

F. A. S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Formerly the FAS Newsletter

SPECIAL ISSUE ON
FIRST USE AND HIROSHIMA

Vol. 28, No. 7

September, 1975

FIRST USE DESERVES MORE THAN ONE DECISION MAKER

The time has come to investigate the political controls over the use of nuclear weapons. The weapons themselves will be with us for the foreseeable future. Safety therefore lies in ensuring that their use is never ordered.

It is only too clear that the use of nuclear weapons by one nation will trigger their use by another nation. The question therefore turns on the *first* use of nuclear weapons — the initiation of nuclear war in what had previously been a conventional conflict or crisis.

The issue of political control over nuclear weapons thus becomes the question of "Who decides?" whether nuclear use shall be initiated.

One fact is central: there is no need to respond instantaneously with a nuclear weapon to a conventional attack. There will be time to consider what to do. A fundamental conclusion springs from this: it is not necessary to leave this decision in the hands of a single decision maker.

And if it is not necessary, then it is not wise. The first use of nuclear weapons is too important an issue for that. Eight hundred million lives may be lost if the use of nuclear weapons escalates to general war. One decision maker would be under unbearable pressures. His personal political interests could encourage him to risk all for winning all. He could be under pressure from subordinates. He may have already mortgaged his ability to decide objectively through speeches and commitments, public and private.

The question of "Who decides?" is the War Powers issue. The first use of nuclear weapons will put at risk more persons than any previous declaration of war. World Wars I and II risked our sons. But the first use of nuclear weapons risks our national survival. Should it be decided by one man?

Under the War Powers Resolution, the President can engage in hostilities for up to sixty days unless Congress votes to prevent him from so continuing. And nothing in that act refers to the tactics or the weapons that he may use. He may turn an undeclared

conventional war into a full-scale nuclear war without any legal requirement to consult with Congress.

Undeclared or even declared, it should not be possible for a President to turn a conventional war into a nuclear war after consultation only with subordinates. A nuclear war will be a new war in every sense except the legal one. It deserves a specific authorization.

We therefore propose, in the spirit of the War Powers Resolution, that the President be required to secure the consent of Congress before employing nuclear weapons except after the use (or irrevocable launch) of nuclear weapons by an adversary. How this consent would be secured, Congress and the President should decide by passing a suitable law. In emergency circumstances, it might, for example, be through a majority vote of the chairmen of the relevant committees of both Houses (Armed Services and Foreign Relations) and of the Majority and Minority Leaders in Congress. In the absence of such an emergency, a President wanting such authority might be required to have a resolution approved by the Congress at large. The details are less important than the fact that the base of responsibility for this enormous decision be promptly broadened. But, in light of the way in which the concept "consultation" has been debased, we do insist that this sharing of responsibility be associated with some kind of vote of persons who are not subordinate to the President. We want more decision makers involved, not just more subordinates or more consultations.

This authority would not limit, in any way, the President's right to retaliate for the use of nuclear weapons against us — thus it would not affect the deterrent or tie his hands. It would be designed to preserve Congress's control over the conventional or nuclear character of the war.

Indeed, it would improve the deterrent. Present strategy envisages the possibility of "demonstration"

—Approved by the FAS Council

Continued on page 2

FIRST USE AND HIROSHIMA

FAS has long supported "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons"; the main obstacle has been the NATO strategy of opposing Soviet conventional attack with American nuclear weapons. Even today, with the Soviet threat declining, Soviet conventional advantages widely questioned, and the British and French armed with nuclear weapons, sensitivities in Germany over any weakening in

"deterrence" have a power of veto over this policy. For this reason, FAS began campaigning three years ago for greater political controls over any first use of nuclear weapons. This effort has interacted with a visit to Hiroshima to persuade FAS to make a major issue of the question "Who decides?" whether nuclear weapons will be used. □

Continued from page 1

nuclear uses if conventional war breaks out, as a signal to the other side of American determination. A better, and much less dangerous, signal would be the request to Congress for this authority. This cocks the revolver without breaking the nuclear threshold. (If necessary, the request could go forth secretly under the proposal we put forward — the Congressional leaders could be consulted privately.)

A number of subsidiary advantages would ensue. At least some members of Congress would be forced to become aware, if not expert, on nuclear strategy, in preparation for possible consultation in an emergency. For too long, too few Congressmen have understood the Nation's basic nuclear strategy. For example, no one on Capitol Hill seems to know whether submarine commanders have the authority to use nuclear weapons without consulting the President. And the very real dangers of an emerging counterforce posture are widely misunderstood in Washington.

Second, the sharing of responsibility would signal the U. S. armed forces that the instantaneous use of nuclear weapons was not inevitable; the hair-trigger readiness to go nuclear in Europe or Korea might be modified by more serious preparations to fight conventionally at least at the outset.

Our basic argument is simple and we repeat it: if more than one decision maker *can* be involved in the decision making process, then more than one man should be, simply in view of the importance of the issue. And since there is no requirement for instantaneous response to conventional attacks by nuclear ones, there is the time for such involvement of more than one.

The first use of nuclear weapons in Europe would be the most far-reaching and fateful military decision taken in the history of mankind. It would bear the seeds — perhaps make inevitable — the destruction of the industrialized world and one-quarter or more of humanity. It would make likely the devastation of the Europe we are trying to protect, and the complete destruction of 100 major U. S. cities and many smaller ones which would, in turn, make the survival of the remaining half of our population problematical. The entire ecology of the planet might well be affected. Should this decision be left to one man? And, especially, should it be done when there is no clear necessity for it? The insanity of such a decision making process should be clear to every thinking and sober person.

Today we live on the slopes of a nuclear Vesuvius. The signs of its potential eruption are everywhere on the strategic landscape. The sophisticates talk knowingly of political sensitives among our allies. Meanwhile, they mortgage the security of our own country, and those of our allies, by ignoring the underlying reality: a world primed to explode into ruins.

What we propose today runs counter to no important political reality in NATO or elsewhere. It reflects simple and unopposed common sense. It does not require that America foreswear the first use of nuclear weapons — a policy FAS has endorsed for

30 years and still does. It only asks that such first use not be based on a decision making process associated with a single man — an unshared responsibility no sane man should want.

For America, the 30 year precedent against the use of nuclear weapons is a tangible asset. So long as nuclear weapons are not used, America will survive. But if they come to be used, then — if we are not completely destroyed in the subsequent escalation — we will, at the least, emerge into a world in which our enormous economic and conventional force is neutralized by the general assumption that nuclear weapons will dominate future combat. Should one decision maker decide these questions for us? □

FAS

Chairman: PHILIP MORRISON

Vice Chairman: JEROME D. FRANK

Secretary: HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.

Treasurer: HERBERT F. YORK

Director: JEREMY J. STONE

The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 7,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 26 members, FAS was first organized in 1946 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than a quarter century.

SPONSORS (partial list)

- *Kenneth J. Arrow (Economics)
- *Julius Axelrod (Biochemistry)
- Leona Baumgartner (Pub. Health)
- Paul Beeson (Medicine)
- *Hans A. Bethe (Physics)
- *Konrad Bloch (Chemistry)
- *Norman E. Borlaug (Wheat)
- Anne Pitts Carter (Economics)
- *Owen Chamberlain (Physics)
- Abram Chayes (Law)
- *Leon N. Cooper (Physics)
- *Carl F. Cori (Biochemistry)
- Paul B. Corneily (Medicine)
- *André Cournand (Medicine)
- *Max Delbruck (Biology)
- John T. Edsall (Biology)
- Paul R. Ehrlich (Biology)
- *John F. Enders (Biochemistry)
- Adrian Fisher (Law)
- Jerome D. Frank (Psychology)
- John Kenneth Galbraith (Econ.)
- Richard L. Garwin (Physics)
- Edward L. Ginzton (Engineering)
- *Donald A. Glaser (Physics-Biol.)
- *H. K. Hartline (Physiology)
- Walter W. Heller (Economics)
- *Alfred D. Hershey (Biology)
- Hudson Hoagland (Biology)
- *Robert W. Holley (Biochemistry)
- Marc Kac (Mathematics)
- Henry S. Kaplan (Medicine)
- Carl Kaysen (Economics)
- *H. Gobind Khorana (Biochemistry)
- George B. Kistiakowsky (Chem.)
- *Arthur Kornberg (Biochemistry)
- *Polykarp Kusch (Physics)
- *Willis E. Lamb, Jr. (Physics)
- *Wassily W. Leontief (Economics)
- *Fritz Lipmann (Biochemistry)
- *S. E. Luria (Biology)
- Roy Menninger (Psychiatry)
- Robert Merton (Sociology)
- Matthew S. Meselson (Biology)
- Karl F. Meyer (Medicine)
- Neal E. Miller (Psychology)
- Hans J. Morgenthau (Pol. Science)
- Marston Morse (Mathematics)
- *Robert S. Mulliken (Chemistry)
- Franklin A. Neva (Medicine)
- *Marshall Nirenberg (Biochem.)
- *Severo Ochoa (Biochemistry)
- Charles E. Osgood (Psychology)
- *Linus Pauling (Chemistry)
- George Poly (Mathematics)
- Oscar Rice (Physical Chemistry)
- David Riesman, Jr. (Sociology)
- *J. Robert Schrieffer (Physics)
- *Julian Schwinger (Physics)
- Stanley Sheinbaum (Economics)
- Alice Kimball Smith (History)
- Cyril S. Smith (Metallurgy)
- Robert M. Solow (Economics)
- *William H. Stein (Chemistry)
- *Albert Szent-Györgyi (Biochem.)
- *Edward L. Tatum (Biochemistry)
- James Tobin (Economics)
- *Charles H. Townes (Physics)
- *Harold C. Urey (Chemistry)
- *George Wald (Biology)
- Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)
- Victor F. Weisskopf (Physics)
- Jerome B. Wiesner (Engineering)
- Robert R. Wilson (Physics)
- C. S. Wu (Physics)
- Alfred Yankauer (Medicine)
- Herbert F. York (Physics)

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS (elected)

- Ruth S. Adams (Science Policy)
- David Baltimore (Microbiology)
- Nina Byers (Physics)
- Rose E. Frisch (Human Biology)
- Arthur W. Galston (Biology)
- Morton H. Halperin (Pol. Science)
- Garrett Hardin (Human Ecology)
- Denis Hayes (Environment Policy)
- William A. Higinbotham (Physics)
- John P. Holdren (Energy Policy)
- Daniel Koshland, Jr. (Biochem.)
- Raphael Littauer (Physics)
- Franklin A. Long (Chemistry)
- Francis E. Low (Physics)
- Victor Rabinowitch (World Devel.)
- George W. Rathjens (Pol. Science)
- Marc J. Roberts (Economics)
- Leonard Rodberg (Pol. Science)
- Joseph L. Sax (Environment)
- George A. Silver (Medicine)
- Jeremy J. Stone (Mathematics)
- Vigdor Teplitz (Physics)
- Frank Von Hippel (Physics)
- Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)

*Nobel Laureates

The FAS Public Interest Report is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$20/year. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

HIROSHIMA REVISITED

Thirty Years Since the Bombing

In mid-July, Fred Branfman, mainstay of the Indochina Research Center, relayed to me an invitation to attend a forum in Hiroshima on the 30th anniversary of the atomic bombing. I was tempted to go. In earlier years, on August 6, I had given speeches around the country. But no one was listening. I was tired of speaking from Times Square sound trucks to scattered crowds of hippies and drunks.

The International Forum was organized by the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) which is devoted to Naderesque consumer-related efforts in Japan and leans toward the Soviet side of the split. Its representatives are *persona non grata* in Peking. There was also another forum organized in the same city by the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP). The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was, evidently, not going to participate in either of these or to hold its own forum.

Hiroshima being the event it was, it did not seem to matter who held the forum. But the sense of political partisanship in Japan itself is so strong that attendance at either of these forums might make it impossible to deal with members of the other two parties. What to do?

The issue having been raised and considering our beginnings as the Federation of Atomic Scientists, it seemed imperative to attend in some fashion or other. If moral responsibility of scientists meant anything, it meant showing our face in Hiroshima and explaining what in God's name we were doing to prevent a repetition.

I wrote the Mayor the politest possible note, explaining our origins and intentions and received a prompt cable: "Participation deeply appreciated".

What to Say?

But what to say? In July, FAS had been working hard to reopen a question first raised in January, 1972 in this journal. At that time, despairing of ever persuading America to adopt a "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons policy, FAS had proposed an amendment to the War Powers Bill in which the President would have to get Congressional authorization (in some fashion) before initiating the use of nuclear weapons in an otherwise conventional war. Senator Fulbright had proposed the amendment in 1972 but it had not passed. The furor over President Ford's and Secretary Schlesinger's statement about first use in Korea had encouraged us to reopen the issue.

But it seemed so minor. Indeed, in Hiroshima, it might sound like a way to authorize the use of nuclear weapons; albeit, one that required some consultation. How explain the background of our activity to a country in which nuclear questions were treated with simple and unalloyed horror; moreover in a country in which communication and translation is so difficult.

A week of pondering produced a blinding flash. The question at issue was really quite simple: "Who decides?" We would ask the Japanese to help us raise this question in the capitals of all nuclear powers. Were submarine commanders able to decide? Did Politburos decide? Who had the right of life or death over the industrialized world?

A statement was prepared summarizing what FAS had tried to do over the last 30 years, the difficulties we had faced, and these recent new questions. A week before the

event, we wrote Mayor Araki a second letter asking if we might release our statement in a press conference after the ceremonial events of the morning had taken place. We then left for Tokyo.

While in Japan discussing issues with the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese Defense Agency, I began to call the main press organs on the off-chance that the press conference in Hiroshima might not come off for one reason or another. It later appeared that, with each such call, the media were checking with the Hiroshima City Office to find out who I was and being told, inscrutably, that Hiroshima had "no concrete plans" for my arrival. The reason was a cautious concern that misunderstandings would spread through the city about the arrival of "atomic" scientists; would a police guard be necessary? One citizen had already asked whether we had come to repent.

The Japanese newspapermen were like newspapermen everywhere, but with that added air of efficiency and shrewdness that seems to characterize many Japanese. A representative of Asahi Shinbun turned out to have been at MIT for a year and recognized Chairman Philip Morrison's name from an earlier August 6 speech in America; he said warmly, "How pleased I am to see that name again", as if he drew strength from seeing the characters.

The next day I consulted the secretarial service in the hotel to call Hiroshima to set up the press conference. The interpreters were polite, effective, showed good judgment, and high standards of honesty. In Hiroshima, our advance copy of the press statement had just been received. The Mayor's office set about translating all 13 pages overnight — a big job. Mr. Kaoru Ogura, head of the Mayor's Foreign Office, agreed to interpret at the press conference and to arrange a room.

Thirty Years Later Over The Inland Sea

During the flight to Hiroshima, I began to examine the gift I had brought for the Mayor. It was a copy of Alice Kimball Smith's book about the origins of FAS, "A Peril and A Hope." It explained what the scientists had, and had not, done to try to prevent the dropping of the atomic bomb. I had read it closely before but decided to review what references there were to our Chairman. After all, the book bore an inscription over his name to the Mayor saying, "Atomic Scientists Also Say Never Again."

On page 114, to my amazement, Dr. Smith explained the growing concern of the atomic scientists in these terms:

"This theme of the bomb's awful effectiveness was embellished by firsthand accounts of those who had gone with the bombs to the Pacific, among them Captain William S. Parsons, who had assembled the first bomb in the air as the plane neared Hiroshima, and Philip Morrison, who went to Tinian with the Nagasaki bomb and took an observation flight over the island of Honshu (editor's note: the main Japanese island) before coming back to Los Alamos. Morrison, the most articulate of the group, combined a rare sensitivity of spirit with a wide-ranging mind and a gift of language that he later employed with considerable skill at congressional hearings. The substance of what he told his colleagues on his return to Los Alamos he later described to a radio audience in the following words:

"We flew down the Inland Sea, past Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya, and a score of smaller cities. All of them

—Continued on page 4

Continued from page 3

looked the same from the air. The green and gray of the untouched Japanese city — with its gardens and its universal gray tile roofs — was in every town just a narrow fringe to a great rust-red circle, where the wreckage had incinerated under fire-bombs. Our B-29's by the hundreds had ruined the cities of Japan. We circled finally low over Hiroshima and stared in disbelief. There below was the flat level ground of what had been a city, scorched red in the same tell-tale scar. But no hundreds of planes had visited this town during a long night. One bomber, and one bomb, had, in the time it takes a rifle bullet to cross the city, turned a city of three hundred thousand into a burning pyre. That was the new thing."

It was eerie. I was following virtually the same flight path that Phil had followed 30 years before. Would these same cities survive the next 30 years? I have never felt so deeply and personally responsible.

I arrived the evening of August 5 to find Mr. Ogura, and a vaguely suspicious newsman, waiting at the hotel to inspect the foreign traveler. By exercising strong control, showing great sobriety, and employing what were for me, elaborate courtesies, I seem to have (probably barely) passed the test for civilized behavior. But in Japan, one never really knows.

Japan is 11 time zones away from Washington and my body woke me at 3 a.m. By 5 a.m., I was out walking the grey streets and trying to figure out where was the Peace Memorial. By 6 a.m. I was trying to take photographs in the early light and observing early morning commemorations. The real survivors prefer to come in the early morning and generally skip the 8 a.m. official main ceremony.

At seven, I walked back to the hotel to deposit my camera; it seemed improper to attend the central event with it, like some gawking tourist. Returning to the Peace Park, I found a central seat. Midway through the event, while the Mayor was reading the Peace Proclamation, a young man rushed forward in an effort to attack him; he was tripped by a hometown security guard (formerly a champion volleyball player) and carried off. The Mayor showed not the slightest sign of alarm but just resumed reading. At 8:15 — the moment that the bomb had struck — a bell was tolled.

Afterward, I toured the peace museums, saw the pictures and the models of the city after the blast. The larger megaton bombs are 1,000 times larger than the Hiroshima bomb and would, as a result, cover an area 100 times larger with this same complete destruction! All of Tokyo, New York or Los Angeles could look like that after one blast.

At the press conference, Mr. Ogura read, in Japanese, the entire 13 page statement. The questions were sympathetic. Did we understand that our "realistic" approach seeking "progress" would sound strange to citizens of Hiroshima who were, after all, the victims and traditionally called for complete abolition, nothing less. (We supported complete abolition, and were prepared to consider the possibility that our approach was wrong, but felt above all that we were obligated to explain just what it was we were trying to do to prevent a repetition.) Did we think Japan should sign the non-proliferation treaty? (We did.) How could our message be communicated to

the public? ("Who decides?" was as simple as we could make it.)

The next day, touring the city, I sensed that my presence was raising difficult memories for persons on the street; but unsure how much publicity my presence had been given, and because the Japanese mask their emotions and curiosity so well, it was difficult to tell. Stopping for a soda, however, a barmaid asked me in broken English how I liked the city. When I expressed approbation she said facetiously, "Good, otherwise, boom," indicating, unless I am mistaken, that the atomic scientists might strike again.

A rainstorm produced an hour delay at the airport; in flight, a stewardess and pilot of Nippon Airways changed my reservations by communicating with the ground. Ground control whisked me away instantly on landing. It was the end of August 7; I still had not had a chance to buy the major newspapers carrying whatever had become of the August 6 press conference. I thrust a \$10 bill at an English speaking Pan Am counter agent and asked if he would send me the newspapers. He agreed but insisted that \$10 was too much for the service — nothing was required, at most perhaps five? I insisted. Later, while taking tickets, he volunteered that he would send the early and late editions. It was clear from beginning to end. We had atomic bombed the most intricately cultivated people on earth. □

JEREMY J. STONE

ACDA DIRECTOR CONFIRMS FAS FEARS

On June 30, FAS sent ACDA Director Fred Ikle a letter containing six questions with regard to U. S. policy on the use of nuclear weapons. Included was this exchange:

"Q. If the United States were engaged in an on-going conventional war, would the president be obliged, under the War Powers Act, to consult with the Congress before initiating the first use of nuclear weapons?"

"A - Assuming the question refers to a legally declared war, the answer, based on the law, is no. The consultation requirement is found in Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution which provides that:

'The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.'

"The objective of the section is to require consultation in extraordinary and emergency circumstances prior to the commitment of armed forces, not during the course of a declared war."

The answer ducks the question of Presidential use of nuclear weapons in undeclared wars but gives no reason why the answer might not be the same. Indeed, Pentagon analysts are rumored to be taking the 60 day limitation in the War Powers Resolution as a reason for making plans to win wars quickly before Congressional inaction would automatically terminate Presidential authority; this is said to be encouraging plans for nuclear use in Korea! □

JAPANESE DEFENSE ISSUES

The immediate defense issue in Japan concerns the possible presence of nuclear weapons on American ships while they are in Japanese harbors. There must be such weapons. Can anyone imagine nuclear aircraft carriers without them? Or, alternatively, can anyone imagine their off-loading their nuclear weapons before entering port?

The problem lies in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which entered into force June 23, 1960. Article VI grants the U.S. bases which use is subject, among other things, to this understanding:

"Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V (editors note: Article V concerns armed attacks against either party) shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan."

There is nothing in the agreement which explicitly mentions nuclear weapons. However the Japanese Government has adopted three principles concerning nuclear weapons: "no manufacture, no use, and no introduction".

The sticky question concerns "introduction": is the Government violating its principles by permitting introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan? Recently, under opposition party pressure, the definition of "introduction" was made more precise to include introduction into Japanese territorial waters; thus bombs on docked ships would be included.

When asked, the United States simply says that it is abiding by its treaty commitments. Citizens and officials normally say that they do not personally know whether there are bombs on ships.

One obvious possibility is that the U. S. plans to argue that nuclear weapons on ships in Japan simply do not represent a "major change" in the deployment into Japan of U. S. armed forces or their equipment. But, meanwhile, the Japanese seem to be under the official illusion that there are no nuclear weapons in Japan, never have been, and that prior consultation would be required before there were.

The issue is so tense that the Japanese cabinet would likely be required to resign en masse if the issue ever surfaced directly. The nearest to direct surfacing thus far has been the testimony before the Symington Committee by retired, Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque who explained that ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons did carry nuclear weapons. This produced an intense furor in Japan which has still not subsided and made Admiral LaRocque a figure of intense importance there. During the FAS visit to Japan, Admiral LaRocque apparently further shocked the Japanese by asserting that neither the defense of Korea or Japan were necessary, "directly or indirectly," to the defense of the United States. The Security Treaty asserts the opposite:

"Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." (Article V.)

Japanese Government officials are concerned about the

possibility that the United States might withdraw its forces from South Korea. There is a complicated relationship between the Japanese and the Koreans in which each have been, at times, considered stronger or superior to the other; this uneasiness continues. Japan also has about 500,000 Koreans in Japan whose treatment might become an issue were Korea unified. There is virtually no territory in dispute but there are continental shelf questions which might be disputed, and fishing problems.

Many Americans think of Korea and Japan as geographically parallel. In fact, Korea points at Japan. South Korea is only 110 miles from Honshu and 30 miles from the Tsu Shimu islands, North Korea is more than 300 miles from Japanese possessions. Thus the Illushin 28 bombers possessed by North Korea could reach Japan from South Korea but not from North Korea, and so on. The Japanese Government officials therefore think of South Korea as a first line of defense, and consider its defense by Americans as "essential."

Many FAS experts view Korea, however, as a time-bomb waiting to draw America into yet another Asian war. With this in mind, FAS asked one official whether there was not some compensating action that could be taken in Japan to balance a gradual withdrawal of American forces from Korea. He simply noted ironically, but sincerely also, that there is no more space in Japan to station more American troops even if they were to be sent.

Japanese officials are concerned about the new War Powers Resolution and whether it importantly modifies the U. S. commitment to Japan, or the constitutional processes that would trigger carrying out that commitment. However, the Security Treaty does not — as mutual security treaties normally do — require that the Japanese assist America unless the attack is made on our forces in Japan. Thus the Japanese effectively limit themselves to self defense. Self-defense forces plan on "taking precautions against any chance of aggression directed against our country through close contact with the United States" and note the resultant necessity that the two countries "always be in close communication with each other, to endeavor to communicate ideas, and to maintain close relations". Suprisingly, defense planning includes the possibility of ordering the self-defense forces to act against direct or "indirect" attacks and notes that "indirect aggression must be met early."

Japan's Attitude Toward Nuclear Defense

Japanese Defense Agency documents emphasize that the United States has stated that it will "use all types of weapons for the defense of Japan" thus implicitly relying upon U. S. nuclear use to defend Japan. With regard to Japanese nuclear weapons, these documents cautiously make the case for the possibility of such a development while affirming that the policy is not such as to permit it at present:

"With regard to nuclear weapons, we adopt the three point non-nuclear principle. Even though it would be possible to say that in legal and theoretical sense possession of small nuclear weapons, falling within the minimum requirement for capacity necessary for self-defense and not posing a threat of aggression to other countries, would be permissible, the government, as its policy, adopts the principle of not at-

—Continued on page 6

Continued from page 5

tempting at nuclear armament which might be possible under the Constitution.”

Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion is gradually moving from seeing self-defense forces as suitable for disaster emergencies to seeing them as suitable for national defense. In 1970, only ten percent wanted unarmed neutrality and ten percent single-handed self-defense. Forty-one percent liked the present arrangement of reliance upon America and self-defense forces.

The Japanese

No other nation in the world is so massively unified as Japan (one nation with one language, one race, and over one hundred million people.) The method of decision making works towards further unity because it calls for consensus. And the social structure works toward unity because it makes the maintenance of relationships into what is practically a national religion thus tying up the population in a gigantic and multifaceted web.

Rules of politeness minimize confrontation; every disagreement begins with assurances of agreement in principle. And the foreigner who begins by despairing that he will ever be translated correctly ends by wondering whether the Japanese really understand each other when issues get the least bit abstract. Thus both courtesy and language encourage the Japanese to “go along”. The very exception provided by Red Army terrorists and the like is perhaps most easily explained by the terrible situation of those who, for one reason or another, have fallen out of the web. And their strength of their own group ties, even when the group numbers only 30 or so, reflects the same approach to society that is seen in Japanese society as a whole.

The willingness of the Germans to follow their leaders to destruction has often been attributed to their readiness to give and follow orders — the authoritarian personality. It is interesting to reflect that the Japanese readiness to move as a mass arises from quite the opposite tendency, the desire for consensus rather than top-down instructions. But the result was the same as World War II showed.

When General Douglas MacArthur first visited Japan, before World War II, he was alarmed at the determination and strength of will of the Japanese generals. It is easy to understand now, after that War, how unified, determined, effective, and hence dangerous, Japan would be if it went again on the march. Notwithstanding the worst case analyses systematically made about Soviet capabilities, every serious observer of the Russians has doubted that either their style or their efficiency were up to the carefully orchestrated surprise attack. Japan is quite different, as a study of Pearl Harbor makes clear immediately. Japan has the makings of the world's greatest Sparta.

Observation Upon Japanese Defense Problems

While the Security Treaty represents a unilateral American defense commitment in return for base rights in Japan, it also represents a method of defending Japan that does not provide the risks to America and world security that might result were Japan to defend itself. Just as both superpowers may prefer a divided Germany to the threat which might be posed by a unified Germany, a Japan per-

sueded that America and American bases will defend it is a peaceful (indeed a peacefully occupied) Japan.

A second Japanese threat to international order is not far fetched. Japan has today the same resource problems that precipitated World War II. If, for example, the Arab nations turned against Japan before such time as the Japanese nuclear program bore fruit in Japan, the urge to apply military force would otherwise be as strong in Japan as anywhere in the world. Japan has no appreciable supply of either oil or coal. (It probably has not even the land for exploiting solar energy should that become commercially feasible.) Its life line is a constant stream of tankers moving from the Persian Gulf 100 miles apart all day, every day.

At the present time, and under the present arrangements, Japan is without political force in foreign policy. Just as water is without any rigidity until the temperature drops, Japanese foreign policies in the present international climate have no shape except an interest in trade. The war and the post-war reconstruction left it allergic to thoughts of use of force. Internally, allegiances to groups give rise to extremely partisan, and often irrelevant, politics. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party itself has seven different factions. The Socialists and Communists do not work together. As a result of these frozen postures, the national leadership is largely immobilized. Any action on its part will provide an issue upon which one or more parties will seize. Japanese life does not encourage active top-down leadership anyway. Thus we have the paradox of a country whose potential for military activity is great, showing great pliability in foreign affairs.

Because of the partisanship which exploits all missteps, Japan is highly sensitive to “shocks” if it is mistreated by other nations. This effect is enhanced by considerations of face, by expectations of politeness, by the highly literate and informed public, and by the traditional sensitivity of the Japanese to the opinions or actions of foreigners.

Conclusions

All in all, one is prone to conclude that the situation now embodied in the Security Treaty is desirable for both Nations and that America should avoid rocking the boat. One conclusion, for example, would be to get rid of the nuclear weapons on any ships docking in Japan if indeed such weapons are on those ships now. Nowadays, nuclear weapons can be flown promptly to needed spots (if such exist). Our prime interest is in not encouraging the Japanese to accept nuclear weapons for themselves or to lose confidence in our word. To preserve both the nuclear allergy and American credibility, it would seem desirable to abide by Japanese nuclear preferences whether or not they are literally required by the Security Treaty.

A much harder problem arises in Korea. American security is now mortgaged to the readiness of either Korea to attack the other. Someday — especially if nuclear weapons continue to be stationed in Korea — we may lose America to this precarious relationship; certainly we can be instantly embroiled in another Asian war at a time and place of someone else's choosing.

On the other hand, an American withdrawal would lead to South Korean nuclear weapons. Dangerous in themselves, they would also add to the Japanese apprehension.

—Continued on page 7

Continued from page 6

Indeed, South Korea would itself then become a major threat to Japan. Could Japan come to see a nuclear armed, or unified, Korea as no more dangerous than a nuclear armed China or Russia, both of which they now confront? Or would it see even a gradual withdrawal of American forces from Korea as a prelude to American withdrawal from Japan as well — a further encouragement to military self-sufficiency in Japan. Personally, I favor a gradual withdrawal of forces from Korea with whatever reassurance is necessary to Japan. And certainly, the nuclear weapons should be removed from Korea without delay. Advice from FAS members is solicited with a view to a subsequent decision by our Council.

Japan is extremely valuable to the West with a gross national product half that of Western Europe and population about two-thirds of it with an industrial dynamism that is in no way inferior and possibly distinctly superior. It looks upon America with respect and some gratitude and is willing to submerge its military tendencies if only we will continue to protect it. In light of its potential for going awry and of the relative ease of defending an island chain, it seems to this observer to be a real bargain. □ JJS

PEACE DECLARATION

Read by

MR. TAKESHI ARAKI

Mayor of the City of Hiroshima

August 6, 1975

On August 6, 1945, an atomic bomb exploded, without warning, high above the citizens of Hiroshima.

A searing heat flashed from the bomb, a cataclysmic detonation shook the earth, and in an instant Hiroshima City was levelled.

The toll of the dead and injured mounted, while in a pall of dense black smoke an unearthly inferno became a reality.

Beneath the collapsed structures of buildings, in the midst of raging flames, people lay dying, desperately pleading for help. In the streets people collapsed and died; in the rivers bodies drifted, floating and sinking; and a ragged and bloody procession wandered blindly, seeking safety away from the mad and frantic streets, while voices begged 'water, water' as they weakened and neared death. Thirty years have elapsed, and all still linger in our minds today, penetrating our hearts with pain and regret.

And beyond this, countless survivors in their lives today cannot rid themselves for a day of agony and fear that radio-activity has inflicted on them. Hiroshima testifies with her body and soul against this inhumanity.

Moved by the ordeal of suffering that has stemmed from the atomic bomb, the citizens of Hiroshima have called, for and sought peace for mankind, unceasingly and steadfastly pleading that the Hiroshima disaster never again be repeated.

And still in the world today we see nations and people everywhere perturbed by the menace of nuclear weapons.

The countries possessing nuclear weapons have ignored the protest of Hiroshima and not only continue nuclear tests, but absorb themselves in developing these bombs.

Following their lead, other countries are oriented towards arming themselves with nuclear weapons and thus intensify the proliferation of nuclear arms.

The world today is in an era of chaotic nuclear competition, at the threshold of a grave crisis that could lead to the annihilation of mankind, a reality that the citizens of Hiroshima absolutely cannot make light of.

Individual human beings must realize that we live on the same earth as respective members sharing a destined community, and so must stand out resolutely for the abolition of all nuclear weapons.

Facing this formidable situation, Hiroshima City has renewed her resolution to build a true world of peace by formally affiliating with Nagasaki, the city like Hiroshima suffered the horror of nuclear bombing. We wish that our concept of peace be in harmony with that of mankind in entirety.

On this day when we remember and mourn the souls of those who were sacrificed, we hereby plead with all our strength to the people of the whole world that it is high time to abolish all nuclear weapons since they are threatening the extinction of the humanity we should be trying to protect.

MARYLAND PSYCHIATRIC SCIENTISTS REINSTATED

Four scientists at the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center have been engaged for some years in a running battle with its Administration. Untenured employees, they were dismissed for a number of grounds, mostly revolving around competence, but also including the phrase: "seriously breached employee conduct by taking public actions which were not in the best interest of the Center." This phrase pretty clearly referred to their public criticisms of Center activities that had indeed resulted in a State investigation.

Convinced that there were whistle-blowing aspects, FAS persuaded the firm of Boudin and Rabinowitz to take their case without fee, and Mr. Herbert Jordan of that firm successfully won the scientists a right to reinstatement pending a hearing. In the process, he apparently also won for untenured civil servants in many states, expanded rights to pretermination hearings.

Now an administrative hearing has reinstated the four on grounds that their firing was motivated, at least in part, by retribution for their public utterances. This ruling came despite the hearing's finding that the scientists had made their public utterances "in part for personal reasons disassociated from their concern as citizens for the development of the Center". It noted that their public utterances, "at least to some extent, contributed to the consideration of the issues".

However, the reinstatement may well be temporary since the hearing judge does not question the right of the State to fire untenured civil servants for "no reason" or for a "good reason" so long as unconstitutional reasons are not involved. FAS is, however, gratified by the vindication of precisely those whistle-blowing rights which it sought to protect. □

FAS WINS VISA FOR MRS. SAKHAROV

On May 9, 1975, there were newspaper mentions of a three day hunger strike initiated by Academician Andrei Sakharov in protest against the refusal of the Soviet authorities to grant his wife a visa to Italy to undergo an eye operation necessary to prevent blindness. There had been a number of other threats and reprisals against Sakharov.

In the October 1973 Public Interest Report, the FAS Council had endorsed the notion that, to the extent there was official detente, private organizations were justified in trying to protect the rights of their Soviet colleagues. The Council statement had concluded:

"By protecting the rights of all our colleagues around the world, we can, at the same time, encourage a pattern of behavior that is central to permanent peace and well being: intellectual freedom."

No scientist more clearly anchored intellectual freedom for Soviet scientists than Sakharov — and he had not before been so disturbed as to launch a hunger strike. The members of the Executive Committee who were available by phone were contacted, and it was decided to boycott a forthcoming July conference of the World Federation of Scientific Workers on the Role of Scientific Organizations in Disarmament, unless and until the visa to Mrs. Sakharov was granted. During the three day hunger strike other scientific societies were advised of our intention.

FAS plans to contact individual scientists were disrupted by inaccurate rumors from usually well informed sources that Mrs. Sakharov was being permitted to leave but it was only her husband that was being refused a visa. In the end, the boycott was not pressed and, to the best of our knowledge, no single American scientist failed to attend the conference who was otherwise planning to go.

Boycott Successful Nevertheless

Nevertheless, the boycott succeeded. Foreign press reports led to an inquiry from the Soviet Embassy. FAS explained its position and advised that, if the rumors in question were true and could be confirmed, we would promptly withdraw the boycott and even send a delegation ourselves. (FAS had earlier advised the World Federation that it had decided not to attend itself because it could not field a sufficiently strong delegation.) The Soviet representative said he might call back when he knew more

himself about the facts.

During the World Federation conference, on July 18, the Soviet authorities granted the visa; a few FAS members who attended in a personal capacity felt that it was a token to the conference. But since FAS had sparked all the complaints, it was obviously a tribute to our efforts. Unfortunately, as often happens in the Soviet Union, the redressing action came too late to permit FAS to attend in recognition of the Soviet action.

In the end, the boycott seems to have been optimal in every respect. It changed no ones plans to attend the conference but succeeded in its aim; Mrs. Sakharov evidently left for Italy around August 20. It reinforced earlier signals to the Soviet Union, from the National Academy of Sciences, as well as from FAS, that American scientists will not sit idly by while their scientific colleagues are denied the intellectual freedoms necessary to function as scientists. And, it implemented the Council principles adopted previously under the title, "The Responsibility of Scientists Under Conditions of Detente." □

FBI DIRECTOR REPLIES

Clarence Kelley, Director of the FBI, explained at a press conference that past FBI involvement in both surreptitious entry without a warrant and secret denunciatory letters had been motivated by considerations of higher national interests. FAS wrote a stiff letter on July 15 noting that the FBI was not authorized to violate the law (surreptitious entry) or go beyond the law (secret denunciatory letters) but simply to uphold the law.

Mr. Kelley replied politely on August 4 agreeing that there was not "any excuse to engage in illegal activities by anyone, including law enforcement personnel." He explained his remarks as simply a factual explanation of past motivations. He asserted:

"... we do not now engage in these activities, and whenever a problem comes up which might indicate an exceptional type of handling, recognizing that such action might be the subject of criticism later, and, further, recognizing that it could be determined to be illegal under the ordinary legal interpretation, we will not act unilaterally. We will, on the other hand, in such extraordinary circumstances, present the matter to the Attorney General and/or to the President." □

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300
307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
September 1975, Vol. 28, No. 7

- I wish to renew membership for calendar year 1975.
 I wish to join FAS and receive both newsletters as a full member.
 Enclosed is my check for 1975 calendar year dues. (I am not a natural or social scientist, lawyer, doctor or engineer, but wish to become a non-voting associate member.)
 \$20 Member \$50 Supporting \$100 Patron \$500 Life \$10 Under \$10,000
 Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:
 FAS Public Interest Report — \$20 for calendar year
 Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____

Zip

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE: _____

Second Class Postage

Paid at

Washington, D. C.

Return Postage

Guaranteed