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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SCIENTISTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF DETENTE

No organization is, and has been, more devoted to ending the great power arms race than FAS. FAS scientists worked toward this goal from the moment of our founding in 1946. And we early recognized that the arms race could not be halted until state-to-state relations ceased to feature confrontation. Thus, for every arms limitation proposal made by FAS, there were corresponding suggestions for that military and political detente that would make agreement possible.

The official detente for which we worked now exists. But in both nations, there is uncertainty about its implications for non-military but related issues. Soviet newspapers carry warnings against ideological disarmament. American newspapers debate the propriety of amendments linking trade to Soviet emigration.

For scientists, it is the relationship between detente and intellectual freedom that is most troubling. American scientists have long refrained from comments on Soviet intellectual freedom in the interests of great power detente. Should they continue to provide a special dispensation they do not provide to many other countries?

We do not believe that they should. First of all, U.S. scientists, like all U.S. citizens, must recognize that military and political detente is only a temporary and fragile solution to the problem of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals; to the problem of long-standing suspicion; and to the lack of contact be-

tween the U.S. and Soviet peoples. It is all too easy to imagine this detente being reversed. We have seen earlier Soviet peace offensives reversed. The very lack of internal criticism is what makes it easy. Nor can the attitudes of future U.S. administrations be predicted with certainty. And the road to friendship is rocky and paved with possibilities for misunderstanding.

In the long run, therefore, military security requires that obstacles be put in the way of easy and rapid reversals of detente. The right of intellectual dissenters to be heard by the populations of their states is basic to this issue. So long as nuclear armed states exist, it is entirely appropriate—as a security matter — for citizens everywhere to advocate the intellectual freedom required to ensure that detente is not lightly discarded.

Furthermore there is, unfortunately, much reason to believe that detente can lead to stepped up repression in the Soviet Union, as Soviet ideologues insist on greater protection against ideological penetration. Thus the detente from which we benefit can be responsible for new denials of freedom; this provides us with a further responsibility to protest.

As scientists and scholars, we have still other reasons to be concerned with intellectual freedom inside the Soviet Union. Mankind needs science badly and science is a cooperative endeavor. We cannot afford to do without the cooperation of the brilliant
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PROJECTING THE DETENTE

As in physics, so also in political science: to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Perhaps it is inevitable, therefore, that the warm relations between Soviet and American intellectuals should grow cooler in response to the warming of relations between those improbable allies, Richard M. Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. For American intellectuals, detente is a signal to move ahead with criticism long put off. There are a variety of persuasive reasons for expecting this surprising result. See, for example, the Pugwash Conference memorandum reprinted on page 6 arguing that detente will cause problems in Soviet-American scientific cooperation.

But there have been also a variety of concrete signals: on June 24, 300 self-proclaimed American "dissenters" demanded amnesty for dissenters in Communist coun-

tries in a full-page ad linked to Brezhnev's visit; 150 scientists at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) threatened non-cooperation with Soviet-American scientific exchanges unless Soviet Jewish scientists were permitted to emigrate. In September, the National Academy of Sciences amazed observers by threatening non-cooperation in scientific exchange over Sakharov. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences is preparing a similar statement. And American psychiatrists are up in arms over the misuse of psychiatry as a weapon of political repression (see page 5).

For American intellectuals, the end of the cold war is a signal for the beginning of a new round in the struggle for peace and freedom—and since this next
(Continued on Page 3)

Soviet scientists. This cooperation requires that they have the right to speak and travel freely on matters of scholarly interest. And these questions of scholarly interest cannot be tightly compartmentalized. The Sakharov document of 1968 itself reveals the intellectual scope required to deal with the modern social, political, and technological questions faced by great nations. As our Federation has long recognized, only interdisciplinary and freely inquiring approaches to these problems can hope for success. In fact, the ever more complicated problems faced by mankind require ever broader intellectual freedoms for scientists.

As scientists, we must also have a special moral concern that science—the product of our thought—not be misused. Without the right to criticize its use, and to have our criticism heard, how will we fulfill our obligations? It is no accident that Dr. Sakharov's actions reflect moral concern associated with his work on the hydrogen bomb—it was the same sense of concern that led to the founding of our entire organization. We must protect and cherish this sense of morality abroad as we rely upon it in ourselves at home.

Furthermore, as scientists we have an obligation to protect one another in the exercise of the freedoms we require. The scientists we protect today in the Soviet Union may protect our freedoms tomorrow. Colleagues in the international community of science, we are each other's keepers. All citizens who desire science to be done efficiently have a stake in this freedom.

Finally, all who are concerned with the state of Soviet life must ponder what a failure to permit internal criticism will mean. It is impossible for industrialized nations to function efficiently without internal criticism. Despite all the paeans to progress that fill the pages of Soviet newspapers, Soviet progress has been slow in many areas. Soviet citizens whisper that the streets are filled with cars in tens of Western nations. Meanwhile the excuses of war and Stalinist terror recede into the past. Today the Soviet Union thinks that transfusions of Western technology will provide a quick-fix to their lagging economy. But there is no economic substitute for freedom of debate on economic alternatives.

We appreciate very well the history of Soviet Russia that has led to the denial of freedom of speech. The Soviet Government has long believed itself surrounded by enemies and this has been the standard explanation for excesses of repression at home. There were indeed enemies, terrible wars, and famines. But the Soviet Union is far stronger today. The Soviet Government has conceded that co-existence with the West is a correct policy. And a quarter century has passed since the last European war. Present trends can therefore only lead to isolation of Soviet scientists. How long must Soviet citizens and scientists wait?

Neither American nor Soviet citizens should delay any longer in calling for fuller and greater intel-

lectual exchange. Nor need we fear that a call for such freedom will destabilize the military detente we have. For the moment, not only economics but also geopolitics drive the great powers firmly into the emerging posture.

For all these reasons, it is now both timely and appropriate for scientists everywhere to place major emphasis upon protecting the intellectual freedoms they require to fulfill their responsibilities to themselves and to mankind.

Scientists must therefore emphasize acting from conscience and principle and require that their colleagues do the same. They must ignore political pressures and political expediency. They must support the right of their associates to speak, write, function and travel for scholarly purposes. Acts of intellectual courage must be protected and encouraged.

By protecting the rights of all our colleagues around the world, we can, at the same time, encourage a pattern of behavior that is central to permanent peace and well-being: intellectual freedom.

—Council of the Federation of American Scientists

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PROTESTING THE DETENTE—from Page 1

round is intimately connected with the rights of intellectuals to do their thing, the round is bound to open spectacularly.

In the interim, the political flux resulting from detente is giving rise to a period of confused alliances in which fixed positions within each society are disrupted by a confrontation with new dilemmas. In America, some of the older liberal scientists find it "too easy" to fall into the pattern of criticizing the Soviet Union. They courageously resisted, through the McCarthy era, pressures to signal their Americanism by adopting anti-communist remarks. Instead, they counterbalanced the Government policy of Soviet-American confrontation by raising the flag of friendship. For them, it's a bit much to be aligned with those traditionally anti-communist and hawkish forces that are the backbone of, for example, the Jackson amendment. Now, in the fact of official friendship, they find themselves criticized by none other than Solzhenitsyn—for being too cautious about criticizing the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, inside the Soviet Union, many of the Soviet scientists considered most liberal signed the statement attacking Academician Sakharov. What complicated political calculations induced this reversal? Were they told the independence of the Soviet Academy was at stake? Their letter (on page 4) suggests this may have been part of it. Or were they told that Sakharov was moving too far, too fast, and would only help the forces of reaction inside the Soviet Union?

In times like these, where conditions are rapidly and unpredictably changing, calculations are cheap and principles are dear. The statement issued by the Federation Council put weight therefore on the importance of hewing to certain clear principles so that whatever internal and external confrontations result would be based on deeply felt and tenable lines. While the touchstone of Soviet-American scholarly concern has been, for the last quarter century, world war, today it has become the solidarity of the Soviet-American intellectual community. What can be extrapolated from this observation besides the prediction of new problems?

The Impact of Soviet-American Contacts

There is reason to believe that the impact on American thinking of exposure to the Soviet Union is as follows: the Americans trust the Soviet Union less, but fear it less also. This follows from the tendency of the right to have exaggerated fears about the Soviet Union and of the left to be insufficiently suspicious.

Conservatives exposed to the Soviet Union are invariably astonished that the second strongest nation should appear to be so poor and underdeveloped. And they note the still tangible fear of war. For them, both of these observations are deeply reassuring. They also note the absence of crime, a well-ordered society, and no *visible* signs of oppression, which only imagination would have expected in any case. These factors—and the effect of having concrete reality replace speculation—have a sober-

LENIN'S COMPLAINT — STILL VALID

Only when everyone in Russia (as has long been the case in other countries) has the right to complain to the national assembly, to the elected courts, and to speak freely of his needs, to write about them in the newspapers—only then will the officials feel that they have someone to be afraid of.

The Russian people are still the serfs of the officials. Without the permission of the officials the people cannot call meetings, they cannot print books or newspapers! Is this not serfdom? If meetings cannot be freely called, or books freely printed, how can one obtain redress against the officials or against the rich? Of course, the officials suppress every book and every utterance that tells the truth about the people's poverty.

Selected Works, Volume II, p. 278-279

ing and relaxing effect on the fearful.

The effect of exposure to Soviet society on those more favorably inclined to it is quite different but very well established. Liberals are invariably disillusioned. The earliest sign of the phenomenon can be found in "Journey for Our Time" (Gateway Paperback) written in 1839 by Marquis de Custine. It was a trip report of a French friend and contemporary of de Tocqueville. In his own words, "I went to Russia in search of arguments against representative government. I returned from Russia a partisan of constitutions."

In 1937, Andre Gide returned from a famous trip and wrote "Return from the USSR". The introduction begins: "Three years ago I declared my admiration, my love, for the USSR." It goes on to suggest that others reading the volume must declare whether it is he or the Soviet Union which has changed. Noting that Russia contained the "best and the worst", he observed:

"It too often happens that the friends of the Soviet Union refuse to see the bad side, or, at any rate, refuse to admit the bad side; so that too often what is true about the U.S.S.R. is said with enmity, and what is false with love."

Today, in America, there are extremely few so well disposed toward Russia as Gide. Foreign admirers of the Soviet Union declined in quantum jumps after such startling developments as: the Nazi-Soviet pact in 1939; the post-war subversion of eastern European governments; the Khrushchev denunciation of Stalin; the invasion of Hungary; and the invasion of Czechoslovakia. ^{See} But, nevertheless, the effect of seeing the Soviet press, dealing with the Soviet bureaucracy, and observing the anti-intellectual attitudes of the Soviet population at large, is certain to be further depressing to liberal intellectuals. From these reactions come a loss of trust, or rather a heightening of suspicion.

It is more speculative for a Westerner to try to predict Soviet reactions to contact with the United States,

but one wonders if it might not be quite the opposite: to fear our capabilities more but to trust our intentions more as well.

Certainly, the Soviet hard-liners are going to be frightened by exposure to American military and economic strength; they have no real conception of how much richer we are.

But an evaluation of American *intentions* based on exposure to our society should be much more favorable than one based on slogans about imperialism, abstract considerations derived from Marxism, or such facts as the Vietnamese war. On the other hand, Soviet fears of ideological penetration are certain to rise as they witness the strength and penetrating power of the Western culture. Soviet intellectuals may come to have much greater faith in our democracy when they see it despite all its blemishes. It is, for example, startling to see how many mistakes of analysis were made by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in a recent article.

Soviet Exposure To The West

For Soviet scientists and intellectuals, exposure to the West is likely to bring many hard personal problems. The reports of dissidents, including Sakharov, reveal clearly that most Soviet dissident intellectuals became dissident out of a sense of outrage at personal indignities, or frustration in response to minor actions taken against them when they voiced what they considered legitimate complaints. Little dissent arose from the relatively rare visits West by high placed officials.

If, however, large numbers of Soviet intellectuals visit the West, they will be unable to deny to each other the freedoms they have seen and the degree of the restraints placed upon them at home. The extent of spontaneously generated dissent will increase and more and more Soviet scientists will have to take a position on this dissent in an ever more polarized debate. In turn, the demands will rise on Western scientists to protect, by complaint, those repressed for dissent.

All in all, U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union probably has two modes. In the first, there is state-to-state confrontation opposed by U.S. dissenters that call for greater friendship. This has been the pattern of the cold war; it has produced few desirable changes inside Soviet society.

In the second mode, there is official U.S. friendship but U.S. dissent points to the lack of freedom in Soviet society rather than to the prospects for cooperation.

In the first, Soviet agitprop is unleashed to explain that enemies are at the gate and that the outside world is hostile. This can only help the Soviet ideologues and hurt the chances of liberalization. In the second, agitprop is reversed; it becomes all the harder to explain why intellectual freedom and exchange is not permitted.

For a quarter century, the West has tried to melt the Soviet iceberg with a combination of cold and a little warmth; now it's trying a predominance of warmth and a little cold. Let's hope the new policy is more successful than the old. □

TEXT OF ATTACK ON ACADEMICIAN SAKHAROV BY 40 COLLEAGUES (PRAVDA, AUGUST 29, 1973)

We consider it essential to bring to the attention of the general public our attitude regarding the activities of Academician A. D. Sakharov.

In the last few years, Academician Sakharov has moved away from active scientific activities and spoken out with a series of pronouncements against the Soviet Government's internal and foreign policy. Not long ago in an interview given by him to the foreign correspondents in Moscow and published in the Western press, he went so far as to speak out against the detente policy of the Soviet Union and against the policy of consolidating those positive steps which have taken place in the whole world recently.

These announcements of A. D. Sakharov, deeply alien to the interests of all progressive people, attempt to justify a crude distortion of Soviet reality and imaginary criticisms of the socialist system.

In his statements, in essence, he allies himself with the most reactionary imperialistic circles, actively speaking out against efforts to bring about international cooperation among countries with different social systems; against the policy of our party and our government supporting the development of scientific and cultural cooperation; and the consolidation of peace among peoples. In the same way Sakharov has actually become the instrument for hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The activity of A. D. Sakharov is fundamentally alien to Soviet scientists. It looks particularly unseemly in light of the concentration of our efforts on solving the vast problems of economic and cultural structure of the USSR, on strengthening peace and improving the international situation.

We want to express our indignation with the pronouncements of Academician Sakharov, and we emphatically condemn his activity, which discredits the honor and dignity of the Soviet scientists.

We hope that Academician Sakharov will meditate on his activities.

Academicians: N. G. Basov, N. V. Belov, N. N. Bogolyubov, A. E. Brownstein, A. P. Vinogradov, C. V. Vonsovsky, B. M. Vul, N. P. Dubinin, N. M. Zhavoronkov, B. M. Kedrov, M. V. Keldish, V. A. Kotelnikov, G. V. Kurdyumov, A. A. Logunov, M. A. Markov, A. N. Necmeyanov, A. M. Obykhov, U. A. Ovchinnikov, A. I. Oparin, B. E. Paton, B. N. Petrov, P. N. Pospelov, A. M. Prokhorov, O. A. Reautov, A. M. Rumyantsev, L. I. Sedov, N. N. Semenov, D. V. Skobeltzin, S. L. Sobolev, V. I. Spitzin, V. D. Timakov, A. N. Tukhonov, V. M. Tuchkevich, P. N. Fedoseyev, I. M. Frank, A. N. Frumkin, U. B. Khariton, M. B. Khrapchenko, P. A. Cherenkov, V. A. Engelhardt.

ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY FOR POLITICAL REPRESSION

The Soviet directive for compulsory hospitalization of mental patients is often kept by the health institutions from the persons being committed. That directive follows:

"The basic reason for compulsory hospitalization is the danger posed by the patient to society, due to the following characteristics in his morbid state:

- a) psychomotor excitation accompanied by a tendency toward aggressive behavior.
- b) Incorrect behavior due to psychochemical disturbances (hallucinations, delirium, psychochemical automatism, syndromes of disturbed consciousness, pathologic impulsiveness) when accompanied by pronounced emotional stress and a desire for achievement;
- c) Systematic delirium syndromes accompanied by chronic and progressive deterioration, if they indicate socially dangerous behavior on the part of the patient;
- d) hypochondriac delirious states producing incorrect and aggressive attitudes on the part of the patient toward individuals, organizations or institutions."

Since 1969, even the *possibility* of incorrect behavior is sufficient for compulsory hospitalization after renewed emphasis was placed on an older degree. A new term "socially dangerous tendencies" was also introduced.

In practice, a very large segment of Soviet society tends to consider criticism of the Soviet Government, or dissident activity of any kind, as a "socially dangerous tendency." The mentality produced by Stalinist terror, the hopelessness of criticism, the anti-intellectual bias of large elements of the population, the readiness of many individuals to join in tacit conspiracies to suppress dissidence—all work in favor of the device of simply characterizing dissidents as insane. As the adjoining box reveals, this Russian tactic is at least 150 years old.

Hearings released in October, 1972 by the Senate Judiciary Committee (Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union) contain a host of interesting documents on this subject as well as testimony by the exiled mathematician Yesenin-Volpin.

The reports of the Soviet psychiatrists are parodies of psychiatric reports straight from Kafka. General G. P. Grigorenko was accused of "paranoid reformist ideas" as a result of his proclivity for protesting against such things as the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the treatment of Crimean Tartars. It is concluded that he is not "responsible for his actions" because "the intensity of [his] ideas is increased in connection with various external circumstances which have no direct relation to him . . ." —in other words, world events unrelated to him could induce him to another demonstration!

Despite the General's assertions that he was simply acting out of conscience and did not consider his acts to have historical significance, he is accused of a "clear over-estimation of his own activity and of the significance of his personality and reformist ideas, of the rightness of which he is unshakeably convinced" (pg. 69, 70).

Some of the officials view such dissidence as directly

DECLARING RUSSIAN DISSENTERS INSANE HAS A LONG TRADITION

"Some years ago a man of parts, respected by everyone in Moscow, noble of birth and of character, but, unfortunately for him, devoured by love of truth—a dangerous passion anywhere but fatal in that country—dared to state that the Catholic religion is more conducive to the development of minds, to the progress of the arts than the Byzantine-Russian religion; thus he thought as I do and dared to express himself—an unpardonable crime for a Russian." . . .

"The sentence which would decide the fate of such a great criminal was awaited with anxiety; this sentence was slow in coming and people had already despaired of the supreme penalty when the Emperor, in his merciful impassiveness, declared that there was no basis for punishment, that the man was not a criminal to be punished but a madman to be locked up: he added that the sick man would be turned over to the care of doctors."

"This new form of torture was applied without delay and in a fashion so severe that the supposed fool was near justifying the derisory sentence of the absolute chief of the Church and of the State. This martyr of the truth was on the verge of losing the sanity which was denied him by a decision from on high. Today, at the end of three years of a treatment rigorously observed, a treatment as degrading as it was cruel, the unfortunate theologian of broad horizons, only begins to enjoy a little liberty. But is this not a miracle! . . . now he doubts his own sanity and, on the faith of the imperial word, he declares himself insane."

Journey for Our Time, 1839
Marquis DeCustine

threatening their jobs and position. During one interview, an examiner shouted at another examiner who was chatting with Grigorenko "What are you trying to prove to him? He is ready to hang both of us from the nearest tree!" (p. 75).

One does see some progress in the Soviet concern for rule through law in these unbelievable reports. Flown to Moscow for another examination, Grigorenko pointed out that sanction for his arrest would expire in two days. Panic resulted and he was promptly flown back.

The use of euphemisms by the examiners would be laughable if it were not so serious. One asks Grigorenko why, after psychiatric intervention he had "behaved as he should" for a year and half before returning to his "old ways." Grigorenko asks if he is referring to the fact that he had not written anything for distribution and the examiner "nods."

The police view is expressed with fewer euphemisms; Mrs. Grigorenko asks the KGB investigators when her husband had gone out of his mind and is told:

"The illness is a subtle one, not everyone would no-

tice it. But his ideas are socially dangerous" (pg. 97).

Sometimes the doctors are equally frank. One told Viktor Feinberg:

"Your release depends on your behavior. And your behavior, to us, means your political views. In all other respects, your behavior is perfectly normal. Your illness consists of your dissenting opinions. As soon as you renounce them and adopt a correct point of view, we will let you go."

A nurse told him: "You are suffering from a dissident way of thinking."

The concluding paragraph of the diagnosis of Valdimir E. Borisov follows in full:

"Taking into consideration the repeated and active attempts to circulate anti-state fabrications, and also the absence of criticism of his own sick condition, Borisov should be sent for compulsory treatment to a psychiatric hospital of special type" (pg. 152).

Borisov, a then 21 year old electrician, had been incarcerated in the Leningrad psychiatric hospital in 1964 under article 70 of the Soviet criminal code (agitation or propaganda carried out for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet power or of committing dangerous crimes against the State). After four years of such treatment, he still retained the courage to join an "Action Group for the Defense of Civil Rights in the USSR" and to sign a petition to the United Nations. For this he was rearrested.

In the Alice in Wonderland world of Soviet political justice, reliance upon the Soviet Constitution can be dangerous. In a final statement before sentencing, one of the most courageous of the Soviet dissidents, Vladimir Bukovsky is quoting the right of freedom of demonstration (Article 125), and criticizing the law under which he is being tried when the prosecutor interrupts his statement to say: "He criticizes the law, discredits the activities of the organs of the KGB, and he is beginning to insult you (the judge)—a new criminal act is being perpetrated here." □

SOVIET CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 125

In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the USSR are guaranteed by law:

- (a) freedom of speech;
- (b) freedom of the press;
- (c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
- (d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations.

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communication facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights."

SUPERPOWER DETENTE COULD THREATEN SOVIET-AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION

J. J. STONE, 30 AUGUST, PUGWASH CONFERENCE

LEMMA I: *Superpower detente may lead to fewer American restrictions on free circulation of scientists but greater Soviet restrictions.*

Reason: During various periods of Cold War, "national security" was used in America in justifying various restrictions: preventing certain Marxist scholars from travelling to America to lecture by denial of visas; discouraging some Chinese scientists in the late forties from returning to the People's Republic of China by denial of exit visas; restricting some American leftists in the fifties from travelling abroad by control over issuance of passports. These and other restrictions vanish as detente arises, because American society no longer sees any emergency that would excuse them.

On the other hand, as detente improves, Soviet society may become no less (or even more) apprehensive both about ideological penetration and about brain-drain, because both become plausible for the first time in several decades. Hence, new restraints upon free scientific circulation may be imposed (e.g., denial of citizenship) and old restraints, such as mail censorship and limitations on travel, may be continued.

LEMMA II: *Detente leads American scientists to feel freer to criticize Soviet treatment of Soviet scientists.*

Reason: In the first place, American scientists feel freer to criticize because their own society is behaving better, and because the conditions of their Soviet colleagues may become (or seem) even worse than before. (Lemma I). In the second place, American scientists will no longer fear that criticism of Soviet government behavior associates them with crude anti-communism (and witch-hunts) which, during the Cold War, they were strongly opposing in America. In the third place, American scientists will no longer fear that criticism of Soviet government behavior will discourage superpower detente—also a high priority goal of American scientists—precisely because that detente is at hand.

CONCLUSION: *Detente may lead to rising American scientific protests about the treatment of Soviet scientists and may imperil Soviet-American scientific co-operation.*

Reason: The American scientists feel freer to protest. (Lemma II) Also, most American scientists are liberals; they love freedom and are quick to protest its absence. They also feel a community of feeling with all scientists. Soon these feelings will dominate over Cold War attitudes of silence. In addition, many American scientists are Jews; indeed, most of these Jews emigrated from Russia three generations ago. Especially these scientists feel close identification with Jewish Soviet scientists, of which there are many. And the desire of some Soviet Jewish scientists to go to Israel, and Soviet refusals to permit it, will keep these protests alive. If the protests continue, they could lead inevitably to actions on both sides incompatible with scientific co-operation through escalation of even tougher protests on the one hand, and restraints on the other. □

NOTES FROM A PUGWASH CONFERENCE

A Soviet scientist to an American scientist (in confidential tones): They say (in the Soviet Union) that Sakharov is Jewish—but it's not true. They say, "Sakharov", more precisely, "Sucre", more precisely "Sucreman" but it's not true. The American scientist (Jewish) is dumbfounded and wonder's if he should say "too bad he's not Jewish" or relate how President Eisenhower was once called a Swedish Jew to show we have anti-semites too.

* * * *

An American scientist to a Soviet Academician: I hope that you will not simply reject (certain) comments as "anti-Soviet."

Soviet Academician: I do not ask whether people are "anti-Soviet", I ask whether they are "pro-Soviet". Anyway you should not criticize, remember the terrible things American scientists did in Vietnam.

American Scientist: Good, you criticize us and we will criticize you; after all, all scientists are colleagues, let us criticize one another.

Soviet Academician: No, do not meddle in our internal affairs. Anyway, scientists can do nothing in politics.

* * * *

Soviet scientist to American scientist: I am not afraid. I went to speak to Levich; I have known him for years. I said to him, what is this all about. He told me. But I did not understand.

American scientist: Yes, we know you are brave. But what of the others who are afraid to speak to him. How can he function as a scientist. (He is thinking this is how some people in Russia are eased into asylums—if enough people cop out by saying they do not understand "X", "X" can be certified "confused").

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Soviet scientist to American scientist: I speak frankly. I know Sakharov. He is sincere. He hoped for results. But what does he know of political matters.

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American scientist (on President Nixon's Enemy List) to Soviet Americanologist: So now you become President Nixon's friend and I have become his enemy—I'm not sure that I like this.

Soviet Americanologist: Well, each person must do his job!

* * * *

Soviet scientist to American scientist half his age: You are sincere. I know that. But emotional. You have good intentions. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions. I cannot say further.

* * * *

Soviet scientists (old Bolshevik) describing confrontation with students: "So, after my talk, a question was sent to me asking how did I feel about Sinyevsky (dissident author now exiled in Paris). The question had no name. I said that I had fought in the Revolution and if, at that time, I had had a gun and met Sinyevsky, I would

have shot him. But today, I said, we have laws for such people.

Then I received another question, also unsigned, saying, "Have you ever read anything from Sinyevsky?" I said yes, in Vienna. How can people write under assumed names abroad!"

* * * *

American scientist speaking at general plenum [providing the only mention of Sakharov on paper or in general discussion of the entire conference despite the fact that, during this conference, every major Western newspaper had editorials on Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn].

"I welcome the comments of working group III on the need for cultural exchange in Europe as a means of providing long-term security. And I would like to tell a related story, with a moral, involving the two Soviet Academicians whose recent deaths were memorialized two days ago at this conference.

Ten years ago, at a small and select Soviet-American conference of scientists, I submitted a paper against the ABM. It argued that the Soviet Union should not build an ABM lest the U.S. follow suit. It proposed a no-ABM agreement.

Every Soviet scientist at that conference told me I was wrong. General Talensky [military historian now deceased] said my paper was an ultimatum. Professor Vassily S. Emelyanov told a very good joke, which he learned from Henry Kissinger, suggesting that people like me could not distinguish offensive missiles from anti-missiles like a dumb Sheriff that thought anti-communists were a kind of communist.

I was desperate. I pulled a quotation from my pocket and approached Academician Millionshchikov. I said: "At least one Soviet Academician agrees with me; he said in 1956 that defensive weapons might become destabilizing. Who is this Academician Artsimovitch?"

Without any hesitation, Academician Millionshchikov said: "Oh Artsimovitch, he always thinks the opposite of everyone else."

It was then I realized that Academician Artsimovitch was a very great man.

Today, I believe that no nation will be safe until all nations permit their scientists and scholars to speak freely. Again, as before, only one Soviet Academician seems to agree: Academician Sakharov. Forty Academicians disagree. As before, our views are the subject of charges that we cannot tell one thing from its opposite, in this case, peace from war.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that Academician Sakharov will be invited to a future Pugwash Conference so that we can discuss these complex issues with him. These issues are especially important to Pugwash. The scientists here are functioning from a deep sense of responsibility. But they cannot fulfill their responsibility to mankind unless they have the necessary rights to do so. A discussion of these rights is therefore of critical importance. Unless these matters are considered carefully, the Pugwash movement could lose its power and the ability to repeat its successes of the past" [warm applause].

ECONOMIC PRESSURES UPON THE SOVIET UNION

In June, the Joint Economic Committee published 30 papers on "Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies", by a variety of specialists. It was published at a critical time. The Soviet Union had suffered one of the worst years in the history of its economy; the GNP had grown by only 2% in 1972 and massive grain imports had been required. The Stalinist view of autarky or self-sufficiency was being given up and commercial relations with the West were being emphasized. The Soviet Union had reached strategic parity but, outside the defense sector, the economy was lagging. And the Soviet leadership was committed to raising consumer standards. Meanwhile, there continued to be a labor shortage coupled with declining population growth rates. Differential population growth rates were favoring non-European Soviet peoples. Overall, as one author put it:

"Superior American economic power and efficiency is beyond any doubt. The Soviet economy provides a population 18 percent larger with less than half the goods and services, employing 45% more labor than the U.S. and investing in real terms as much as this country. But because the civilian economy (above all agriculture) is inefficient in comparison with the defense sector, the latter's share in the national product is relatively small."

In particular, agricultural production was back to the level of 1968 not only because of bad weather but also because of a failure to improve farm productivity. Under Brezhnev (1965-72) diets, consumer durables, and dress have improved rapidly but there is still a large gap in living standards even between the Eastern European Bloc countries and the Soviet Union; there is also a suppressed inflation—goods and services are not rising as rapidly as incomes—which makes itself felt in shortages.

One author noted certain underlying cultural problems: the obsession with secrecy that complicates plan-

ning; the predominance of engineers, and the absence of economists, in the highest political leadership; the harsh Soviet climate rather more akin to that of Canada than to that of the United States; the low educational and cultural level of the Soviet people; and the terrible losses suffered both during World War II and the purges that preceded the war. Another author reflected on the highly politicized structure of Soviet life and the continuation of what were almost separate social castes under the Tsar: state, army and police bureaucracies. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, as opposed to Khrushchev, these and other well-to-do groups now have access to high-cost material incentives: private cars, imported goods, tourist trips abroad, cooperative condominium flats, and so on.

The controlled economy has resulted in a variety of grey and black markets. There is maneuvering to be allocated plans that one can over fulfill. Moonlighting of various kinds goes on in a marginal private sector selling unavailable special services, or using the influence associated with one's job for private gain.

Can the Soviet economy be run efficiently from the center? One author concludes:

"the latest round of modification in Soviet planning and incentives leaves the essentials of the system unchanged, but add to the degree of centralization and to the complexity of administrative arrangements. The innovations also help to swell the administrative bureaucracy, which has increased one-third since 1965. As clearly exemplified in the ninth Five Year Plan, the planners' pressure on resources—taut planning—continues unabated. The familiar chronic malfunctions persist, and the problem of devising incentive schemes to remove them continues to defy solution. Finally, the efficacy of monetary incentives is being eroded by the continuing unavailabilities of desired goods and services. The strong, current emphasis on "moral incentives" and the heightened pressure for "shock work," socialist pledges and socialist competitions of all kinds is the familiar and predictable response of the political leadership." □

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