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Marvin L. Goldberger, Chairman
S. E. Luria, Vice Chairman
Jeremy J. Stone, Director

FAS DEFLATES R&D SCARE IN UNPRECEDENTED HEARING

On May 6, FAS released a 50 page heavily documented staff study entitled: "Is There an R&D Gap?" Analyzing long-standing and oft-repeated charges of forthcoming Soviet technological superiority based on greater research and development spending the FAS study concluded:

This entire episode has been a classical numbers game featuring selective disclosure, questionable assumptions, exaggeratedly precise estimates, misleading language, and alarmist non-sequitur conclusions.

The study was approved and supervised by an Ad Hoc Committee on Military R&D chaired by new Federation Chairman, Marvin L. Goldberger. Other members were George W. Rathjens of MIT, and economists Richard R. Nelson of Yale and F. M. Scherer of Michigan.

Following the press conference on May 6 — which received wide press and TV coverage, including the cartoon on the right — FAS received an unprecedented public hearing from the R&D Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In its three years of existence, this Subcommittee had never previously held a public hearing; indeed, even its executive hearing sessions had been informal affairs — briefings without transcripts. But the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator Thomas J. McIntyre

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SHORTEST MISSILE GAP ON RECORD

In December, the news leaked out that the Soviets had stopped building SS-9s, which in fact had happened months before. By February 7, Soviet SS-9 sites built or under construction was reported to have actually *declined* from 300 to 288 (Wash. Post). This disclosure threatened the Safeguard ABM program, which was, after all, designed to defend Minuteman missiles against the threatened continued construction of SS-9s.

By April, spokesmen for the Defense Department had latched onto a new possible threat — but by June that threat had virtually evaporated. Its rise and fall reveals a great deal about the endemic susceptibility of the American political community to the traditional defense scare.

Inevitably, it fell to Senator Henry M. Jackson to release the classified information. On March 7, on Face the Nation (CBS), Senator Jackson told America that the Soviet Union had been in the process, for several weeks, of deploying "an advanced generation" of missiles as "big or bigger" than the SS-9s and probably superior to them in quality. He said: "Contrary to the position earlier indicated

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The Intergovernmental Ballistic Balloon



The Intergovernmental Ballistic Balloon

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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE: SCOVILLE DEPLORES EXAGGERATED THREAT

On May 3, on the first day in which the full Senate Armed Services Committee has evidently ever heard outside organizations, Herbert Scoville, Jr. testified for FAS as Chairman of its Strategic Weapons Committee. Scoville warned against "Perennial compulsive reaction to time-worn exaggerated threats."

Ticking off, one by one, the different threats to our strategic forces, Scoville showed that each was moving more slowly than predicted or making no progress at all. In particular, he noted that the rate of Soviet SS-9 deployment had actually been cut back. In 21 months, there had been only 20 new starts rather than the predicted 50 a year. Even if the new holes, then said to number about 40, were added, the total large missile capability in the Soviet Union would be about half that predicted. Further, the new holes might reflect new Soviet efforts at hardening. Alternatively, they might reveal a Soviet interest in giving

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of New Hampshire is determined to do a conscientious job; on August 5 of last year, he had made, for example, an excellent speech on the B-1 bomber.

Dr. John S. Foster had decided not to answer the Federation charges but, as interest mounted in the subject, he agreed to interviews and called in reporters. The evening before the hearings, a long and illustrated Evening Star article revealed that DDR&E was claiming it had "cracked the code" of the Soviet R&D budget late last summer. Rising early, Dr. Stone prepared a five page rebuttal showing that DDR&E statements since last summer were quite at variance with this notion. Filling in for Dr. Nelson, whose plane had been canceled, Dr. Stone told the Subcommittee, in conclusion, that the DDR&E claim was "at best a gross exaggeration, and at worst, a snow job." A written statement from Chairman York emphasized his full agreement with the underlying Federation report and called Pentagon charges that the Soviet Union would gain technological superiority "alarmist and misleading."

Rathjens Deplores Exaggerations

Speaking for the Federation, Dr. George W. Rathjens warned that exaggerations by responsible officials "needlessly frighten the ill-formed public, further alienate the informed public, and are a serious impediment to the orderly processes of government." He suggested that a widening "credibility gap" in this country was more serious than any missile gap, R&D gap, or balance of payments gap, and said "some of the best minds being produced in this country will not be available to the government simply because they will have become conditioned to not believing what their government tells them, and because they will be profoundly skeptical of the purposes to which their inventions and ingenuity might be put."

In addition to the Chairman, Senator McIntyre, the two and one half hour hearing was attended by Senator Barry M. Goldwater who asked several questions arising from his concern over Soviet technological improvements. Other members of the Subcommittee are Senator Peter H. Dominick (R. Colorado), Lloyd M. Bentsen (D. Texas) and Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Va.).

Informal discussions with Congressional staffers involved now reveal a general awareness of the degree of DDR&E exaggerations, despite the fact that most of these do not share Federation policy views.

In his opening remarks, Senator McIntyre seemed fully to accept the Federation position that technology base expenditures, rather than total R&D expenditures, was a more correct measure of technological effort. Indeed, in revealing questions, Senator McIntyre asked the Federation whether or not a certain amount of exaggeration was not to be permitted Executive Branch officials. He noted, further, that Dr. Foster had urged him not to cut the DDR&E budget unless he felt that Foster was not doing his job in which case, he, Foster should be fired. Dr. Rathjens replied that misrepresentation to Congress should be deplored from whatever source. Dr. Stone noted that Congress cannot fire an Executive Branch employee and that the Constitution inescapably vested in the Congressional

AFTER THE R&D GAP — THE MILITARY ACADEMY GAP THURMOND SAYS SOVIETS HAVE 98 ACADEMIES TO OUR FOUR

It is a mistake to think of Soviet capacity solely in terms of weaponry and systems development. The Soviets have devoted great attention and a sizable budget to the development of human resources to support military plans. They have systematically set about to provide themselves with the necessary supply of technicians, advanced experts, and strategic thinkers appropriate to advanced weapon technology.

The United States has four topnotch military academies, which down through the years have provided us with some great officers. I do not in any sense want to downgrade the job they are doing. Yet, I want to point out that the Soviets have 98 military colleges, each graduating about 60 to 80 officers annually, and 19 academies providing advanced military education. Today I want to focus attention on just one of these academies, the Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineering Academy in Moscow. . . .

—Senator Thurmond
Congressional Record —
Senate, April 14, 1971
page S4874—

Committees the duty of examining and adjusting Executive Branch requests.

The Federation has been urging the R&D Subcommittee to hear Dr. Foster on this subject, and to call other intelligence agencies. Senator McIntyre had earlier asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to investigate the matter but GAO's report has been delayed. Meanwhile, public interest in the subject remains high. The Christian Science Monitor editorial of May 12, called the Federation a "public front for the opposition inside the Administration to a new and bigger weapons program". *Time Magazine*, on June 7, contrasted the Federation view with that of Foster's and argued that "If Foster is wrong but manages to convince the Administration that such a threat exists, the result could be to destroy the spirit if not the substance of the SALT negotiations, and cut to a minimum any chances of real force reductions in Europe". *Time* warned against taking a technology gap on "faith" in view of past, now exploded, gaps.

PRE-FOSTER RESEARCH GAP

"As far as I am concerned . . . there is a research gap at the present time. We aren't putting enough money into basic research to keep ahead of the Soviet Union. We are going to close that gap — and then create one where they are behind us all around the world".

Republican Presidential Contender Richard M. Nixon to a group of Southern delegates to the nominating convention, (Today, August 7, 1968, Cocoa, Fla.)

Shortest Missile Gap—From Page 1

with the so-called leveling off of the number of new SS-9 sites, we now find that the new developments are ominous indeed." (NYT, March 8).

This was too much even for the Defense Department whose spokesman commented "It is correct that we have detected some new ICBM construction in the Soviet Union. We are not sure exactly what it is or what the Soviets' intentions are".

By March 18, Dr. John S. Foster was telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that these silos could be part of an ICBM system that "could make major United States weapon systems obsolete in the late nineteen-seventies."

On April 22, Secretary Laird warned that he might seek a supplementary appropriation for more strategic weapons in the face of a "sobering" new and apparently extensive "ICBM construction program" in the Soviet Union.

By April 23, Soviet new ICBM silos were put at 40 in both test and operational areas (Washington Post).

By May 3, Mr. Joseph Alsop said, in a column suggesting that this might be remembered as the "darkest time in the American story" —

"Just possibly, they are preparing an attempted first strike, to knock out U. S. nuclear-strategic power. More probably, they have in mind some sort of hideously grave confrontation with this country, with overwhelming power on their side."

On May 10, in Newsweek, Mr. Steward Alsop released a great deal of classified information concerning the exact size of the holes and projected 70 missiles a year. He added that two of twenty-one Soviet MRV tests were either malfunctioning MRVs or MIRV tests. He concluded that "the available clues suggest that the Russians are now going all-out to achieve in the near future a really decisive nuclear-strategic superiority".

Scare Begins To Break

On May 24, however, the scare began to break. Robert Kleiman, of the New York Times editorial board, reported that 2/3s of the new holes were for the smaller SS-11 missiles. The rest seemed to be for hardening the holes for the larger missiles.

On May 25, Council Member Herbert Scoville, Jr. — testifying for the Federation before the Senate Defense Appropriations Committee — referred to the Kleiman report and said that, if it were true, the Congress and public should beware the process of "selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence" upon which one earlier scare had evidently been based.

On May 26, the New York Times reported that the CIA believed that the larger silos were "required to accommodate the concrete liners" involved in hardening, and Senator William Proxmire called it the "shortest missile gap in history"; he pointed out that he had called the scare "highly exaggerated and even semi-hysterical" when it began and had related it to the Spring procurement offensive.

Forced to explain these matters in a background briefing, Defense Department spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim said it was now agreed that there were holes of two dif-

ferent sizes but that the SS-9 could fit into either! But by the first of June, according to Time magazine, the Russian crews were trundling up concrete liners" for the holes indicating that hardened missile sites were the only thing at issue.

Finally, on June 14, Mr. Stewart Alsop wrote a Newsweek column "Good News At Last." He said, "some good news recently received by President Nixon might have justified his calling a national holiday, perhaps with some judicious dancing in the streets." Insisting that if the new holes had been for MIRVed SS-9s it would have been "hard evidence of the grimmest possible Soviet intentions," Mr. Alsop's article seemed a Buchwaldian finish to an absurd soap opera.

In the end, it was a three month scare. But even for this short period, few Senators would risk opposing the leaked surmises of the Defense Department lest they turn out to have sufficient substance to discredit the Senator.

Perhaps the most serious part of the scare was the lurking suspicion that it had been *saved* for the Spring — and was not simply a product of the Spring search for justification for new U. S. weapon systems. Asked about this, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had gone on record with the observation that the big holes had not been discovered until February or March. But in a May 26 New York Times dispatch, it said the new holes had started appearing "last December".

NO-ABM AGREEMENT SOUGHT

The ABM announcement (See Box) of May 20 was pointedly obscure. Apparently in an effort to protect against the charge that the United States had over-compromised, White House background briefings evidently suggested that the offensive agreement to be conjoined with the limit on ABMs would also be a *formal* agreement. Uncertainty over whether or not this was so dampened FAS enthusiasm for the Presidential announcement. Later discussion, at a Presidential news conference, seemed to suggest that the limitation on "offensive weapons" might be informal. In a statement read to the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 25, the federation welcomed the President's statement, and concurred in the priority accorded an ABM limitation. It urged "revision of the budget request before Congress, during this critical negotiating period in order not to foreclose future options for limiting armaments."

TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S ABM ANNOUNCEMENT

Key paragraph of the three paragraph U.S.-Soviet announcement was:

"The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABM's). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons".

1971 ELECTION RETURNS

M. L. Goldberger — S. E. Luria Elected

Vice-Chairman Marvin L. Goldberger was elected Chairman of FAS in ballots counted on May 10 and took office on June 1. Chairman of the Physics Department at Princeton University, Goldberger has long experience and interest in both arms race and environmental problems. Under his Chairmanship, the Federation hopes to balance its strong interest and active role in arms limitations with effectiveness in other science and society problems.

In a close contest for Vice-Chairman, Nobel-prize winning biologist S. E. Luria was elected. Luria has long been active in public issues ranging from fallout shelters to the antiwar movement.

Six of eleven candidates for the Council were elected for four year terms. These include: Harrison Brown, Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences and Professor of both Geochemistry and Science and Government at California Institute of Technology; Barry M. Casper, Associate Professor of Physics at Carleton College and Director of the FAS TACTIC Office; Laurence I. Moss, Executive Secretary, Committee on Public Engineering Policy (COPEP) of the National Academy of Engineering, and an organizer of the Coalition Against the SST; John R. Platt, Professor of Physics at the University of Michigan and Associate Director of its Mental Health Institute; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Chairman of the Department of Political Science at MIT, a former special assistant in the Office of Science and Technology to three Presidential Science Advisers and the organizer of the Science and Public Policy Studies Group (SPPSG); Quentin David Young, Professor of Preventive Medicine, University of Illinois College of Medicine and a former chairman of the Medical Committee for Human Rights.

These six candidates replaced the following six members: Dan I. Bolef, Bernard T. Feld, Arthur W. Galston, Gerald Holton, David R. Inglis and Marvin Kalkstein.

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up on using SS-9s for destroying Minuteman and using a new missile for the MIRVs. This would set the projected threat back several years. (By May 25, newspaper articles were quoting authoritative sources as saying that many of the big holes were for the small SS-11s! See "Shortest Missile Gap on Record, Page 1.)

Linking the exaggerations of the threat to unnecessary procurement in the United States, Scoville concluded that the following cuts in the budget were indicated: Hold MIRV in abeyance and save \$1.6 billion; halt Safeguard ABM deployment and save \$1.2 billion; terminate the AWACS air defense program; limit R&D on ULMs to that necessary for studies; and cut advanced MIRV guidance system expenditures.

Committee Chairman John Stennis called Scoville's remarks a "real challenge" and the first time that an opposition witness with comparable credentials had questioned DOD's projected threat. He promised that he and the Committee staff would give Scoville's remarks "serious study."

HALPERIN DESCRIBES LIMITS ON DEFENSE ANALYSIS

In an unusual statement on June 10, Council Member Dr. Morton H. Halperin told the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that there was "no clear way to determine how much is enough to spend on defense." Arguing for parallel efforts to influence separately both the size and the shape of the defense budget, Halperin called both for limits on defense expenditures and for categorization of weapons programs as "good," "bad" and "wasteful."

Dr. Halperin's testimony, approved by the Federation, exposed fundamental questions on which the political judgment of Congress was needed and warranted. He urged Congress to give the Executive Branch overall spending guidelines for future years.

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