

# F. A. S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Formerly the FAS Newsletter

THIS ISSUE:

TEST BAN; DNA POLL RESULTS

Vol. 29, No. 6

June, 1976

## TEST BAN: PRESUPPOSITIONS OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION

For the last few decades, there has been no desire more heartfelt than that of arms controllers for arms control negotiations. In fact, the struggle to secure these talks has forced into the background the question of what would happen once the talks began.

But the last two efforts, in Vladivostok on offensive weapon numbers, and in Moscow on nuclear weapons explosions above a certain threshold, have forced the arms control community to confront the reality of current negotiations.

A review of the negotiations over the last two decades reveals these conclusions. First, the only important treaties that came into being did so through widespread public political support. The Test Ban Treaty occurred only after the public became persuaded that atmospheric testing was hazardous to its health. The SALT I Agreement prohibiting anti-ballistic missile defenses was secured only after the ABM had become a hot domestic political issue — bitterly opposed on quite unilateral bases: expensive, unlikely to work, and an arms race stimulant.

Indeed, the actions prohibited by both these treaties were close to being prohibited unilaterally in America. Atmospheric testing might have had to be stopped in America without a treaty. And, as far as the ABM is concerned, the last of its five rationales was, significantly, "Give us the ABM so we can use it as a bargaining chip in negotiating a ban on ABM's with the Russians." Even so, it was only approved in the Senate on a tie vote!

By contrast, recent experience with those arms

negotiations that were unsupported by major public pressure has been disappointing. The Vladivostok Agreement limited missile numbers to those that were already programmed — numbers which were not likely to be significantly exceeded in any case. In effect, the treaty only signaled an already impending shift from a numerical race to a qualitative race. And its qualitative limits were few and disappointing.

The Moscow effort to limit underground tests, undertaken in the twilight of President Nixon's tenure, produced a treaty so weak as to be largely counterproductive. It was an effort to skim the public relations cream off a long-standing issue in order to achieve a painless press triumph. (See FAS statement, p. 3).

This experience gives the lie to a hope which arms controllers have long entertained: that an alliance between superpower doves might achieve, through a coordinated halt, arms restraints which could not be secured on a unilateral basis. Instead, it looks now as if such a dovish alliance can only be achieved once America has decided that the restraints were warranted on a unilateral basis.

In turn, this suggests a review of the desirability of achieving arms restraint through the negotiating process. Is it easier to sustain the argument that certain spending is wasteful or to negotiate an agreement with the Russians that neither will engage in such waste?

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—Reviewed and Approved by the  
FAS National Council

## MOVING TOWARD A UNILATERAL HALT

In 1972, eight FAS arms specialists specifically endorsed the Council's call for a complete Test Ban without on-site inspection. When asked, in light of the Threshold Test Ban's inadequacies, whether the FAS Council ought not now move toward calling for a unilateral halt in testing, seven who responded of the eight agreed.

Obviously, there are many ways in which this halt could be achieved. FAS has not tried, at this stage, to secure a consensus on any one. For some, the unilateral halt should be quite unrelated to Soviet actions. For others, it might be unilateral but reviewable at some specified or unspecified future year. For still others, it might be contingent upon Soviet agreement by some date.

In any case, apart from the desirable political signal a halt would issue, continued nuclear testing can only lead to cheaper bombs. And if some dramatic new method of building such bombs were discovered here, the general

fact of its discovery — which is really the only hint others need — would quickly spread. Thus the only important result of continued testing is bound to be threatening to our security. We have already invested in more than 20,000 bombs and we have the wealth to be able to buy expensive bombs. Why make them cheap for others? It is as if the strongest man in a Western frontier town were trying to lower the price of that great equalizer, the Colt revolver.

The last refuge of testing proponents is always the health of the weapons laboratories. Testing, it is argued, is the only way to maintain readiness for future testing. But it is impossible to believe that national policy should be estopped by the bureaucratic problems of maintaining a laboratory. And there will never be any hurry in returning to nuclear testing anyway; so heavily armed are we already that there will not even be a critical rush to *buying* new weapons, much less to *testing* new ones. □

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As an analogy, imagine two alcoholics who decide to reduce their addiction by agreeing that neither will consume more alcohol than the other. Such an agreement is an invitation to charges of violation by each party. It also invites tacit or open agreements to arrive at higher, rather than lower, limits. And if each party favors different kinds of alcoholic beverages, the technical details of who has, in fact, consumed more alcohol can produce further pressures for consumption. Should the spouses of such alcoholics encourage or condemn such cooperative efforts? This approximates the problem.

It is tempting to conclude that U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations are usually going to succeed only when they turn their attention to projects so discredited by public opposition that they could as easily, indeed more easily, be stopped unilaterally.

We are beginning to see the tendrils of grass roots support now for this approach. And in no area does it deserve more support than in the area of nuclear testing. The halt to underground nuclear tests has long been unfinished business. These tests are quite unnecessary for a nation with more than 20,000 warheads. And their continuance erodes our ability to take a strong line in non-proliferation proceedings. Even if one prefers to halt testing in America simultaneously with a halt to testing in the Soviet Union, the recent announcement of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty makes it crystal clear that no such agreement is likely until there is widespread public opposition to testing here.

#### Moratorium Proposed

In 1972, we called for a complete test ban and observed that on-site inspection was not necessary. The Nixon Administration vented the decade-old pressure for such a complete test ban by seeking the high threshold test ban; the Ford Administration has continued along this path. Thus our hopes for ending nuclear tests have now diminished sharply.

With this experience in mind, and in this context, we have come to believe that we should simply call for a unilateral halt in American nuclear testing.

We understand very well that the times are not propitious for such a proposal. Many politicians believe that an air of hawkishness is abroad in the country that discourages innovation or leadership in national security policy. Election years encourage this kind of jingoism. And we well know with what delighted alacrity the national security primitives will characterize any proposal that we have had enough nuclear tests as "unilateral disarmament" of some ominous kind.

But in these and a number of other related areas in the strategic arms race, we believe that the "emperor-wears-no-clothes" analogy has force. The public has been ahead of the Congress and the Executive Branch in recognizing the distortion of common sense represented by our bloated strategic armory. In any case, someone has to tell the truth. And the truth is that the tests are unnecessary and that this would be a good time to stop them. □

## NUCLEAR REACTOR POLL RESULTS

Although FAS's poll on nuclear power was reported in Science Magazine and elsewhere, a member has observed that our press release was not yet covered in our own Report. We regret the delay which resulted from oversight. The results were as follows:

- 1) RAPID ADVANCE 16%    3) MORATORIUM 36%  
2) GO SLOW 21%    4) PHASE OUT 26%

Thus those opposed to nuclear power outnumbered those in favor by a decisive 62% to 38%. Approximately 700 members returned the ballots or 10% of FAS. Our press release on the subject broke down our interdisciplinary membership as follows: Physics, 20%; Medical Sciences, 16%; Chemists, 15%; Biologists, 15%; Psychology, 7% and Engineering, 7% with other disciplines smaller. □

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The Federation of American Scientists is a unique, non-profit, civic organization, licensed to lobby in the public interest, and composed of 7,000 natural and social scientists and engineers who are concerned with problems of science and society. Democratically organized with an elected National Council of 26 members, FAS was first organized in 1946 as the Federation of Atomic Scientists and has functioned as a conscience of the scientific community for more than a quarter century.

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- Myron E. Wegman (Medicine)

\*Nobel Laureates

The FAS Public Interest Report is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$20/year. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

## FAS OPPOSES THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

*The September, 1974 FAS Report was devoted to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty (Threshold Test Ban Treaty); it rejected the treaty in a lead editorial. Noting that the agreement required supplemental negotiations on so-called peaceful nuclear explosions in any case, FAS urged that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty itself be renegotiated. This has not occurred. Consequently, and after a further review, FAS continued its opposition to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty with its supplemental treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions.*

*The most enthusiastic backers of this treaty combination consider it only slightly better than nothing. In order to maintain even this quite limited enthusiasm, they are forced to argue that the treaty will not so vent the political pressure for test ban progress as to substantially reduce the prospects for a more meaningful agreement. In addition to the standard political reasons for fearing that the passage of the treaty will remove the test ban from the pressing political agenda of the next President, there are technical reasons for fearing that this treaty makes further progress more difficult. In the view of some FAS officials, the "slightly better than nothing" advocates are engaged in a form of wishful thinking encouraged by a natural reluctance to oppose an initialed treaty.*

### FAS Statement — April 14, 1976

The proposed Threshold Test Ban Treaty is worse than nothing. It arose out of Watergate politics and will serve our country ill. We continue to believe it should be revised.

In the first place, it directly reneges on U.S. declaratory policy of more than a decade which repeatedly emphasized that the only problem in the way of a Test Ban Agreement was verification. The clear implication of this position was that any threshold agreement would be reached at a threshold level no higher than the capabilities of national verification demanded.

This level is now somewhere around 10 kilotons or less — not the proposed 150 kilotons. In the context of verification there is no justification whatsoever for a level as high as 150 kilotons; quite the contrary, this level has been set by military considerations. Neither military establishment needs to test larger explosions. And we, at least, are unwilling to give up the right to test below this 150 kiloton level.

In itself, this situation does not make the Treaty worse than nothing but only reduces its value to nothing. In addition, however, we doubt that this Treaty level will ever subsequently be lowered. The Threshold Treaty will, if ratified, take the Test Ban Treaty off the political agenda. If a dozen years of saying we wanted limits bounded by national verification capabilities could not lead to better than this, the present reversal of policy is likely to end the matter for the foreseeable future.

#### Worse Than Nothing?

The Treaty is also worse than nothing in its effect on its most important audience: the nuclear-tending pow-

ers. No treaty limiting tests would, of course, make much difference to the heavily armed superpowers. But the Test Ban was supposed to set an example of restraint to those who might build nuclear weapons themselves. Unfortunately, this Treaty will be seen by them as a bad joke. Thus, with regard to proliferation also, it is counterproductive.

Finally, the Treaty badly mishandles the problem of peaceful uses and is again counterproductive. It advances the notion that peaceful uses are plausible. But our country believes there are no sensible peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Why then enshrine in a Treaty elaborate methods of verifying them? This can only encourage new nuclear powers to justify bombs as intended for peaceful uses.

How did the Treaty get into this insupportable condition? The facts are well known. The dying Nixon Administration, failing to get a SALT agreement, tried to achieve the requisite political triumph with a test ban quickie. It settled on the 150 kiloton limit — ten times higher than observers had expected — to avoid having to knock heads together inside the American defense community. And since then, this Treaty has been going down a pointless bureaucratic road.

What else could have been done? In the first place, the Treaty limits could have been set at an appropriate level — which we believe could have been no nuclear weapons tests at all but which certainly could have been much lower. Second, much, if not all, of the paraphernalia of the Treaty designed to cover multi-stage peaceful explosions involves explosions that will, if attempted, vent. Hence, they constitute explosions which are now prohibited by the Partial Test Ban Treaty. It is a mistake to draft a Treaty to cover illegal actions. It can only encourage the Russians in their efforts to get the "venting" clause repealed or redefined. As things stand, they are claiming that the venting was supposed to protect "health" and that limited venting should be permitted. In the light of all this, it would have been better to divide the issues and have peaceful uses taken up separately, in some international forum. It is there that the eventual permission for such venting explosions would necessarily have to be given in any case.

Finally, it should be noted that the linkage between peaceful and military uses makes doubly unlikely any reduction of the 150 kiloton ceiling. After all, such reductions would now require the Russians to reduce their peaceful limit as well!

It is argued that this treaty provides an important precedent in permitting on-site inspection of peaceful tests. This is entirely misleading. On-site inspection is a precedent whose time has passed. Since the early 1960s when this was an issue, satellite inspection of above-ground events has made on-site inspection unnecessary for strategic weapons treaties. And seismological advances have narrowed, virtually to equivalence, the tests which can be detected but not identified. Thus there is little to which on-site inspection is relevant in the seventies.

For all these reasons, the Treaty is a mistake. We urged, in September 1974, that the Treaty be reopened and renegotiated while the question of peaceful uses was being discussed. It is evident that this has not been done. With regret therefore, we conclude that we cannot support its ratification. □

\*Technically, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, already signed but not ratified, is being sent to the Senate along with the recently negotiated and about to be signed Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. We refer to them jointly as the "Threshold Test Ban Treaty" since they are, for all practical purposes, an inseparable whole, the latter Treaty having been created to resolve a loophole in the former.

## NAS STRENGTHENS POLICY SUPPORTING FOREIGN COLLEAGUES

On paper, at least, the National Academy has clarified and strengthened its readiness to defend its foreign scientists by having its Council adopt suitable guidelines. Drafted in the office of Dr. George Hammond, the Foreign Secretary, the guidelines observe:

"We will continue to use the quiet and informal contact as our principal mode of communication with peer groups and governments in other countries. We do not eschew entreaty by public vehicles; indeed, *we anticipate that such action will occasionally be appropriate.*" (Italics added).

This represented an important step forward from earlier statements of the Academy President which emphasized the importance of husbanding "political capital" and talked of public action only in cases as desperate and important as those involving Sakharov. (Indeed, FAS knows of no previous public statement by the Academy except in the Sakharov case).

FAS Director Stone wrote to Foreign Secretary Hammond characterizing the guidelines as "forthright and comprehensive" and offering to help in quiet or open fashion in their implementation.

The April, 1976 annual report of the Academy President made clear that the Academy had not heretofore had a policy:

"Patently, the Academy must learn its own mind in these matters, must decide whether it has a responsibility or obligation to speak to violations of the human rights of scientists or other intellectuals wherever these may occur, must determine whether our exchange programs with Communist countries or programs of technical assistance to developing countries are leverage in discussions with the officialdom of such nations."

This belated formulation of Academy policy, and the crucial decision to combine synergistically the quiet force of private remonstrations with the threat of public acts, obviously reflected the complaints of FAS, and many NAS members, since December, 1975 when FAS reported three complaints of Soviet scientists about Academy inaction.

### Kovalev Case

The extent of NAS progress may be measured in connection with the Kovalev case.

In February, 1975, Academician Andrei Sakharov appealed directly to Academy President Handler to defend Sergei Kovalev. The letter specifically asked Dr. Handler to "acquaint your colleagues with this letter" and began by saying that he was appealing to "you and through you to the National Academy of the USA." No significant action or Academy referral of the letter seems to have been taken; the letter was only belatedly mentioned in the April 25, 1976 annual report of Handler, more than a year later.

A year after its receipt, as reported in the February, 1976 Report, Foreign Secretary George Hammond had reported to an FAS member that nothing was being done at NAS for Kovalev. (Indeed, he advised FAS that he was not taking up individual cases at all except for illustrative purposes!)

By March 18, 1976, Dr. Handler was still questioning whether the Academy *should* do anything in cases like that of Kovalev inasmuch as, it was argued, Kovalev had

## DEPT. OF SOMEBODY'S CONFUSED

"... the Academy has issued a new set of guidelines which say **it will no longer 'eschew' public declarations.**"

The Academy, as is indicated in a set of guidelines from the council to the foreign secretary, is going to **continue along much the same path it has been following.** It will emphasize private remonstrations, **issue public protests only rarely**, and do nothing to deliberately sever its relations with other nations. A particularly noteworthy provision, in some persons' view, is the guidelines allowing for some greater measure of public activity. **It says, in part, "we do not eschew entreaty by public vehicles; indeed, we anticipate that such actions will occasionally be appropriate."** (emphasis added).

*From Scientists' Rights: Academy Adopts "Affirmation of Freedom" Barbara Culliton, Science Magazine, May 21.\**

Will the Academy continue along the same path it has been following (public statements thus far only in the case of Sakharov) or will it follow the guidelines it has just promulgated — "occasional" public statements to complement its private representations? Evidently, only the future knows the answer to this critical issue.

not gotten into trouble for his scientific activities. A letter from Handler to two FAS sponsors observed:

"In essence, to expect the Academy to register formal protest in such a case as that of Kovalev, who knew what he was doing and what penalty to expect, is to consider it appropriate that the Academy support, in another country, some forms of what is there deemed to be political dissidence. Perhaps we should. But that is a major decision which should be taken by the Academy membership only after the most sober reflection and debate."

The guidelines would now seem to put this question to rest since they defend the human rights of persons quite generally and emphasize the defense of those who happen to be scientists. Kovalev was defending his own human rights and those of others and is a scientist.

The FAS sponsors who received this letter (John Edsall and David Baltimore), took particular exception to the notion that Kovalev "knew what he was doing and what penalty to expect." In fact, Kovalev's actions had been legal under Soviet law. No effort had been made at his trial to demonstrate that he had "anti-Soviet intent" and that he had deliberately circulated knowingly false

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\*This article contained several serious factual errors in reporting the incident in which the FAS Report carried Benjamin Levich's criticism of Philip Handler's decision not to meet with Levich. The errors may have arisen in part through lazy rewrite of an older story. Further evidence of a general misunderstanding of what the debate was all about was evinced when the article implied that there was a school that wanted *only* public representations. Obviously, there is no such view; FAS and all other organizations involved in these matters use and value private representations. The only relevant question has always been whether others would from time to time use public appeals. Among other errors, also, the article quoted Director Stone as calling the guidelines a "distant" improvement when he had said "distinct" improvement and other warmer comments, not quoted. In defense of Science Magazine, it should be said that this is only the second article to which FAS has taken public or private exception in the last ten years.

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statements; both are required by Soviet law to support a charge of anti-Soviet agitation.

In any case, under these guidelines, the Academy *can* challenge the legal code of nations when this code "contravenes the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights". Hence, again, there is no question but that the guidelines would cover Kovalev.

As the adjoining box reveals, there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of the guidelines. As bureaucracies do, the Academy is sometimes arguing that new policy is simply a continuation of old policy and that nothing has changed. Sometimes this turns out to be true. But often it does not. FAS took an optimistic view and accepted the Academy decision at face value. It sent copies of the guidelines to leading scientific societies and urged that these societies adopt some similar declaration and form some human rights committee with which to monitor their implementation. The Report will relay responses. □

### FAS SUPPORTS HELSINKI ACCORD COMMISSION

On May 4, Director Stone testified before a subcommittee of the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in support of a commission that would monitor the compliance of States with the Helsinki Accord. The prepared remarks observed that scientists required at least limited human rights just to do their work: the right to travel and communicate for scholarly purposes for example. The right to emigrate — at least when denied the right to function as a scientist in one's country of origin — was necessary also to avoid the waste of science. Since states benefited from scientific cooperation, they were normally inclined to provide at least these limited rights to scientists. Thus human rights of scientists provided a kind of litmus test for the readiness of states to provide more general human rights and deserved special attention by the commission.

As the newsletter went to press, the proposal for a commission had passed the Senate and House. On May 14, 1976, the press reported that nine Soviet public-interest defenders had formed their own commission to monitor the Helsinki Accord. Chaired by Y. Orlov, one of the Soviet scientists who had been blacklisted for his human rights activities, it contained Mrs. Sakharov and seven other dissidents. The Commission was called "Public Group to Assist the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR". Its plan was to relay written complaints by Soviet citizens about violations of the accords to heads of government and the publics of signatories of the Helsinki Accord.

On May 15, Orlov was detained for questioning and then released with a warning to cease these activities. Dr. Stone met with Professor Orlov in Moscow last November (December Public Interest Report). Professor Orlov, a physicist, is a corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences and was under consideration for a state prize for his work when blacklisted for his human rights activities some years ago. □

### RESULTS OF DNA STRAW POLL FROM APRIL PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

In its April publication, FAS discussed DNA recombinants and the problems which this kind of genetic engineering might produce. It asked members to read the Report

and to advise whether the guidelines appeared to them to be reasonable. Members were asked to advise, also, whether they were or were not biologists.

As the table below shows, 50% of non-biologists and 64% of the biologist respondents supported the guidelines. 30% of non-biologist respondents thought them insufficiently cautious, however, as did 25% of the biologists. Five to ten percent thought them probably too restrictive.

	biologists	non-biologists	total
A. "probably too restrictive"	12	11	23
B. "probably about right"	83	98	181
C. "probably insufficiently cautious"	32	61	93
D. "insufficient information"	2	23	25
	129	193	322

### MEMBER RESPONSE ON DNA

Richard Wilson fears a repetition in the recombinant DNA context of the nuclear power debate. He suggests that moratoria on DNA manipulations might come years after the research began, just as the science was about to prove itself useful. In order to protect against such late rising opposition, and to control the process, he believes there should be a committee of intelligent nonprofessionals, perhaps on six-year terms, formed into a committee of the National Academy of Sciences. At the moment, he sees no reason to believe the experts who are, he feels, interested parties.

Lynn Williams considers the guidelines admirable in some respects but considers that: P1 and P2 containment are meaningless; that even P3 containment requires Federal inspection of biological safety cabinets to be meaningful. He sees many unsettling analogies between the nuclear and biological situations and warns that the latter is vastly speeded up and may lead to Price-Anderson analogies, and pressures for commercialization, within as little as 2-3 years.

R. Stephen Whiteaker feels that biological containment at a level of 10" might be all right if one could be assured that the recombinant chimera surviving at this level was not surviving due to a mutation that gave it selective advantage over the surviving organism.

Bernard D. Davis thought that the novelty of the strains at issue was being exaggerated as was their capacity to cause epidemics. He felt that human DNA, and DNA of human viruses, was getting incorporated into bacteria at a low level of efficiency and that the incorporation of eukaryotic DNA into bacteria was not, therefore, unprecedented. The Darwinian fitness in microbes depended on a balanced set of genes, and virulence was not easy to come by. He felt, in sum, that the risks from recombinant DNA research were real and justified precautions but were not so threatening as to justify restrictions that would seriously hamper valuable research.

### A Michigan Group

The following group of scientists has written FAS and NIH: Arthur Schwartz (Mathematics), Susan Wright (Humanities), Marc Ross (Physics), Robert P. Weeks (Humanities), Max Heirich (Sociology), and Donald N. Michael (Psychology). This group supports the third school and believes that proliferation of research facilities presents a "grave risk to the security and well-being of

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the public" at the present state of experience. The committee feels that the National Environmental Policies Act applies and that an impact statement should be provided; that Dr. Curtiss's strain does not satisfy the criteria for a disarmed strain of the La Jolla guidelines; that NIH should prepare a statement on the costs and problems of monitoring the research; and that all should be conscious of the uncertainty surrounding critical aspects of this research — including, for example, the efficacy of biological containment. □

### 1976 ELECTION RESULTS

In the April, 1976 election, George W. Rathjens was elected Chairman. Dr. Rathjens, trained as a chemist, has devoted his life to systems analysis of high technology projects and is now Professor of Political Science at MIT.

The six Council Members elected were: Dr. Myra Karstadt, lawyer and biochemist; Dr. Alvin Weinberg, former Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Professor William Shurcliff, best known for his effective opposition to the SST; Lipman Bers, President of the American Mathematical Society; Robert H. Williams of Princeton University, a leading architect of the Ford Energy Study; and Geoffrey Chew, Chairman of the Department of Physics at Berkeley. □

### FAS CATALYZES B-1 BOMBER OPPOSITION

On May 17, FAS released a statement of opposition to the B-1 bomber which had won the endorsement of 19 former officials of the defense community. The statement was a single sentence asserting:

"The tens of billions of dollars required to build and operate the B-1 bomber are not warranted by any contribution to our security which it might make."

On May 18, the NBC Evening News and its next morning TODAY Show carried photographs of FAS's building and Director and comments of former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford; it suggested that our release had turned the debate around. On May 20, the B-1 did indeed suffer the first setback of any strategic weapons system on the floor of the Senate by a vote of 44-37.

The Transcript follows:

**FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300**  
307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002  
June 1976, Vol. 29, No. 6

- I wish to renew membership for calendar year 1976.
- I wish to join FAS and receive the newsletter as a full member.  
Enclosed is my check for 1976 calendar year dues. ( I am not a natural or social scientist, lawyer, doctor or engineer, but wish to become a non-voting associate member.)
- \$20 Member     \$50 Supporting     \$100 Patron     \$500 Life     \$10 Under \$10,000
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- FAS Public Interest Report — \$20 for calendar year
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#### John Chancellor:

And from Washington today there were indications that the B-1 bomber program may be in trouble. For the first time there are indications that Congress may be having second thoughts about the funding of the new bomber.

#### Marilyn Berger

The new campaign to ground the B-1 bomber started here — Federation of American Scientists Director Jeremy Stone drafted a statement saying the B-1 just isn't worth the tens of billions of dollars that it will cost. The statement was endorsed by 19 former high ranking members of the American defense community — including a Secretary of Defense and a top Air Force official. The most prestigious name on the list is that of Clark Clifford, President Johnson's Secretary of Defense —

#### Clark Clifford:

The whole B-1 bomber program is going to cost about 90 billion dollars. I consider it the most inexcusably wasteful program that our government is now contemplating. This is very clearly a perfect illustration of the old adage, "Act in haste and repent at leisure."

#### Marilyn Berger:

More than 40 Senators seem to think that Clifford is right and want at least to delay funding. This has shaken lobbyists for Rockwell International, prime contractor for the B-1, which keeps an office on Pennsylvania Avenue, just a block from the White House. Its lobbyists are handing out this fact sheet without the Rockwell International name on top, warning that any funding delays will disrupt production, add to costs, eliminate job opportunities and further Soviet objectives. Rockwell does not seem to be making much of an impression. I am told there is growing sentiment to leave a production decision to a new President — whoever is elected in November. The prestigious opposition seems to be having an effect. For the first time this year, it's a big question whether the B-1 will ever fly and certainly about whether it will fly any time soon. □

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