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CONTAINING THE ARMS RACE: NEW APPROACHES NEEDED

What should be the approach of the arms control community to the Reagan Administration? On the one hand, the Administration says that it wants "real" reductions and would welcome "sincere" Soviet proposals. On the other hand, it emphasizes and creates a number of obstacles to any arms control at all. It emphasizes the linkage of arms control to lesser issues that are hard to define and unlikely to be controlled. It has initiated a round of harsh words that can only complicate the negotiation of arms control. It is bent on mobilizing domestic support for arms expenditure and must surely feel that this effort is dissonant with negotiating arms control agreements. And it is installing persons in national security agency positions who are known for an absence of sympathy for arms control, to put it mildly. Indeed, if appointments continue as projected, Secretary of State Haig will find himself unable to pursue arms control even when and if he so wants, because the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) will be filled with obstructionists.

Under these circumstances, it behooves arms controllers to review the menu of possibilities that go beyond formal arms control. They should, of course, continue to emphasize that the Reagan Administration's declarations of desire for real arms control could be rather easily fulfilled. Here the notion of holding to the main elements of SALT II while adding to them annual reductions (probably by an agreed percentage reduction of the various SALT II limits and sublimits) is the

simplest method at hand.

And if the Reagan Administration is so unwilling to make proposals, is it not time, in any case, to urge the Soviet Union to make a suitable proposal? Not since 1917 when Foreign Minister Maxim Litvinov called for General and Complete Disarmament has the Soviet Union addressed this problem. American conservatives are deservedly impatient with the prospect that America has to make all the proposals; a concrete and plausible Soviet plan is surely in order.

If formal arms control is not about to be achieved, then discussion of the arms race and the evolving deployment dilemmas it is about to place upon each side ought to be encouraged. And along with this, in any case, the arms control community ought to address the issue of high level ignorance of the other side. Only 40% of the Senators have ever been to Moscow and only 40% of the Politburo have been here. The Presidents, and even their national security advisers, normally have no experience with the nation about which they talk so often. One-third of a century into the arms race, the leadership of the two sides still are reluctant to permit, much less encourage, their leading officials to get the first-hand experience that is so obviously needed to formulate policy. If only under the rubric of "know the enemy," this conservative administration ought to be encouraged to permit its legislators and national security officials, including military officers, to travel to the other camp. *(Continued on page 2)*

HAROLD UREY, ANDREI SAKHAROV, ARMS CONTROL & HUMAN RIGHTS

This newsletter is dedicated to Harold Urey who died in La Jolla last month at the age of 87. (See pg. 7) In this Report, by an appropriate coincidence, we discuss the very topics which underlay his long interest in public affairs. Reflecting his interest in human rights, we report on a most unusual letter received on February 18 from Andrei Sakharov from his Gorky exile (see pg. 8). We discuss also the problem for FAS of pursuing human rights around the world when the Administration seems to want mainly to pursue anti-communism under the banner of human rights.

On the arms race, the above editorial discusses new possibilities for arms control in an era in which it may be that only fresh approaches will succeed. Harold Urey would have liked exploring fresh approaches. Also, on pg. 5, the Weinberger and Haig confirmation hearings have been examined with a fine-tooth comb for their relevance to future issues of defense and human rights. □



Dr. Urey flanked by his many scientific medals in the Harold Urey room of the Harold C. and Frieda D. Urey Hall that houses the Chemistry Department of the University of California at San Diego.


(Continued from page 1)

If even coordinated policies of restraint become impossible in the emerging world situation, then all the more emphasis will have to be placed on cutting unilaterally the ties of action and reaction that exist. It will be necessary to look all the harder at the viability of land-based missiles, which in the absence of arms control—and with present methods of discounting uncertainties—looks ever more problematical. Alternatively, it will be necessary to be much more realistic about the implausibility of attacks upon land-based missiles and the many uncertainties such attacks would involve. At present, however, we tend to ignore the uncertainties when, and only when, the drive is on for missile replacements.

And if it becomes impossible to break these ties of action and reaction through force deployment, the Administration may well find a nation ready to drop out of the arms race. The force levels on both sides are so high as rightly to encourage the public to wonder why new weapons must be bought on the basis of ever more political rationales. Popular consciousness, ever changing, may suddenly become unwilling to keep up with the nuclear Joneses. And the ever more expensive and complicated solutions to strategic problems, such as the current MX-basing schemes, may be opposed unilaterally.

Finally, arms controllers should emphasize the many new dangers that the world faces: energy depletion, North-South struggles, and inflation and stagnation. Without alternative problems to contemplate, the superpowers could be willing to spend their resources on arms for the indefinite future.—Reviewed and approved by the FAS Council.

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WILL HUMAN RIGHTS MERGE WITH ANTI-COMMUNISM?

In 1975, an FAS official was asked, during his lecture to State Department officials, how the Federation's championing of human rights for Soviet colleagues would fit in with its traditional program of supporting detente and disarmament. "Very simple." was the answer. "During periods of relatively warm state-to-state relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, FAS members feel they can afford to indulge their strong taste for civil liberties. If, however, state-to-state relations between the superpowers returned to the hostility of the 40s, 50s, and 60s, FAS policy would, presumably, return to emphasizing its obvious first priority—the avoidance of suicidal nuclear war—and would downplay the issue of Soviet human rights."

Has this time come? Members are asked to comment on some of the following reflections. Each and every member will be able to assess the extent to which superpower relations have begun to, or might later, deteriorate. But elements of the Administration's human rights policy suggest, at least, that the Federation should cease to collaborate with the Administration on Soviet human rights lest our policy seem as politicized as theirs will shortly.

Not long ago, for example, at an off-the-record meeting, one high official on human rights explained, from his point of view, three reasons why he felt human rights deserved a high priority. The first was that human rights was an obvious vulnerability in the Soviet political armor. The second was that the human rights issue afforded the possibility of securing an unusual degree of Western unity. Startlingly, only the third reason concerned the importance of human rights *per se*. It was crystal clear in his presentation, and in answers to inquiries, that a dominant goal was simply to embarrass the Soviet Union.

New Posture Emerging

Now a second person, but with seemingly similar views, is about to become Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. If, indeed, Ernest W. Lefever is placed in charge of U.S. foreign policy on human rights, he plans to make a clear distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism (as does Secretary of State Haig in the box following.) As a long interview in the February 13 New York Times made clear, Mr. Lefever opposes "scolding" right wing regimes, noting that in the case of Argentina, this policy "didn't bring anybody back to life and was counterproductive." On the other hand, he feels that "with our adversaries I approve of public criticism."

So Mr. Lefever is another who would use human rights as a political weapon. And, as the New York Times noted, his style and approach fit in well with Reagan Administration attitudes toward downplaying the Carter policy predisposition toward human rights protests against non-communist states.

Mr. Lefever observed that "In their preoccupation with the minor abridgement of certain rights in authoritarian states [human rights activists] often overlook the massive threat to the liberty of millions." No doubt it is difficult

indeed to compare the human rights violations of different countries, and distasteful to have to try to rank the outrages—all of which are so ultimately abhorrent to the human spirit. But it has to be noted that in Argentina and some other Latin American states, people who would be arrested in the Soviet Union (and given arranged trials) are simply kidnapped to places unknown. And where in the Soviet Union these persons suffer malnutrition and cold in labor camps, in Argentina they were tortured with electric prods and disappeared forever. Even the horrible and cynical treatment given to Soviet political dissenters in psychiatric hospitals—by KGB colonels pretending to be doctors—is easier to endure than the professional application of torture provided in parts of Latin America.

To Argentina, moreover, Mr. Lefever applies the absurd criterion of "bringing back the dead" which, of course, cannot be fulfilled. What criterion would he apply for the Soviet Union?

In the case of Argentina, Mr. Lefever notes that public scolding was "counterproductive" because the most effective way to get reform is "quiet diplomacy and maintenance of friendly relations." Undoubtedly this is sometimes true, and a balance of public and private efforts would be the obvious conclusion of most FAS members. But what, in this connection, of the Soviet Union? Is the public scolding which Mr. Lefever endorses without any counterproductive effect? Can human rights agitation be counterproductive with regard to the Soviet Union? This is an important question to which little consideration is given in American human rights discussions.

For example, at the meeting mentioned earlier, the question was asked whether the very success in securing the release of hundreds of thousands of Jewish emigrants—from an already anti-semitic nation that permits virtually no emigration of non-Jews—has not heightened anti-semitism for the millions of Jews who will remain behind. (Indeed, there is quite tangible evidence that this new situation in which a Jewish intellectual might well succeed in leaving the USSR is giving Soviet anti-semites an excuse for denying Jews both training and appointments so that their subsequent "treasonous" exit will not embarrass the regime). Thus freedom for hundred of thousands of Jews may lead to still greater intellectual serfdom for millions of others. It is believed, for example, that even half-Jews are not now being admitted into Moscow University.

What can be done about this "hostage" dilemma is quite unclear. But it is absolutely characteristic of Russian (and later Soviet) bureaucratic behavior to acquiesce in external pressures while taking reprisals behind the scenes where the pressure cannot make itself felt.

What is shocking, however, is to discover that human rights activists have no conception of the problem at all. One important U.S. political figure gasped that no one she had ever spoken to in the Soviet Union had advised her to do other than to protest loudly and vocally. But, obviously, no one had ever dared speak to her who was not *already* a dissident—one who had cut his or her ties to enjoying any kind of normal life and was waiting in the anteroom of

the anti-semitic Soviet world for expulsion.

And quite apart from anti-semitic backlash, political backlash in communist countries is quite as possible as it is in non-communist states. The human rights situation in the Soviet Union was much worse in Stalin's time and it could again deteriorate.

Scientists Naturally Focus on USSR

Now for scientists, there are special reasons why the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union tends to crop up with greater emphasis than it does elsewhere. In the first place, because science and scientists are found in rough proportion to the gross national product of a nation, there are more scientists in the Soviet Union than in all of Latin America. In the second place, as Soviet scientist Benjamin Levich advised FAS in 1975, many of the best Soviet scientists are Jewish—perhaps 20% of the Soviet academicians are Jewish although Jews represent about 3% of the Soviet population. The percentage of Jewish scientists declines thereafter because the younger Jews saw ever more discrimination after the brief period of post-revolutionary avoidance of anti-semitism. Meanwhile, in the United States a similar situation exists, with perhaps 30% of the scientists at the best universities being Jewish. As a consequence, much U.S. agitation is encouraged by a strong cultural bond between these related groups. Indeed, the majority of American Jews are, like the present writer, descended from Jews who left Eastern Europe and Russia between 1880 and 1910 and who have a sense of "There, but for the grace of God, go I."

For those who doubt the significance of this effect, a number of anecdotes can be told. But in particular, the grassroots organization Scientists for Orlov and Sharansky (SOS) was conceived of as "Scientists for Sharansky" and was expanded to include Orlov only on subsequent protests by an observer that Orlov—though a Soviet dissident and not a Jewish refusenik—was more highly ranked both as a scientist and as a human rights agitator than Sharansky. (Orlov was the Chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Commission while Sharansky was only a member, and Orlov was a Corresponding Member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences while Sharansky was a much more minor scientist). But, characteristically, the dissidents, with the notable exception of Andrei Sakharov, have gotten much less attention in the United States.

Thus, for scientists, there are a number of wholly understandable and natural reasons why agitation for human rights by U.S. scientists tends to focus disproportionately on the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, this proclivity tends to be reinforced by the worldwide struggle between East and West, and by the many political forces which would rather find fault with adversaries than with others. As this is going to press, for example, a new group entitled "Committee for the Free World" has announced its formation to lead a "struggle for freedom" and to defend the non-communist world "against the rising menace of totalitarianism." Sponsored by 400 intellectuals frequently identified with the neo-conservative viewpoint, it is sponsored by foundations known for helping conservative causes.

THE NEW SELECTIVITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS

Senator Helms: All right. How much concern do you have about what has appeared to many to be selective application of human rights standards by the United States?

General Haig: Well, again, I touched upon this in my opening statement. I think it is presumptuous of me to go very much further than to suggest that I think the problem is not the principle of human rights, which I fully support—and I have reiterated that here today—but in the application of that principle I think we have made some mistakes.

I do not like to think it is naivete or stupidity that caused those mistakes, but perhaps an excess of zeal combined with what is probably an inadequate mechanism for the application of it. Here I want to look very carefully at my own Department and the way that the human rights issue has been given policy consideration, to be sure that that was not the source of some of this excess zeal and distortion.

You know, I have spoken on philosophic terms to this question, and it is always dangerous, because it is when you get into those areas that people's sensitivities are irritated. But I have made the point, and I will make it again, that authoritarian or autocratic regimes generally derive their character, as unpleasant as it is to Americans, from environmental forces: a lack of political development, a lack of economic development, perceived internal or external threats, an historic legacy, as is true in so many of our Latin American countries.

But because the situation is the product of environment, it lends itself to an entirely different approach as you seek to move it toward a more moderate condition. On the other hand, a totalitarian regime by ideological conviction rejects the principles and values and ideas that you and I espouse.

It cannot serve the purpose of social justice nor meet the vital interests of this country to pursue policies that seek to drive, or have the practical consequences—no one seeks to do it—of driving autocratic or authoritarian regimes, some traditionally friendly to us, into totalitarian molds. Such a state is fundamentally antagonistic to all we represent and seek to achieve in the world.

So there is bound to be a growing divergence of emphasis between an anti-communist school of human rights unconcerned about politicizing human rights and a universal school of human rights who fears just that. And there is bound to be a second running disagreement on the extent to which human rights ought to be allowed to destroy the atmosphere needed to maintain peace and arms control. Members are invited to comment on these issues and a carefully designed series of options will be sent out to the membership with the annual election ballot in mid-April, to get an impression of the members' views. □

CONFIRMATION HEARINGS FORESHADOW POLICY

The confirmation hearings in January of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci provided a first look at the philosophical underpinnings of the new administration's foreign and defense policies. Unfortunately, a review of some 600 pages of hearing transcripts reveals an alarming predisposition on the part of both Reagan's nominees and members of the new Senate Republican majority to view all the complex strands of U.S. foreign relations through the murky lens of the East-West military balance. For the new Reagan national security team and its sponsors on Capitol Hill, the strategic balance has acquired decisive significance while arms control is either a minor force, a mistake, or an irrelevancy.

When Senator Pell inquired whether the vast overkill potential of U.S. nuclear forces could actually be used in a crisis "rather than just having a larger amount to make the rubble bounce," he was treated to a discourse on the mysteries of the nuclear balance:

"I think, to answer your question in dialectic-strategic terms, it is really not quite so simple as to suggest that merely the perception of overkill or adequacy in the context of damage to populations, cities, or both is the essence of our strategic need. I think it is vitally important for Americans to recognize that the perceived balances between us and the Soviet Union, as a backdrop to the conduct of all of our relationships with the Soviet Union, are a vitally important aspect of our anticipated success.

"You know, in crisis management, at lower levels of tension in which probably, certainly hopefully, the rattling of nuclear sabres will not be engaged, this backdrop serves to strengthen American diplomacy, to enable the American President to speak authoritatively at these lower levels, and hopefully to bring about a resolution without resort to higher levels of tension and potential conflict. That certainly had a role to play in President Kennedy's successful management of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

"What I am suggesting is if you slip into the exclusive mentality that it makes no difference what our levels of strategic power are because we have enough to register what we presume to be an unacceptable damage, then you tend to discount all of these other factors.

Disarmament Discounted By Haig's Theory

"I'd suggest another thing that you discount by such a theory, and that is the incentive, as we sit down to negotiate with the Soviet Union, to achieve real breakthroughs in reduction of nuclear armaments."

Haig ducked the question of whether he was advocating a policy of strategic nuclear superiority, telling Senator Hart, "I would prefer not to get into whether or not we are seeking superiority in the narrow sense of that term or simply adequacy right now."

Equivalence Too Tranquilizing

"Today we are faced," he testified, "with a situation where indeed equivalence, or whatever you want to call it, did not provide for the American people, for the Congress,

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE HOSTAGES

Pell: ...didn't you say to a group of Washington businessmen, quoted in the *Boston Globe* of Dec. 2, 1979, that in connection with the hostages, every option should be considered, including "even the unthinkable"? What did you mean by "the unthinkable?"

Haig: In the first place, Senator, I am not sure I am familiar at all with what you are referring to. In the *Boston Globe*?

Pell: The *Boston Globe* of Dec. 2....I am told this was a quotation.

Haig: Including "the unthinkable?" And it said, "including the unthinkable?"

Pell: Including "the unthinkable."

Haig: I don't even recall the incident. It does not sound like my language—"unthinkable." I would have been more precise if I had felt it was justified.

Pell: Somebody gave me the article.

Haig: I'm glad. He probably gave you the question too. So he's probably the expert on it.

Pell (quoting the article): "Perhaps the most startling aspect of Haig's Washington speech came in response to a question of how he would have handled the Iran hostage problem. After initially calling on Americans to 'rally round the President' Haig lowered his voice and said the Administration should consider every option. Then, after a melodramatic pause, he added, 'even the unthinkable.'"

Haig: Well, Senator, I don't recall that.

Pell: Well, good, I'm delighted. And I trust the story is inaccurate and I'm glad to assume it was.

Globe reporter David Nyhan contends the story "isn't inaccurate," noting that Haig "did not flat out deny he said it. He just said he didn't recall it and that, if he had used language like that, he would have been more precise."

for the executive branch, the understanding of what was necessary in the face of the continuing growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power.

Superiority Needed Overall

"I hope I didn't leave you the other day with the impression that I was discounting the desirability of superiority and rejecting that thesis. What I was trying to do—and I think this is clear if my words are carefully read in their entirety—was to suggest that in this triad (NATO triad of central strategic forces, regional nuclear forces, and conventional power) together with our allies, we have to be unquestionably superior in the broadest sense of that term."

Sometimes A Failure To Get Arms Control Is A "Success"!

Although Haig testified that he "does not necessarily reject" the idea of an interim agreement containing some of the "less controversial" provisions of SALT II, he noted that such an arrangement would have to await the outcome of a detailed discussion with the President "on the strategy

and objectives of any revised approach to the arms control issue."

What is the likely direction of this "revised approach?" "I think it (SALT)...can be an effective process," Weinberger remarked, "but I would certainly not want to enter it from the point of view of feeling if we didn't get a treaty, it was a failure. Sometimes the failure to get a treaty is a success." Haig struck a similar note, saying that he had "always been a proponent for arms control, and especially efforts to get the nuclear genie back into the bottle," but quickly tempered that endorsement with the observation that arms control must "always be pursued as ancillary to our own vital national interests first and foremost."

Haig said he believed that "historic precedent would suggest it is not when there is an adequacy of armaments, but when there is an inadequacy on one side or the other, that the likelihood of conflict is greatest.

"I think there are things to be settled in our relationship with the Soviet Union in the period ahead which, as callous as it may sound, are of even greater importance than efforts to get control of the growth of armaments. These things will plant the seeds for the kind of confrontation that ultimately may lead to the employment of Armed Forces—heaven forbid. And it is [confrontation] that must be prevented in its totality."

Flexibility Preferred To Arms Control

When asked to comment on whether the United States was better off with or without the SALT II agreement, Carlucci noted "that the agreement was negotiated under a given set of Defense Department programs. Those programs are going to change. We are going to have a much more dynamic Defense Department program. When you do that, you want to have maximum flexibility. The agreement, which has been withdrawn, does not give us the kind of flexibility that I think is needed..."

Arms Race Interactions Downplayed

Carlucci testified that he was "not one who believes that we should not take steps because the Soviets might then take other steps. They are going to take whatever steps are in their national interest, and they are not going to follow whatever we do. I think we have to look purely at our national interest, and then enter into negotiations."

Once we decide "what kind of systems we have to have to deter any potential adversary," Carlucci observed, "then we should go into the negotiating process. But we should not let the negotiating process drive our national security policy."

The Role of Nuclear Weapons: No Disavowals In Store

When Senator Carl Levin (D. Mich.) asked the Defense Secretary-designate whether his previously stated belief in "the maximum deployment of every military capability and every weapon we have" meant he would have recommended the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam, Weinberger responded, "I was not connected with the Government when we were in any kind of decisive stage of that conflict, but it just seems to me, Senator, that if it is a serious enough situation to warrant a war and warrant a committal of U.S. forces, we owe it to them to be ready,

WILL SOVIET WEAKNESS INDUCE ADVENTURES?

"What we Americans must keep very, very clearly before us as we assess the sacrifices we must make in the period ahead," Haig observed, is that the U.S. is not "facing the inevitable and inexorable supremacy of Marxist-Leninism as a system. Quite the contrary, it is a profound historic failure. If one measures the success of the Soviet brand of communism, we find economic shortfalls that are increasing in severity over the last 3 to 4 years. We find an agricultural basket case in the history sense...We find demographic problems with the Soviet system, as non-Soviet populations begin to thirst for greater autonomy and a greater voice in the conduct of Soviet policy. We find that transmitted into the Eastern European zone of influence....Why is the decade facing us so dangerous. There are two converging realities. On the one hand, we have this growth in sheer Soviet military power...and simultaneously Soviet society is faced by these pressures, these manifestations of failure described earlier...I think history would confirm that totalitarian states, when plagued with internal failure, and armed beyond the limits of prudence and reasonableness, frequently indulge in external diversions to insure their incumbency and continuation in power. One need only look at Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, to suggest at least there is some flirtation with that kind of diversion underway in Moscow today." — General Alexander Haig

not necessarily to do it, but to be ready to utilize the strengths that we have.

"It is still possible, I believe, to fight some wars (!) using conventional forces that don't involve nuclear weapons;...But I think that if you advise potential opponents in advance that you do not intend to utilize the strength that you have or you do not intend to cross certain lines, that you have almost assured another Vietnam, which is the kind of situation which I think we have to avoid in the future....Any time you get into a war the possibility that you will use every weapon available has to be left open."

In other words, the United States should not forswear the first use of nuclear weapons, even against small non-nuclear nations such as Vietnam.

General Haig adopted a similar stance. "Our deterrent is founded in the uncertainty which we have intentionally generated on the part of a potential aggressor so that it would not know at any given time what the nature of the Western response would be, and therefore could not calculate with certainty the advantage of launching an attack of any kind in the first instance. This deterrent is based inherently on the willingness of an American President—in conjunction with our allies—to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve our vital interests, including the use of nuclear weapons, should this, heaven forbid, be necessary." □

HAROLD C. UREY DIES AT 87

In January, one of the most important of the atomic scientists who founded FAS passed away. Born in 1893, Harold Urey was already approaching 50 years of age when World War II began. An extraordinarily versatile chemist, he had already received the Nobel Prize in 1934 for his discovery of deuterium and had shown dramatically how life might have originated from chemical processes.

At Columbia since 1929, he became in 1940 director of the atomic weapons program established to separate uranium isotopes and to develop D₂O production. He and his colleagues developed the process of gaseous diffusion through a porous barrier which was then the most important method for the separation of uranium isotopes needed to build the atomic bomb.

As a consequence of both his scientific fame and his contribution to the atomic bomb, his views on atomic energy were eagerly received in the post-war period by the press and public. In the book about the origins of FAS—*A Peril and A Hope* by Alice Kimball Smith—he is mentioned on 50 of its 500 pages.

In particular, he made major contributions to eliminating over-rigorous security provisions from the May-Johnson bill, of which he was the most prominent opponent. And he called for international control of the atomic weapon and, later, for union among Atlantic nations confronting the Soviet Union. In the end, he supported the development of the H-bomb (the "super," as it was called) out of fear the Russians would get it first.

Harold Urey was known for his diligent study of problems before enunciating an opinion on them. He criticized the courts for being overly severe on the Rosenbergs for their espionage, but only after reading the entire transcript and concluding that there really was no key "secret" that they had revealed.

Dr. Urey was known for these qualities: intensity, creativity, enthusiasm, consideration for others, moral convictions, the willingness to defend unpopular causes, a sense of fair play, perseverance, extraordinary powers of concentration, and financial generosity. In recent memorial ceremonies, he was characterized as "the man we love," one who radiated imaginative ideas and "sheer goodness."

In the late forties and fifties, he was for less government involvement in nuclear power for peaceful purposes, on the theory that the private companies could do a better job of it without government restrictions. Later he turned against nuclear reactors and became a strong supporter of anti-nuclear groups.

Harold Urey was always active in public affairs even in his eighties, in his work, for example, with city planners in San Diego. And he did much to help strengthen the University of California at San Diego where he spent his "post-retirement" career from the age of 67 to 87. The regard for him felt by the University is indicated by the fact that the building in which the chemistry department is housed is named after him and his wife Frieda, who played an active role in backstopping his career and freeing him to pursue it.

But Harold Urey was, as the above indicates, much more than a pure scientist. He was also a scientist in public affairs who personified the way in which scientists should participate in public matters. With this in mind, the FAS Fund has opened discussion with the Urey family to see how FAS might best establish a Harold C. Urey Fellow in Science and Public Affairs, who would function in Washington from the FAS headquarters in ways that would memorialize this aspect of the extraordinary career of Harold Urey. □



At the February 7 La Jolla commemoration, Jeremy J. Stone and Cyril Smith raise with Frieda D. Urey the possibility of an FAS memorial for her late husband.

ANDREI SAKHAROV APPEALS TO FAS FROM GORKY

Andrei Sakharov has managed to send a letter to FAS from his exile in Gorky describing his concerns. Addressed to FAS Director Jeremy J. Stone, it says that he and Elena are "very disturbed" about their son's fiancée, Elizaveta Alekseeva, who appears to be in the "line of fire" in Moscow and whose right to emigrate is being denied to put pressure upon him. ("There is no other reason for holding on to her except the unlawful one of using the situation to put pressure on me. But indeed this gives me a basis for asking those participating in my defense also to speak up for her right to leave to get married.")

Academician Sakharov recalled Stone's visit to his dacha in 1975, and said:

"I know much, though of course not all, about the important work which FAS is conducting in my defense. I heard your speeches on the radio, in spite of the jamming. They pleased me very much. Thanks for 'adopting' me. [This is in reference to the FAS policy of "adopting" colleagues in distress.] Undoubtedly, your speeches were well suited to the more detailed and broader development of a campaign. It seems to me quite proper that FAS and SOS [Scientists for Orlov and Sharansky] look upon my defense as a part of the campaign for all repressed scientists in Russia—Orlov, Kovalev, Sharansky, and all the others....It is also important that you emphasize the similarity between my position on disarmament and the position of FAS. [This is a reference to the FAS policy of supporting arms control notwithstanding current political differences between the superpowers.]

Other sources advise FAS that the jamming in Sakharov's apartment is so severe that the radio cannot be heard there. The Soviet Academy of Sciences has not responded to his request for help for his stepson's fiancée. (The stepson Alexey Semyonov is currently at Brandeis University.) □

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Elizaveta (Liza) Alekseeva, Elena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov

YURI ORLOV EXPELLED FROM ARMENIAN ACADEMY

A letter from Orlov's family, dated October 17, 1980 reported insistent rumors that he had been stripped of his position as Corresponding Member (this rank is second only to Academician) of the Armenian Academy of Sciences. This rumor has subsequently been confirmed by Agence France Press.

Mrs. Orlov has appealed to the Madrid Conference to save her husband from "unworthy barbarian treatment" which included forbidding her husband to rest lying down although a commission of doctors had earlier given him this right to rest for two hours each day. In October Orlov spent 30 days in the punishment cell where solitary confinement is combined with hot food only every other day. □

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