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SPECIAL ISSUE:

SALT THREE

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AFTER SALT II, WHAT?

Nothing seems more difficult for man's psychology than to negotiate explicit limits on anticipated combat. In his mind—and in his hormones—the premises of struggle are themselves at war with the premises of negotiation. Far, far easier to march tranquilly forward to the beat of one drum than to try to remain attentive to two discordant beats.

This difficulty is compounded by the psychology of groups of men. Usually a group consensus can only be achieved upon limits that are so clearly favorable to the group on one side as to preclude agreement by the other. And since groups, especially groups preparing to fight, are reluctant to fragment their consensus, limits less clearly favorable are not acceptable.

These eternal verities apply to the arms race. They limit potential agreement to precluding or dismantling only those weapons that are clearly unnecessary and undesirable. Obviously, huge quantities of nuclear weapons fit that formula. But the very size of the overkill undermines motivation for disarmament by questioning the feasibility of making any significant ultimate change.

The SALT talks, and the SALT process, are suffering from these realities. The first major agreement—precluding significant anti-ballistic missile systems—has been highly successful and an ever solid consensus approves it. It is increasingly clear that these expensive systems would have been unworkable especially against MIRV) and would have further stimulated the arms race.

Strains in SALT

But the effort in SALT I and SALT II to balance up the offensive forces on both sides is under ever greater strain. Technologies beyond the control of the talks, when conjoined with the weapons systems on the two sides, contain the seeds of future disparities even if present forces are indeed being balanced. And the rate of change of technology puts the weapon future beyond the ken of all but a handful of well-placed weapons technologists.

The effort to ratify treaties concerning these ever more arcane subjects puts an especially heavy burden on our political process because it subjects to minute scrutiny the details of agreements for which a two-thirds majority must be reached. Despairing of reaching an informed and defensible position, Senators will,

increasingly, vote their impulses or the latest shift in the temperature of U.S.-Soviet relations.

True, the danger of deliberate surprise attack continues to wane and ever more bizarre scenarios are necessary to maintain alarm. But the difficulty of the subject camouflages a constant creep in assumptions made by those concerned. The period of maximum danger is, as always, a few years hence, like a receding desert mirage. Meanwhile, threat scenarios are fashioned (or emphasized) to meet the requirements of solutions, ever more based on the psychology of matching, rather than the imperatives of defense.

As the Pentagon guts SALT from the right, a debilitating despair looms on the left. How long can the Administration claim to have "put a cap on the arms race," or otherwise turned the corner while warhead numbers continue their rapid sustained increase? After SALT II, what?

Approaches to SALT

This newsletter contains sketches of a wide variety of approaches to this question from using the talks only for dialogue, to massive unilateral cutbacks in U.S. forces to the real levels needed for military defense. Each approach has different implications for SALT. But one thing seems to be clear. If SALT achievements are going to be minor, then the talks must adopt a comparably lower posture. If the arms race is only going to be managed—rather than limited or turned around—then the talks must go forward in the business-like style of managers—insulated from political pressures, and efforts to exploit them for political triumphs.

A very wide consensus favors maintaining the SALT talks. The trick is going to be first to decide how much they can be expected to produce and then to shape political expectations accordingly. In effect, SALT is losing "face" for the sin of non-achievement. As experts in social psychology have long known, it is only the truly humble who can long avoid embarrassment. Sooner, rather than later, an Administration is going to have to communicate to the public the bad news that SALT, as it is progressing now, is not going to provide foreseeable answers to the grim dilemma posed by the ever-present possibility of nuclear armageddon. □

—Reviewed and Approved by the FAS Council

SALT II ANNOUNCEMENT IMMINENT

As this goes to press, the SALT II agreement appears imminent, and a subsequent newsletter will discuss the

technical details, probably the January issue. The December issue will discuss Libya and terrorism. □

SEVEN APPROACHES TO SALT

Seven approaches to arms limitations are distinguished here, ordered according to how ambitious they are in terms of anticipated impact on strategic forces or, perhaps, equivalently, according to the amount of political capital each would require of a President to institute.

I. Cutting back to what we really need.

One approach is to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the political capital exists to persuade the United States to cut back to what, in some efficient economic sense, it really needs. This also assumes that no U.S.-Soviet difference in weaponry above this level will make any political-military difference in bargaining or crisis termination.

Using this approach, a Boston Study Group led by Professor Philip Morrison recommended—

“... the steady elimination of nearly all land-based missiles, the elimination of the manned strategic bombers, but the retention of most of the submarine ballistic missile fleet, without the new Trident submarines now being built, and with a measure of reduction in the force loading of those subs we retain. We urge withdrawal of our sub bases to U.S. territory, and an end to growth in our present strong force of anti-sub attack submarines.” (*The Price of Our Defense: A Reasoned Military Policy for the 1980s*, to be printed by New York Times Press)

Some land-based missiles would be retained as a hedge against sea-based force problems (say 100 hardened silos). The more modern 31 of the Polaris-Poseidon force would be kept, comprising about 5,000 warheads capability, but the number of warheads would be, under this plan, steadily reduced, until there was only one warhead per missile (or 496).

The Boston Study Group would argue that this reduction was safe militarily, less wasteful economically, and represented, at the same time, a way out of the arms race dilemma. In due course, they would argue, the Soviets would see the irrelevance of buying more weapons in a one-sided competition. And because this approach deflates the arms race, the Group would consider it less likely to lead to war.

II. Buying only what we need.

A zero-base approach to buying only what we need, but without emphasizing cutbacks to smaller forces, was attempted by Senator George McGovern in 1972. In the strategic situation of that time, he called for: reducing air defense, leaving essentially a surveillance capability; discontinuing deployment of Minuteman MIRV warheads; cancelling the Safeguard ABM program; stopping prototype development of the B-1 which would be made unnecessary by maintenance of the B-52/FB-111 force; and halting the conversion of the Poseidon submarines.

Buying only what one needs accepts the fact that any President has a limited store of political capital to reverse the decisions of the past; that the savings from such reversals are often less significant than forgoing the purchase of new weapons; and that the politically or militarily disturbing aspects of already existing systems have often already been assimilated.

This policy focuses therefore on the *new* expenditures. But it also seeks to determine what is militarily required rather than only to “match the nuclear Jones.” It is reluctant to engage in negotiations over weapons which can be determined not to be necessary unilaterally.

Thus, for example, the U.S. would not, under this policy, reverse itself and build strategic air defenses just because the Soviet Union was doing so, when it had earlier concluded that air defenses without missile defenses were pointless, and missile defense was both infeasible and precluded by treaty.

Supporters of this policy are reluctant to submit unilaterally resolvable issues of this kind to arms negotiations, lest the failure of the negotiation be taken to mean

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a requirement for the weapons to be built. They remember a familiar syndrome in which hawks and doves tacitly agree to leave an issue to U.S.-Soviet negotiations—the hawks because they think negotiations will fail and the doves because they prefer to hope for success than to debate the issue at home. This was much the spirit applied in the ABM case. Before SALT, the U.S. critics of ABM just argued that ineffective Soviet ABMs need not be matched. Later they acquiesced in the notion that, if ABM negotiations with the Soviets could not be successfully concluded, a U.S. ABM would (have to) be built.

An interesting possible new case would be negotiations on budget levels. The U.S. feels no particularly strong internal pressure to match Soviet defense spending, partly because Soviet spending is hard to measure and partly because it has not thus far been made an issue. An agreement to negotiate over budget levels would, according to this view, catapult budget levels onto a political stage such that U.S. officials would indeed feel pressure to match. And since the budget levels would still be hard to define, the net effect could be to increase U.S. expenditures without having had any real chance to reach a relevant arms agreement.

In short, buy only what you need is not only a policy of showing restraint in purchasing. It is also a policy of showing restraint in designing the arms negotiation agenda. One would negotiate what one felt had to be negotiated and had a reasonable probability of being negotiated unsuccessfully.

III. SALT III with reductions.

The Administration and the Soviet Government are evidently prepared to hold out the promise of this policy in the declaration of principle of SALT II.

Presumably, the SALT III reductions would take place in back-up strategic forces: bombers and land-based missiles. Unfortunately, no consensus exists in the United States, and perhaps also in the Soviet Union, as to what priorities should be followed in designing such reductions.

For example, the Soviet Union has 135 long-range bombers built in the late 1950s, and they should be ripe for reductions as should about 400 U.S. strategic bombers. But the U.S. is upgrading those B-52s and arming them with cruise missiles partly in response to having scrapped the B-1 bomber; politically this is hardly the time to start phasing them out. Nor is the whole Soviet strategic bomber force an adequate trade for our much superior force so that percentage reductions would have to be considered.

For land-based missiles, the U.S. is ever more readily conceding the impending vulnerability of its land-based force; but reductions would make it *more* vulnerable though less critical. Formally, the MAP scheme of building many holes into (and out of) which a small number of missiles would be furtively moved, could accommodate reductions. But, in practice, the existence of the holes would provide a ready-made "breakout" from a small number of missiles to the installation of a large number.

Thus the reductions, if accompanied by MAP, would be purchased at the price of a potential instability—the multiplied rapid rebirth of missile numbers.

For their part, the Soviets see their fixed site missiles as becoming vulnerable, but this, their main strategic force, is more likely to seem to need reinforcement than to look suitable for disarmament fodder.

No doubt some percentage reductions in back-up strategic force could be arranged. For example, a 10% reduction in overall numbers of bombers and land-based missiles with freedom to select among the bombers and the land-based missiles. (The overall number of ICBMs + bombers is about equal on the two sides. The U.S. has $1054 + 440 = 1494$, to the Soviet $1400 + 135 = 1535$. And the U.S. bombers have payload advantages over the Soviet bombers while the Soviet ICBMs have throw-weight advantages over the U.S. ICBMs.) Reductions in the MIRV limits (now at 1320 launchers which can be so MIRVed) could be considered also.

But the pressures on both sides are really upward:

The current Soviet strategic missile delivery capability

Vehicle	Number of vehicles deployed	Total delivery capability No. warheads
<i>MIRVed vehicles</i>		
SS-17	40	160
SS-18	50	400
SS-19	140	840
Sub-total	230	1,400
<i>Non-MIRVed vehicles</i>		
SS-7	109	109
SS-8		
SS-9	238	476 ^a
SS-11	840	960
SS-13	60	60
SS-N-5	21	21
SS-N-6	544	1,088 ^a
SS-N-8	284	284
Sub-total	2,096	2,998
Total	2,326	4,398

^a Estimates.

SOURCE: SIPRI YEARBOOK, 1978


The current US strategic missile delivery capability

Vehicle	Number of vehicles deployed	Total delivery capability No. warheads
<i>MIRVed vehicles</i>		
Minuteman III	550	1,650
Poseidon C-4	496	4,960
Sub-total	1,046	6,610
<i>Non-MIRVed vehicles</i>		
B-52	300	4,300 ^b
Titan	54	54
Minuteman II	450	450
Polaris C-3	160	480
Sub-total	964	5,284
Total	2,010	11,894


^b Including SRAM

SOURCE, SIPRI YEARBOOK, 1978


The current US strategic missile delivery capability



Number of warheads



Total yield (Mt)



cruise missile warheads are increasing on our side and the fractionation of Soviet warheads into smaller and smaller ones increases their number of warheads. Hence these reductions would be more apparent than real in the capacity of the two sides to destroy people and property.

IV. SALT III without reductions.

SALT III will be complicated with or without reductions since a number of shifts in the strategic balance will be taking place and new issues arising. Perhaps any President will have his hands full without them.

In the first place, much of what SALT III is really all about is resolving the dilemmas that were pushed off into the future via the device of the three-year SALT II protocol agreement. There were the hard problems: limits on ground-launched cruise missiles that would otherwise reach Soviet territory from West Germany, and limits on deployment of mobile missiles. The protocol was only negotiable precisely because these limits were not really binding during the period of the protocol on the U.S.—the ground-launched cruise missiles and the mobile missiles were not ready for deployment.

In the second place, what should be done about grey-area systems such as the SS-20 and medium-range Backfire bombers on the Soviet side, and the F-111s and those ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles on our side?

In the third place, what of the new issues? Will civil defense be both necessary to discuss and feasible to control? Will our concern about Soviet air defense lead us to reject the still hard logic of "no air defense without missile defense and no missile defense has already been agreed?" Will there be limits on numbers of warheads per missile (fractionation) or on terminal guidance of warheads to their target, or on depressed trajectory missiles (i.e., missiles which arrive a few minutes faster than expected and may have significance for surprise attack on bombers from submarines)? Will new strategic weapons, e.g., lasers, plague SALT III as cruise missiles have plagued SALT II? Will anti-satellite warfare become an issue? And can limits on anti-submarine warfare be defined in such fashion that they could be negotiated should both sides wish to do that?

Under these circumstances, the role of reductions is perhaps one of public relations. The reductions would be useful in the struggle to maintain the campaign against nuclear proliferation, since it would show great power sincerity. But if it seemed only a figleaf of reductions to mask an ongoing arms race, it might, ironically, turn off

arms control enthusiasm. Here again is the issue of what social psychologist E. Goffman calls staying "in face"; a lower posture can be more easily maintained in adversity.

V. "Mission" control.

A new approach to strategic arms control was outlined by Christoph Bertram in Adelphi Paper 146 of the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS).^{*} He argued that "quantitative" arms control makes for "timid and cautious deals" and that specific restraints encourage each side to "push the military effort to the maximum of what is permitted rather than accept less," thus transforming permissions to build up to a certain level into obligations to do so.

Instead, Bertram would take the ABM treaty as a model and prohibit entire missions. The ABM treaty prohibits, after all, not only existing but future technologies, and is of unlimited duration. This leads him to wonder if agreement could not be reached to preclude the other dangers implicit in the usual *quantitative* arms proposals.

He proposes that the principle of not achieving the ability to strike land-based missiles in quantity replace such discussions as MIRV limitations. Negotiating the principle of not achieving nuclear war-fighting capabilities in Europe would replace quantitative discussions of theater nuclear weapons. And discussions on the mission of conventional surprise attack would substitute for negotiated efforts to reduce Soviet tank armies. Other missions would include strategic anti-submarine warfare against missile-firing submarines or anti-satellite capabilities.

Once there was agreement on the missions that neither side should be allowed to seek, there would be a second stage of agreed implementation. But this stage would be freed from the overemphasis on equality of weapons. Instead it could focus on emerging technology and could exploit different quantitative adjustments on the two sides so as to achieve compliance with the mission principle.

Bertram argues that non-compliance on the one side is always the answer to non-compliance on the other so that the turn to excessively formal treaties looking to a quite irrelevant equality of weapons is an elevation of the means and a forgetting of the real goal. Instead, he would cope with disagreement through the method of "justification by challenge"; parties would notify each other of their plans

^{*}"Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach"; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London WC2N 6AL, Summer, 1978; \$1.50.

dition of future tacit or formal agreement. By helping avoid misunderstandings of intention they can avoid otherwise unnecessary procurement. By making evident that specific actions would necessarily create responses, they may—even without warnings—produce a preemptive restraint. In the end, the discussions will expose the irrelevance of the arms race to the participants themselves and, in its eventual winding down, this can hardly be a small factor.

It is true that talks without the prospect of agreement may not engage the highest level of attention, lacking as they do the sense of crisis and immediacy which it requires. But how much of a disadvantage this is depends upon how high a posture one wants the talks to have and this, in turn, depends on what can be sustained.

Conclusion

To the uninitiated, but only to the uninitiated, the course would seem clear: stop the arms race (put "a cap" on it) and then begin the process of disarmament until one reaches "zero nuclear weapons." To those professionally involved in the struggle, on whatever side, the issue could not be more clouded.

If we assumed that technology were not moving the arms race along far more rapidly than any politically foreseeable reductions, we would *still* have the problem that—addicted to deterrence as the world has become—there is no political will to reduce weapons below the level required for deterrence. And reductions down to that level (whatever it is) are hobbled by a sense of having only reduced an irrelevant overkill. Clearly, restraint in firing, should war occur, will save more lives than any foreseeable disarmament.

Worse still, there is no consensus on which weapons should properly be treated as "older" or "obsolescent" so that the disarmament fodder itself is not clearly defined. Notion of triads, and protections against technological breakthroughs, have destroyed any consensus upon what should be dismantled next.

Even arms control—as opposed to disarmament—has its own problems: constantly emerging new technologies and difficulties in reaching a consensus on them (e.g., the cruise missile, lasers) before they burst on the scene in a form too mature to halt.

And the political process—at least in the United States—is losing its enthusiasm for SALT. The left is becoming increasingly and justly disillusioned and the right—having lost the fat of U.S. superiority—is nervous and unwilling to reach agreements of any substance lest these turn out to bear the seeds of some future imbalance.

Perhaps the only trend of a favorable kind is the declining numbers of persons who really take war games seriously. A kind of benign neglect is taking place in the arms race. The new generation prefers to worry about accidents in unarmed reactors rather than in the 1,000,000 times more devastating effects of a nuclear war.

The question underlying this newsletter, which has insufficient room to discuss it, is how to keep disarmament and the SALT talks going at a level, and in a way, that is sustained and productive. Perhaps the most important axiom is this: it is unnecessary, and it is dangerous, to ask of the talks more than they can produce. Unnecessary because talks and their results can be sustained at any level so long as the public is not led to believe that the

results are not far beneath expectations, and dangerous because a failure to fulfill expectations can tar the arms control process and lead, in the process, to heightened unnecessary arms procurement.

Will each SALT agreement lead implacably to another that is still more intractable until one fails of ratification? Do the two governments have a bear by the tail which will in time lead to a discrediting of the process, and less-than-could-be-achieved results when it eventually fails? As in all things political, deciding on what can be achieved can constitute a decision more important than any taken subsequently. Before we negotiate next, we must think carefully where we are going and why. □

DISSENTS ON CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

The October editorial proposed the possibility of failing to rehire federal employees on specified anniversary dates of their hiring (e.g., every five or ten years) without filing charges as now required for dismissal. In the event that this failed of passage, it suggested keeping the federal government at its present size and utilizing contract workers (who *can* be dismissed). The newsletter revealed that FAS had discovered the government growing exponentially, when such contract workers were included. But the permanent staff get tenure promptly and easily and are almost never fired. Council Member reactions varied.

Council Member Denis Hayes called it "best piece on the subject I've ever read." Leonard Meeker said that five years, rather than ten would be sufficient and argued: "The federal service should be made up of unusually and not ordinarily talented people and they should be motivated by a standard of excellence, not ordinary service to the public interest. In short, a new conception of the Civil Service is required.

"It should be expected that only a relatively small percentage of entering federal employees will stay for a career of government service. Competition, selection and fresh recruitment should continue at all stages and levels."

George Silver thought that "periodic review should be undertaken but in more formal ways than simply letting the supervisor decide."

Philip Morrison noted that the fixed-period appointment, to which he inclined, was not being proposed for academics and hence had a certain complacency about it.

Most strongly opposed to the position was Leonard Rodberg, who wrote:

"The editorial is wrong on all counts. The 'fundamental problem' is not the fact that 'most persons cannot be dismissed without the filing of charges.' In fact, it is not clear what 'fundamental problem' the editorial is responding to. Are federal employees incompetent? (I don't believe so.) Do they not care about doing a good job? (I don't believe so.) Are they not responsive to the public? (That may be, but if so, the problem lies in the structure of the bureaucracy—accountable upward rather than 'outward' to the public—and in the tasks they are given to do (regulate private behavior, etc.). If the editorial is simply accepting (without explicitly saying so) the right-wing critique of government (that all government is bad), then I most strongly reject that.

"As noted, I do not believe that public employees are 'immune to caring whether (their) job is done well or

not.' Very often their jobs are alienating and repetitive, very often they get no rewards of a psychic nature, etc.

"If there were a sunset law, I don't believe that managers would fire them because they thought 'someone abler or harder working might be found.' In too many cases, people would be fired because they refused to toe the mark, were too independent thinking, etc. Setting up mini-autocracies is certainly no answer to the problem of creating a responsive bureaucracy.

"Lastly, I think the *worst* thing that could be done is to increase the use of private contractors. People who join the government do so voluntarily, because they want to work in the public sector. Employees of private contractors have made no such commitment. In fact, the trend toward private contracting of public services, will destroy the whole notion of 'public service' and will reduce, *not* increase, the accountability of the government to the public. (The process of choosing contractors is highly political; there are many, many documented cases of totally incompetent, even fraudulent contracting operations that have been kept on for repeated contracts. For a full exposition of this, see D. Guttman and B. Willner, *The Shadow Government*, Pantheon, 1976.) Privatization will not improve the public service."

HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

Excerpts from testimony before the House Subcommittee on Domestic and International Scientific Planning, Analysis, and Cooperation, by Jeremy J. Stone on October 5, 1978.

Our concern with human rights for foreign colleagues was heightened in 1975 when I traveled to Moscow to meet with leading Soviet dissidents and refuseniks and with Soviet officials. Subsequently, the Federation made sustained efforts to persuade a number of other scientific societies to give comparable priority to the human rights of their colleagues.

"The American Refusenik"

In addition, FAS devised a strategy which was described in our March, 1976 publication as the American "refusenik." Here American scientists were encouraged to adopt foreign colleagues in trouble, and to advise the Governments which were oppressing them that they would refuse to cooperate with such a Government until the foreign colleague regained his human rights.

This strategy was one of individual conscience, and applied to all oppressed colleagues and to all governments. We have increasing reason to believe that this strategy is the most appropriate single strategy for the scientific community.

To take one prominent example, a group of scientists in Berkeley, spontaneously organized, have applied this method to the cases of Scharansky and of Orlov. Called "Scientists for Orlov and Scharansky," they are refusing to cooperate with the Soviet authorities until these members of the Helsinki Commission are released from prison. With the permission of the Chair, I would like to submit for the record, this statement which the S.O.S. group has asked me to submit to you. Of course, we hope and expect that not all scientists will adopt the same two persons

and, indeed, that scientists will be adopted all over the world.

May I say parenthetically that I am especially pleased that this group has sought to help representatives of two quite distinct movements rather than only one. Orlov, as you may know, is a dissident not a refusenik. He is not Jewish, and is not applying to go to Israel, but is instead trying to secure rule of law within the Soviet Union. In that capacity, he became Chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Commission. He is also—as a corresponding member of the Armenian Academy—the highest ranking Soviet scientist to be put in prison in recent times. Scharansky, on the other hand, is, of course, a Jew, did apply to go to Israel, and served on the Helsinki Commission during his time as a "refusenik."

Scientists for Orlov and Scharansky, and other (less prominent) efforts by American scientists, show that the method of contingent refusal to cooperate—the American "refusenik" method—has been widely adopted by American scientists.

Please observe that it does not require any breaks in scientific exchange. Indeed, breaks in scientific exchange would destroy the method by making such refusals irrelevant. Breaks in scientific exchange would further politicize cases, permitting the Soviets to argue that the cut-off was politically inspired by their traditional "anti-Soviet" enemies. By keeping the movements obviously based on individual and grassroots activity, a maximum of credible pressure is placed on authorities, in whatever country, to comply with human rights standards.

But no one method should exclude others and, in particular, FAS also endorses the notion that some who feel outraged by human rights violations should *not* boycott scientific cooperation with those countries but should "go and complain."

In general, FAS believes that flexibility is quite important. The personalities of different countries are quite different in their responses to pressures and inducements. And the situations of dissidents are constantly varying. It is neither necessary nor wise to devise hard and fast rules any more than it would be wise for a bad-debt collector to confront all debtors with the same approach.

Sustainability

Most discussions of human rights focus on "effectiveness" but I believe it is even more important for the human rights movement to consider the problem of "sustainability." Will human rights become a fad of the Carter Administration, with future administrations adopting a different, and perhaps more diffuse, approach to human liberty? Or will the Administration, and the public, learn during this period of human rights enthusiasm, to devise strategies which can be sustained over time?

To my mind, the scientists have made great strides toward solving the problem. In particular, the above methods do not overstrain the enthusiasm of scientists and can be used and reused.

Commercial Dealings

But the business community has not been encouraged to devise analogous strategies as it should be. And the Administration can only intervene sporadically, and therefore ineffectually, in commercial dealings.

In utilizing commercial dealings for human rights pressures, the Administration has the problem that anything really important to the Soviet military is already barred

on security grounds and anything really important to the Soviet population (e.g., grain) cannot be prohibited on humanitarian grounds. Hence only sales of marginal importance can be influenced and these, ironically, tend only to expose the impotence of the Administration. They prick the Soviets. Possibly, they arouse more antagonism here, among the business community, than in the Soviet Union.

Something better should be devised. I have confidence that something can be, but I do not know precisely what it is. The interest of stockholders in having their corporations responsive to human rights concerns is one asset in devising the strategy, and the relative disinterest of a corporation in selling somewhere is another, since it can evoke its concerns selectively.

Shaping A Business Strategy

But to make a business community strategy possible, some building blocks are necessary. In the first place, concern should not be focused so much on the absolute level of human rights in a country, but with whether the human rights record of that country is improving or degrading. After all, we cannot hope to change the fact that countries have poor human rights records—almost all of them do, and they will have for decades. But we can try to reward progress and chastise retrograde activities. Obviously, the business community cannot make these decisions. But the State Department could release, each year, an assessment of the human rights record of virtually all countries with regard to their progress or lack of it for the past year. This would provide the business community—and other public sectors—with the information they need to make their decisions. Indeed, State is providing these reports on several countries now, to assist Congress in determining whether to vote aid.

Once the businessmen have these reports, they should be encouraged to shape a strategy in which countries with improving records are rewarded with preferential rates. For example, a long-term contract to provide trucks could state that a further discount would be available if the reports on the country showed an improving human rights policy. These and other mechanisms are child's play compared to the pricing schemes and maneuvers shown by

businessmen in a variety of areas; I have no doubt that the business community can think of some way to inject human rights consideration into their now-you-see-it-and-now-you-don't price structures.

But will they want to try? They will if they think the alternative is government intervention in a cruder effort to inject human rights into their concerns. All in all, I think the business community should be engaged in a dialogue on these matters, and not just written off as unsuitable for human rights agitation.

Tactics

By its nature, the struggle for human rights is going to be a long one. In the short run, all the cards are normally in the hands of the oppressor. Put another way, the human rights movement is normally a fairly important movement. It is important indeed that this impotence be hidden rather than revealed.

To take an example, consider the question of Presidential involvement. Is it desirable for the President to associate himself publicly and personally with specific dissidents, as was the case with Scharansky? On the whole, I would argue not, on the simple grounds that this association can be used to expose the basic impotence of the President in particular and of the human rights movement in general. Put another way, oppressive authorities may try to use such cases as a way of embarrassing the President, and, by implication, his entire human rights efforts by showing that no amount of pressures will succeed.

This does not mean that an Administration should not undertake to help specific dissidents—of course not. But need it be by Presidential press conference? Personally also, were I a Soviet dissident, I would rather have help at the highest levels come privately than publicly.

Put most simply, human rights agitation is a *political* effort, and must therefore take into account human nature, the nature of group politics, the psychology of foreign governments; above all, it must be infused with some sense of tactics.

Rather than dilate on these and other related principles, I shall await your questions, but I have attached two relevant editorials from the FAS Report for the Record. □

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