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ARMS LIMITATIONS
INITIATIVES

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FOUR APPROACHES TO THE ARMS RACE

On an ever thinner rationale, the arms race marches on. Mutual suspicion, eroding very slowly, the momentum of 35 years of weapon procurement, disillusionment about the feasibility of meaningful arms control, and the complications of ever-changing weapons technology continue to undermine the prospects for a negotiated halt or disarmament.

Against these factors, the West has motivations to press for agreement: a new fear of Soviet capabilities if the arms race continues, and an economic climate in which the U.S. can no longer build all the weapons that first seem indicated. Increasingly, also, there is popular political pressure in Europe—and perhaps soon in the United States as well—for serious discussions of arms limitations as the Reagan Administration's militancy produces a backlash, in parts of the population, of increased fear of war. In fact, the primary purpose of this newsletter is to generate public support for arms control.

At present, however, unless strenuous precautions are taken, offensive weapons arms control could facilitate new weapons as much as prevent them. Even under the Carter Administration, SALT was being used to advance the prospects of both the weapons programs most deplored by the arms control community. To advance the prospects of SALT II, MX in its present basing mode was announced, committed to, and linked to arms control in the most unequivocal way. And the ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe—which, being able to reach Moscow, would eliminate any fire-break in the escalation ladder from violence in Europe to total destruction of the industrialized world—were deemed by the European allies to be acceptable *if and only if* SALT was ratified.

Today, no doubt, the price of arms control would be even higher, since spokesmen for this Administration talk openly about using arms control to “facilitate”

arms buildups. For the Reagan Administration, arms control is something to be done, with sleight of hand, to assuage the demands of pacifists, clergymen, leftists, and assorted Europeans while continuing a buildup deemed necessary to catch up with the Russians. Some even talk of trying to achieve some kind of “decisive” capability to disarm the Soviet Union if war breaks out.

No wonder therefore that the arms control community is taking to the hills in an effort to round up new citizen support with which to confront the Administration. Meanwhile, it seeks necessary new intellectual capital with which to construct its proposals and plans.

Among the major goals in this period are these four:

- 1.) The two sides must get to know each other better, not because they will like each other more but because, as a result of greater familiarity, the specter of deliberate nuclear attack or even deliberate running of major risks of nuclear war will fade. A program of increased exchanges of visits between political personalities is therefore critical. Surely the Reagan Administration, in any case, cannot oppose a campaign of “know the adversary”—which has always been sound military advice.

Hence we propose, as we have proposed for ten years, that Senators especially, and political figures more generally, be encouraged to visit the Soviet Union to get their own impressions of what Russia is like. In particular, please check on page 10 whether your own Senator has any first-hand knowledge of the object of our national anxiety. Help us regenerate legislation to make these trips to the adversary's heartland politically feasible.

- 2.) A reopening of the arms limitation dialogue,

(Continued on Page 2)

FAS PREPARES SECOND SPECIAL NEWSLETTER FOR PUBLIC CIRCULATION

The 12-page February FAS Report on the Effects of Nuclear War was quite successful and thousands of additional copies have been requested by, and mailed to, non-members, with a view to educating the public. As a consequence, we decided to publish a companion 12-page newsletter which would help the same citizens inform themselves on initiatives that might be taken to cope with the danger described earlier. As a result, this special issue does not so much contain ideas that are new to FAS

members as it does summarize a number of FAS (and other) approaches to the arms race that deserve wider distribution. We ask members to indulge us in the repetition. We plan to mail this “initiatives” newsletter out along with the earlier “effects” newsletter. The last two pages of the report encourage such distribution; please do not hesitate to give your own copy away to prime our larger circulation if you have no need to keep it. □

(Continued from Page 1)

and the formulation of proposals by both sides, is critical. But our community must be especially vigilant about the use of such proposals to construct bargaining chips, advance the prospects of weapons under procurement, or justify entirely new weapons. We have to be ready to denounce phoney arms control proposals, as well as support real ones.

Here we want your support in urging the Administration to adopt an arms control agenda, and in urging the Soviet Union to come forward with some kind of comprehensive arms control proposal. In particular, we will be exploring whether or not the Soviet interest in qualitative limitations on U.S. strategic weapons can be coupled with the U.S. interest in quantitative reductions of Soviet weapons. A discussion of various aspects of a simple method for reductions (PAR) and rising popular interest in a freeze is contained within, on pp. 4-5.

3.) Much more attention has to be given to the longer run; we need to consider where we want to be 20 years hence. If, for example, we could control both sides, what would be the nuclear weapons postures and doctrines which we would like in the year 2000? This continues to need some serious fresh thought especially because so much of arms control planning has necessarily been associated with very current problems.

Here we support, among other things, something like the proposal of Senator Edward Kennedy for a Select Commission on National Security Policy. (See pg. 11) We would like your help in getting it reaffirmed and adopted. When the time comes for new initiatives in arms control, America wants to be ready with a viable, well-thought-out program.

4.) As indicated above, a new generation has to be educated, and an old one reeducated, about the facts of nuclear war to provide that political basis of support which arms control requires.

Here we need your help in building a new constituency for arms control that has the political muscle to ensure both that reasonable proposals are made and that negotiations are seriously pursued. It may be that arms control can succeed only when U.S.-Soviet relations are in a certain pattern; but whatever political conditions are critical to its success, we have to be better prepared at home than we are now. Therefore, please examine and return to us pages 11 and 12, where some suggestions are made for your assistance either to our own efforts or to those of selected groups.

—Reviewed and Approved by the FAS Council

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UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION: WHO'S AHEAD?

There are a variety of ways of assessing the relative positions of the two superpowers in the arms race.

I. **BOTH BEHIND:** Perhaps the most important measure is this: the two superpowers have gotten themselves into a position of special insecurity whereby they are both slated, should nuclear war occur, to be completely destroyed. In this regard, *both* great nations are far *behind* a variety of third world and Southern Hemisphere nations which are not directly in the line of fire. The latter will suffer from radioactive fallout, and from such planetary wide effects of nuclear war as might result from depletion of the ozone layer, interference with the food chain, and the destruction of the industrialized world with which they trade. But they are not, at least, targeted with nuclear weapons. Thus the security of the superpowers has been enormously diminished since World War II, not only in absolute terms but relative to others.

II. **DISARMING STRIKES IMPOSSIBLE:** The second most important observation to make is that neither side can launch an attack which would "disarm" the other, i.e., preclude a devastating nuclear attack in response. Each maintains (and can be expected to maintain) nuclear strike forces adequate to "deter" the other side. Each side does this by maintaining a dispersed set of strategic forces, including land-based missiles, sea-based missiles (on submarines), and strategic bombers waiting on airfields. It would require thousands of accurately and simultaneously fired missiles to destroy even those targets which can be located, and the submarine-based missiles at sea cannot be located.

Thus each side is equal to the other in this most fundamental characteristic that neither can win a nuclear war against the other.

III. **SATURATION PARITY:** The two superpowers are equal also in the fact that each has so many nuclear weapons as to saturate the target system of major cities of the other. There are only 2,000 U.S. cities with populations over 10,000, and each side has several thousand warheads at the ready. The Soviet situation is similar. Before an attack, there are tens of weapons ready for each significant city, and even on "second-strike" (i.e., in retaliation, when many nuclear weapons would have been destroyed), each side could be assured of being able to destroy all of the major, and even medium-sized, cities of the other.

In such a context the two sides are at a level of parity through having "saturated" the relevant target system of the other side.

IV. **INCOMMENSURABILITY:** At the fourth level of analysis, the two sides are *incomparable* numerically because each is ahead in certain areas, and behind in others. The United States has a better strategic bomber force, a better strategic missile-firing submarine force, and a better capacity for anti-submarine warfare. The Soviet Union has a stronger land-based missile force and a better defense against bombers (air-defense). By treaty, neither

has any significant defense against ballistic missiles.

V. **SPECIAL VULNERABILITY:** Currently, the United States is concerned that *one arm* of its deterrent—the strategic missile force on land—will become vulnerable to Soviet land-based missile strikes. This asymmetry will be redressed in time by the increasing vulnerability of the Soviet land-based missile force to our own increasing accuracy of sea-based missiles, or perhaps as a consequence of the deployment, in one form or another, of the MX missile. (Already, as high a proportion of the Soviet deterrent is vulnerable to our attack as vice versa because much more of their force is exposed on land.) In time, through the eighties, the land-based missiles of both sides will be vulnerable *if* one accepts the theories under which such vulnerability arises (Viz., that the many uncertainties involved would not, quite by themselves, dissuade any leader from seeking to test the theory. Of course, the real dissuader are the other arms of the deterrent.)

VI. **IN POLITICAL TERMS:** The great political irony of the debate over superiority is the enormous reluctance of the Soviet spokesmen to allege Soviet superiority in strategic forces: and the (counterproductive) proclivity of our own conservatives to assert it for the Soviets. The Soviet press *has* long alleged that its forces are equal and adequate but has denounced Western claims that the Soviet force is superior. No doubt it fears that the Western "hare" might bolt ahead of the Soviet "tortoise," as has happened before both in the arms race and in the (space) race to put a man on the moon. No doubt it prefers a tranquilizing declaratory posture of parity to a provocative charge of superiority; nevertheless, for whatever reason, the Soviet posture makes it much more difficult for it to secure such political advantages as hawks here fear can be secured from superiority. □

STATE OF THE ARMS RACE, 1981: PERCEPTIONS ACCORDED PARITY WITH FACTS

"But whatever we do, it must not only correct the actual imbalance of capability; it must also correct the perception of imbalance. It must be made clear in the minds of Soviet officials as well as other world leaders that the Soviet Union does not have an edge on the United States in strategic nuclear strength. A major step in doing that is to create the impression that the United States is seriously committed to improving our strategic forces, even if in reality some of the actions we take will contribute only to overkill. (Italics added.) Changing the world's perception that we are falling behind the Soviet Union is as important as not falling behind in fact."

—**"Why We Shouldn't Build the MX,"** Admiral
Stansfield Turner, *New York Times*,
March 29, 1981

WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION COULD DO

There are two main approaches available for comprehensive strategic arms policy. One would take SALT II as a basis and try to secure its ratification with improvements—including reductions of nuclear weapons, and whatever other changes were necessary to secure ratification. A second approach would be to forget SALT II and to start anew to seek a general comprehensive freeze of the arms race.


SALT WITH IMPROVEMENTS (“Shrink SALT II”): The Salt II agreement, though not yet ratified, had been negotiated for 7 years (1972-1979) under Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. A complicated agreement, it provided a series of limits on strategic weapon numbers by limiting launchers (bombers and deployed missiles on land and sea). It also limited “fractionation” of missile warheads to the maximum number of warheads previously achieved. Thus it:

limited numbers of ballistic missiles and strategic bombers to	2250
limited numbers of land and sea-based MIRVed ballistic missiles (and those bombers armed with cruise missiles) to a total of	1250
limited numbers of MIRVed land-based missiles to	820
and limited the Soviet Union’s large land-based missiles to	308

The agreement limited strategic weapons modernization of existing weapons to changes of about 5% in external dimensions, but it permitted each side to have one additional new land-based missile (in the U.S. case, the MX) and any number of new types of sea-based missiles. It permitted the U.S. to go forward also with the cruise missile, and it permitted, under the qualitative restraints, considerable modernization of Soviet weapons. The above numerical limits were binding to different degrees on the two sides but, overall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the SALT II Treaty would have only a “nominal” effect on the planned U.S. program. Whether it would have a significant effect on the Soviet strategic program was controversial, but it was generally agreed that, in the absence of SALT II ratification, the Soviet Union was in a better position to exploit rapidly the absence of SALT limitations than was the U.S.

In sum, the SALT II agreement was criticized by both left and right as having insufficient effect on the arms race and as lacking “real disarmament.” As a consequence, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed a resolution—unanimously—on November 1, 1979 which:


“urges and requests the President, at the earliest possible moment during the SALT III negotiations, on the basis of mutuality, to pursue continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the Treaty so as to take advantage of the Treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms which promotes strategic equivalence under strategic stability.”



During the Congressional discussions, such a method of reducing the SALT II levels by lowering the already-agreed-upon levels by a negotiated percentage (e.g., 8%) was called percentage annual reduction or PAR.

In sum, a strategy of calling for reductions to be added to SALT II has these advantages:

- 1.) It makes ample use of an almost-ratified agreement, long under negotiation, which has both a majority of the Senate supporting it and the endorsement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- 2.) The reductions involved have the unanimous support, in principle, of both left and right wings of the debate and are a logical next step.
- 3.) Indeed, the reductions could give SALT II that “new improved” quality that would make it possible for the Reagan Administration to return the treaty for ratification with its own stamp and new enthusiasm.
- 4.) The reductions have, in principle, the capacity to resolve such instabilities as land-based missile vulnerability by permitting each side to reduce the more vulnerable parts of this force so as to shift the balance of the triad and hence to minimize concerns about vulnerability of exposed arms.



In particular, a strategy of reducing the force levels by an agreed percentage (PAR) builds on SALT II in a way that is natural and simple and sustainable over time. No SALT III agreement could be simpler, since this one requires, in principle, only the negotiation of a *single number* which would be applied, year after year, until one nation or the other was unwilling to continue.

Since the Defense Department and Congressional Armed Services Committees could determine which weapons were removed ("freedom to choose"), the hawks would presumably feel the matter had been left to the "experts," while the doves would find in this proposal real disarmament. The strategists would see decreased vulnerability and the disarmament theorists would see an extendable process. This process would also maintain a modicum of detente, since each side would be reluctant to permit relations to deteriorate and the disarmament to halt.

On the other hand, the diminution of the limits would not by itself necessarily overcome the ability of either side to improve the effectiveness of its force. Much would depend upon modernization limits (e.g., a reduction in numbers of missiles would not reduce numbers of warheads unless there were—as there is in SALT II—a limit on the number of warheads that can be put on each missile). And the replacement of older systems with newer systems would not be prevented directly, except insofar as the process of reduction and the costs of replacement, in the context of reductions, undermined national enthusiasm for spending the money (i.e., why replace what is about to be dismantled, etc.).

THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE FREEZE PROPOSAL: Under the SALT II agreement, the Soviet Union could effectively double its warheads within the permitted limits and the United States could build both cruise missiles and the MX missile. These "loopholes" in SALT II, none of which would be resolved even by percentage reductions of the already negotiated limits, have led a substantial fraction of the U.S. peace community to endorse a "CALL TO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE," which has been shaped and promulgated by the small "Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies."*

This proposal does not call for any disarmament, but it calls instead for a thorough-going freeze of all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons, and of missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons. More ambitious than SALT II, even with reductions, it would include also a halt to all nuclear testing and even, if possible, to production of fissionable material and new warheads. Most difficult to achieve, of course, would be the halt in on-going programs on both sides, such as:

On the U.S. side: production of improved Minuteman MIRVed warheads and Trident I submarine-launched missiles, and development of MX, Trident II submarine-launched missiles (SLBM), air-

launched cruise missiles (ALCM), long-range land- and sea-based cruise missiles, and Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM).

On the Soviet side: production of SS-17, -18, -19 ICBMs, SS-N-18 SLBMs, SS-20 IRBMs, and Backfire bombers, and development of improved versions of the ICBMs and SLBMs.

The freeze is based on the premise that each side has more than enough and that a rough parity exists—all fully justified notions from a common sense point of view—and that an across-the-board halt would coordinate a freeze that would otherwise not come about.

From the standpoint of political reality, the freeze has a number of problems:

- 1.) Since neither side has ever seriously pursued negotiations toward such a broad-based resolution of the arms race, can such an agreement be secured without negotiations simply by announcement and reciprocal agreement?
- 2.) If far-reaching negotiations are to ensue, will not both sides prefer to amend SALT II, i.e., to tighten it up, rather than to start again?
- 3.) It was the collective unreadiness to close the SALT II loopholes that produced SALT II: e.g., the Soviets did propose "no new land-based missiles" but the U.S. insisted on at least one new missile being permitted since it wanted MX.
- 4.) Such problems as the vulnerability of Minuteman missiles to Soviet ICBMs may not be resolved by the freeze, which seems to come too late to preclude the relevant worst-case fears of the Defense Department.
- 5.) Nor does the freeze resolve the apprehensions of those who fear that their side is behind and requires on-going programs to catch up—this is especially true, we know, of U.S. conservatives.

More generally, the freeze needs to be conjoined with a proposal for reductions, so that the critical question of "After the Freeze, What?" can be resolved to the satisfaction of the government involved. Here a "percentage reduction" of the various categories might be workable.

(Continued on Page 6)

U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

	1 JANUARY 1980		1 JANUARY 1981	
	U.S.	USSR	U.S.	USSR
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS 1/2/	1,054	1,398	1,054	1,398
OPERATIONAL SLBM LAUNCHERS 1/3/	656	950	576	950
LONG-RANGE BOMBERS (TAI) 4/ OPERATIONAL 5/ OTHERS 6/	348 225	156	347 223	156
FORCE LOADINGS 7/ WEAPONS	9,200	6,000	9,000	7,000
DEFENSIVE 8/ AIR DEFENSE SURVEILLANCE RADARS	88	7,000	91	7,000
INTERCEPTOR AIRCRAFT (TAI)	327	2,500	312	2,500
SAM LAUNCHERS	0	10,000	0	10,000
ABM DEFENSE LAUNCHERS	0	64	0	32

*For those who want to support this proposal, it can be reached at 251 Harvard St., Brookline, MA 02146; (617) 734-4216.

SOVIET COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSALS

Soviet arms limitation proposals have often seemed wholly at odds with Soviet readiness to permit the necessary verification, and they sometimes insist that all nuclear states join in, thus requiring Chinese and French agreement, which makes the agreements unlikely. But in 1977 and 1979, the Soviet Union called for a Nuclear Weapons Moratorium that would halt production of all nuclear weapons, ban all nuclear tests including underground testing for peaceful purposes, and begin gradual reductions of existing stockpiles.

On May 26, 1978, the Soviet delegation to the U.N. proposed cessation of the production of, and prohibition of, all types of weapons of mass destruction; and reduction of military budgets by members of the Security Council in absolute figures for a period of three years. (How the military budget reductions could be verified is especially unclear.)

(Continued from Page 5)

On the other hand, if the Soviet Union proposed concrete versions, with verification possibilities, of earlier and vague offers to halt all production and deployment of new weapons, and if it offered to freeze its strategic arsenal if the United States would also, it would surely be difficult for a U.S. Administration to refuse negotiations.* The freeze is, with all its problems of interfering with on-going production lines, obviously a much more sophisticated arms control proposal than for example, earlier motions of general and complete disarmament. Someday, one side or the other may propose something like this (and agreement could, after all, eventually be reached with agreed exceptions.) But the West is likely to make such proposals only under sustained pressure from an aroused domestic constituency—which, of course, the freeze proponents are moving to secure over the coming years via grass-roots campaigns.

A similar freeze idea, christened "Stop Where We Are" by the bureaucracy, was proposed by ACDA to President Nixon as the initial U.S. negotiating position for SALT I. Nixon rejected the idea. □

ARMS RACE DANGERS IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT

Besides quite new kinds of weapons (lasers, particle beams, etc.) and more nuclear proliferation (i.e., nuclear states) the following near-term problems can be anticipated from a continuing arms race:

Land-based Missile Vulnerability: Very large investments in land-based missiles (the 1,000 Minuteman missiles in America and the 1400 Soviet land-based

missiles) will inevitably be perceived by many participants as vulnerable to the missiles of the other side and may lead one or both sides to replace them with mobile missiles (complicating counting and verification problems for future treaties). Alternatively, they may prepare to fire them on warning (leading to greater danger of hair-trigger launches than might otherwise have occurred). Or they may protect them with more than the permitted 100 anti-ballistic missiles (leading to renegotiation and possible loss of the existing treaty against ballistic missile defense).

Firing on Warning: In particular, if both sides adopted the policy of defending their land-based missiles by preparations to fire them within the 30-minute flight time of an attack, each would have the incentive to fire first rather than second. Should an attack seem imminent, each would then fire at the missiles of the other rather than wait; attacks could occur that would not have happened otherwise. Firing on warning, sometimes called Launch Under Attack (LUA), requires effective delegation of authority to fire to lower levels, since it permits only ten to twenty minutes to reach, awake (if necessary), and consult a President who, under the circumstances, will hardly know any more than the computers about what is happening.

The ABM Treaty: In 1972, the superpowers signed their most important arms control agreement—an agreement not to try to defend themselves against ballistic missiles. This anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty limited the two sides to a minor ABM site of no more than 100 interceptors (100 interceptors are an irrelevancy in a world with ten thousand warheads on a side). The agreement, completely successful, precluded the two sides from launching into an enormously expensive race to achieve a defense against ICBMs, a race that would have been unsuccessful due to the tremendous scope of the task—shooting down thousands of incoming warheads (laced with decoys and also taking various measures against their destruction) in a short space of time with a system that, inevitably, could never be fully tested under actual conditions.

Today, there is danger that the agreement will come unstuck as a result of efforts to amend it to permit anti-ballistic missiles to defend offensive missiles rather than cities. This would be particularly likely if ABMs seemed more promising than they did a decade ago. Even then, it took a 50-50 vote in the Senate to slow down the momentum of the complex of forces that wanted to build the ABM and, hence, to make the negotiations possible that led to the treaty. New advances in ABM techniques coupled with war in space notions could lead to a new dimension in the arms race.

The MX MISSILE: A complex of 200 missiles being shuttled around between 4600 holes in an enormous shell game, the MX missile deployment now planned for the states of Utah and Nevada is likely to require 8,000 miles of road, and enormous amounts of construction. It has been estimated to cost between \$78,000,000,000, and \$100,000,000,000. Notwithstanding the size of the project, designed to compensate for the projected vulnerability of Minuteman missiles, the MX itself may have to

*In 1964, after little more than a high-level weekend meeting for preparation, the Johnson Administration proposed at Geneva that each side discuss with its allies a freeze of its strategic forces. This was, however, at a time when U.S. forces were far superior to Soviet forces; that the Soviet Union would not agree was certain.

be further defended by ABMs if its deceptive tactics someday fail, or if Soviet warheads reach the point where all of the 4600 holes could be attacked at once—and if its expansion is not warranted at that time.

SOVIET MISSILE IMPROVEMENTS: The Soviet force can be expected to increase, in the absence of arms control, from 6,000 warheads to many more (20,000?) and to include substantial improvements in accuracy and destructiveness.

EUROPEAN THEATER COMPLICATED: In the absence of arms control, the United States is embarked on placing 562 long-range theater missiles in Europe (454 ground-launched cruise missiles and 108 Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)). These will be a response to the continued replacement of 20-year old Soviet fixed-site IRBMs with the mobile SS-20. Since the U.S. cruise missile will be completely vulnerable to attack, they and the SS-20s may be fired sooner rather than later if war begins to erupt. Indeed, the political purpose behind the installation of these missiles is to construct a seamless web that will ensure nuclear escalation so as to deter conventional attack. The risks of producing a war that nobody wants by removing all the escalation fire-breaks is obvious.

SOME OTHER APPROACHES TO COMPREHENSIVE TREATIES

Besides freezes or SALT-plus-reductions, there are other formulations. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau proposed a method of "suffocation" of the nuclear arms race by negotiating four measures: a comprehensive test ban; an agreement to stop the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a prohibition on production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then reduce military spending on strategic systems. (It is admitted that the latter would require a Soviet openness in reporting, comparing, and verifying such expenditures, which is, of course, wholly non-existent now on the Soviet side.)

For those who are technically minded, there is the proposal of Professor Sidney Drell that the sum total of warheads plus launchers be limited to 10,000 at most (e.g., a ten-headed missile could be turned into ten single-warheaded missiles and still stay below the limit; thus, this is an upper limit with much flexibility below). (See *International Security*, Winter, 1980.)

Still another approach is that of Ivan Selin, who argues (op. cit.) that Soviet-American relations are likely to continue to be bad, that SALT agreements can occur only when they happen to be improving, but that, even so, unless these agreements are significant *militarily*, ratification on both sides will not occur. He believes future agreement should focus on maintaining the survivability of land-based ICBMs on each side; maintaining the viability of the U.S. bomber force to penetrate Soviet air defenses; and trading off the vulnerability of Western medium-range missiles in Europe against diminutions in the threat to Europe from comparable missiles in the Soviet Union.

WHAT ARE THE RISKS OF WAR?

There are, in principle, several ways in which a general nuclear war could start but, in fact, only two of these receive much discussion. The first, *deliberate surprise attack out of the blue*, traditionally gets most of the attention and is used to shape weapons purchases (procurement). Such an attack represents the most serious test of a "deterrent", since the forces being attacked can then be presumed not to have been alerted. For example, in the absence of a crisis, fewer bombers than otherwise are ready to take off, fewer submarines are at sea, and so on.

In fact, such a deliberate surprise attack has not been considered a likely way for nuclear war to start for decades. A consensus of sophisticated strategic analysts would agree that *nuclear war arising through escalation* from lower-level violence contains most of the likelihood of nuclear war.

In the sixties, there was much concern about *unauthorized behavior* in which a U.S. or Soviet strategic air command general (or some other officer with access to nuclear weapons) might precipitate nuclear war by ordering, on his own authority, that a weapon be launched. Since that time, precautions in the West with regard to electronic controls, and "two-key" systems requiring more than one person to fire, have diminished this possibility, and the Soviet weapon buildup has made it even less likely that any Western officers would seek to precipitate nuclear war. Nevertheless, this possibility does still exist, in particular in crisis periods, when weapons would be closer to being unlocked, or with regard to submarines where weapons may not be under continental command and control.


The notion of nuclear war arising from an *accident* is, similarly, of most concern during a grave nuclear crisis, since it is then, and perhaps only then, that the firing of a single nuclear weapon would serve to catalyze a full-scale response. In general it would be a major inhibition to nuclear war if one could keep the strategic forces of the two sides in a relaxed, i.e., unalerted, condition where their commanders were not trigger-happy.

The spread of nuclear weapons to other nations has contributed to the possibility of *catalytic nuclear war*, wherein a third power deliberately seeks to provoke a nuclear war between the superpowers. Thus a Soviet attack upon China could induce a Chinese general to try to involve the United States in war against the Soviet Union. Or an Israel losing a nuclear war with the Arabs might threaten to bring down the nuclear roof on the whole world.

From what lower-level violence might nuclear war arise? The most common scenarios feature war in Europe or war over oil.

With regard to war in Europe, there appears to be a crisis in eastern Europe about every 12 years (Hungary, 1956; Czechoslovakia, 1968; Poland, 1980). Within, perhaps, ten such periods, one could expect a violent uprising in East Germany. Should the Germans seek to reunify their country at that time, and should the Rus-

(Continued on Page 8)



PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR = 1% PER YEAR

In his "Statistics of Deadly Quarrels," Lewis F. Richardson plotted the rate at which frequency of wars decreased in proportion to their size, using as a base the period 1820-1946. Responding to a footnoted invitation, Jack C. Greene extrapolated the graph to (presumably nuclear) wars of size 300,000,000 dead and calculated the resultant frequency to be on the order of 1% per year ("The Case for Civil Defense as Developed Through Systems Analysis" OCD/DOD). Reproduced above, the log-log graph plots numbers of quarrels per size of quarrel against size of quarrel.

(Continued from Page 7)

sians be as alarmed at that prospect as we might expect, fighting could break out on the frontier between the two Germanies. Should the Soviet Union then move its forces into West Germany, current plans call for the West to use nuclear weapons if no other means exist for stemming the advance. And since it is generally conceded that the Warsaw Pact has conventional superiority, the use of nuclear weapons by the West cannot be discounted. Should these nuclear weapons be used—or indeed be about to be used—one could anticipate a pre-emptive strike by Soviet forces on Western nuclear depots, ground-launched cruise missiles, and all the rest. This kind of war by escalation from unrest in Eastern Europe through Western first-use of nuclear weapons to Soviet full-scale response has traditionally been the most likely scenario for nuclear war.

More recently, oil has provided a resource of sufficient value to provide a context in which the superpowers

might risk fighting with one another—and hence, inevitably, risk some likelihood of nuclear war. Should Soviet forces move into the Middle East, threatening not only the 32% of oil which we receive from the Persian Gulf but the 77% the Japanese receive and the 70% received by the Europeans, the West would feel obliged to take some kind of military action. The use of nuclear weapons to stem an otherwise conventional advance has been bruited about. Unlike the case in Europe where nuclear forces are lined up like dominos ready to go off all at once, a single nuclear strike against Soviet forces advancing into the Gulf area would not lead inevitably to nuclear escalation. But it would obviously be very dangerous indeed, and since the two sides confront each other largely in Europe, the fighting might be expected, in any case, to spread there via, for example, pressures on Berlin. Thus the fuse to nuclear war might be lit in the Middle East but actually explode in Europe.

As mentioned above, war between Russia and China cannot be discounted, with a long disputed border at issue and great fears on each side about the other. Such a war would be especially difficult to contain.

It should be emphasized that any particular route to nuclear war has, in any particular year, a rather low probability. As a consequence, all kinds of low-probability reasons for nuclear war must be regarded with vigilance, including turmoil inside such nuclear powers as Russia and China. □

NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

If nuclear weapons are not used "first" by someone, then they will not be used at all! Thus any inhibition against "first-use" of nuclear weapons is an inhibition against general nuclear war. Conversely, if nuclear weapons are used in a conflict between two nuclear powers, it must be regarded as certain that nuclear *retaliation* will result and it must be regarded as highly likely that, subsequently, nuclear *escalation* will occur.

Thus, first-use is the greatest "fire-break" against nuclear war; this has given rise to consideration of a doctrine of "no-first-use" which a nation might adopt as its policy.

It is widely believed, but utterly false, that the United States has adopted such a policy, or, at least, that it would not, in fact, use nuclear weapons first. In fact, no nation has really adopted this policy, and the U.S. policy is quite the opposite; our policy is one of overtly, and repeatedly, stating that we would indeed use nuclear weapons first, if necessary, to defend our interests in Europe against the threat of an overwhelming Soviet conventional invasion. The United States has also threatened the use of nuclear weapons in Korea (not only in its efforts to seek the end of the Korean war but also, in 1975 by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger to forestall invasion.)

In fact, *each* nuclear power appears to have sufficient fear of some kind of conventional attack to preclude its formal adoption of a no-first-use policy. The Chinese and the Russians fear conventional incursions from each

other. The British and French share the American fear of Soviet conventional attacks in Europe. It seems likely, as a consequence, that even if four of these nuclear powers adopted no-first-use as a doctrine, the fifth—which ever it was—might well fear to do so. Accordingly, efforts to formalize no-first-use doctrines are not easy to negotiate. Moreover, they suffer the difficulties of all declaratory policies that they might be changed once war broke out, since they change only expectations (and force planning to some extent) and not capabilities.

Nevertheless, inhibitions against first-use grow in importance with every passing year in which nuclear weapons are not used. Ultimately, as the 36-year precedent of non-use is extended from 1945, nuclear weapons may become as “unthinkable” as biological weapons; this negative public attitude may then be the main bulwark not only against nuclear use but against weapons production by nuclear powers and proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear nations.

No One Decision Maker

Because the public normally thinks of American use of nuclear weapons as an immediate response to Soviet nuclear attack, little thought has been given to the following simple observation: *if American first-use were under consideration, there would be time for an American President to consult with others.* After all, no conventional war in Europe can be lost in a matter of hours.


This observation has given rise to the notion that American first-use should be governed by more controls than simply the decision of a single decision maker—a President supported by subordinates. By this reasoning, the President might be bound, in a kind of (nuclear) war powers act, to consult with, and get the approval of, a special committee composed of pre-designated Congressional leaders. This would place a “lock” on the first use of nuclear weapons by a group of persons who were not subordinates to the President and who could ensure therefore that the decision received critical review.

Perhaps the simplest way to understand the proposal is to observe that the Constitution now requires the President to consult the Congress (to get a declaration of war) if he wants to go beyond the constitutionally-permitted “repelling of attacks” to the waging of an extended conflict. Should he not also have to turn to the Congress to get permission to escalate beyond a conventional war (which threatens our sons) to a war with nuclear weapons (which raises national risks of nuclear destruction)?

Should a single man, under the tremendous strain induced by the very crisis at issue, have the sole responsibility for determining whether to take an act that might cost 800,000,000 lives in the next 24 hours? It is absurd on the face of it.*

The problem with this legislative notion of “no-one-decision-maker” is that it finds opposition on both right and left. After all, the traditional point of view puts an overwhelming faith in the President (and no faith in the congressional leaders) and is especially nervous about limiting the President’s war powers. The left, meanwhile,

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1982 \$)



which supports “no-first-use”, sometimes sees legislation of this kind as “legitimizing” the first-use of nuclear weapons via a projected endorsement by congressional leaders, and thus as weakening the inhibition against nuclear weapons by specifying a method by which they can be used (notwithstanding the fact that all agree nuclear weapons could be used immediately by the President today in any conflict whatsoever!) □

SAINTS AND DEVILS THRIVE ON DISTANCE: POLITICAL EXCHANGES

One third of a century into the cold war, most political leaders of the two superpowers have never seen the object of their anxiety. It was this simple observation that impelled then-Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska, with FAS encouragement, to introduce a bill (November 7, 1969, S.3127) which would have paid the expenses of designated U.S. public officials to visit the Soviet Union if they had not already done so (see following box for his comments at that time). Then, and still today, only 40% of the Senate had the benefit of first-hand experience with Soviet life and attitudes.

After hearing Averell Harriman and George Kennan, both former ambassadors to the Soviet Union, speak in favor of the bill, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved it and the Senate passed it by 38-29 on April 20, 1970. But the Nixon Administration quietly resisted

(Continued on Page 10)

*This notion of legislation paralleling the war powers act was first put forward by the Federation of American Scientists in a December 9, 1971 press conference, the text of which was printed in January, 1972 in the FAS newsletter and was commented on favorably by then-Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, in a Committee Report on the War Powers bill. Later, in the November, 1975 FAS Public Interest Report, the issue was raised again and a draft resolution of Senator Alan Cranston (D-Ca.) printed—but this was never in fact introduced.

WHERE POLITICIANS FEAR TO TREAD!

"Consider what a strange state of affairs now exists. Since the Second World War, \$1 trillion has been appropriated for defense, principally for our defense against the Soviet Union. Yet most Congressmen and Senators who cast their votes have never been there. Appropriations continue at such a rate that in the next 10 years, we will spend an additional trillion dollars. No Senator or Congressman spends one-millionth of that sum without going to see the site of the dam or airport for which the money is being spent.

Every Congressman bears direct responsibility for decisions affecting the conduct of defense and foreign policy. Each must consider his vote on defense matters to be among the most important votes he casts....

Every year since 1958, we have sent to the Soviet Union between 500 and 3,000 scientists, sportsmen, doctors, educators, and specialists of other kinds. Has not the time come to send political leaders who must, after all, make the decisions upon which our future depends?...

This is not a proposal to brainwash the American political leadership. Historically, those most sympathetic to the Soviet Union have been disillusioned by their visits. In 1936, Andre Gide's report on his trip, "Return from the U.S.S.R.", created a sensation. Three years before, Gide had declared his "admiration", his "love" for the Soviet Union. He returned deeply troubled and said:

'Good and bad alike are to be found there; . . . the best and the worst.'

He was not the first...These observers were far more sympathetic to what they set out to see than our political leadership would be.

Our political leadership cannot be fooled. It is true that the Soviet leadership and Soviet society both will try to show visitors only the best, much as a housewife insists upon tidying up the home before guests are received. But this makes no important difference. Many differences between American and Soviet ways of life are so visible that they cannot be hidden from the traveler for even 30 minutes, much less 2 weeks. It is not only the political left that is traditionally disillusioned by contact with the Soviet Union. The far right will also be startled. The Soviet Union is far behind us in living standards. They will see that the Soviets are not 10 feet tall.

There is much evidence that the more conservative the American politicians are, in economic and political philosophy, the more favorably impressed they are likely to be by the Soviet Union.

In other words, some of our political leaders with exaggerated stereotypes will lose them. This is not brainwashing. This is broadening. This is education. People often fear and often they idolize what they do not know. That is what Dr. Harold Lasswell meant when he said: "Saints and devils thrive on distance."

—Senator Mike Gravel, November 7, 1969 S13945

(Continued from Page 9)

the bill and it died in the House of Representatives.

No simpler, less expensive, and more obviously indicated scheme for slowing the arms race exists than this one. While the relations between the superpowers are not good today, it means only that more sustained efforts are necessary to persuade the political officials that they can dare to visit the heartland of the adversary. In this connection, supportive newspaper editorials are most important for the elected officials, whose fear of "junketing" charges otherwise tends to deter them.

Senators who have not been to the Soviet Union: (59)

Abnorr, James	Jepsen, Roger
Andrews, Mark	Johnston, J. Bennett
Armstrong, William	Kassebaum, Nancy
Baucus, Max	Kasten, Robert
Bentsen, Lloyd	Long, Russell
Boschwitz, Rudolf	Matsunaga, Spark
Chafee, John	Mattingly, Mack
Chiles, Lawton	Melcher, John
Cochran, Thad	Metzenbaum, Howard
Cohen, William	Mitchell, George
D'Amato, Alfonse	Murkowski, Frank
Denton, Jeremiah	Nickels, Don
Dixon, Alan	Packwood, Bob
Dodd, Christopher	Pressler, Larry
Dole, Robert	Proxmire, William
Durenberger, David	Quayle, Dan
East, John	Randolph, Jennings
Exon, J. James	Riegle, Donald
Ford, Wendell	Rudman, Warren
Goldwater, Barry	Sarbanes, Paul
Gorton, Slade	Sasser, James
Grassley, Charles	Simpson, Alan
Hatch, Orrin	Specter, Arlen
Hawkins, Paula	Symms, Steven
Heflin, Howell	Thurmond, Strom
Heinz, John	Tsongas, Paul
Helms, Jesse	Weicker, Lowell
Huddleston, Walter	Williams, Harrison
Humphrey, Gordon	Zorinsky, Edward
Inouye, Daniel	

NEW INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL REQUIRED

One of the problems of coping with the arms race is a steady shift not only in the technological dilemmas it poses but in the underlying political premises. Technologically, the arms race has absorbed, in 35 years, among other things the atomic bomb (1945), the hydrogen bomb (1953), the ICBM (1959), Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) (1970), the long-range Cruise Missile (1974), and has moved on to worrying about lasers and particle beams. Each posed important new developments hard to assimilate. Where with the atomic bombs the question was what would be destroyed, with hydrogen bombs, the question became what would be left. ICBMs posed new problems of 30-minute warning (rather than hours), and new verification problems because they were harder to locate. MIRV created the possibility of tens of thousands of warheads rather than "only" thousands of missiles. And the cruise missile posed quite new problems, both of verification and of proliferation of strategic weapons to new kinds of vehicles (boats, trucks, etc.). Coming less than a decade apart, these major develop-

ments, and many minor ones, posed technical problems faster than the community of persons charged with them could reach a consensus even on the problems that were arising, much less on solutions to them.

With this in mind, the Federation proposed a "Hoover" Commission, with members from the legislature, the executive, the arms control and national security community, and the public, to explore various possibilities for coping with the arms race, and to try to give some direction to arms control planning. It would review the likely course of the arms race, with and without SALT agreement, and try to reach some understanding of the utility (or lack of it) of reductions in nuclear weapons (as opposed to freezes or the precluding of particular weapons systems), and would reconstitute some consensus on arms race policy.

A Commission of this kind was proposed by Senator Edward Kennedy on March 21, 1980, but with wider scope. Endorsed by 27 foreign policy and defense policy experts of all ideological stripes, his proposal stated:

"The Administration and the Congress should establish a Select Commission on National Security Policy, consisting of distinguished citizens from public and private life, with experience and expertise in this area. By October, the Commission should submit recommendations to both branches of government on necessary nuclear and non-nuclear defense programs and on economic and political initiatives to secure our national interest in future relations with the Soviets, our allies, and the non-aligned nations.

As a matter of utmost urgency, the Commission should be specifically instructed to assess our defense needs in the absence of a SALT agreement, in the event of adherence to the treaty, or under any other conditions the Commissioners find preferable to these two alternatives...."

The Federation urges citizens to write President Reagan urging the Administration to consider Kennedy's proposal.

PARTICIPATE IN THIS GREAT ISSUE OF YOUR ERA; NUCLEAR WAR CAN TAKE YOUR LIFE

POOL MY NAME

Please give my name, provided on page 12, to

___ 1) The following group(s) _____

___ 2) Any groups which FAS thinks need my help in a worthwhile campaign.

FOR THOSE WHO FAVOR ELECTIONEERING AND, IN PARTICULAR RECONSTITUTING THE SENATE

Council for A Livable World: Founded by Leo Szilard, the Council for a Livable World is based on the ingenious notion that persons concerned with war-peace issues could be most effective in electing Senators by contributing to those selected Senate campaigns where very good candidates were facing very bad ones in states with sufficiently small populations to be influenceable. Its track record in deciding such key races, in close elections, is quite good. In effect, the Council serves as a tip sheet for those who want to know where best to place their electioneering bets so as to construct a Senate that might best pass such measures as SALT treaties. Money is normally sent directly to the touted candidates. 100 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, (202) 543-4100.

FOR THOSE WHO FAVOR NATIONAL EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGNS

Ground Zero: If you are concerned about nuclear war and you liked "Earth Day," you'll love Ground-Zero. It is planning a week-long affair in the spring of 1982 to study and ponder nuclear war and would emerge as a new broadly-based ad-hoc coalition and needs sympathetic support. Located at 305 Mass. Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., 20002; (202) 547-6603.

FOR THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE MX

The National Campaign to Stop the MX: This group was launched in April of this year to "assist cooperating organizations to focus attention on the MX issue, educate the American public about the impacts of the system, and to work for a complete halt to the MX system." Located at 305 Mass. Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; (202) 547-6602.

FOR THOSE WHO LIKE LARGE COALITIONS

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy. The Coalition unites 46 national religious, labor, peace, research and social action organizations working for a peaceful, non-interventionist, and demilitarized U.S. foreign policy by combining grassroots constituents organizing with coordinated activity on Capitol Hill. (202) 546-8400; 120 Maryland Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002.

AND IF YOU ARE NOT A MEMBER, WHY NOT JOIN FAS

- I wish to renew membership for the calendar year 1981.
 - I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.
- Enclosed is my check for 1981 calendar year dues. (I am not a natural or social scientist, lawyer, doctor or engineer, but wish to become a non-voting associate member.)
- \$25 Member \$50 Supporting \$100 Patron \$500 Life \$12.50 Under \$12,000

Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:

FAS Public Interest Report — \$25 for calendar year

Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund.

NAME AND TITLE _____
Please Print

ADDRESS _____

CITY AND STATE _____

PRIMARY PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE _____ Zip _____

ARE YOU WILLING TO HELP—AND HOW?

FAS would like to combine its effort to distribute this arms race "initiatives" newsletter (and its nuclear war "effects" publication) with an effort to secure the names of arms control activists who would help FAS and/or other groups in various ways. So, if you will let us know of the extent of your interest in participating, we will make your name available to other groups as well, or not, as you prefer, but in particular will keep your name in our activist file. Do then let us know if you are:

- 4) _____ 10 - 20 hours
- 5) _____ Still more

A DISTRIBUTOR

One who would like to help us distribute these publications and would like to:

- _____ a) order _____ copies (at 20¢ per copy and \$2.00 handling)
- _____ b) have us send copies to the list of names you enclose (same cost)
- _____ c) would like to send us a tax-deductible contribution of \$_____ to support the overhead involved in sending out these publications. (It is approximately \$1,000 per month.)

In addition, if you would like to have your name given to like-minded groups, let us know; some relevant groups are mentioned on page 11.

AN ACTIVIST

One who is sufficiently activist that you might, if persuaded it was a relevant and useful campaign, want to: help a suitable national organization that required such amounts of time weekly as:

- 1) _____ occasionally
- 2) _____ one hour; _____ 3 hours
- 3) _____ 4 - 10 hours

AND CAN YOU HELP WITH OUR FOUR PROPOSALS?

Check Off

LET YOUR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE GO!

- _____ 1. I will contact those of my elected representatives who have not taken the trouble to travel to the Soviet Union to urge them to do so and will assure them that I consider such a visit to be an important part of their duties and not junketing.

COMMIT YOUR ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES TO ARMS TALKS

- _____ 2. I will ask my elected representatives to endorse the following statement:
 "Arms limitation talks are in the mutual interest of avoiding mutual destruction and should not, and must not, be linked to lesser aspects of the superpower competition. The talks should be reopened at once and both sides should make far-reaching but plausible proposals."

HELP US PUT ARMS LIMITATIONS ON A FIRM FOUNDATION

- _____ 3. I agree that arms limitation planning must be as well-prepared and far-seeing as weapons planning and, with this in mind, I do endorse the notion of a select commission at the highest possible level to try to report on the likely state of U.S. security with and without arms control in the period between now and the year 2000. I will write President Reagan and endorse the Kennedy proposal described on pg. 10.

GIVE ARMS LIMITATIONS THE POLITICAL MUSCLE IT NEEDS

- _____ 4. I wholly agree that arms limitations will not succeed without a vigilant and aroused citizenry which presses its elected officials to abandon the traditional route of simply preparing for war and building more weapons. With this in mind, see my response on the preceding page.

Name _____
Street _____
City _____ Zip _____

<p>FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300 307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 May 1981 Volume 34 No. 5</p>
