

# F. A. S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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SPECIAL ISSUE:

SALT &amp; GENERAL SEIGNIOUS

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## SALT AND GENERAL SEIGNIOUS

We will be saying more about SALT, and about the confirmation of retired Lt. General George M. Seignious II as each runs the Senate gauntlet. But, in the meantime, this Report carries some insights into both problems, and their interrelation.

In the first place, an enclosed letter to the President puts forth a scheme for far-reaching disarmament. It shows that substantial reductions of strategic weapons are possible. The PAR method is simplicity itself, requiring, to a first approximation, only the negotiation of a single number. And it represents an existence theorem, as mathematicians would put it, revealing the political-strategic feasibility of the reductions FAS wants.

Therefore, let the superpowers be judged according to the PAR standard: "If not substantial reductions, why not?" Disarmament has been around the corner now for a long time. Four years after Vladivostok, the arms race continues unabated and even a true freeze of strategic weapons is nowhere in sight, much less any significant dismantlement. We shall be looking at SALT II and asking whether we can still believe that reductions will follow in SALT III.

General Seignious's recess appointment is part of the selling of SALT. The way the Administration repeatedly sought out a general to head the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, shows its deter-

mination to placate the right. We can expect a number of weapons systems, and related programs, to appear as domestic bargaining chips in an effort to ensure SALT's passage. But the Seignious appointment could easily be one of the most expensive. SALT II is not going to be worth the candle unless redeemed by a suitable SALT III. Does General Seignious have the skills, and intellectual depth, to provide the necessary leadership? Or will the Agency be further demoralized?

Having discovered a statute barring retired military officers from occupying the top three positions in the Defense Department, FAS is campaigning to ensure that comparable legislation cover the top two positions in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. ACDA was set up to provide a countervailing force to traditional military thinking, and the notion that ACDA should be handed over to the military professionals is, really, outlandish.

After having a representative of FAS talk privately to General George Seignious, we have decided that no grounds exist for making an initial exception, in his case, to our policy of civilian control of ACDA. With reluctance, therefore, we shall oppose his confirmation.

—Reviewed and Approved by the FAS Council

## LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OUTLINES DISARMAMENT PLAN

December 13, 1978

President Jimmy Carter  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

My Dear Mr. President:

May we suggest that the simplest way to fulfill your statesmanlike desire to move toward zero nuclear weapons appears to involve nothing more than the negotiation with the Russians of a *single number*, viz.:

The superpowers would agree to dismantle a small percentage (somewhere between 2% and 10%) of their strategic delivery vehicles each year with each side retaining the "freedom to choose" those weapons that it would dismantle in any given year. Retained weapons could be modernized or replaced (within the agreed restraints, perhaps, of SALT II). The duration of the agreement would be indefinite, with review conferences each five years to review the

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## THE SEIGNIOUS AFFAIR — PART I

The appointment of General George M. Seignious as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is wrong on so many grounds and levels that it is hard for one to know how to begin. The story is something like this.

Administration aides in the White House, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Gerald Rafshoon, and Hamilton Jordan—faced with a difficult struggle to get ratification of its expected SALT II Treaty—decided to find a general for this position as an assist. They thought it was a terribly clever way to give their Administration a hawkish patina, to defend against the charge of being soft on the Russians, and to avoid both a confirmation struggle and a premature debate on SALT. This was public relations opportunism.

General Andrew Goodpaster formally declined an offer after General Brent Scowcroft turned aside overtures. The group nevertheless persisted, and they found three-star General Seignious willing to leave his position as president of the Citadel, a military school in South Carolina. The persistence in seeking a general, despite

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progress of the agreement and the possibility of its prolongation. (I call this proposal PAR for Percentage Annual Reduction.)

These are the advantages, among others:

a) The *Senate* would be faced with a simple, understandable concept rather than a complicated agreement, and Senate ratification would be once and for all rather than periodic.

b) The *Defense Department* would confront something akin to a simple budget cut in which DOD gets to implement the cuts; indeed, in this case, the cuts would not require DOD to show financial restraint. DOD gets a maximum of freedom, and a year-by-year opportunity to decide what to dismantle after it has seen the whites of the eyes of the then current technology and the exact form of the previous year's Soviet cutback.

c) For the *President*, PAR provides the possibility of a dramatic announcement of eventual major disarmament, without the necessity for any major action in the short run. Even U.S.-Soviet agreement in principle to PAR, without agreement to a specific percentage, would be electrifying.

d) For the *hawks*, who have lost confidence in the U.S. negotiating apparatus, PAR represents the reassuring replacement of an untrustworthy network of doves and bureaucrats with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense.

e) For *doves*, PAR provides the presently absent hope that SALT II will really lead to something by building cleverly, as a starting point, on the one equality thus far in sight—numbers of delivery vehicles.

f) For the *strategists*, PAR provides strategic advantages associated with the fact that the U.S. force is, at its core, considerably more invulnerable, and less exposed than that of the Soviet Union and can thus make more effective use of the freedom to choose what will be dismantled.

g) For the *Russians*, PAR provides a continuing disarmament process which will appear to the Soviets as a way of assuring a modicum of detente—their major goal.

h) For *Senator Jackson* (and his supporters) there is the fact that PAR leaves the implementation of U.S. SALT reductions primarily in the hands of the two Congressional Armed Services Committees, one of which he will soon chair. Furthermore, and startlingly, Senator Jackson publicly proposed, in 1975, something quite similar to PAR—the ongoing dismantlement by each side of 700 of the most obsolescent nuclear delivery vehicles. (This is the quota of a 5% PAR agreement for almost ten years.)

i) For *SALT II ratification*, if the Administration moves quickly, a superpower statement of intention to move toward PAR could: relieve Senators of the specter of succeeding agonizing debates; add impelling promise to what has already been accomplished; and might win over SALT opponents by indicating that DOD would be in charge of subsequent reductions.

If necessary, of course, this simple outline of a proposal can be built upon with side conditions—so long as these do not become disruptive of too many of the above virtues. Attached to this letter is testimony describing the PAR proposal, and some graphs, which I presented last week privately to the General Advisory Committee of ACDA; it describes the proposal by sketching why it may be the *only* way to achieve disarmament goals in SALT III.

Mr. President, our organization was founded by those scientists who built America's first atomic bomb and we are, consequently, dedicated and concerned observers of the disarmament scene. Watching your work as President, we have come to understand quite well—and we doubt not at all—your deep personal sincerity of interest in turning the arms race around, and your keen awareness of the dangers that both the existing stockpiles, and the arms contest itself, provide for our Nation.

Unfortunately, most of your relevant subordinates may view real reductions with emotions ranging from despair to quiet hostility, assuming as they so often do, that disarmament could only become hopelessly complicated, and evoke ever more political resistance.

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\*Nobel Laureates

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If for no other reason than to force the rethinking of these premises, would it not be useful to ask the relevant agencies: what objections they have to this simplest of all possible schemes; what variants of it might be acceptable; and what options might exist for splicing this approach to the SALT II negotiating process?

Needless to say, Mr. President, I and the organization which I have the honor to staff would be happy to pursue this matter with your Administration in any fashion you might suggest.

Most Respectfully,  
JEREMY J. STONE

## SEIGNIOUS, PART I

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the obvious fact that their determined search would become known is a kind of media cynicism; who did they think they were fooling, especially by this time?

General Seignious seemed especially good to them because Paul C. Warnke had selected him as ACDA's military adviser on the SALT team. As a result, they felt the doves would be under control.

The elapsed time between initial conversations at the White House and public announcement: one week and a half. This was impulsive staff work and meant, in particular, that they checked with very few people. According to General Seignious his own friends alerted him to the fact that he had joined a coalition that opposed SALT II, and was listed as a sponsor of the group: three days before the public announcement, he resigned from the Coalition for Peace Through Strength, which promptly lashed out at him for reversing his position. Thus were the hawks antagonized at the outset.

### General Seignious Helped ACDA

But they would have been anyway. General George M. Seignious was not just a general, but the very general who had carried ACDA's burdens at the SALT negotiations, he has been the foil for the general representing the hawks, General Edward L. Rowny. No doubt the Warnke camp considered Seignious the least worst general and one to whom they had obligations. Perhaps this accounts for the speed with which President Carter endorsed him. A general acceptable to the doves!

At the outset the doves were told there would be no recess appointment and that the purpose of the nomination was to prevent a pre-SALT ratification fight. In short, the assumption was that a general would not be opposed. In fact, however, the particular general chosen could hardly avoid precipitating such a fight in light of the fact that he had been ACDA's house general during the negotiation. Thus the nominee was counterproductive.

The Administration then gave Seignious a recess appointment, further increasing the likelihood that the debate would be spirited. After all, this postured the confirmation hearings as those of an acting director, rather than of a nominee, and one who can fairly be grilled on all ongoing activities of ACDA, including in particular SALT II. Thus was a complicated web woven.

At this stage, it was discovered (by FAS) that a statute existed preventing career military officers from serving as Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense; this persuaded us that it might be possible to persuade the body politic of the impropriety of a general serving as Director of ACDA, an impropriety obvious

anyway. We began mailing out letters which said:

Whatever the Senate shall decide with regard to the confirmation of Lieutenant General George M. Seignious II (USA, ret.) as Director of ACDA, we urge the adoption of a provision of law which would prohibit retired or active duty officers from serving as Director or Deputy Director of ACDA. We observe that ACDA deserves at least as stringent civilian control as does the Defense Department and the latter does have such legislation.

Dr. Alton Frye prepared an article for the *Washington Post* summarizing the history and urging the general to withdraw. Thus did a boy shout that the Emperor wore no clothes.

During this time, the aides to liberal Senators were, for the most part, successfully blackmailed by the fear of upsetting the SALT Treaty debates. What good could come of a debate over the ACDA Director? This was politics, but premature since they knew nothing of Seignious.

On December 8, 1978, FAS released the names of persons supporting prospective legislation; they included:

William Attwood, publisher and former Ambassador  
Alain Enthoven, former Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Joseph H. Filner, businessman  
William C. Foster, former ACDA Director  
John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard economist  
James P. Grant, President, Overseas Development Council

Theodore M. Hesburgh, President, Notre Dame  
Carl Kaysen, former Deputy National Security Adviser to President Kennedy

George F. Kennan, historian and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union

George B. Kistiakowsky, former Presidential Science Adviser

Franklin A. Long, former Assistant Director of ACDA  
Leonard C. Meeker, former Ambassador to Romania  
George W. Rathjens, Chairman, Federation of American Scientists

Charles W. Whalen, Jr., President, New Directions  
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, MIT

Also listed were fourteen groups, whose operating officers, speaking either for the group or for themselves, endorsed the paragraphs also:

American Friends Service Committee  
Americans for Democratic Action  
Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church  
Center for National Security Studies  
Council for a Livable World  
Council on Economic Priorities  
Friends Committee on National Legislation  
Fund for Constitutional Government  
Mennonite Central Committee  
New Directions  
Unitarian Universalist Association, Washington Office  
Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church  
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom  
World Federalist Association

The extent of the miscalculation became clear to FAS when an FAS official had the opportunity to interview him (and paraphrase his views). General Seignious seemed hopelessly over his head in this job, a veritable babe in the woods.

• He thought FAS efforts to get legislation precluding future generals from being in charge of ACDA was a charge that he personally was disloyal!

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- He thinks the distinction between that community of people which think the main danger is the Russians and those who think the main danger is an uncontrolled arms race is a false distinction since, without the Russians, there would be no arms race.

- He denies the possibility of a "nuclear war nobody wants" on the grounds that *someone* must have launched a nuclear weapon and that person or persons wanted the nuclear war.

- As a consequence, when asked why ACDA was set up as a separate agency and not just staffed by DOD, for example, he said he did not know and so would not say.

- Asked whether it was not a misuse of the uniform for the White House to have sought determinedly for generals, he said that the President had not told him they were looking for a general and neither had the White House aides.

- Asked whether it was not so that there had been such a search, he said he did not know that others had been asked; it had only been said in the media.

There was more and shrewd observers in ACDA were saying that:

"Where Seignious was supposed to help SALT, now only SALT can help General Seignious."

The more pliable and coerceable ones were saying that

## PAR INVENTED AND DESCRIBED FOR GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Testimony Before the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament

Thursday, November 9, 9 a.m.:

AFTER SALT, WHAT?

Jeremy J. Stone

Members of the Committee:

Thank you so much for inviting me to present my personal views on SALT III to this distinguished and important body. By happenchance, just before your invitation, I had completed preparation of the attached FAS Public Interest Report (November, 1978) with its agreed Council editorial and seven approaches to "After SALT II, What?" I shall describe these positions very briefly if the members desire.

Subsequent to your invitation, however, I gave further thought to the approach of the seven that is most relevant to you: "SALT with reductions." The more I thought about this problem, the more a certain specific method recommended itself to me. Indeed, the more I thought about it, the more difficult it was for me to see how any other approach would satisfy the various political and military restraints reality puts upon the disarmament process and its goal.\*

### Percentage Annual Reductions (PAR)

Assume that the United States agreed with the Soviet Union to dismantle a small percentage (somewhere between 2% to 10%, e.g., 5%) of its strategic delivery vehicles each year with each side having "freedom to choose" those weapons that are to be destroyed in any given year. Assume that the duration of the agreement were indefinite, with review conferences each five years to review the progress of the agreement; of course, there would be withdrawal rights. Graph I shows various rates

ACDA could have gotten someone much worse. (This conventional wisdom results from the fact that Zbigniew Brzezinski is involved in the White House clique deciding and it is assumed that he would propose more hawkish candidates; but whether President Carter would approve such candidates is another story, especially if the pro-arms control groups objected. Perhaps the President's solution would be to let Secretary Vance decide who should be the next Director. Since the ACDA Director functions much as a State Department undersecretary, this would be natural.

A high Administration official had said, in a related context, that: "These arms issues are always skewed to the political right and probably always will be." One saw why this was so when some groups committed to disarmament declined to sign the prospective legislation lest it upset the Seignious affairs which might upset SALT, an argument which can be turned on its head if Seignious can not handle the job. The doves are gentle and often easy to coerce.

But one who is not is Senator John Culver of Iowa. He released a statement saying he would sponsor a bill requiring that a civilian head the arms control agency (and he reserved judgment on General Seignious).

TO BE CONTINUED IN THE NEXT ISSUE AS EVENTS UNFOLD.

of reduction.


This agreement for Percentage Annual Reductions (PAR) would have a number of advantages. Rather than just enumerate, let me indicate why, from different points of view, this approach to "After SALT, what?" is strongly indicated.

### I. Why PAR Seems the Only Alternative—

#### Various Derivations

#### A. Derivation from International Political Requirements

Consider that if the United States and the Soviet Union do not reach agreement soon on a *dramatic* plan for re-



\*Learning that the Chairman of our organization, Dr. George W. Rathjens, had once proposed something like this to a Committee of the House of Representatives further encouraged me.

ductions of nuclear weaponry, world cynicism concerning superpower readiness to disarm will be confirmed and solidified beyond recall.

But if the reductions are to be dramatic, they must be *long-range* since the superpowers are patently unable to negotiate dramatic progress in the short run.

And if the reduction plan is to be long-range, it must permit each society great *flexibility* in what is to be dismantled in later years since even the best weapons experts cannot foresee with much confidence what kinds of weapons may be preferred by then.

Thus, as far as the medium to long run, the two sides may only be able to agree to a schedule of *numbers* of weapons to be dismantled each year—rather than on a schedule of specific weapons.

Among possible such schedules, there is much to be said for a schedule that is as simple as possible. One finds two alternatives among the simplest schedules. One possibility would be a *fixed percentage* of the *initial* inventory (e.g., 5% of the 2100 starting number, which is to say 105 delivery vehicles dismantled each year). But this leads to the implausible conclusion that the U.S. would be totally without strategic delivery vehicles at a specific future date, and a date not too far off either (in this case, 20 years).

The second alternative is to assume a fixed percentage of the just achieved inventory (e.g., 5% of whatever level of strategic delivery vehicles one had last reduced to). In short, the PAR agreement outlined above.

In other words, reasoning backward from the superpowers' requirement to show dramatic progress, one can make a good case that they will be forced to something like PAR.

#### B. *Derivation from Military Realities*

Consider now the military realities. The last ten years have eloquently established the inability of the superpowers to control the qualitative arms race; that race has outpaced even speculative *proposals* for its control, much less the *negotiation* of these proposals. It seems evident, therefore, that no long-range plan can be based on a schedule for tightening *qualitative* restraints.

This leaves *quantitative* restraints. But, in this event, delivery vehicle reduction is about the only parameter that is suitable. (Warheads, and cruise missiles, are proliferating in number and largely beyond precise numerical limitation.)

One could conceive of PAR agreements, in which there was little or no freedom to choose but in which the percentage reduction had to be applied separately to the sea-based, the land-based, and the bomber forces. But this adds little for those who seek disarmament and tends to preclude the agreement's acceptance by the military establishment. Freedom to Choose is really "son of" the well-known DOD desire for Freedom to Mix\*

In short, long-range plans are likely to involve reducing numbers of delivery vehicles with freedom to choose because little else long-run is within the realm of the militarily acceptable.

Also, the lack of even short-run consensus—inside both

the arms control community and the Defense Department—on which strategic weapons amongst our triad are least useful means that any effort to force a specific reduction proposal upon the Defense Department, from outside or above, will find great resistance. Consequently, any reduction method should permit the military to work out their own compromises which can then easily receive endorsement by the rest of the body politic. (In short, one adopts the approach to weapon reduction which Defense Secretary Charlie Wilson took to budget cuts in the fifties: announce the ceilings and let the military implement the reduction by deciding what they think is the most dispensable.)

Thus, for the military, PAR turns the threatening prospect of an arms control agreement (i.e., tying one's hand behind one if the other side will too) into the much less threatening prospect of something akin to a unilateral overall limit on budgets (coupled to the reassuring fact that the other side will be forced to comparable limitations).

#### C. *Derivation from Negotiating History*

The major theme, and single most salient accomplishment, of the SALT talks on offensive weapons has been to bring into equality the numbers of delivery vehicles on both sides. If, then, one is to build from strength on the negotiating history, what is more appropriate than to begin to reduce these agreed numbers?

#### D. *Derivation from Consideration of the Ultimate Goal: The Transition from Overkill to Underkill*

PAR also seems indicated when one considers the problems of moving from what one might call "overkill" to finite deterrence and hence to minimal deterrence. At the moment, the SALT talks are concerned, at best, with elimination of unnecessary "overkill." Only a few believe that the present level of weaponry is necessary to deter.

At some point, however, reductions would reach the stage in which it would be necessary to discuss deterrence criteria in detail and, in time, to progressively reduce those criteria.

After all, the eventual goal is not a lower level of still massive deterrent forces, but a removal of the dangers of mass destruction by securing a relationship between the nuclear powers in which resorts to nuclear force are outside the realm of the conceivable—as with relations between U.S. and Canada and so on.

Can the superpowers "break through" to this kind of relationship in the kind of negotiations which are underway, negotiations which assume the relevance of mass destruction and which debate the criteria in full (cold-blooded) view? Can widespread public debate persuade society that the contingencies being debated are not "conceivable"? Is forcing debate on the thinkability of nuclear war the way to make nuclear war unthinkable?

This line of thought suggests that the method of securing reductions should be one that takes on momentum of its own while requiring little or no public review.

PAR has this quality because it requires public agreement only on a single number and this only once! It leaves virtually all military considerations to the defense ministries themselves (separately) and keeps their speculations and contingency planning within their own more private community.

After the initial Senate vote, PAR transmutes periodic apocalyptic Senate ratification debates (requiring 67

\*Hopefully, the cost of modernization will discourage modernization on each side, and the projected decline in the numbers of delivery vehicles will discourage the replacement or modernization of at least those vehicles which are seen as being slated soon for disarmament. But modernization would be permitted under PAR unless otherwise agreed.

votes) into a fairly standard annual DOD question of weapon retention (requiring 50 votes for confirmation).

### PAR Runs an Arms Race in Reverse

In a sense, PAR is just a way of running an arms race in reverse. In the abstract arms race, both powers are tied implicitly to similar rates of advance because each fears that the other's rate of advance will, if not matched, be dangerous. But within that constraint of matching rates of advance, each power in an arms race has the freedom to procure whatever it wants.

Under PAR, the two powers are again linked by a similar rate, but it is a rate of reduction rather than one of advance. And, as before, the two powers have freedom to choose—but in this case, it is freedom to reduce where they wish, rather than to procure what they want. Graph II compares the rate of buildup of the arms race with its reduction under PAR of 5%.

### The Public Relations Advantage of Simplicity

If the superpowers cannot negotiate a rate of reduction, i.e., a *single number*, (e.g., 5% or 2% or whatever), then it is hard to believe that they can negotiate, successfully and sustainedly, reduction agreements more complicated. This truth provides great public relations advantages for the nation proposing PAR, viz. "If the other side will not agree to *any* percentage reduction, how can it claim to be for reductions?"

### II. Initial Implementation: How Would It Work at First?

Which weapons would be dismantled by each side in the initial years? The United States has 390 bombers, 1053 land-based missiles (and 53 Titan missiles) and 656 sub-launched missiles in Polaris and Poseidon submarines. It could decide to eliminate first:

- 1) half the bombers, or about 190
- 2) the Minuteman IIs, of which there are 450
- 3) and the Polaris submarines that are not armed with Poseidon missiles, of which there are 10, with a total of 160 Polaris A-3 missiles

This would pare down the backup forces, and remove the less modern Polaris submarines, and in so doing eliminate 800 delivery vehicles.

This would constitute the U.S. quota of reduction for the first *ten* years, up to the second five-year review period. It would still leave the U.S. with a triad. Specifically, it would leave the U.S. with 31 Polaris-Poseidon submarines, 550 land-based missiles (with three warheads each), 53

Titan missiles, and 200 strategic bombers. Moreover, these weapons might well have been much improved depending upon procurement. Thus, for example, the Minuteman missiles might have been replaced with MX. (Since MX is projected to have a dozen warheads rather than three, the halving of the land-based force would involve no reduction—but instead a doubling—of the land-based missile warheads available.)

The Soviet Union could find its 800 vehicles in a number of ways; most of them would presumably come from its large land-based missile force. Interestingly, it does not matter much what the Soviet Union dismantled in planning U.S. reductions although there are some interactions. *But the PAR plan does permit each side to watch closely what the other has dismantled in planning its own subsequent reductions.* The force of the other side will not vary by more than one year and (in this example, by more than 5%) before the other side gets a fix on what it has done, and is in a position to plan its reductions in response.

### III. Some Initial Speculations on Side Issues

#### Modernization and Qualitative Restraints

One would supplement the basic PAR agreement with whatever could be negotiated with regard to limits on improving weapons: e.g., limits on fractionalization of warheads, limiting warheads per delivery vehicles, precluding new kinds of technologies such as directed energy beams, and so on. One would attempt these supplementary negotiations whenever one thought there was a sufficiently high chance of success to warrant the risks associated with a failure of the negotiations (viz., that nations might be led to buy more than they otherwise would have as a result of overcommitment to bargaining strategies).

#### Third Powers


It would be 16 to 32 years before the United States reached 400 delivery vehicles even if it negotiated a percentage between 10% and 5%. The Chinese may not have 400 long-range strategic delivery vehicles within 16 years but, in any case, it would be an obvious condition of the agreement, to be discussed in five-year reviews, that third parties not exceed some related number and, in due course, join in the program of reductions. These problems can be left to the future.

#### Grey Area Systems

There are a number of ways of decoupling grey area systems under this proposal. One can ignore them (on the grounds that they are irrelevant since each nation has enough for its deterrent). One can deter their construction by threatening to match their construction with other grey area systems. One can include grey area systems in the overall calculation of the initial inventory (or include them on a fractional basis, e.g., two for one) and try to work from the uneven levels that result. Or one can consider them as theater weapons and work to limit them in MBFR negotiations—conceivably in some analogue of percentage annual reductions (PAR) to theater nuclear weapons.

#### Minuteman Vulnerability

Obviously, there are solutions to Minuteman vulnerability which could not be accomplished under PAR, e.g., building 10,000 more Minuteman missiles. But I suppose that all of the proposals for dealing with Minuteman vulnerability that are consonant with the SALT II agree-





ments, that is with a limit of 2,250 delivery vehicles, would be consonant with PAR.

Over time, of course, the Minuteman force would decline in numbers—as would all the other arms of our forces and theirs—and hence Minuteman could become still more vulnerable. But the important issue is the overall vulnerability of the overall strategic force. And since PAR permits each side to throw away whatever it wants, each can dismantle the most vulnerable forces it has and get a residual strategic force which is, *per weapon*, more invulnerable. □

### CASTRO: STILL "FAIR GAME" AT LEAST IN THE PRESS

Should a newspaper publish an item whose only publishable point is that it encourages a person's assassination? This unusual question arose in November when *Newsweek's* "Periscope" published this item:

#### CASTRO'S WARY TRAVEL PLANS

Cuban President Fidel Castro has accepted an invitation from the Spanish Government to pay his first visit to Spain, but he has set some ground rules: to help prevent assassination attempts, Castro wants the dates and itinerary of his trip kept secret as long as possible. Sources say that Castro will probably make the trip next spring, and that, at his request, the visit will include a tour of the impoverished Galicia region where his father lived before emigrating to Cuba.

This item is an interesting example of the above principle because it has so little other social value. All it does is to blow the secrecy desired by Castro for his trip to Spain. For example, had the "wary" been left out of the title and the reference to fears of assassination also been left out, there would surely have been insufficient news value to justify running the item—especially in the so often hyped "Periscope."

This item would make for useful discussions in journalism classes precisely because it is so short that it so unmistakably has so little other point. Are there any limits on responsible journalism? *Newsweek* decided not to publish a critical FAS letter.

Another aspect is whether this item was in good taste. It seems not.

And a third question is whether it would have been done to anyone else fearing assassination, e.g., Begin? ("Begin's Wary Travel Plans . . .") It seems not also. Castro, one observer pointed out, was still "fair game."

A fourth interesting question involves the source of the leak. Were the Cubans to have published a comparable item about Teddy Kennedy, we would none of us have had any doubt about its malevolent purpose. ("Teddy's Wary Travel Plans . . . Teddy Kennedy is traveling to Texas but wants the dates and itinerary kept secret; but sources say it will be in the spring to Houston.")

#### Who Leaked It?

Who leaked this Castro item? FAS wrote Admiral Turner on November 9 saying that it was "presumably" intelligence information leaked by someone here with access to it and asked whether CIA would investigate the possibility of a leak from U.S. intelligence information.

The CIA's approach to the problem was simply to attack the presumptions involved rather than investigate. On November 20, its Director of Public Affairs called them "faulty logic at best." ("At best" probably means

ill-intentioned or subversive at worst.")

Antagonized by this lackadaisical approach, FAS called around and discovered a source who knew who wrote the item, and who described that author as the person working for *Newsweek* who had the U.S. Government as his beat. This seemed circumstantial evidence linking the item to U.S. Government sources and even seemed to pinpoint the author. Another source on *Newsweek* said the item was partly from sources in Spain (whether American sources, e.g. at our embassy, or Spanish sources, he did not know) and partly from U.S. Government sources.

We wrote to CIA again with this new information (but without revealing our sources). We got back a still more petulant reply, but this time from Admiral Turner himself. Since there had been no identification of our sources, he found it:

"difficult to either pursue any investigation or to put much credence in your assumption that this information came from the intelligence community."

By the end of the letter, our efforts to get some investigation had been described as:

"broad and unsubstantiated conclusions about the malevolence of the United States intelligence community."

Would you believe from this expression of outrage that the same agency had earlier actually tried to assassinate the very individual in question? Finally, if an intelligence agency turns a "presumption" into "unsubstantiated conclusions," how in the devil can anyone trust its policy evaluations? Really, Admiral Turner, we would like a bit less defensiveness and a bit more action. We *could* be right. Why not check around as best you can; it shouldn't even have required our letter at all. This is serious business and if it had threatened someone more on the U.S. side, would not you be checking vigorously? □

### NAS PLANS MAMMOTH EINSTEIN STATUE

For the one hundredth anniversary of Albert Einstein's birth, the National Academy of Sciences plans to spend \$1,600,000 for a bronze figure of Einstein surrounded by a precise star map showing the heavens as they were at his birth.

Objections have been far-reaching and diverse to President Handler's project despite the fact that the NAS Council affirmed the idea unanimously, and the necessary funds, borrowed from a bank, have already been committed to the undertaking.

- The star map has been said to suggest an interest in astrology.

- The *Washington Post* reviewer of such things, Paul Richard, said:

"The proposed Einstein statue—a gigantic ill-advised chunk of public piety—promises to be gross as well as trite."

and a *Post* columnist, Daniel Greenberg, called it "a statue without stature."

- The *New York Times* editorialized against it and the executor of Einstein's estate, Otto Nathan, has protested it in letters to the *New York Times* and to Philip Handler.

- The Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry suggested Einstein would have preferred to help immigrant scientists escaping from lands of oppression as did Einstein himself.

- FAS has received member complaints also about the misuse of funds.

—Continued on page 8

Continued from page 7

• Support for the project came from AAAS Chairman of the Board Emilio Q. Daddario, who editorialized at length in *Science* about it, urging members of AAAS to contribute to the NAS project; but his 700-word column never addressed the question of Einstein's own reaction to it.

#### Einstein Deserves Better—But What?

Einstein deserves something better than a project he could not have supported and would not have desired. It is, after all, in very poor taste to memorialize any person in a way he would not have wanted. According to Esther M. Stone, wife of I. F. Stone, who visited Albert Einstein in 1949 at his home after driving to Princeton from Washington, Einstein said in a tone of I-couldn't-bear-it: "I hope they never build a memorial to me in Washington." In any case, at the first inevitable suggestion that the money might better have been spent on some good work that directly helped the needy, Albert Einstein would have completely agreed. And he would have been, in any case, too embarrassed by this memorial to have attended its dedication.

In an effort to repair the damage, and considering the likelihood that the project is too far underway to be stopped, FAS wrote the NAS Memorial Steering Committee urging that an equal amount of funds be contributed to publishing the "Collected Works of Albert Einstein." These potential 15 or 20 volumes have been languishing for 24 years because funds were not available to edit the material, in preparation for their publication by Princeton University Press. Thus while institutions everywhere fatten their endowments, and decorate their buildings, with Einstein's name and semblance, few seem to want to know what this fascinating individual really thought. If the statue turns out to make possible the funding of his collected works, perhaps his spirit might just be placated. □

#### FAS COMMENDS WARNKE

FAS sent Paul C. Warnke the following commendation on November 9, 1978.

Like a political analogue of the traditional Western hero, Paul C. Warnke ran the confirmation gauntlet; suffered the tribulations of Congressional oversight; and con-

fronted the stubborn Russians without the slightest sign of flinching.

Armed only with unsurpassed debating, negotiating, and administrative skills—and with little or no covering fire—he framed the issues, designed the treaty and sustained the negotiations.

Now that the fracas can be managed by the local forces of law and order, he is making his modest departure into a temporary sunset—the absence of fanfare being, as so often, the last claim that patriotism puts on self-sacrifice.

Counting ourselves spokesmen for some of the local townsfolk, and wanting to recognize the contribution he has made to keeping us out of the fallout shelters, we accord him this commendation and send him our admiring regards. □

#### PUBLIC SERVICE AWARD TO WILLIAM A. SHURCLIFF

At the FAS annual Council meeting on December 16, 1978, William A. Shurcliff was awarded the 1978 Federation of American Scientists Public Service Award for "ingenious conception, solitary tenacity, vigorous pursuit, and proven success of his grassroots activities re the SST and solar power."

William A. Shurcliff's first foray at grassroots organizing began in 1967 when he founded the Citizens League Against the Sonic Boom (CLASB). From then through 1971, he devoted his weekday evenings and weekends to organizing opposition to the SST, mailing out newsletters and press releases. This league was so effective that one survey of scientific activism observed:

"More than anyone else, Shurcliff deserves the credit for having made it impossible to fly SSTs over the United States." (*Advise and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena*, Joel Primack & Frank von Hippel).

Today William Shurcliff is applying his grassroots organizing skills to solar power. Convinced that solar power can be made cost-effective only if a wide range of do-it-yourself home inventors are encouraged to tinker with promising designs, he is compiling and distributing compendiums of just such possibilities.

Dr. Shurcliff, a modest man, raised a host of objections to his receiving this award, but his campaign to avoid it was uncharacteristically unsuccessful. □

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