

F. A. S. NEWSLETTER

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS—Founded 1946—
A national organization of natural and social scientists and
engineers concerned with problems of science and society.

Vol. 24, No. 3
March, 1971

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AMERICA AND THE USE OF FORCE

The Federation of American Scientists is a quarter century old this month. Twenty-five years ago, its founding members were startled into political activity by the moral and social problems posed by nuclear weapons. American military technology, and American willingness to use that technology on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, produced FAS. Again today in Vietnam, American technology, and its willingness to use that technology in war, are posing important moral and social problems.

In recent weeks, a wealth of new material has appeared bearing on three relevant science and society questions. Is America committing war-crimes in Vietnam with a weapons technology that is necessarily indiscriminate in its destructive capacity? Can the civilian leadership of industrial-bureaucratic states be trusted with the use of such force as science can provide? Is the military establishment a threat to American society?

WAR CRIMES IN VIETNAM?

"If certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked against us."

**Justice Robert Jackson
Chief U.S. Prosecutor at Nuremberg**

No one has a better right to raise the question of American war crimes in Vietnam than General Telford Taylor, the American Chief Counsel at the post-war Nuremberg war-crimes trials. His book "Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy" raises questions that no American can lightly dismiss.* Taylor concedes that a judicial determination of the legality of American participation in the war would present "enormous difficulties" to any court and especially to a domestic court. But he has acknowledged that General Westmoreland "might" be convicted if world war II war crime standards were applied. Every citizen should read this book and judge for himself whether he could consider American military tactics to be war crimes if, for example, they were pursued by some other country.

Both sides engaged in strategic bombing of cities in World War II and as a result this issue was not raised at Nuremberg. But in Vietnam, it appears that hamlets and villages have been bombed or shelled simply because a shot was fired from them at Allied aircraft or a mine found nearby. Taylor points out that a U.S. Marine Corp leaflet declared "The U.S. marines will

not hesitate to destroy immediately any village or hamlet harboring the Vietcong". Reprisals of this kind are certainly not permissible. When the Germans shot French hostages for the loss of German soldiers to nearby ambushes, we did consider it criminal.

Taylor points to the "free-fire" (artillery) or "free-strike" (air) zones. Here mass evacuations precede ground rules that permit firing at anything that moves.

But these evacuations are inevitably incomplete, in the conditions prevailing in South Vietnam, considering the degree of control of Saigon and the degree of literacy, and responsiveness to Government, of the population. Americans have turned prisoners of war over to South Vietnamese where torture is frequent. It is a violation of Article 12 of the Geneva Convention to turn prisoners over to powers that are not observing the requirements of the Convention.

Taylor's book is going to pose a problem for the Administration. It triggers the sensibilities of the young and forces the Administration to come to grips with those emerging moral attitudes that refuse to suppress an awareness of what it is we are doing. As the Administration concedes that the war should be terminated promptly the public will wonder at the pointlessness of U.S. military actions. And in a cooler atmosphere, serious retrospective questions will be raised. No involved public official can now ignore the possibility that he is implicated in some way in war crimes.

Specific evidence of alleged war crimes is also available now through the investigations of the National Committee for a Citizens Commission of Inquiry on U.S. War Crimes in Vietnam. Hearings at which veterans have testified have occurred in 13 cities during the last year. Testimony has focused on four separate areas:

- (1) Ground combat operations (search and destroy, free-fire zones, "Zippo squads", etc.)
- (2) Treatment of civilians and/or prisoners by U.S. forces (interrogation and torture, detention centers, civilian prisons, etc.)
- (3) The air war (saturation and pattern bombing of civilian centers use of cluster bomb units, napalm, white phosphorous, helicopter gun ships, defoliation program, general destruction of croplands, forests, rivers/watershed, etc.)
- (4) Pacification and resettlement of civilian population/refugees (destruction of "New Life" hamlets, barbed-wire concentration camps, civilian prisons similar to Con Son).

*Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy, Telford Taylor, New York Times book, \$1.95

This evidence seems unmistakable. The soldiers give their names and units and specific locations at which the atrocities took place often naming specific officers involved in the atrocities, up to and including generals. Their stories are of a piece with news reports for the last several years indicating widespread disregard of American soldiers for distinctions between civilians and enemy soldiers. And the specific reports have the compelling ring of a truth that is too real to be fiction. Vietnamese women and child mingling with G.I.s who have just landed without resistance on a beachhead are suddenly slaughtered in a few minutes of pandemonium provoked by an unexplained burst of gunfire. The officer adds their names to the body count and calls them all "gooks". Radar technicians testify that they were zeroing in artillery at anything that moved at night. Torture with electrical devices, clubbing, pistol whipping, cutting and mutilation are described and sometimes shown with color slides.

A direct order is reported to an information specialist, by the Chief of Staff of the 25th infantry division, to withhold all war crimes information from U.S. reporters. There is murder of enemy troops trying to surrender. There are forced marches of civilians to resettlement areas, leading to deaths by starvation and exhaustion. It is reported to have become standard operating procedure to destroy villages after search and destroy operations, and to kill domestic animals. Buses bearing only civilians have been shelled for no reason.

Not all, but many, of these alleged crimes, arise from the effect of high technology weapons, artillery, bombardment from airplanes, napalm, and so on, or from the effort to clear areas so that this technology can be used with minimized effects. A new problem has arisen from the use of listening devices to trigger bombardment. The recently released "Investigation into Electronic Battlefield Program" reveals that the United States is going to spend about \$200 million annually for sensors. (pg. 37). Many of the devices in this program are simply laid around camps or air dropped in remote areas. When they pick up sound, allied forces fire in the direction of the sensor. (see box this page). The likelihood that these sensors would be consistently used with discrimination seems small. Quite the opposite. Whenever they sound the alarm, it is presumed that the enemy is out there.

CAN THE WAR BE FOUGHT HUMANELY?

The basic issue that arises when we consider the application of the laws of war to the situation in Vietnam is the recognition that our military capabilities are not suited to the political and military mission that they have been assigned. Furthermore, the efforts to fulfill that mission almost inevitably involve the systematic and massive reliance on battlefield tactics that not only are violations of the laws of war, but constitute what the United States itself regarded as acts of barbarism when they were performed by other governments.

Richard A. Falk

Milbank Professor International Law and Practice, Princeton University, Chairman, FAS Committee on International Law (War Crimes and the American Conscience, Knoll McFadden, pg. 5).

Asked if they had had much trouble with false alarms, a Major Hudson testified that the interpretation people had "stricken" that word from the vocabulary—"non-targetable activation" had replaced it. Unfortunately this is no joke. The capacity of the military bureaucracy to bemuse itself is very much at issue in the question of war crimes.

CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP AND THE USE OF FORCE

If war crimes are being committed in Vietnam, why are they not stopped? And if the war can only be fought by uprooting large populations, by use of free-fire zones, by indiscriminate firing and shelling, by acquiescing in torture, if not in conducting it ourselves, and by firing whenever sensors hear noises, why are we continuing to pursue the war—a war so little connected with concrete American interests?

Certainly, the explanation does not lie in the shifting rationalizations of ideology, rationalizations so evidently fitted to the market the public will buy. It is a close analysis of the public temper—not an analysis of the threat—that permits the politician to determine whether his slogan will be: 1) keep

DO COMMANDERS IN DOUBT HOLD FIRE?

Mr. Gilleas. There is a lot of interest in the ability of sensors to discriminate between enemy forces and friendly civilians. . . The question is, how do we prevent sensors from killing innocent people versus enemy troops?

General Deane. . . The sensors might give you an indication if over an acoustic sensor you heard voices and determined from the conversation that they were enemy, that is the only way I would know you would be able to tell. Now, when you get into that kind of a problem, you have to bring your knowledge of where your friendly forces are, where it is likely friendly people are civilian and use your best judgment.

I think the commanders that I have known, if they had doubts they would not fire.

Pg. 33, Hearings before the Electronic Battlefield Subcommittee of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Armed Services, November 1970.

September is the heavy rainy season in this part of South Vietnam and our monitors at French Fort had trouble differentiating between rain falling on the sensors and human movement. We had several false alarms before the operators attained a good feel for reading the monitor.

In the third week of September our efforts with sensors finally paid off. At 11 o'clock one night, the monitor at French Fort indicated movement being reported by two of our sensors. It was raining rather hard but there was no doubt about the reading—something more than rain was registered on the Portatale monitor. Two of the 175 mm guns opened up . . . pg. 45-46 Ibid.

SHOULD MILITARY COURTS JUDGE MILITARY WAR CRIMES?

These eye-witness accounts make it painfully clear that what happened at My Lai was not an isolated aberration. Instead, My Lai and other atrocities became the inevitable consequence of tactical field policies: the free fire zone, search and destroy, the body count measure of success, the forced removal of civilian populations.

President Nixon's decision to allow only the military to deal with war crimes and war crime responsibility has led to the situation that confronts us today—the military establishment willingly will not do anything about these horrors.

Congressman Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif) commenting on the December, 1970 hearings of the Commission on Inquiry which he placed in the Congressional Record E714-E721/, February 11, 1971.

them off the beaches of California; 2) prevent communist expansion in Southeast Asia; 3) help a brave free people in South Vietnam.

The real question is how the civilian leadership reaches its decisions. And the most important new contribution to this problem lies in George E. Reedy's "The Twilight of the Presidency". According to Reedy, the sycophantic court-like atmosphere of the White House puts no limitations on a President's conduct other than his own "character and personality". Hence it provides a "stage upon which all of his personality traits are magnified and accentuated". Living without peers, universally deferred to, pampered, and with his every mood reinforced by courtiers, a president may eventually lose his psychological balance. If he does, Reedy believes this fact will be hidden also until the President literally foams at the mouth. Remarking on a variety of political bloopers that presidents have made in the past, Reedy argues that shrewd politicians lost their political judgment through social imprisonment in an American court.

If Reedy is right, still more extreme court-like situations should have produced exaggerated symptoms of the same disease. In both the Soviet Union and in Nazi Germany, we have recent evidence that this seems to have been the case. Albert Speer, armaments minister in the Third Reich, begins one chapter of "Inside the Third Reich" explaining:

There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favor is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. (pg. 83)*

Invariably, the leaders are lonely. John F. Kennedy used to complain of the difficulty of keeping friends in the White

House. Hitler told Speer, "one of these days, I'll have only two friends left, Fraulein Braun and my dog." (pg. 302) And Stalin wandered out onto a balcony and mumbled to himself "I'm finished, I trust no one, not even myself". (pg. 309) These are three quite different degrees of social isolation—but they all reflect the dilemma of the King.*

Reedy writes that "A White House assistant lives a life of anxiety. There is no fixed point in his daily routine, other than the occasional smile of approbation or nod of approval that comes from the President." (pg. 94). Commenting on a friendly word from Hitler, Speer notes that "all the intrigues and struggles for power were directed toward eliciting such a word, or what it stood for. The position of each and every one of us was dependent on his attitude." (pg. 317).

The most extreme version of the phenomena of trying to stay in Court is reflected in the story of Molotov and Mikoyan trying, as Khrushchev put it "to stay alive" by desperately, inviting themselves to Kremlin movies when Stalin no longer wanted them around. (pg. 310)

Reedy writes there is no such thing as adversary discussion in a cabinet meeting . . . What follows is a gentlemanly discourse conducted on an extremely "high" level . . . Chief executives are human and prefer "discussions" which are never sharper than suggestions on how to improve the tactics of an already determined course of action. . . senators do *not* play the role of adversary in the presence of the chief executive. (pg. 77-80)

Extreme versions of this phenomena show Hitler and Stalin being deflected from courses only when they heard silence rather than the usual chorus of approval. In the fall of 1944, Hitler suggested the use of gas. "When no one at the situation conference spoke up in agreement, Hitler did not return to the subject". (pg. 414) A companion story, told in Moscow, has Stalin advising the politburo that it had been suggested that Moscow be renamed for him. The ensuing silence led him to drop the subject.

Reedy writes: "Inevitably, in a battle between courtiers and advisers the courtiers will win out" (pg. 98). Khrushchev writes: "Beria was extremely powerful because of his closeness to Stalin. You'd have to have seen Beria's Jesuitical shrewdness in action to imagine how he was able to pick the exact moment when he could turn Stalin's goodwill or ill will for someone to his advantage." (pg. 251)

Reedy writes: ". . . it is clear to me that where Presidents are concerned, the tolerance level for irrationality extends almost to the point of gibbering idiocy or delusions of identity." (pg. 168) By July 1944, Hitler had revised his views on the 1937 Moscow trials and "could no longer exclude" the quite insane possibility of treasonous collaboration between the Russian and the German general staffs (pg. 390). Khrushchev comments on a story Stalin told: "Of course he was lying. None of us had any doubt about that" (pg. 303). President Johnson was widely said to have told assistants stories nobody believed.

These court-like atmospheres are, and have long been, part and parcel of the process of governing many Western societies;

*At one point Stalin made hostile remarks about Beria to Khrushchev. Although Khrushchev suspected that Stalin wanted to get rid of Beria, he noted that he "had to watch my step" because Stalin might trick him into agreeing and then use it against him. (pg. 101) Here is the ultimate in leader-isolation when subordinates are afraid even to agree with the leader and to conspire with him.

*Page references refer to whichever of the following three books is indicated by the context: Twilight of the Presidency, World Publishing Company 1970; Inside the Third Reich, Macmillan 1970; and Khrushchev Remembers, Macmillan, 1970.

CORPORATE WAR CRIMINALS?

If — as seems to me possible — some of the reported uses of napalm in Vietnam fit the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly as this weapon affected civilian populations, it would seem that a case might be made for holding the manufacturer of this weapon responsible as “an accessory” or as a consenting partner, or surely as an agency “connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission” or as “a member of an organization or group connected with the commission of any such crime.”

George Wald
Harvard Nobel Laureate in Biology

CRIMES AGAINST ENVIRONMENT?

“After the end of World War II, and as a result of the Nuremberg trials, we justly condemned the willful destruction of an entire people and its culture, calling this crime against humanity genocide. It seems to me that the willful and permanent destruction of environment in which a people can live in a manner of their own choosing ought similarly to be considered as a crime against humanity, to be designated by the term ecocide.”

Arthur W. Galston
Yale University Biologist
FAS Council Member

they help provide the status that induces in the population a suggestibility to royal commands. As Harold Lasswell has pointed out, the authority of position can substitute for the authority of personality. Strong leaders can afford strong men around them, and strong arguments put to them. They can risk a diminution in the court-aura. But weak leaders need the psychological protection of the court.

It is not long ago, in sociological time, since suggestions were made that George Washington should be king. In a recent Florida speech, Senator Fulbright noted that in contrast to popular attitudes toward Congress, “words of irreverence for the Presidency are severely frowned upon, like cutting up in church,” and he noted “atavistic longings for a king who can ‘do no wrong.’” In Russia, the population invariably blamed disasters on the scheming ministers of the Tsar but not upon the Tsar himself. The Tsar was a “Father” that could not and would not, make mistakes. Despite the Khrushchevian denunciation, large segments of the Soviet Union continue to voice this view in excusing Stalin. In Nazi Germany, Speer reports a psychological crisis among Hitler’s aides when, as he put it, in “violation of the court tone,” Guderian sharply opposed Hitler in a conference. The “open quarrel” was a “palpable novelty.” (pg. 421)

A reading of the Reedy, Speer and Khrushchev books unmistakably suggest the same general phenomena at work in all three countries, albeit in quite different degrees. In placating the King, energetically serving him, and never arguing with him, the leader’s aides serve him badly and give him too free rein. And by isolating the leader in his command post, he is permitted to lose touch. Speer says: “The fact that we regarded minimal differences as so important merely shows in how closed a world we all moved.” Today in the White House, an undefined Nixon Doctrine for Asia hints that we can somehow intervene less often while maintaining the same commitments—these hints are considered a major effort to address the problem of disentangling ourselves from Asia. Seventy-three percent of the population want to put a time limit on the war according to the Gallup poll, and the White House still considers it unthinkable. The White House unmistakably moves in a closed world.

Hard to Raise the Issue

In the case of war crimes, the difficulty of having the issue raised in the White House is evident. No courtier, and no

adviser, is going to raise this issue sharply—indeed it would have national political repercussions if it became known that he had.

Nevertheless, it must be raised. Speer became a war criminal, in his own mind, when a friend of his hinted of terrible things in Auschwitz, and he made no attempt to find out the truth. Once the issue of war crimes is raised in official circles, then—and only then—will it be given serious attention. Telford Taylor has made this possibility an issue in the public mind. It remains to make it an issue in the more isolated confines of the White House. Whatever the United States is, or is not, doing in Vietnam, history should record that after several years of war, official Washington had the strength to examine self-critically the morality of its effort to prevail in Vietnam.

THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Discussions of America and the use of force normally focus on the military industrial complex, not upon America itself. The Pentagon, rather than the White House, is the focus of concern. This is the point of view of two important new books on this subject. The first “The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society” by Adam Yarmolinsky is an excellent and comprehensive study of twenty aspects of military influence on American life.

Chapters deal with the size and scope of the military establishment, its use of troops in domestic disorders, its public relations network, its spending, its system of justice, and so on. As the book states, these chapters describe a phenomenon “both quantitatively and qualitatively new” in American history.

The book is not, as Cyrus Vance points out in a blurb, “anti-military” but it is “anti-military-establishment” in its expressions of alarm at the size of the Defense Department and the unrestrained power of the military to secure financing.

But while the tone suggests that the military establishment is the villain, the conclusions often point instead to American society and its Governmental structure. Was it the strength of DOD, or the weakness of the State Department, that permitted the former to have 50% more representatives at overseas missions than the latter? Whose fault was it that Presidents were “aware of the military establishment’s prestige with Congress and the public” and hence paid “unusual deference” to military opinion.

Apropos of military influence on foreign policy, one chapter concludes that the major danger arises when "civilians adopted military ways of thinking about political problems". Even the chapter on the Pentagon's handling of news concludes that "To a considerable extent, the public gets the information it wants to hear".

Military efforts to indoctrinate the public with anti-communist notions became possible only when the body politic decided that "anti-communism" was not a political issue—hence was an issue upon which military expressions of view were permissible. The ambivalence of many Americans about defense spending and the jobs it provides is well known, and well documented in this book.

The long-standing habit of the Defense Department of paying for weapons systems two to three times original cost estimates is so well documented that an observer is entitled to argue that few in Congress really care. Indeed, the military has been civilianized to the point where one chapter concludes that, for better or worse, we are all "civilians in a quasi-military, quasi-civilian society."

This book reveals no evidence that the defense department ever got the country into trouble without decisive help from civilians outside the Defense Department, or on top of it. The kinds of problems that other countries have with their military men we seem to have had, instead, with our CIA. It was the CIA whose U-2 flight scuttled the Paris summit conference. And it was the CIA's disastrous plan to invade Cuba to which Kennedy finally acceded without much enthusiasm. It has been the CIA's operators abroad, not those of the Defense Department, who have had the means and occasion to influence American foreign policy on their own.

Have they done so? This book credits the problems caused by CIA to the "inherent limitations" of covert instruments of policy and points out that CIA activities are supervised by an undersecretary level interdepartmental committee.

So where are we? There are no scapegoats to be found. America let the military establishment grow like topsy and now it does not know what to do about it, or even how it happened. In particular no consensus has yet formed to spend the funds which we are only beginning to be able to cut out of DOD's budget.

Adam Yarmolinsky's book documents the warnings of President Eisenhower and does it more effectively perhaps than any book before it. But the point of view it reflects is associated with no cure. Only a comparably incisive analysis of American society, aspirations, and role can suggest a solution.

How Much is Enough?

By contrast to the Yarmolinsky book, "How Much is Enough?" surveys the Defense Department from the point of view of internecine struggle. Written by the first Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, Alain C. Enthoven, and his special assistant, K. Wayne Smith, it provides a clearly written and definitive insight into critical aspects of Defense Department life: McNamara's struggle to gain control of DOD, how systems analysis works, and the limits of military expertise.

The examples provided of systems analysis should make the process clear to the least mathematically inclined reader. And the authors show no bias whatsoever in nicely delineating the achievements and failures of their craft. Indirectly, and the

more persuasively for being indirect, the book provides a defense of Secretary McNamara's point of view, if a tentative retreat from part of it.

The McNamara instructions were to "develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings" and "to procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost". Unfortunately the notion of "military requirements" is highly undefined. Experienced observers, i.e. observers who have adopted the standard universe of discourse in which these matters are discussed, still disagree about America's needs by as much as 50 billion a year, or more than half the defense budget. Outside observers have still wider differences.

Is There a Solution?

Requirements could be stipulated, e.g. 2-1/2 wars or 1-1/2 wars simultaneously and these could in principle be developed at length, if somewhat randomly, in view of the manifold contingencies. In fact, the requirements would be generated by political-military pressures arising especially from service traditions, the status quo, and, as this book notes, the tendency of the national security community to "accept its own assumptions, almost all of which have a pro-defense bias".

But even if requirements were established, the effectiveness of the weapons to be bought would be under great dispute as participants jockeyed to influence the numbers of weapons in the budget. One of the greatest differences between McNamara and the Generals was that one side emphasized effectiveness and the other had a bias toward high numbers of "glamorous" weapons resulting, the authors claim, in a bias toward a "hollow shell" of military capability.

In the final analysis, the authors feel that:

The problem was that the Services could and did flood OSD with proposals for more of everything, and the Secretary of Defense and his staff could not possibly do justice to them all. . . . And since the analysis of complex defense issues is almost never clear-cut and provable one way or the other, this meant that the pressure on the Secretary for continuous budget increases was very great.

In their answer, they suggest moving back toward—if not to—the ways of Charlie Wilson and budget ceilings. After calling for more help from Congress and the public, they say:

Part [of the answer] lies in moving the Department toward the middle ground between the positions that (1) the Services should ask for anything they think is needed, and (2) the Services should be given a financial total and be left free to spend it as they see fit. We have explained at length what is wrong with the latter position. Perhaps it is combat fatigue from serving so many years on that particular firing line, but it seems to us that the general climate outside the Department and the anticellings rhetoric caused the Department to spend so much time near the former.

Both the Yarmolinsky book and the Enthoven book show that America's problems are organically connected with one another. The age of military scapegoats is past.

Jeremy J. Stone

BITING THE NUCLEAR APPLE: COUNTERFORCE AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Administration may be moving toward a counterforce policy of maintaining the capability to strike at Soviet land-based missiles—much as the Administration charges that the Soviets are building a capability to put U.S. Minuteman missiles out of action if war occurs. In the State of the World Message of last February, the President asked: "Should a President in the event of a nuclear attack be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans?"

In a Stanford University speech of February 10 Council Member Sidney Drell called attention to this remark and noted that the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General John D. Ryan, had made a related statement on September 22, 1970. General Ryan had praised the new Minuteman III multiple warheaded missile as the "best means of destroying time urgent targets like the long range weapons of the enemy". In the same speech, he argued for multiple warheads as a way of attacking "... the remaining strategic weapons which the enemy would no doubt hold in reserve".

A more detailed defense of this counterforce policy was made by Dr. Michael May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Orbis (summer, 1970). Dr. May argued for ABM, as well as multiple warheads, to preserve the capability for "achieving military victory or at least for preventing military defeat".

Drell pointed out that the President's national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, had attacked just such counterforce policies in 1962 in his book "The Necessity for Choice". Kissinger had said that a "counterforce strategy designed to win a victory *after* we concede the first blow is an illusion". He had argued that efforts to develop such a capability would impose "staggering force requirements", would lead to a "spiraling arms race" and might "provoke a pre-emptive attack".

In fact whether the United States attacks Soviet weapons or Soviet cities, in an initial or in a retaliatory attack, only a fool would anticipate as a result, less than total unrestrained nuclear war. Nevertheless, these distinctions seem likely to be used to justify, in retrospect, the thousands of multiple

warheads with high accuracy that we seem likely to deploy in the seventies.

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

There has been a spate of concern about tactical nuclear weapons. In November, and twice in January, C.L. Sulzberger wrote in the New York Times columns in support of a European tactical nuclear strategy. He argued for, and hinted at, the development of "truly tactical nuclear weapons" of small yield and little radioactivity. He argued against the prevailing custodial procedures for controlling nuclear weapons as "too complex". And he urged that "freer dissemination" of information about these weapons would encourage our Nato allies to accept this strategy.

FAS Chairman Herbert F. York and Council Member Herbert Scoville, Jr. wrote to the Times at length in a letter appearing on February 16. Asserting that there was "no easy firebreak" once nuclear weapons have been used, they thought it better to "strengthen further" the Presidential control over nuclear weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons would be expensive and would produce high collateral damage through radiation.

With regard to a related problem, the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam, President Nixon told a recent press conference that "of course" nuclear weapons would not be used in Vietnam. But the United States has never adopted a "No First Use" policy toward nuclear weapons, as has the People's Republic of China. In the absence of a formal declaration of this kind, some concern will persist, especially in connection with the Asia Doctrine of somehow maintaining our commitments with reduced forces.

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March, 1971, Vol. 24, No. 3

FAS NEWSLETTER; 203 C St., N.E.; Washington, D.C. 20002
(202) 546-3300

Published monthly except during July, August and September by the Federation of American Scientists. FAS is a national organization of natural and social scientists, engineers and non-scientists concerned with issues of science and society.

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