the ability to read, think, and act in the midst of the Senate's inevitable tumult and despite his key position—examined our analysis and promptly voted against



Eugene V. Rostow

confirmation. Meanwhile, the Committee decided that it should ask Professor Rostow a few additional questions, drafts of which FAS would prepare in lieu of its testifying. These would have to be answered by Rostow before the final vote on the floor. This was done and, in answer to one of them, Professor Rostow seemed to soften somewhat the implication that arms control could not proceed until the Soviet Union was in full compliance with rule of law.

Excerpts from the FAS analysis follow:

* * *

"The only arms control agreement mentioned favorably by Professor Rostow in his prepared statement is the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 between ourselves and Canada! Nothing good about the Partial Test Ban Treaty for which a complete consensus exists in this country. Nothing good about the ABM treaty which has saved the United States tens of billions of dollars, ensured the utility (by guaranteeing the penetrability) of our missiles and slowed the arms race. Quite the contrary, he strongly urges reviewing that treaty and states inaccurately that "It is even more obvious that SALT agreements have not saved money" which the ABM treaty has.

Worse, Professor Rostow seems to consider SALT agreements threatening:

"Adverse changes in the balance of power have been ignored because of the excessive hopes we invested in the SALT process and in nuclear arms limitation agreements."

Thus, far from being an advocate for arms control, he would presumably feel obliged to reduce expectations for their success and utility.

But this is not all. Professor Rostow's "minimal goal in arms limitation negotiations" is a relative force buildup—a strategic force that will permit us to use our military force with "comparative freedom"; this means, in the current jargon, one that would let us be less worried about

(Continued on page 4)

(Continued from page 3)

nuclear escalation than (by comparison) the Soviet Union and hence requires of us at least an element of strategic superiority. His goal in arms control negotiations, in any case, is a strategic force which he believes we do not now have. Thus he wants to dramatically improve our military posture through arms control if he is to have any at all.

But he feels we *must* seek more than this minimal goal which he notes would be a "license for aggression" and could make "the world safe for conventional and covert war." He wants instead to go further and "restore world public order." This would certainly be nice. But who has previously thought this a prerequisite to nuclear arms control—much less a goal of arms control? And can such a person be, simultaneously, an advocate of arms control? If arms control will await the restoration of world public order, it is going to be long in coming and then be quite unneeded. Arms control is, after all, agreement between adversaries.

Professor Rostow thinks the main lesson of the last ten years is the importance of the U.S. returning to the "containment policy pursued between Truman's time and the American withdrawal from Vietnam" and asserts that "unless effective containment is restored, we cannot expect to pursue detente and arms control fruitfully."

So he proposes to link arms control not just to "containment" but to Soviet acceptance of the rules of the U.N. Charter.

"What I suggest therefore is a fifth possible approach to arms limitation negotiations, to be developed with our Allies in the period ahead—a policy which would link arms control to the effective revival of the Truman doctrine and the acceptance of the Soviet Union of the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the international use of force. Such an approach is well within the reach of Western policy. The Western nations have more than enough power and potential power to accomplish that goal. What has been lacking is a shared perception of the problem, and the political will to deal with it."

Mr. Rostow does seem prepared to consider signing such treaties as have been hanging in the wings if the Administration agrees: the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

But everything else about arms control is negative. He questions the feasibility of limits on anti-satellite weapons. Non-proliferation can only be achieved "in the overall context of international security." He is dubious about the Comprehensive Test Ban.

And, in all this, he is fearsomely consistent. Thus asked by Senator Cranston whether he believed in arms control, he said:

"Certainly on the premise I described earlier—world public order."

Or later, asked if he would be an advocate for arms control, he said:

"Certainly, I'll be an advocate for arms control but

within the framework of our foreign policy, our defense policy and the national interest."

Told by Senator Cranston that he seemed not to find arms control practical, he denied it but only by referring to the Rush-Bagot treaty again and observing:

"If rules are enforced and finally come to be accepted, then there will be a role for arms control."

He then went on to note that "arms control *negotiations* can contribute to achieving rule of law." (emphasis added)

We wonder if Professor Rostow is persuaded that he is not engaged in a political charade because of the high political and propaganda values he puts on arms control *negotiations*—rather than because of the desirability, at this time, of arms control *treaties*. Perhaps only this can make his expressed views consistent.

Underpinning Professor Rostow's position is an unusual lack of awareness of the danger of nuclear war. Asked whether he believed in "limited nuclear war," he returned to his view that:

"My idea is to avoid this possibility. To draw back to a state system of stability..."

Pressed by Senator Pell on whether the U.S. and Soviet Union could survive a nuclear war, he said it "depends" and pointed to the example of Japan! Japan, he noted, correctly, had survived! Should we have as Director of the Arms Control Agency a person who compares a war with two nuclear detonations with a nuclear war that could include, today, 10,000 on each side? Mr. Rostow went on (only under repeated questioning) to observe that "goulish computations" had noted that 100,000,000 could die but that was *not* the "whole population."

Even Mr. Rostow's freudian slips are unfortunate or are they slips? Asked about his review of the ABM treaty, he said that we must wait to see whether "the ABM treaty is irrelevant or a very serious problem." In fact, the ABM treaty is neither irrelevant nor a problem but a vitally important part of American security in the minds of a whole community of defense analysts and not just arms controllers."...□



Jeremy J. Stone & Townsend Hoopes testify at Rowny confirmation hearings.

HAIG ARMS CONTROL PRINCIPLES

Secretary Haig's July 14 speech on arms control contained six principles listed below with an excerpt of their explication. Later, on August 12, he delivered a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations which noted that "We have initiated the intense preparations and conceptual studies that must precede a resumption of progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks." Formal negotiations on theater nuclear forces were to open by the end of the year, the Soviets being willing. But one Administration official believes real strategic arms control may be put off until the 1990s when a new round of deployment has settled down.

Our first principle is that our arms control efforts will be an instrument of, not a replacement for, a coherent allied security policy.

• • •

There is little prospect of agreements with the Soviet Union that will help solve such a basic security problem as the vulnerability of our land-based missiles until we demonstrate that we have the will and the capacity to solve them without arms control, should that be necessary.

Our second principle is that we will seek arms control agreements that truly enhance security.

• • •

That is the greatest measure of the worth of arms control, not the money saved nor the arms eliminated...A treaty that, for example, had the effect of locking us into fixed ICBM deployments would actually detract from the objectives of arms control.

Our third principle is that we will seek arms control bearing in mind the whole context of Soviet conduct worldwide.

• • •

Such "linkage" is not the creation of U.S. policy: it is a fact of life.

Our fourth principle is that we will seek balanced arms control agreements.

• • •

Each agreement must be balanced in itself and contribute to an overall balance.

Our fifth principle is that we will seek arms controls that include effective means of verification and mechanisms for securing compliance.

• • •

As much as any other single factor, whether the Soviets are forthcoming on this question (of verification) will determine the degree of progress in arms control in the 1980s.

Our sixth principle is that our strategy must consider the totality of the various arms control processes and various weapons systems, not only those that are being specifically negotiated.

GENERAL ROWNY'S CONFIRMATION

"A SALT Treaty which required the U.S.S.R. to accept greater reductions and to eliminate the asymmetries in warheads and throw-weight would make the achievement of the U.S. task of regaining strategic parity more rapid and less expensive. It is for this reason that I believe we should decide to renegotiate the provisions of this treaty." (pg. 677, AS) (emphasis added).*

General Edward Rowny had been for six years the representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the SALT delegation. It was widely assumed, throughout the defense community, that it was he who kept Senator Jackson informed of ongoing SALT developments which Jackson's office then used to critique and oppose the agreement. Indeed, in testimony on SALT, General Rowny had told Senator Stennis:

"General Rowny. Senator, I am very scrupulous about staying in channels. The Chiefs asked me for my opinions. I had all sorts of pressures to talk to the press but did not do so. Some Senators did question me and when they made such overtures the Chiefs told me that it was perfectly all right to respond. I talked to those Senators and I did report to them and did not seek out any Senator."

As the SALT negotiations ended in July 1979, General Rowny found that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for whom he had worked, had accommodated themselves to the treaty. As they noted, it had only "nominal" effects on the American weapons program and was a "modest" contribution to national security. He decided, however, to oppose the treaty and became a leading, and obviously most knowledgeable, critic. Opponents of the treaty on the Foreign Relations Committee even had him made a consultant to the Committee so that he could join in their opposition in the most intimate fashion.

It was this background, and FAS's continuing opposition to having retired military officers head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) which led it to urge Senators to oppose General Rowny for ACDA Director when his name was first floated by the Administration. The Administration then treated General Rowny quite unfairly, keeping him hanging in the wind for several months before choosing Dean Rostow. It then offered Rowny the SALT delegation leadership.

The Foreign Relations Committee heard General Rowny on July 9, 1981, in the afternoon; but to the dismay of the outside witnesses it permitted, it heard them only the next morning virtually guaranteeing a press blackout. The hearings were chaired, not by the full Committee but by the Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee, Senator Larry Pressler of South Dakota. No other Senator attended and only perfunctory questions were asked. (At one point the groups testifying, which included besides FAS, the Committee on National Security and the Council for A

(Continued on page 6)

*References are to SALT Hearings; AS=Armed Services, FR=Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

(Continued from page 5)

Livable World, were asked to describe their finances—a question which we, at least, could not remember having been asked since the mid-nineteen fifties.) All in all, participants in this hearing got an existential appreciation of what the Reagan Administration election really meant. Our point of view could not have been more thoroughly ignored.

In its testimony, the Federation called General Rowny's positions and characteristics "a recipe for permanent negotiations in a search for ever more adversary concessions." Excerpts follow:

* * *

"Turning to the specific reasons why General Rowny is unlikely to reach agreement if left on his own, we note that his approach to the problem appears to be a combination of:

1. Assigning too great strategic significance to those areas of strategic weaponry where the Soviet Union is deemed ahead ("I cannot overemphasize the importance of the consequences of the Soviet Union having by 1985 three times as many reentry vehicles on ICBM's as will we.") (pg. 543, FR) and too much political significance also ("The more they have, the bolder they become.") (pg. 562, FR).
2. Proposing not to compensate the Soviet Union for treaty-induced-cutbacks in the areas where it is ahead ("If you are going to be equal, you should be equal without paying the other side anything to come down to equality.") (pg. 756, AS).
3. Calling for intrusive methods of inspection to which the Soviet Union is unlikely to agree: ("In my view we need cooperative measures now for bombers and cruise missiles, and therefore some types of intrusive measures I think are an essential part of any SALT agreement that is going to be verifiable.") (pg. 452, Part 6, FR).
4. Frustration, arising out of hard experience, with Soviet bargaining tactics leading him to a consequent desire to match the hard bargaining style of the other side. ("They see negotiation as a competition whereas we tend to see it as a problem-solving exercise. I had a little cartoon in my desk in Geneva, the old Pogo cartoon, 'We met the enemy and he is us.'"), (pg. 693, AS).
5. Excessive confidence that U.S. tactics of stonewalling will bring the Russians around. ("They need [agreement], in my opinion, more than we do.") (pg. 555, FR). In this regard, he has accurately characterized his own SALT II position, of expecting the further major concessions he considered possible as a "voice in the wilderness" (pg. 554, FR).

For example, General Rowny's position on SALT II was so tough as to be self-contradictory. He felt the Russians needed the treaty more than we did but, on the other hand, that they were winning the arms race! He testified that:

Even if SALT did not explicitly prohibit any of our programs, the greater momentum of the U.S.S.R. will cause the United States to fall behind the U.S.S.R. strategically. *By any objective measure, the United States will become strategically inferior to the Soviet Union in the early 1980's.* (emphasis added) pg. 542, FR.

Under these circumstances, would the U.S. have the strong bargaining position that would lead the Russians to offer "elimination of the Soviet's SS-9's and SS-18's" (i.e., the Soviet heavy missiles) as suggested in this Rowny complaint about the Treaty?:

"(1) The Treaty grants the Soviet Union a unilateral right to 308 launchers for heavy ICBM's. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognized from the outset that Soviet heavy missiles would pose a serious problem, *we did not press hard enough for the elimination of the Soviets' SS-9's and SS-18's.*" (pg. 539, FR)

In fact, General Rowny's own testimony shows his view that it was not a failure of the *SALT negotiators* to "press hard enough" to eliminate Soviet heavy missiles but a failure of the *United States* itself to engage in a sufficiently persuasive arms buildup, to achieve that result (which is quite a different matter):

"Chairman Brezhnev is personally committed to pursuing an agreement on SALT and thus we can expect him to enter into a more evenhanded agreement—one which is equal and which provides for essential equivalence between the both sides. *The Soviets will only do so however, if we make it clear that the United States will do whatever is necessary to stay even.* We must make it clear we will not accept strategic inferiority." (pgs. 543-544, FR).

General Rowny believed that the United States would fall behind in the arms race owing to Soviet momentum, even if SALT did not restrict us *at all*. He believed that Brezhnev would support a SALT treaty that was fair "only" if the U.S. made it clear that it would "do whatever is necessary to stay even." Therefore he opposed SALT II in favor of arms buildups which, he assumed, would follow in the absence of the SALT II Treaty. All the rest about hanging tough—in the sense of a negotiator hanging tough—was misleading. What he wanted was for the *United States* to hang tough and for the U.S. to put the SALT talks on ice while it engaged in a military buildup.

General Rowny's position, in short, was that "essential equivalence" was being lost and that, *if* we could somehow win back at the bargaining table what we were losing in the arms race, then arms control would be sensible, but not otherwise... □

*Now, in fact, the boldest Soviet actions came when the Soviets were weakest: the Berlin confrontation of 1948, the Berlin confrontation of the early sixties, and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Looking at these, it seems plausible to argue that the Russians have been *less* bold as they got better armed.

FEDERATION MORTGAGE DRIVE SUCCESSFUL

Thanks to the generosity of 1,000 FAS members, the FAS drive to raise a mortgage amortization fund that would permit FAS expansion into the adjacent townhouse at 305 Mass. Avenue, N.E. has been completely successful.

Members will recall that the FAS Fund had sought to raise \$105,000. The interest on this sum was to service the FAS mortgage payments on 305-307 Mass. Avenue. The principal would be used to pay off the mortgage when it came up for renegotiation in 1988 at which time \$163,000 would be owing. (The relatively low 10% interest rate on the existing mortgage militated against seeking to actually "burn" the mortgage at this time.)

A large donor provided \$35,000 if it would be matched at a two-for-one ratio. The FAS Fund then secured donations in the \$3,000 to \$5,000 range from a handful of donors to provide a first matching \$35,000. FAS then appealed to its 5,000 members who have, thus far, provided not just the \$35,000 needed but \$50,000! Thus the mortgage amortization fund, now in escrow, stands at \$125,000. A large 20% of the members made a special contribution to this effort.

In effect, about 80% of the FAS mortgage and tax payments on its buildings are now raised by the current high interest rates applied to this fund. And about 75% of the principal required in 1988 has now been secured by the fund itself.

Reagan Administration Encourages Self-Sufficiency

The success of this drive has special meaning in the context both of the Reagan Administration budget policy and trends within the foundation world. It appears to be ever more important for groups like ourselves to become financially self-sufficient if they can. The Reagan Administration budget cuts have enormously increased the pressure on foundations and reduced, proportionately, the prospects for success in foundation proposals. Meanwhile, it has increased the time spent, and the cost incurred, to secure such grants.

With regard to individual giving, the Reagan Administration tax bill has encouraged the poor to give while discouraging the rich. The good news is that those who did not itemize their deductions (but simply took the 10% of adjusted gross income allowed) may now get an additional exemption for donations to such tax-deductible organizations as the FAS Fund. Previously, they had no incentive to make such contributions since, not being itemized, the contributions did not add to their deduction. Seventy percent of American citizens were not itemizing (including, for the most part, persons who did not own their own homes and lacked deductible interest). Unfortunately, this segment of American life was not giving much to public interest groups.

The wealthy, on the other hand, have been discouraged from giving in a number of ways. In the first place, with the highest tax brackets reduced from 70% to 50%, outright gifts of cash from larger donors will cost them 50¢ on the dollar rather than 30¢ which will discourage giving accordingly. In the second place, the net cost to the rich in



FAS Headquarters

giving assets that have appreciated in value has increased as tax rates declined. Groups like the Federation, which are 35 years old and prestigious—and which have put down an anchor as in our 1974 headquarters purchase and 1981 mortgage drive—may have an opportunity to become self-sufficient in a fashion that would weather this storm. The Federation is redoubling its efforts to do just that. Members will hear more about this in due course.

FAS INITIATING A NETWORK OF CORRESPONDENTS

FAS is seeking volunteers from among those of its members inclined toward grass roots educational activism to serve as local FAS "Correspondents" at colleges, universities, and other institutions of higher learning where FAS members are, by and large, co-located. The function of the Correspondents would be:

- a) to link FAS to local area members, and others, in a kind of two-way transmission belt so that ideas and suggestions could be transmitted up and down for local and national action;
- b) to organize, or find others to organize, local events that might be suggested nationally as useful to FAS goals, or suggested locally and subsequently approved, such as educational uprisings concerning nuclear war, environmental pollution, or medical health, etc.; letter-writing campaigns to newspapers; educational seminars for local officials or Congressmen; and so on.

The Correspondents, as currently envisaged, would serve one-year renewable terms, and be appointed from the National Office. A Correspondent Co-ordinator is being hired to appoint, oversee, and communicate with these Correspondents. Appointed Correspondents would be expected to furnish a letter, on the anniversary of their appointments, reporting on the work of the previous year. (It is anticipated that Correspondents would serve at most three single year terms before being asked to rotate the assignment for at least one year, so as the better to involve other local individuals.)

For the year 1980-81, Correspondents are being urged to focus on the dangers of nuclear war. Educational material on this subject will be available from the national office, as well as other suggestions for alerting the public to the dimensions of this danger, and to certain proposed solutions.

There are two dates already at which suitable national activity is planned with which FAS Correspondents could usefully collaborate. The earliest date appears to be Veterans Day, November 11, at which teach-ins are being scheduled. A second occasion for joining in with national activity may occur in April 1982, when a week of educational instruction is planned by an organization entitled "Ground-Zero." And, in between, there are a number of suggestions which the National Office will be making for introducing nuclear war into the University curriculum, scheduling the showing of relevant movies, briefing local officials and so on.

Obviously, a single correspondent can only do a certain amount of work. In some cases, his or her function might be finding others interested in doing the work, serving as a contact point for us only initially, but reporting on events subsequently, and ensuring that material is presented fairly when the event occurred.

We need trusted and responsible persons of good will and energy. Where several members apply for the position at a single university, preference will be given to persons who are long-term FAS members, former FAS officials, or others known to current officials for past service in accordance with FAS traditions and methods.

Persons wishing to be appointed FAS Correspondent for the academic year 1980-81 should write promptly to: Correspondent Coordinator, FAS, 307 Mass. Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002. Describe your background and relationship with FAS, and interests in the position. A first round of appointment decisions will be made in late September. In some cases, where applicants are either numerous or non-existent, we may ask for "initial conveners" who would be willing to convene the members at the institution in question with a view to having them select a representative whose choice could be confirmed by the National Office subsequently. Accordingly, persons volunteering to be an "initial convener" might send us a letter so stating. □

FOIA: AUTHORS GET PRECEDENCE

Much about how the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) works, and does not work, was made apparent when the Federation applied in the Spring of 1980 for a declassified version of a document "National Security and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty" by Joseph K. Landauer of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. After shunting the request around for a bit, the Department of Energy denied the request on the fatuous, and deliberately misleading ground, that "no declassified copies of the subject report exist and therefore the request is denied". FAS made a new request emphasizing that it knew that no declassified versions of this report existed and that, in conformity with the FOIA Act, it requested a copy of the report itself while simply assuming that DOE would withhold whatever was classified.

More shunting around. Three months after the original application, DOE announced that "the required coordination [between the agencies involved] may take as long as several months". So much for the 10 day rule!

But during these three months, the author of the report—apparently unbeknownst to DOE in Washington—had had his report declassified and had indeed submitted it to the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.

Seven months still later—ten months after our original request—FAS was advised that the document was "denied in total" on grounds of classification. On March 23rd, FAS wrote DOE and reported these events. It noted that the totally denied document had, in fact, been in our possession in a wholly approved declassified form for a few months as a consequence of the author's declassification. It invited the Department of Energy to explain what on earth was going on but received no answer.

Accordingly, the Federation invited the House Subcommittee on Government Information, chaired by Congressman Glenn English to investigate, which it is doing now. □

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300

307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002

Return Postage Guaranteed

September 1981, Vol. 34, No. 7

**Second Class Postage
Paid at
Washington, D.C.**

I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1981.

I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.

Enclosed is my check for 1981 calendar year dues. (I am not a natural or social scientist, lawyer, doctor or engineer, but wish to become a non-voting associate member.)

\$25 Member \$50 Supporting \$100 Patron \$500 Life \$12.50 Under \$12,000

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:

FAS Public Interest Report — \$25 for calendar year

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____ Zip _____

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE _____