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THIS ISSUE:

THE ARMS RACE

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THE TWO POINTS OF VIEW

During the Foreign Relations Committee confirmation hearings of Mr. Paul C. Warnke, it was stated by various senators that he and Paul Nitze represented different schools of thought between which the senators would have to choose. But, for the most part, the probing of that philosophical difference was a probing of Mr. Warnke's writings and an attack by Mr. Nitze on Mr. Warnke. Little or no attempt was made to draw Mr. Nitze out on his own views. And, above all, little or no attempt was made to discuss the implications of these differences for real-life negotiation.

There are basically three different positions which one can take — in varying proportions — toward the U.S.-Soviet arms race. There is first the arms race view. One can assume that both sides are reacting to each other and that the contest has a reciprocal, reactive quality with considerable bureaucratic, political, and ideological momentum. This has produced productive capabilities wholly out of proportion to what would otherwise be a suitable solution to legitimate fears on each side.

There is a second opposing view which believes that the Soviet Union is bent on strategic superiority and that its negotiators are competently and seriously seeking to achieve a "war-winning" strategy by a combination of procurement and manipulation of the SALT talks. This view wants to subordinate arms control, for the time being at least, to strategic arms buildup. Thus the Chairman of the Executive Committee on the Present Danger (of which Mr. Nitze is Co-chairman) wrote the *New York Times* on February 17 that we can hope for success in such negotiations "only if our deterrent military strength is restored."

Live With Ambiguity

In between these views, there is a school of thought characterized by Harold Brown's view that we may have to "live with ambiguity."

The Nitze school ascribes to the Soviet Union a predominant unity of thought and purpose. The arms race school assumes that there are mixed motives and intentions, as in other governments, with some believing that strategic superiority is achievable and desirable, and others contending it is unachievable or non-existent. According to this school some Soviets would be arguing that the arms talks were a kind of accommodation in which a solution was to be found to a common problem. Others would be arguing that the talks should be a focus of hard-bargaining for residual strategic advantage. Still others would see the possibility of achieving some kind of war-winning capability in desperate circumstances.

In our own government, there has always been a mix-

ture of intentions, inconsistent actions, and mixed attitudes. And much weapon procurement can be viewed, in any case, in two different lights. For example, it was argued that our decision to multiply our warheads with MIRV was "defensive" since its avowed purpose was to penetrate a Soviet anti-ballistic missile system and thus to prevent its construction. It was argued that the warheads were too small to destroy Soviet land-based missiles — which was true with the accuracy then at hand. On the other hand, the most perceptive and best informed strategic analysts knew — and certainly the Russians' Defense Ministry knew — that accuracy would, in due course, get to the point where even the "small" warheads (three to ten times the size of Hiroshima) would be able to destroy missile silos with high probability. At that point, the U.S. would have enormous potential for counterforce strikes. This time has already begun with the MK-12A warhead. (See pg. 3).

Similarly, in the Soviet Defense Ministry, some may have argued in the early seventies, when these programs began, that the modernization of Soviet land-based missiles with larger and more numerous warheads is wholly necessary because — in the face of a U.S. attack with silo-killing missiles — each surviving missile must be made to count. And the improvements in accuracy were necessary to strike at U.S. silos if the course of the hostilities made this possible. (This assumption is the basis upon which we are spending funds to achieve high accuracy on our land-based missiles.) Both sides have always actively considered war scenarios in which their missiles get a chance to impact on the territory of the other before theirs were fired.

Both Sides Envision First Strategic Strikes

It should be understood, at the outset, that virtually no one — in any school of thought — foresees surprise attacks out of the blue. By that token, the war does not reach strategic levels at which missiles are called into play without some kind of undefined and unforeseen (by the missile strategists anyway) political scenario. In this sense, the missile experts do not think in terms of who is the "aggressor", and their calculations of who strikes first with missiles become independent of who is the "guilty" party in precipitating the war. The U.S. could easily be the defender, and yet have its missiles strike first. Indeed, this is the dominant scenario — one in which Russian forces in Europe are thought to overrun the western territory and U.S. missiles try to redress the situation with strategic strikes.

From this point of view, the Soviet Union suffered badly

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in the 1974 agreements because, as Secretary Kissinger pointed out, it had 85% of its throw-weight in the land-based force that is becoming vulnerable, while we had only 25% in that force. He concluded correctly:

"In the 1980's the greater flexibility of our force, and the greater vulnerability of their force, is very likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their forces is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force — regardless of what the weight of the individual warhead is." — December 3, 1974 background briefing.

It is for reasons like these that Soviet intentions cannot be gleaned from Soviet modernization of its land-based missile force. In the first place, matching alone would dictate that they MIRV their missile force after we have done the same to ours — and this is at the heart of the modernization now underway. (Our missile force is now MIRVed. But the Soviet missile force is only about 20% MIRVed, with about 15% of the force being modernized and replaced with MIRVed missiles each year.) In the second place, the throw-weight and size of the missiles is dictated partly by the traditional fact that Soviet missiles have always been large to overcome technological disabilities. With the lower accuracy, for example, larger warheads are necessary to achieve the same kill capability. (And, as indicated on page 3, accuracies in the United States have already gone to the point where throw-weight differences are not very important for hard-target destruction.)

Finally, the Soviet land-based force plays a far larger role in the Soviet strategic force, and hence its modernization can be a response to the increasing and high level of threat we place upon it. Against an American missile attack, and despite the missile modernization, Soviet surviving missile-throw weight is declining — not increasing.

When Civil Defense Is Added

It was the addition of Soviet civil defense to the calculations that turned the Nitze school from one that worried about appearances to one that worried about the Soviet Union achieving a "war-winning" capability. Only the civil defense provided any possibility of turning missile imbalances into important differences in outcomes, i.e., in surviving populations.

Indeed, if one imagines that a Soviet civil defense program can adequately protect the Soviet population against the 4,000 warheads of the deployed Polaris submarine fleet, the attack upon the U.S. land-based missiles and bombers need not be perfect, since considerable added damage could still be marginal to the total.

The Nitze school has been very clear about what it wants. In "Deterring the Deterrent", Foreign Policy, Winter, 1976, he urged:

a) 550 MX missiles in a multiple-aim point mode (i.e., mobile missiles with 14 super accurate warheads; see page 4). b) The B-1 bomber armed with strategic cruise missiles, and c) Trident II missile in an "appropriate" number of Trident submarines.

In particular, he wanted combinations of accuracy, yield, and reliability to "give high probability of destroying some 1,500 to 2,000 hard targets" — which is to say, the Soviet land-based missile force. Furthermore, he wanted the United States to retain 3,000 deliverable megatons after any Soviet attack and after our response

against Soviet military targets as well! (The alert Poseidon force, by Mr. Nitze's calculations, would constitute only 80 megatons — hence he would like a reserve force, over and above our requirements for striking Soviet hardened missiles — of some 30 times the megatonnage of the deployed Poseidon force!)

There seems little question that these requirements are inconsistent with the Vladivostok Agreement as we know it. The MX missiles in a multiple aimpoint mode would pose verification problems and would force upwards the limits both on MIRV and on overall aggregates. The B-1 bomber with cruise missiles would have to be considered a MIRVed vehicle and would also push up both limits (the Air Force plans to retain the B-52's so no reduction occurs there).

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
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After bitter attacks on Mr. Warnke, Mr. Nitze was asked whether it was not true that a difference in philosophy was at issue and not personalities. He said: "Yes, it's probably true". Indeed it is. Whatever merit there is in Mr. Nitze's concerns and desires for our deterrent, there is little question that his philosophy, at present, would bring the arms talks to a screeching halt. In effect, he is complaining about our defense policy, not our arms control policy. The Defense Department should listen closely to his views, and its decisions on his concerns should, in turn, illuminate and influence our arms control policy. As things stand, Mr. Warnke is bearing the brunt of complaints that go far beyond his limited purview. □

**THE COUNTERFORCE RACE:
LAND-BASED MISSILE SURVIVABILITY**

The ability of a missile to destroy hardened missile silos on the other side depends upon accuracy, missile yield, reliability, and retargetability of the offensive missile and the hardness of the silo of the missile being attacked.

If used with reasonable care, a measure K of accuracy and yield serves as a useful benchmark for offensive capability. Here K is the sum over all warheads of the 2/3rds power of the yield of each warhead divided by its CEP (accuracy) squared.

A recent article ("Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia") by Thomas Garwin and John D. Steinbruner in *International Security* (Summer, 1976) has developed the necessary calculations. The (delivered) K value required for the Soviet force to destroy between 90% and 97% of the U.S. force is about 50,000 to 80,000*. For the U.S. to destroy between 90% and 97% of the Soviet force would require delivering be-

tween 20,000 and 65,000 units — the larger uncertainty arises because of larger uncertainty concerning Soviet hardness.

How are the two sides doing in securing missile forces with the accuracy and yield that would supply such large K values?

According to a report of Congressman Leggett, "Two Legs Do Not a Centipede Make" (*Armed Forces Journal International*, February, 1975), the U.S. now has an (undelivered) K value of about 25,000 — only enough to destroy the Soviet force at the lower limit of estimates of its hardness.

However, the U.S. is deploying during Fiscal 1978, the NS-20 guidance software improvements for Minuteman III missiles and, in addition, deploying the MK-12A warhead, doubling the yield of the 3 Minuteman III missile warheads from 170 kilotons to 350 kilotons. Press reports suggest the accuracy will be 600 feet, or .1 of a nautical mile.

In this case, these changes applied only to the 550 Minutemen III missiles with their 1650 warheads would leave these warheads alone with a K value of about 80,000, greater than the 65,000 which is the high range given earlier. In fact, here, reliability would be the restraint in the calculation. With perfect reliability and the hardness assumptions of the most conservative estimate given, perhaps 100 Soviet missiles would be left; with 90% reliability, perhaps 250 left (16%); and with 80% reliability, 400 left (25%). A review article of the Institute for Strategic Studies has suggested that guidance might reach 400 feet without terminal guidance methods; in this case, even against a Soviet force of 1,000 psi silos, the Minuteman III force alone could destroy virtually the same proportion of Soviet missiles as its reliability, e.g., 90% or 80% or whatever it was.

The dramatic effect of this improvement in MM III is shown in the above chart from the Rumsfeld posture statement, pg. 125. It shows the United States reaching, by fiscal 1978, much greater hard-target kill capability than the Soviet force. (Also it requires about 20% higher K values to attack and destroy our force than it does the Soviet force because of greater hardness here; this adds to our advantage.)

As the Rumsfeld chart shows, the Soviet Union will not attain this kind of hard-target kill capability until about the end of fiscal 1983. Thus we are jumping into a five-year lead. □

*These estimates exaggerate kill capability by overlooking the fact that missiles may be unreliable, perhaps firing successfully only 80% or 90% of the time. On the other hand, most of the unreliability can be witnessed in the initial phase of firing and in this case, at least in principle, new missiles can be retargeted and fired to replace those which were unreliable. U.S. missiles can now be retargeted within 25 minutes over and beyond their pre-stored targets.

The estimates are also exaggerated to the extent that a number of warheads have to be aimed at the same target to achieve the necessary K value for their targets; in this case, through "fratricide," one incoming missile might turn one or more others into duds. This exaggerated effect is minimized or eliminated when the kill probability of single warheads becomes high enough to reach the 90%-97% probability unaided.

THE MX MISSILE

The Defense Department solution to the problem of land-based missile vulnerability is a follow-on missile to Minuteman called the MX. The MX would have much greater accuracy (100 feet) than even the Minuteman III with its MK-12A warhead. (At this accuracy the target is almost invariably inside the crater made by even the smallest missile warhead we use.) It would carry more warheads (14 rather than 3) of approximately the same size as our largest MIRV warhead (200 kilotons). But, most important, it would be mobile.

The kind of mobility involved has been under discussion. At least 30 options for hiding or moving the missiles have been discussed, including firing the missiles from airplanes, hiding them under ponds, moving them on railroad cars, and so on.

The Defense Department wanted to leave these matters for the future, arguing that MX could be installed, at the outset, in the Minuteman silos themselves. But the Senate Armed Services Committee derided the notion, observing, properly, that the Defense Department could not simultaneously claim: (a) that MX was needed because Minuteman silos were becoming vulnerable; and then state (b) that the same silos were a good place for installing MX. The Committee insisted that no funds be spent on studying how to put MX in existing silos and, after a long struggle, seems to have made its point.

The two possibilities left are shelters and trenches. Under the shelter notion, an area of Western land in size equal to a square of about 100 miles on a side would be filled with about 10,000 missile shelters. These would not be fully hardened silos (1,000 psi) because of the great cost of such hardening but, instead, would be hardened to about 50 psi to prevent easy destruction of all of them with but a few weapons. (If the shelters are on a grid about a mile apart then, with this hardening, Soviet MIRVs of about 200 kt could destroy at most one.) About 1,000 missiles would be shuffled around to these 10,000 shelters in a gigantic shell game.

The other possibility is to build hundreds of 20-mile-long covered trenches. Inside the trench one or more vehicles would trundle up and back with a missile carried on each. In order to destroy the missile, the Soviet Union would presumably have to attack the full length of the trench. If it failed to destroy that part of the trench in which the missile was at the time of the attack, the missile could fire out of the trench.

The MX represents a very potent offensive weapon. One thousand MX missiles with 14 warheads each would constitute an enormous capacity for destroying Soviet land-based missiles. Each of the warheads, with the planned accuracy, would have a virtually certain ability to destroy a Soviet land-based missile no matter how well hardened. Thus the Soviet planners would envisage, on paper, anyway, that a force many times larger than their 1500 land-based missiles in existence at present would be attackable with these 14,000 silo-killing warheads. If they took this matter seriously, as one supposes they certainly would, the Russians would have to go mobile. No doubt they are already planning to do so and with this kind of contingency in mind.

MX supporters do not deny the offensive threat MX provides but suggest it may encourage the Soviet Union

Deliverable Warheads, mid-1976

Warheads	U.S.	S.U.
ICBM	2,154	2,195
SLBM	5,120	785
Bombers*	1,256	270
	8,530	3,250

(Assumes that B-52's are each armed with four gravity bombers and Tu-95's and Mya-4's with two bombs. If each B-52 G/H is additionally armed with 20 SRAM, the U.S. bomber warhead total would exceed 5,000.)

Equivalent Megatonnage, mid-1976

Systems	U.S.	S.U.
ICBM	1,150	2,950
SLBM	780	785
	1,930	3,735

Missile Throw-weight* and Bomber Payload,** mid 1976

Missile Throw-weight	U.S.	S.U.
ICBM	2.4	7.0
SLBM	.9	1.2
Bomber Payload	22.8	4.7

*In millions of pounds at maximum range

**In millions of pounds assumes maximum weapons load

(From the *Military Balance*,
Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976-77)

to put more of its missiles at sea. The alternative, that it may encourage the Soviet Union just to build more and bigger missiles on land, is not mentioned.

What if, as this suggests, the fears aroused by MIRVed fixed land-based missiles drive each side to go mobile?

In the first place, just as MIRV made limits on individual warheads impossible to achieve, mobility might make it impossible to achieve limits on numbers of vehicles. It is not easy to see how one could be sure how many weapons the other side had if one could not locate them amidst shelters or in trenches.

In the second place, it is not at all clear that these new strategies would, in fact, produce a situation for land-based missiles that was any more stable than the present one.

For example, let us assume that we built 10,000 shelters into which we put 1,000 mobile missiles. Would our force be secure if they did the same? No! One thousand Soviet MX would have 14,000 warheads, each capable of destroying a shelter. Shelters clearly are not a solution in an age of tens of thousands of MIRVed warheads. It is significant that the Army and McDonnell Douglas are studying a mobile ABM system that would move around with the mobile missile to help protect it.

How secure would trenches built on one side or the other be? The Defense Department has not released costs on building a trench large enough for giant transporters traveling in concrete tubes to trundle a missile, but building and hardening such a thing would obviously be expensive. Meanwhile, warheads on the other side would be plentiful. Three to six to nine 200 kiloton warheads per mile of trench should do in even very hardened trenches. And the cost-exchange ratio of warheads per trench is really quite irrelevant since the plentiful quantity of warheads on the other side stems from each side's un-

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swerving desire — not to destroy trenches or shelters on the other side — but to maintain a viable land-based arm of its deterrent even in scenarios where many of the missiles will be destroyed.

MX may be an example — of which there are increasingly many nowadays in arms race planning — of a scheme being proposed that looks good in advance to some, mainly because it is not scrutinized with anywhere near the vigilance that would be provided when and if it were pursued. In the construction and planning phases, eagerness to go forward undermines the worst case assumptions that will later re-emerge. This encourages a "solution" which lasts less long than its cost would suggest it deserved.

MX and SALT

As a delivery vehicle, either the 1,000 MX would have to be substituted for the 1,000 Minuteman in fixed silos to keep the U.S. vehicles under the 2,400 Vladivostok limit, or else the limits would have to be raised.

Furthermore, as MIRVed vehicles, 1,000 MX would virtually, by itself, exhaust the Vladivostok 1320 budget, leaving little room for the 496 Poseidon MIRVs and the 240 Trident submarine MIRVs, much less the 550 MIRVed Minuteman III missiles in hardened silos. (MX could, of course, be emplaced with a single large warhead rather than 10 to 14 small ones, in which case the MIRV budget would not apply.)

All in all, it seems reasonable to assume that MX and Vladivostok are incompatible numerically and, perhaps, even conceptually; the 2400-1320 limits are too low and the very notion of a limit applied to mobile missiles may be unworkable.

WHAT IS THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT?

On November 24, 1974, President Ford and General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev reached an agreement on the main provisions of a "Vladivostok" agreement which they hoped would be concluded to limit arms through 1985. The plan was to incorporate relevant portions of the Interim Agreement which was about to run out in October, 1977 and, in addition, to limit numbers of delivery vehicles and numbers of MIRVed vehicles to equal agreed numbers: 2400 strategic delivery vehicles (missiles, bombers) and a sublimit of 1320 MIRVed missiles.

It had earlier been planned to reach a short extension of the 1972 interim agreement, but it was realized that the extension would run out just as the Soviet MIRV program was growing and the U.S. B-1 program being finally approved. The final agreement specified that the agreements on reductions would occur no later than 1980-81 but, in response to criticism, this was changed to permit negotiations on reductions to take place at any time.

When the Russians had argued for avoiding the question of mobile missiles, the U.S. had opposed mobile missiles in 1972 and called them "inconsistent with the objectives of the Interim Agreement". But the agreed position in 1974 shifted. On December 3, 1974, Secretary Kissinger said both sides "can add land-based mobiles" under the total but could not add fixed land-based silos. He thought numbers of mobiles could be verified to within 25% to 33%.

No definition was given of what constitutes a "heavy bomber", and this has led to problems over whether the Soviet Backfire bomber, which can reach the U.S. on un-refueled *one-way* missions, is to be covered. Meanwhile, the U.S. has argued that the word "missile" should not include "cruise missile". Backfire and cruise missile have thus become the central unnegotiated issues. (In this same December briefing, Kissinger had said that airborne missiles of range more than 340 miles would be counted as individual missiles though not as MIRVs.)

The agreement also refers to "other categories of weapons that would have the characteristics of strategic weapons". This could mean an air-launched MX missile, perhaps, or some entirely different kinds of weapons.

The Interim Agreement sub-ceiling on heavy missiles (313) was to remain in force. That agreement prevented the upgrading of launchers for "light" ICBM's (or ICBM's of older type) into landbased launchers for modern "heavy" ICBM's. Unfortunately, the negotiators were unable to reach full agreement on what constituted a "heavy" ICBM, and so the U.S. made a formal unilateral declaration interpreting the word by saying that the U.S. would "consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM." It said it would proceed on the premise that the Soviet side would "give due account" to this consideration. However, the SS-19 had a volume 50% greater than the SS-11 which it replaced, and so the unilateral interpretation proved ineffective.

In order to verify the MIRV limits, the U.S. is using the fact that the new MIRVed Soviet missiles (SS-17 and SS-19, which are replacing the SS-11, and the S-18, which is replacing the SS-9) required modification in Soviet silos — modifications which could be observed. It was decided to consider every modified silo to contain a MIRVed missile even though, in principle, a single warhead might be on the missile. Soviet verification was said by Secretary Kissinger to be based on *Aviation Weekly*. □

SOVIET SPOKESMEN WARN OF RISKS OF FAILURES IN ARMS LIMITATION

Academician G. Arbatov, Director of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA, recently published an important speech in *Pravda* (February 5, 1977) criticizing opponents of disarmament and warning of the consequences of a failure to reach agreement. He said:

"... in October, the interim agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. limiting certain types of offensive strategic arms will expire. And if in the next few months there is no new agreement on the 1974 Vladivostok understanding, the arms race may get an additional impetus. The matter is complicated also by the fact that there are systems of mass destruction weapons already on the conveyor belt whose inclusion in an arsenal would make a new spiral of the race, which would not only be expensive but also capable of considerably destabilizing the situation.

Later in the speech, he returned to this theme of possible destabilization and said:

[The Arms Race] can be destabilized by new types

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of weapons which are, as they say, on the conveyor belt — weapons which raise anew the fears of the possibility of the “first (disarming) strike,” and which create great obstacles for the supervision of the existing and future agreements on armaments limitations, undermine mutual trust, sowing suspicion and fear.

This is why the time factor is so important . . .”

It is evident, from these remarks and other signs, that the Soviet Union's present leadership is eager for an agreement. This speech quoted Party Secretary Brezhnev at Tula warning that the risks of agreements must be compared with the risks of no agreement:

“One cannot justify the continuation of the arms race,” said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, by saying that a limitation of arms constitutes a risk to national security. “Today,” he said, “there is much more danger to general security in inaction, in letting the continued arms race get out of hand.”

Speeches and articles of this kind are invariably drafted with both domestic and foreign audiences in mind. But the style gives strong indications of being addressed to an internal Soviet debate. One passage suggests that Arbatov is worried that Soviet specialists might begin to take seriously some American concerns about the efficacy of Soviet civil defense:

“As regards civil defense, it is certainly not a secret weapon in the hands of the Russians. All examples and methods of civil defense have long been known and they do not at all provide a key to victory in nuclear war. If it were otherwise the U.S. military specialists would certainly not start spending billions of dollars on a new military bomber, the Trident program, on new aircraft carriers, but on the construction of underground shelters and provisions.”

This argument — that if something made sense, the Americans would be doing it already — is a typical Soviet formulation tapping a deep and ever-present vein of Russian belief that the West knows how to do things best. (Indeed, scientists in Russia with novel approaches often have difficulty funding their projects because their superiors say: “If that is such a good idea, why isn't America doing it?”) It is striking to see a Soviet spokesman implying, as he does in a paragraph, that General Keegan is wrong in arguing that many more Americans would die in nuclear war than Russians.

This speech reveals a sharp increase in the sophistication of those Soviet analyses that reach the Soviet light of day. Pravda audiences are told that “parity” exists but with “asymmetries” of many kinds which permit “dishonest analysts” to prove whatever they like. An article of Drew Middleton's is critiqued rather well, and a technical analysis of the strategic balance provided. With some of the rhetoric taken off and certain points omitted, parts of it could have been published in the West.

The speech ends by warning against those who “wish to brake and arrest the positive processes started in international relations”; again, as elsewhere in the speech, Arbatov makes no effort to identify which superpower these persons inhabit. The speech leaves little doubt that at least Arbatov's school of thought in the Soviet Union wants agreement, wants detente, and fears what may happen in Soviet internal policies if whatever school of thought opposes it gains the upper hand. □

IN THE LAND OF THE HAWKS

Between the religious crusaders who fear the Godlessness of Communism and the military who warn of Russian strategic power lies the school of thought, sparked by Eastern European emigrants, who seek freedom for their “captive nations.” An effective vehicle for the latter has recently been shaped in an “American Council for World Freedom” (ACWF). Its conference on “The U.S. and the USSR After Detente” was co-sponsored by AFL-CIO Executive Council, American Security Council (a vehicle of retired U.S. military men), the Catholic War Veterans of the U.S.; the Veterans of Foreign Wars; National Captive Nations Committee, Inc.; Young Americans for Freedom; American Legion, and so on.

When invited to participate on the SALT panel — in a conference to be addressed by 19 well-credentialed hawks — FAS Director Stone agreed despite warnings that he was probably designed to be the “sacrificial dove” whose feathers would be ceremoniously plucked. As so often is the case with dark suspicions, this proved entirely unfounded. And the conference provided a useful opportunity to take the temperature of this wing of the right.

Ray Cline, the conference organizer and former Director of the Department of State's Intelligence and Research (INR), proved a jovial moderator who began the numerous attacks on “detente” by wondering why we had to pursue our foreign policy in a foreign language, using a foreign word with so many different implications.

He was followed by the President of the Operative Plasterers' and Cement Masons' Union, who called detente a “hoax” which was giving us “the shaft.” One glimpsed another motivation beneath the heart-felt ideology when Mr. Powers complained about loss of jobs from the Pepsi Cola barter agreement in which Pepsi is sold in the Soviet Union in return for rights to sell vodka here.

Mr. Geoffrey Pattie, M.P., who is the shadow government defense minister in Great Britain, followed with a well-prepared speech warning of Finlandization. He believed the Soviet Union was not readying for war but wanted unchallengeable military might, partly for China, but also to browbeat the West. He wished SALT well but felt that MBFR could not succeed so long as based on proportional reductions that overlooked the Soviet mobilization advantages. Helsinki had been, on balance, of help to the Russians despite the Basket Three advantages for the West on human rights.

ACWF Is Not A Human Rights Group

ACWF is, of course, concerned not with world freedom but with preserving Western freedom and, if possible, freedom for Eastern Europe. It is no human rights group and obviously prefers a bastion of anti-communism to a state that might be free but relatively less reliable.

As a result, the only reference to problems of freedom in such widely tyrannized places as South America, Africa, and Asia was when Mr. Brian Crozier said he preferred to use the phrase Soviet “target area” for “free world” since, as he put it delicately, “some nations were noticeably less free than others” in that area. He felt that World War III had been underway since the end of World War II in a “unilateral war of aggression.” The Bloc had many weaknesses, if only we would start a “counter-offensive”; NATO

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should, however, re-examine its premises so as to be able to deal with the techniques of World War III: blackmail, terrorism, espionage. People did not understand the nature of the threat of subversion and misinformation, and the West might have to consider "restrictions" on its freedoms to cope with the problem.

General Andrew J. Goodpaster, former Commander of SHAPE, observed that detente has always been an "unstable reference point" but had nevertheless been an objective of his command. There it meant reduction of the causes of tension, chief among which were the excessive Soviet offensive forces in Central Europe. (Thus detente meant Soviet reductions.) General Goodpaster supported parity at the MBFR talks, and considered it a test of Soviet intentions. He felt a limit on the reductions they could agree to, however, would be the minimum needed to maintain a preponderance over their Eastern European Allies whose reliability, in war, was uncertain.

Richard Whalen denounced a "semi-hysterical complacency" abroad illustrated by a Zurich gnome who explained to Whalen furtively that he was studying how to run his business after the Russians took over Western Europe. He considered the Soviets such a poor financial risk that if we stopped lending them the interest they would be bankrupt. But, if we kept lending them money: "Once you owe enough, you own the bank." He complained that the Coalition for a Democratic Majority got satisfaction with only three of fifty nominations for jobs, of which one was Schlesinger — in the wrong job.

Stefan Possony attacked detente and warned vaguely of the need for consolidated mobilization methods, warning systems, and instant reaction times which he said it was no secret "didn't exist." Asked later what weapons he had in mind, he said that over the next 20 years or so, new weapons would arise beyond nuclear weapons. Asked if he meant lasers, he said "no, high energy particle beams" and alluded to matter-anti-matter reactions. He was clearly the deepest geopolitical thinker of them all. He told the audience that we have the resources to put the Russians out of business without firing a shot, but we were collaborating in their project to do the opposite to us.

In the question period, one of the audience rose to ask why we could not insist that any plants we build in the Soviet Union should have free trade unions; this, plus land-reform, was the questioner's program for reversing the problems in Russia.

Historians Have a Deeper View

In the afternoon, two historians provided more substantial fare. John Alexander Armstrong of Wisconsin suggested that the problem with Russia was neither extreme ideological fanaticism nor extreme cultural xenophobia. Instead, the average rulers, to survive Stalin, had learned to ignore considerations of humanity. These narrow men, inadequately trained, saw the Leninist ideology as the justification for their careers. Thus they seized opportunistically on every socialist advance (as in Cuba) as a vindication for their posture and would find it impossible, for the same reasons, to stomach any reverses — reverses being inexplicable in the Marxist irresistible advance.

Dr. Lane Hull of the University of Alabama said that

Moscow had worn the cloak of imperialism for the last five hundred years and that, under the ideology, realities remained the same. Like an amoeba, Moscow was absorptive and expansive but not digestive. Even the Ukraine and similar captive entities were not digested.

The Second Day

Marshall Goldman of the Russian Research Center said the Russians were becoming "imperceptibly dependent upon the world economy" and slightly hostage in their need for spare parts. They are being "sucked into civilized behavior", and in a generous aside, Goldman wondered if this was what was intended by detente-backers.

An economist, Miles Costick, said the Soviets had decided to build up their military power through 1985 and that, meanwhile, they would exploit the West for food, etc.

Ernest Lefever of Georgetown University said that, unlike authoritarian regimes, totalitarian regimes could not be moderated. The West was ignoring the appeal of Mesianism to the Third World, failing to recognize the tenacity of purpose of totalitarian systems, and misunderstanding their single-minded readiness to use all instruments to advance their cause.

In the questioning, the Chairman of the Captive Nations Committee, almost beside himself with frustration, asked what *action* could be taken to prevent the destructive U.S. policy of building communism.

SALT Dawns

The SALT panel did not, as I had expected, question the desirability of SALT. The first speaker, William Colby, former CIA Director, gave an eloquent, sensible, and informative defense of arms control. In a wide-ranging and humanist discussion, he warned against emphasis upon destruction of innocent people in deterrence, and upon the kind of loss of liberties that occurred in treatment of U.S. Japanese in World War II. He deplored the obsession with strategic weapons problems when other military and non-military issues were more important. It was possible, he said, to proscribe weapons — as we did with gas in World War II. Arms control could save large sums, as it had in the ABM agreement (\$50 to \$100 billion).

He sketched in rough detail intelligence methods that could make it impossible for the Russians to believe they would get very far in violations; the sure knowledge that our awareness of their violations would awaken this sleeping giant would adequately deter violations. He alluded, at one point, to the possibility of penetrating individual Russian conversations.

John Lehman, the outgoing Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said that after SALT II we should immediately go in for negotiations on reductions of strategic weapons. He said there had been no wild "surge" buildup recently in Soviet forces, as the press suggested, but just a steady progress.

William Schneider, now of Hudson Institute but formerly with Senator Buckley, was the most cautious about SALT but emphasized that the new strategic weapons programs on line — Trident, B-1, etc. — could help pressure the Russians into a suitable agreement.

The last speaker in the Conference, your own FAS

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Director — realizing that the panel was considerably to the left of the sentiments of the audience — raised and answered the view that SALT was a snare and a delusion if one assumed the Soviets were single-mindedly seeking strategic superiority.

Conclusion

There is little or no right-wing opposition to SALT and/or the ABM agreement. The approach taken by this school of thought toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is to apply relentless pressure: not to sell wheat; not to export jobs; not to lend funds. But the hopes that the Soviet regime will be toppled are obviously absent and there is no indication given of how the Manichean struggle would terminate. In short, the opposition to "detente" is an effort to beat something with nothing. And it is this absence of any policy which has left the ranks of this school rather thin. □

SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY ADVANCES

1984 may not be here but it is getting closer. The Senate Judiciary Committee has released 1200 pages of documents outlining that future.

To frustrate efforts to photograph documents through windows, venetian blinds are handy. The closing of curtains will prevent laser beams from picking up the slight vibrations of window panes that would otherwise permit a reading of your conversation.

But what do you do about microwave respiration monitors that can, from as far away as half a mile, monitor the variations in the movement of a person's solar plexus to determine whether the person is telling the truth? Perhaps a pillow under the belt.

Dark glasses may or many not work against a lie detector that works by monitoring the minute momentary changes in the pupil, retina, and focus of the human eye.

For those who reassure themselves that the tidal wave of modern communications makes selective wiretapping impossible, consider electronic scanners that can sort through written transmissions. And couple these to so-

phisticated scanners that will signal when key words on tape recordings are found, thereby reducing enormously the cost of bugging. As for selecting out your particular phone, consider the microwave interceptor that can target specific phone calls.

It is all coming, or so suggests the Judiciary Committee, unless a surveillance technology industry is brought under control through the Federal Government articulation of a coherent national policy on surveillance technology and development of new institutional mechanisms.

One has to admire George Orwell's predictive capacity. The study even mentions the passive surveillance of an individual's preference in TV programs — just like the monitored requirement in "1984" that individuals watch Big Brother on TV. Voice stress analyzers no larger than a book are available now at a relatively low price; the report wonders what will happen when they are made in sizes as small as a wristwatch. (This is yet a new reason for terminating conversation when your partner looks at his watch.)

In fact, however, this report suggests that a heavy burden is about to be placed on man's wrist. It suggests, in addition, such wrist sets as: Personal Communication Wrist Radio; Emergency Rescue Wrist Beacons; Personal Navigation Wrist Set; and Voting/Polling Wrist Set. Talk about tennis elbow!

Legal problems abound. We are having enough trouble with wiretapping; what should be done about its visual counterpart, the televised intrusion?

The problem is what to do, and here the report is pessimistic about achieving its objective. It concludes:

"The conditions surrounding Federal involvement and the characteristics of contemporary surveillance technology strongly suggest that these objectives are possibly elusive and perplexing.

"The findings . . . present strong evidence for circumscribing the use of surveillance technology, limiting its authorization, providing greater coherence and standardization of use, and insuring adequate and extensive controls and oversight."

The 13 different specific suggestions were also somewhat vague and did not deal with specific technologies. Apparently no one really knows whether to laugh or cry. □

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