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FOR DOVES

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THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE: NEED SALT BE AT ISSUE IN THE SALT DEBATE?

In the jargon of the journalist, the question of ratifying the SALT II agreement is often shortened to ratifying "SALT." A failure to ratify the projected agreement is considered a defeat for "SALT," whereas a two-thirds majority for the agreement is hailed as a victory for "SALT."

There is a logical error here, to which Descartes pointed three hundred years ago, which involves substituting one symbol for another and then, in manipulating the new symbol, forgetting what the first one really meant.

After all, in logic, a defeat of any particular proposed treaty could lead to a better one. Indeed, the ratification of a poor treaty could discredit the entire SALT process. Logically the SALT process—and any particular result of the process—are quite distinct.

Understandably, the Administration and all those implicated in the particular proposed SALT II agreement have every reason to emphasize the misidentification to enhance support for their result. For them, a defeat of their SALT agreement is truly "thinking the unthinkable." And partly, also, because the proposed SALT agreement is so short on real substance, the dominant argument for it has become the alleged necessity to vote "for the process." The implicit assumption being, of course, that a vote against this agreement will put an end not only to the agreement itself, but to the SALT process more generally.

This might well be so, but it is no more inevitable in political reality than it is in logic. After all, we know the

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TWO OF THE CASES FOR SALT

Reprinted first is the relevant part of the opening statement of Americans for SALT, which FAS helped to organize. (The excerpt ends where the statement turns to arguments against those critics who argue America is behind.) Next are the relevant parts of an article by Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. A third supporting statement for SALT II was made by Jan Lodal in Foreign Affairs and this is discussed in terms of what it reveals about the weakness of the treaty. (See pages 5-6)

Americans for SALT

Statement by Executive Cochairmen Townsend Hoopes and Charles Yost:

Americans for SALT is a national citizens campaign for ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), now in the final stages of negotiation by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Those involved in this effort believe that ratification of SALT II is supremely important to the safety and interest of the American people. The treaty will set equal ceilings—upper limits—on the number of nuclear weapons systems now targeted by the two nations to destroy each other. It will provide for actual reductions in Soviet strategic systems. It will place limits on the development of new weapons. All provisions of the agreement would be verifiable by intelligence means at our disposal. We would continue to have the right to develop, and eventually deploy, new weapons systems if we should decide there is an imperative necessity to do so.

Conclusion and ratification of this agreement is a critical

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THE SALT II AGREEMENT TURNS WASHINGTON ON ITS HEAD

While hawks strain to find flaws in a treaty that will permit all the procurement for which they have called, doves are rising in the defense of a treaty they privately consider largely a sham. After six years of negotiation, during which numbers of alert nuclear warheads rose fantastically on both sides, a treaty has been proposed for the next six that very probably precludes hardly a single thing either side desired to do.

If nuclear warheads were somehow to be frozen in number and then cut back at 5% a year on each side, the freedom that both sides have been permitted from the time the negotiations started to the end of the treaty will take 23 years to overcome! This is a measure of the loss of ground during these negotiations begun in 1972.

Inevitably, FAS members and officials will have diverse views on the SALT treaty as they did on the Vladivostok

agreement from which this SALT II treaty evolved. We await the treaty details, not yet available, before polling the organization further. In particular, as discussed at the annual council meeting, FAS opinion will depend very significantly on whether the agreement shows the superpowers ready, willing and committed to a subsequent process of sustained and continuous reductions. And much of this will turn on what the declaration of principles says, not yet revealed—and on what the spokesmen for the two sides say, and can be credited with—about SALT III.

But in the absence of this further information, we have attempted herein to debate two alternatives, from the disarmament-supporter point of view: (a) asking the Administration to try harder on the one hand, and (b) approving the treaty on the other. Member comments are encouraged, as always. □

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agreement might well be defeated. Do we all plan to give up because only a Senate majority, for example, rather than a two-thirds majority, supported a particular agreement—a failure that would result from God only knows what diverse reasons?

Quite the contrary, if, indeed, a two-thirds majority could not be mustered for this particular agreement, a decisive majority—probably well exceeding two-thirds—would vote for recommitting the agreement to the negotiators and asking them to “try harder.”

Hawks concerned with Minuteman vulnerability would urge that sharp cuts in land-based missiles be agreed, so as to reduce the degree of vulnerability. But this is, after all, a legitimate arms control goal of which doves can hardly complain.

Doves would jump at the chance to reinstate the talks and, privately or openly, would welcome the opportunity to try for an agreement that better achieved disarmament goals than the one at hand. Few in the Senate would vote against “trying again”—certainly not those who had already antagonized some of their constituents by voting “no” on the treaty. So, at least as far as the United States is concerned, a defeat of this agreement would not end the SALT talks.

Nor would the Soviet Union be likely to concede that its Senate opponents had decisively put an end to the Soviet campaign for detente and disarmament. This campaign is a staple in Soviet thinking, and one that is made all the more necessary by U.S.-Chinese normalization of relations.

In fact, a Senate defeat of the agreement might not, for a time at least, preclude a tacit understanding not to violate the guidelines of the SALT II agreement itself. This is the pattern, for example, of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which was negotiated and signed but never ratified.

The fact that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate has not even taken up the ratification of this Treaty has not led either side to breach its provisions to limit underground testing to 150 kilotons. Instead, both are complying with its provisions while they seek to negotiate a still better comprehensive agreement.

The likelihood that this would occur in the case of the proposed SALT II agreement is enhanced by the fact that, like the Threshold Test Ban, the agreement precludes the two powers from very little that they actively want to do. The very reason the SALT II agreement is often termed a “sham” by doves, supports the possibility that it will not be violated pending further negotiations. And President Carter would only need a Congressional majority—rather than two-thirds—to put down any Congressional revolts that tried to do otherwise by passing procurement legislation on precluded weapons.

The option of “recommittal” of the agreement is important for doves to consider not only because the defeat of the agreement may indeed arise, and these contingencies seize center stage. In fact, doves have every reason to believe that nothing important will come of the SALT talks unless pressure is put on both superpower Administrations to try much harder than they have, which recommittal might produce.

At the very least, those who seek disarmament have every right to insist that the superpower leadership provide

the assurance that this “process” we are asked to support has some serious intention of moving toward sustained disarmament. So far, the “process” is a pig in a poke at best, one which, on the historical record, has been a failure.

It was, after all, 15 years ago—half the superpower race ago—when Secretary McNamara proposed at Geneva that a freeze of strategic weapons might be negotiated. This freeze is still not in sight, much less reductions, and, since that time, more than 10,000 warheads have been deployed on the two sides—most by far of the weapons each has.

For the political leadership of the two sides, unfortunately, the line of least resistance seems to be a “sham” agreement, one which limits the two sides only in direc-

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tions they have little intention of going, so as to avoid struggle with their military, but one which permits claims of progress for their political constituencies. Unless something new is added to this political calculus, no important disarmament will ever occur.

As we have remarked before, the superpowers are acting much like alcoholics who find it easy to agree that a few more drinks on each side will not hurt; in this way, they get the illusion of going on the wagon, and the drinks as well.

What is new, ironically, is the interest of U.S. hawks in disarmament, an interest stemming from their concern over the Soviet force buildup. Doves, who are never strong enough on their own to secure disarmament, ought to consider how to use this unexpected support to their own advantage.

In America, as a result of this confluence of interest, there exists a latent coalition for substantial disarmament. And it does seem, in fact, that it was the Russians who have objected to reductions in this last round.

Why not, therefore, pressure the Soviets—and the Administration—to agree to a more far-reaching scheme? We know the Russian system is slow to get itself together behind new ideas, as is ours also. Why not hold out for a greater degree of compliance with disarmament goals on the part of the Americans and the Russians and get the Politburo and the Administration to instruct their Defense Ministries to be more forthcoming?

When all is said and done, Senators will have to decide what it is they want; this is their Constitutional duty. But all participants should be aware that they could, if they wished, structure the debate in a far more constructive—and realistic—way than it is now structured, using, as tools, speeches and resolutions.

Instead of what Senators call an “up or down” vote on SALT, they could have a debate on approval or recommendation of a particular SALT agreement. Since, in fact, few of them really would vote to end SALT if the agreement failed, this restructuring cannot help but add reality to the debate. And it minimizes the risks that, in a spasm of self-fulfilling prophecies, all of SALT itself will come to be gambled on the Administration ability to rally the last crucial handful of Senate votes. □

TWO OF THE CASES FOR SALT

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step towards further, more comprehensive nuclear arms control and reductions in SALT III and beyond. The SALT talks are properly viewed as a process vital both to arms control and to more stable relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The SALT process has been carried on for nearly a decade under presidents of both parties. SALT I prevented the building of anti-ballistic missile defenses by either side. It also froze temporarily the number of offensive missile launchers at the existing 1972 levels. The preliminary Vladivostok accord negotiated by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger in November 1974 called for limiting each side to 2,400 offensive launch vehicles of all types. Subsequent SALT II negotiations have produced agreement to lower this overall number of 2,250, which will require the Soviet Union to dismantle up to 300 existing weapons systems.

Failure to ratify SALT II would abruptly interrupt this process of controlling and reversing the arms race. It

would lead inevitably to an escalation of political tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union and to sharp increases in strategic nuclear arms expenditures by both countries. An arms race thus unrestrained by any agreed limits would undermine the present strategic balance and pose grave new dangers to both countries, to their allies, and indeed to all mankind. World peace and America's security depend fundamentally on joint determination and action by the superpowers to curb the strategic arms race.

Public opinion polls consistently show that 70 to 80 percent of Americans favor a new nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union. Our principal European allies have strongly urged conclusion and ratification of SALT II and have emphasized the dangers of failure to ratify. . . .

SALT II: Will Carter Make the Strong Case There Is?

From the Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1978, article by Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.:

. . . Nor have we stood still in the last ten years as some suggest. In 1970, we had roughly 4,000 nuclear warheads. Today, that figure has more than doubled. Published figures show that between 1970 and 1977 we added over 500 new ICBMs to our arsenal. During the same period the Soviet Union deployed something over 400 new ICBMs. Today, we are pressing forward on several strategic nuclear programs, such as the Trident and cruise missile, which can significantly improve our capabilities.

The Soviet Union has not been idle either. Whereas we once could speak of our clear superiority in nuclear weapons, now we refer to our “essential equivalence” with the U.S.S.R. The Soviets have had an ambitious weapons development program which has produced a nuclear arsenal of impressive proportions. If we use ICBM throw-weight (thousands of pounds carrying capacity) as the yardstick of comparison between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the latter is clearly superior. This is, however, only one measure of comparative strength and gives a skewed impression of the realities just as does citing only our numerical superiority in warheads.

Despite the efforts of both the Soviet Union and the United States to expand their nuclear arsenals, both countries share a mounting sense of insecurity. We are both arming without really increasing our chances of surviving nuclear war as functioning societies. What we should both be seeking instead is a condition of strategic stability in which neither side can gain a unilateral advantage by initiating nuclear war. We should also be seeking to reduce the potential damage of any nuclear exchange within the context of maintaining strategic stability. Limiting the number of nuclear weapons targeted on each other can contribute to this goal. That is what SALT II seeks to do.

• In SALT I the Soviet Union was permitted more ICBM and SLBM launchers than was the United States. Under SALT II the principle of equal aggregates has been accepted. SALT I sets limits on the aggregate number of strategic nuclear launchers. This means that equal ceilings will be placed on the combined total of bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs each side can have. There will be sublimits as well for certain categories of delivery systems. For example, neither side will be permitted more than 820 MIRVed ICBMs. This limitation is of great importance to the United States because it is precisely this category

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of Soviet delivery vehicles which we consider most threatening.

- To achieve the overall aggregate of 2,250 the U.S.S.R. will have to destroy from 250 to 300 launchers at present targeted on the United States. Since our active force is under the agreed aggregate of 2,250, we will not be required to destroy any of our existing weapons. This agreement will inhibit Soviet weapon deployment while leaving us considerable leeway to pursue our strategic programs as planned at present.

- Under SALT I both the Soviet Union and the United States bound themselves not to interfere with the so-called National Technical Means of surveillance of the other side. No deliberate concealment of nuclear launchers is permitted. This injunction will be an important part of SALT II. Our negotiators believe that the limits being established are limits we can verify through independent means. We have absolutely no intention of "trusting" the Russians. Senate ratification of this agreement and certainly my vote will depend on the verifiability of this agreement.

AN IMAGINARY DIALOGUE — TRY HARDER VS. RATIFY

One way of exposing the issues is to overhear the always illuminating back and forth of a debate; this conversation might have occurred between a Carter Administration aide and a hard-nosed disarmer.

Try Harder: The treaty is not constraining anything that would otherwise have been purchased.

Ratify: Quite the contrary, intelligence estimates suggest the Soviets would have built hundreds more land-based missiles in the absence of the treaty, and would have modernized and MIRVed still more missiles than they can under the treaty, of those missiles they already have.

Try Harder: The Russians' interest in still greater numbers of missiles and MIRVs is problematic since they have enough for any conceivable military or political purpose and would be deterred from getting still more by the fear that, in the absence of a treaty, they would set off a U.S. response. For the same reasons, it should be possible to add on to SALT II some reductions; neither side needs all these weapons.

Ratify: But why not negotiate this treaty now and add on the reductions and other advances subsequently without the risk that the talks might be broken off, if SALT II is not ratified?

Try Harder: The problem is that the superpowers are not really interested in progress in disarmament but only in seeming to have progress. To give them the treaty, without the progress, is to permit another stalling game until 1985, at which point another sham agreement will be negotiated. The risk that the talks would be broken off is truly minimal; because of political, international, and strategic reasons both are almost forced to continue discussions.

Ratify: But the risks of changes in Soviet political attitudes—such as the death of Brezhnev—and the need for detente, make it our desire also to seem to be making progress in disarmament, and not snubbing the Soviet desire for an agreement.

Try Harder: Should we, then, permit SALT to be used for political purposes, rather than disarmament purposes?

- SALT II will take initial steps toward grappling with the issue of controlling the proliferation of new types of weapons and the modernization of existing systems. Ultimately, we can control quantity, but we do so to little purpose if we do not also control quality.

- Finally, SALT II will point to SALT III. It will set out a tentative agenda for continuing efforts to get control over our nuclear arsenals. A major topic on that agenda will be further restrictions on those Soviet systems we consider most worrisome.

Critics of SALT point to range restrictions placed on cruise missiles and the exemption of the Soviet Backfire bomber from aggregate restrictions as evidence that SALT does not serve U.S. interests.

The restrictions on cruise missiles will be in a protocol to the treaty which will expire before we even can deploy our first cruise missile. The Soviets will be under severe pressure to make major concessions if they want to see these restrictions continued for the full term of the treaty, which is scheduled to expire in 1985. Here, we will have a bargaining chip of enormous potency. . . . □

And are not the Russians locked into a modicum of detente by our close improvement of relations with China? It is a permanent reality of geopolitics that the Russians cannot wage a war of words on both their European and Asian fronts.

Ratify: Everything you say may be true but sending the treaty back for improvements is too smart by half. Enormous efforts have been put into the treaty during the last six years and too much can go wrong if the moment is not seized to sign it.

Try Harder: No doubt, there is a risk in failing to ratify the treaty. But the history of disarmament has been an almost total failure thus far, in part because its supporters were always willing to approve gratefully cosmetic agreements. Now is the time to stand our ground; indeed, if we do not achieve a pattern of reductions now, there are many reasons for believing that we never shall.

Ratify: But a failure to ratify the treaty will not be seen by the Russians, or the world, as a triumph of enthusiasm for disarmament over bureaucratic rigidities; instead, it will be seen as a signal that the hawks are in charge in Washington. Both sides will then build more weapons.

Try Harder: The Carter Administration can shape the environment of expectations, even in the wake of a SALT failure to ratify, by proclaiming its intention to bring the treaty back with improvements. Weapons desired by hawks can be forced upon it only by a 50% vote in both houses and if the Administration cannot prevent those votes, it cannot negotiate any SALT treaty.

Ratify: You are asking for too much of the SALT treaty anyway. These reductions you want will never reach the point of making any difference in the destruction of the United States if war occurs. What you call a "sham" agreement is not only quite useful in reducing the probability of war by stressing superpower common interests, but it is probably also about as much as can be done in reducing both destruction in war and the probability of it.

Try Harder: Even if that were true, you underestimate the distaste of the citizenry, and the world population, for

obvious shams. During the ratification debate, and subsequently under the treaty, it is going to become only too obvious that this is not a serious effort. And then even your vaunted political advantage will be lost.

Ratify: If so, people like you will be responsible for destroying its credibility by pointing out its loopholes.

Try Harder: The realities of these matters cannot be hidden and the lack of enthusiasm of arms control supporters for this treaty cannot be artificially orchestrated.

Ratify: Well, what would be your price for supporting this agreement?

Try Harder: We want an agreement in principle between the two sides for sustained and substantial reductions to follow; and we want this agreement to outline how they will be achieved so that the agreement is more than just another preambular paragraph of the kind that past treaties have always had, and superpowers have subsequently ignored.

Ratify: But it is unrealistic to think we can do this. The Soviets rejected our early proposal for sharper cuts, and they are not about to negotiate SALT III with reductions in a few weeks.

Try Harder: The Russians want this treaty badly, and there is no hurry to do it in a few weeks—take a few months, or a year or two if you want. And don't confuse their normal reluctance to engage in anything serious in disarmament—a reluctance our own Defense Department shares—with their inability to get themselves together for new departures in policy when the moment of truth arrives. Their politburo can advise their defense ministry that some kind of reductions are now necessary for political reasons.

Ratify: Look, this is easier said than done. And if it fails, how could we come back with the SALT II agreement? To urge further progress on them is to commit ourselves to get that progress or give up what progress we have.

Try Harder: Your chances of ratifying the treaty are not that good anyhow. What if, in the absence of a disarmament sweetener, you simply fail to ratify the treaty; where would you be then?

Ratify: But we don't really need a disarmament sweetener to keep the doves in line—no dovish Senators are going to defect from the treaty no matter how low the enthusiasm of some citizen disarmers. So, how does this further agreement-in-principle help us? It could even harm us with the hawks since it will provide further complexities that have to be analyzed. We should let well enough alone.

Try Harder: You underestimate the interest of hawks in having disarmament. They may prefer to call it "reductions," but it means the same thing. And their desire to resolve some of their concerns with reductions—concerns about throw-weight imbalance and about land-based missile vulnerability—should not be ignored. Undecided Senators are vulnerable to arguments that arms control is not just cosmetic but can achieve arms control goals and allay fears.

Ratify: But, according to DOD studies, even our early disarmament proposals would not have saved Minuteman from becoming vulnerable or done much about throw-weight.

Try Harder: This is why we want a *continuous* process of disarmament begun. No treaty is going to solve any

problem permanently because no treaty can control all technology and keep the two forces perfectly balanced. What we believe is achievable is a process of reductions which, once begun, would make the transitional problems just that—transitional. Land-based missiles would be phasing down, if not out, and hence imbalances between them would be much less important.

Ratify: But this just rhetoric until some kind of plan for such a process is put forward.

Try Harder: No, FAS put forward a sample plan of this kind called PAR, just last month. And it can be varied in all kinds of ways while still achieving the above result. If you don't like that plan, design another that does the same thing, but don't say that none is possible.

Ratify: Look, this is ridiculous. We do not need to placate the arms control community but the hawks. This is why we put a General in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We simply do not need to do these things you suggest.

Try Harder: Then why are you arguing with me if you don't care how we will stand on the treaty? If you don't need our vote, don't complain about our denial of it. □

DETAILS OF THE CASE FOR RECOMMITTAL

The SALT II negotiators have been fiddling while Rome burned. From 1972-1974, they negotiated the Vladivostok agreement. In effect, it took the upper bound of the number of strategic delivery vehicles possessed by either side (2,400 on the Soviet side) and set that as a limit. It then took the upper limit of the number of missiles planned to be MIRVed by either side (1,320 on the U.S. side) and set that as a limit. During these two years of negotiation, U.S. warheads rose from 6,000 to 8,500 and the Soviets completed their MIRV development.

For the next two years, from 1974-1976, little happened. In 1977 and 1978, there were the further negotiations of the Carter Administration. The result was that, four years after Vladivostok, the Russians have been induced to dismantle 250 strategic delivery vehicles by 1982, and the Americans will dismantle nothing. Thus, *ten years* after the negotiations began, reductions will have totaled about 250 vehicles out of about 4,500 on the two sides—about 5% over ten years or ½% a year.

During much of the time, the U.S. fought for, and won, the right to deploy about 3,000 cruise missiles and, of course, the Soviets retained the right to do the same. Counting the cruise missiles, warheads have, or will have by 1985, risen from about 10,000 to 13,000 on the U.S. side, and from 2,500 to perhaps 11,000 on the Soviet side from 1972-1985. Is this arms control?

In fact, the negotiations gave little attention to controlling numbers of warheads until late in the talks when they limited "fractionation"—the extent to which the missile payload could be subdivided into little warheads. What were the limits? They were the limits per missile now being deployed.

Rather than seeking disarmament or real restraints, the participants talked about strategic stability. For example, an important pro-ratification article from which we shall be quoting is that of Jan Lodal, "SALT II and American Security" (*Foreign Affairs*, Winter, 1978-79). Noting that SALT is more than a political exercise, he says:

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"To be successful, *SALT must improve our security by helping to stabilize the strategic balance* between the United States and the Soviet Union. Evaluating strategic stability involves complex technical questions, and even among the experts there is no consensus on how to measure the strategic balance."

(Italics added.)

This candid statement reveals a great deal about the limitations of using SALT to achieve stability.

For one thing, many doves do not consider that there is instability at all—just impending vulnerability of one arm of our strategic force (and comparable vulnerability impending for the same arm of the Soviet force). But if there was instability associated with the vulnerability of land-based missiles, did SALT II help it? Not at all. The defenders of the agreement simply assert first that it is sufficiently "flexible" (read "non-binding") that anything one would want to do for land-based missile survivability, one could do under the agreement!

Probing further, they assert that the mobile missile (MX) scheme "multiple aim point" (MAP) system in which a shell game is played with missiles will be *made feasible* by SALT. SALT will, in effect, keep the world safe for MAP! Thus Lodal says that numbers of warheads permitted on new types of missiles will be limited to 10 on ICBMs and 14 on SLBMs. He goes on:

"These provisions solve a major military problem for U.S. force planners, making a 'multiple aim point' (MAP) system—having more hardened shelters than there are missiles with the missiles clandestinely shuffled about among the shelters—at least theoretically feasible for the United States. Without such a limit, proliferating the number of aim points (targets) that the Soviet Union would have to attack if it wished to destroy our land-based missile force could lead to no more than a continuing race between our deployment of additional aim points and the Soviets' deployment of additional aim points and the Soviets' deployment of additional warheads. But the treaty will restrain the number of Soviet counterforce warheads to a practical limit of about 9,000, setting this as the worst case situation for which U.S. force planners might have to prepare."

But even if one accepts the irony of SALT making MAP possible, it only raises the further question of whether a SALT agreement ought to be trusted to delimit a worst case situation so firmly as to permit the expenditure of billions of dollars. What if SALT breaks down? Will we be out of pocket the tens of billions of dollars involved in the MAP scheme, and then find it does not work because the Soviets built still more warheads? Even a dove can see the risk of that.

According to Lodal, who believes it is "difficult to see how [the treaty] can be opposed on its technical merits," the new SALT treaty demonstrates that all that can be hoped for in arms control is that it will "moderate the competition, reduce the level of hostility, and clarify the intentions of each side." But precisely because it does so little it may be hard to see why it should be supported "on its technical merits."

Most important, but missing, of course, is the important problem of getting rid of the weapons so that, if they should all go off, the industrialized world would not be utterly devastated. The real goal of disarmament, to reduce the destruction if war occurs, has been utterly overlooked here, as in most other analytic pieces, simply

because the authors have lost any hope of getting from 2,250 to the few hundred that it would require to importantly make a difference. □

SALT III WITH REDUCTIONS


Whether the SALT II agreement were ratified or not, what would be the possibilities for structuring reductions in SALT III?

PAR: In the first place, there is the method of simply reducing by a fixed and agreed percentage each year the limit 2,250 on numbers of strategic delivery vehicles. This method (PAR) was described in detail in the January PIR where it was provided as an existence theorem for the fact that reductions could be feasible. Modernization constraints could be those of SALT II.

PAR applied to overall totals and MIRV total: Here percentage annual reductions (PAR) would be applied not only to the overall limits (2,250) but also to the limit on numbers of MIRVed launchers (1,250) thus insuring that neither side simply dismantled only the unMIRVed weapons first.

PAR applied to overall totals, MIRV totals, and land-based MIRV missile totals: Here one adds to the foregoing percentage reductions, each year, reductions in the limit of 820 on land-based MIRVs so as to ensure that the land-based MIRVs were not maintained while the sea-based ones were dismantled instead.

Land-based MIRV phase-out: Here the two sides would agree simply to phase out, over a fixed period, all land-



"... as a matter of fact, every day since SALT I went into effect, the United States has been adding a number of nuclear warheads to our inventory; and the Soviet buildup has continued despite SALT" (Paul C. Warnke, in "SALT—The Alternative is Unacceptable," September 12, 1978, in *Los Angeles*)

based MIRVed missiles. There are approximately 550 U.S. Minutemen III missiles of this kind possessing 1,650 warheads.

(Presumably the limits on the overall totals would be reduced accordingly, or else one or both sides would be encouraged to add missiles or bombers to make up the difference.)

Land and sea-based MIRV phase-out: Here the two sides would add to the foregoing a replacement of MIRVed warheads at sea with single warheaded missiles. This particular method treats the land-based MIRV missile as totally expendable but keeps the missile itself, on the submarine, albeit with a single warhead. One could, of course, require that the sea-based MIRVed missiles be dismantled entirely, but this would lead to an elimination of entire missile-firing submarines too early in the process.

Land-based missile phase-out: Here the two sides would agree to phase out all land-based missiles over some agreed period, e.g. five or ten years, or to phase them down to a very small force. □

STATE OF THE UNION: WHAT THE PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE SAID

After having advised us on January 20, 1977, that he wanted to move toward "the elimination of all nuclear weapons," President Carter advised the Nation on January 23, 1979, that he would "sign no agreement unless our deterrent force will remain overwhelming." And despite the fact that our Nation can be destroyed in 30 minutes, he advised the Congress that "the State of our Union is sound." The Administration is forgetting both the danger of a nuclear overhang and the importance of a solution to it, through sustained and continuous reductions of nuclear weapons.

What follows is the kind of State of the Union Address that no President seems to have the courage to make.

* * *

Three decades of the arms race have only confirmed the dilemma in which both superpowers are imprisoned. With each passing year, they have grown stronger, but, paradoxically, less secure.

In the forties, for example, no nation could lay a glove on America. In the fifties, a nuclear war would have left our major cities devastated. In the later sixties and seventies, the survival of large fractions of our population, and that of national recovery itself, became problematic.

The paradox is that, during this period, our weapons armory grew from a few to tens of nuclear warheads, to hundreds and then to thousands until, today, we have approximately 10,000 nuclear weapons at the ready.

The Soviet situation is, of course, similar. Its nuclear warheads increase steadily, though still less than our own. Yet, with every passing year, their society is still more imperiled.

The SALT talks, begun under President Nixon and carried on by President Ford, first began to deal with this dilemma in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty. This agreement, ironically, prohibited each side from building defenses against missile attack—defenses which both sides agreed would only stimulate further warhead production without, in fact, providing the protection for which so many billions would have been spent.

But despite this permanent agreement to remain ex-

posed to missile attack, and despite the presence of thousands of warheads on each side, the agreement could not, and did not, break the momentum of nuclear weapons deployment on the two sides.

Soon both sides had ten times more than had been considered necessary for deterrence even a decade before.

In my opinion, we have now reached an era of saturation parity. So long as the forces of the two sides remain secure against deliberate attack, each side has ample nuclear weapons to deter any person rational enough to be deterred at all. In this sense, we can have deterrence.

Unfortunately, deterrence is not safety. Our deterrent capability only means that the major danger we face shifts from being a nuclear Pearl Harbor to being a war nobody wants. Such a war, arising as most of mankind's conflicts do, through miscalculation and escalation, can occur despite the largest (and most stable) strategic forces.

A war nobody wants would be no less destructive for the fact that it was undesired by the involved leaderships of both sides. It would pollute the planet in ways time would never eradicate. It would obliterate the superpowers, leaving them, again paradoxically, more pitiful than many smaller countries less directly in the line of fire. Let no person mistake the potentially fatal cloud under which our Nation, the Soviet Union, and many other Northern Hemisphere countries have now fallen as a result of the nuclear arms race.

Fortunately, in no particular year is the risk of this failure of deterrence very great; so no man need feel hopeless about the prospects of negotiating our way out of it.

Unfortunately, over decades, the risks of this war nobody wants do mount; and since it is only too clear that it will take decades to eliminate the nuclear overhang, we must begin at once.

In short, SALT is, and ought to be, an effort to negotiate greater certainty that the United States will reach its 300th birthday, 97 years hence, and its 400th.

In my opinion, too many strategists have become habituated to the danger and oblivious of the irrationality that has always been the human condition.

For these strategists, war has become a war game and only a war game, rather than the universally undesired spasm of unimaginable horror it would in fact be.

For such strategists, the question always is: "Who's ahead?" But the history I have just described makes the answer clear: We're both behind.

For some, the question is of "managing the arms race." But the history of this contest shows that, in the absence of a major effort to reverse it, the arms race will be managed by forces well beyond the control of the political leadership on both sides.

No man filling the position I hold can seek to do less than to remove this apocalyptic danger from the horizon. On the one hand, if we can remove this threat of nuclear devastation, America's survival is virtually guaranteed. But so long as this threat of nuclear war remains, so long will our future be mortgaged.

And as I have indicated, it will be mortgaged not just to the Russians but to Russian roulette—not just mortgaged to deliberate attack but to events beyond the control of rational deterrence.

—Continued on page 8

Continued from page 7

The SALT agreement we have negotiated is but a way station on the road to regaining a measure of the invulnerability to destruction we once had and have so recently lost.

It only begins the process of reductions by requiring 250 Soviet delivery vehicles to be dismantled over the next few years.

But it does begin the process of disarmament and, whatever else SALT III will do, I promise this: SALT III will involve sustained and continuous reductions of strategic weapons on both sides.

We plan to reverse the arms race and, if possible, we will run it in reverse gaining the same momentum downward that has plagued us for decades in the upward direction.

In this SALT II agreement, we have achieved certain stabilizing measures. They give each side confidence that the other will not exceed certain guidelines in numbers of strategic delivery vehicles, and in numbers of weapons in each delivery vehicle and so on. The confidence and

planning advantages generated by these agreements will be put to good use in the shaping of future agreements.

But none of these stabilizing measures will conflict with our own needs to maintain the invulnerability of our nuclear force. Those things we may need to do, we can still do within the restraints agreed.

Begun under a Republican Administration and completed under a Democratic one, the agreement is totally bipartisan. And carefully shaped as it has been by strategic experts over four years, I have every reason to believe that it will meet the approval of the public and the legislature as its details are analyzed.

But one thing is certain. While SALT agreements can always be modified in future negotiations, a failure to ratify this agreement could, for the foreseeable future, halt the SALT negotiations themselves. Nothing could be, as I have indicated, more tragic in its potential implications for the future of this country and the industrialized world. The process simply must be continued until the threat of nuclear annihilation is lifted. □

CHAIRMAN GEORGE W. RATHJENS RESIGNS

FAS Chairman George W. Rathjens has felt obliged to resign during his second two-year term as Chairman because of having accepted two related Government positions as: (a) Deputy Representative for Non-Proliferation to Ambassador Gerard Smith, and (b) Chairman of the U.S. Interagency Committee for Evaluation of the International Fuel Cycle. These two assignments will be taking 80% of his time and thus, although he will be officially still employed by MIT, he felt a conflict of interest would exist between his serving as our Chairman and his Government service.

Jerome Frank, Vice Chairman, has graciously agreed to serve as Chairman through the remainder of his second and last two-year term as Vice Chairman, which expires in June, 1979. But he had long expressed a disinclination to serve as Chairman, and we are faced with twin vacancies for Vice Chairman and Chairman in June, 1979.

The nominating committee, chaired by Arthur Rosenfeld, proposed to run two candidates for Vice Chairman in June, 1979, to replace Jerome Frank, and to have the winner serve as Chairman during the last year of George

Rathjens unexpired term until June, 1980. This has a number of advantages in maintaining, among other things, the sequence of our elections.

The candidates proposed for Vice Chairman are Professor Nina Byers of UCLA, and Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton.

Candidates proposed by the nominating committee for the six seats available for Council are: Herman Feshbach, Professor of Physics at MIT; Andrew Sessler, Director of the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California; Peter Raven-Hansen, Washington lawyer; Richard L. Meier, UC Berkeley Professor of Environmental Design; Ellis Mottur, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Center, former science assistant to Senator Kennedy; Hugh DeWitt, physicist at the Livermore Laboratory; John Holdren, UC Berkeley environmentalist; Richard Nelson, Yale economist; Martin J. Sherwin, Princeton historian.

Persons wishing to nominate candidates by petition should obtain the signatures of 10 FAS members for Council Members and 20 for Vice Chairman and send them to the national office by March 10. □

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