

F. A. S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Formerly the FAS Newsletter

SPECIAL ISSUE ON
SCIENTISTS IN THE WHITE HOUSE

Vol. 3, No. 1

February, 1975

SCIENTISTS WANT THE PRESIDENT'S EAR

In the two years since January 26, 1973, when President Nixon dismantled the Office of Science and Technology, and the position of Presidential Science Adviser, no issue has more preoccupied the general scientific community.

The degree of consensus urging some kind of reversal of this decision is astonishing. A year later on the 22nd of January, 1974, the Committee of Scientific Society Presidents voted in favor of a three man White House Council on Science and Technology and, at a lunch that same day, so advised then Vice President Ford. The consensus among the scientific society presidents has not diminished but has grown to virtual unanimity as shown by subsequent meetings on May 1 and October 9. Indeed, at the last meeting, on December 9, which was held in conjunction with heads of engineering societies, there was again virtual unanimity in favor of this Council, and by engineers as well.

As is known, the Council on Science and Technology was also the recommendation of the Killian Committee of the National Academy of Science and, in this form, received wide editorial support. Furthermore, as part of Senate Bill S.32 sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy, it passed the Senate this fall.

In short, the scientific community was asking the President to reverse his predecessor but not insisting that he recreate exactly what had been before. Instead, the Council on Science and Technology was modeled after many successful councils including the Council on Economic Advisers and the Council on Environmental Quality. The three man Council would be created by law but its three members would serve at the pleasure of the President and have his confidence.

Why is the scientific community so concerned and so unanimous on this issue? The answer is clear. There has been no time in American history, outside of war, in which scientific advice was so important to the National well-being and prosperity. But we cannot help if we are not heard. And to be heard, we believe that we need the President's ear.

Only scientists can tell the President whether nuclear reactors are really safe, whether decisions made now can help ease food shortages later, whether advances in medical research do or do not make cancer ripe for cure, whether energy crises can or cannot be alleviated with one or more of the current proposals.

Obviously, there are Government agencies for each of these decisions and they do have scientists. But, in contrast to non-scientific issues, the President cannot himself assess the scientific advice given by those agencies. He does not speak the many languages of these scientific disciplines. He therefore needs his own scientists to provide a system of scientific checks and balances. Under each President since Eisenhower, this was done effectively by having White House scientific advisers. They were the scientific eyes and ears of the President and helped him assess the information he was given. Without such checks, he will be prey to every bureaucratic pet proposal and excess in the scientific field.

We believe that President Ford knows this very well. While in Congress, he was the beneficiary of a Scientific Advisory Committee in his Congressional District chaired by Dr. Vernon Ehlers of Calvin

—Continued on page 2

—Released by the FAS National Council
at its December 27 Annual Meeting

THE RISE AND FALL OF SCIENCE ADVICE

A few months after the National Science Foundation was created in 1950, William T. Golden, now AAAS Treasurer, began a study for President Truman on the organization of the Government for the promotion of scientific activities. Golden was already thinking of a scientific adviser to the President, possibly with an advisory committee. His memorandum to the President was eventually entitled "Mobilizing Science for War; a Scientific Adviser to the President." A Committee chaired by James R. Killian, then investigating the Research and Development Board, was unanimously in favor.

The National Science Board of the National Science

Foundation opposed the proposal evidently on the grounds that NSF's duties lay in this military arena. In 1951, NSF decided not to become involved in military research and its opposition was dropped.

The notion of a science adviser to the President ran into the opposition of General Lucius Clay who wanted the science adviser to be linked to his Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). In the end, President Truman welcomed a Science Advisory Committee to ODM as adviser to himself as well.

Sputnik was launched October 1957 and the Science

—Continued on page 3

Continued from page 1

College which met with him to good effect. In the last few days [December 22, 1974], President Ford has evidently asked Vice President Rockefeller to review this issue. We believe the Vice President, who is an experienced executive, knows also the importance of scientific checks and balances and quiet scientific advice. So we are hopeful.

When President Nixon dismantled this system, he aroused considerable antagonism in the scientific community. They believed that his administration was anti-science. Subsequently, he tried to quell the concern by giving the Director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) the title "Science Adviser"—if not "Presidential Science Adviser."

There were and are several problems with this arrangement.

1. First and foremost, the NSF Director does not have the President's ear. He may see him occasionally but that is something else entirely.

2. The NSF Director cannot help coordinate either policy for science or the application of science to policy from the bureaucratic level of an agency head. Indeed, NSF Directors had this purported authority to coordinate from its beginning in 1954, but the first NSF Director announced that the authority was unworkable—as it has continued to be.

3. The NSF Director has a conflict of interest in coordinating science policy while functioning as an Agency head.

4. The NSF Director has enough work to do without trying to do the work of a White House Council.

5. Under the existing ground rules, the NSF Director has no authority to question or discuss the science that goes on in the Defense Department.

Asked by FAS to describe what Dr. Stever's position is on the question of putting the scientists in the White House, we were advised by his assistant Philip Smith that he considers the present system to be "working," to be "adequate," and "capable of being made to work better." Dr. Stever has decided, we were told, not to be an advocate of the current system or any other system. He does consider, however, among the advantages and disadvantages of the various systems, these advantages of the current system:

1. NSF has a greater budget for policy research than the Office of Science and Technology had.

2. The White House has a crisis ridden atmosphere and staying out of it provides better perspective.

3. The National Science Board provides a vehicle for discussing science policy.

It is perhaps sufficient to say of these advantages, however, that there is nothing whatsoever to prevent a White House science advisory apparatus from making use of these advantages of NSF to the extent they exist.

In summary, for the scientific community, the issue of having the scientists in the White House

has all of the potential for the disastrous missteps of the Nixon pardon. We predict the following. If the President accepts the scientific community's desire for a Council on Science and Technology, he will go forward to have the best relations with the scientists of any Republican President since Eisenhower. If, instead, he accepts a public relations solution of some other kind—giving more visibility to the NSF Director, or putting forward an advisory Council to OMB or something else of this kind—his decision will be widely denounced by scientific groups of all kinds and his standing with scientists will never recover. □

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The FAS Public Interest Report is published monthly except July and August at 307 Mass. Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002. Annual subscription \$15/year. (However, please note that members of FAS receive the FAS Professional Bulletin and the FAS Public Interest Report as well as other membership benefits for a \$20 annual fee.) Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C.

Continued from page 1

Advisory Committee to ODM was still in business. In a conversation between President Eisenhower immediately after the event, Detlev Bronk mentioned Golden's original proposal for a full-time science adviser. A month later, encouraged by a meeting with the group and by comments from I. I. Rabi and James R. Killian, the President appointed Killian Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Thus was PSAC started. (For more detail, see reference 2 listed on p. 6).

Killian was succeeded by George B. Kistiakowsky, a Harvard chemist, who enjoyed especially warm relations with President Eisenhower. Kistiakowsky would sit in on National Security Council meetings and Cabinet meetings in a location in which the President could see him frown—a signal often followed by a Presidential request for Kistiakowsky's opinion.

President Kennedy appointed Jerome B. Wiesner as his Special Assistant for Science and Technology. By 1962—five years after PSAC was established—the demands for more public activity in this office were so substantial that the Office of Science and Technology (OST) was created. It had been noticed that the Science Adviser could not testify in his role as confidential science adviser; OST would provide a statutory base which the Science Adviser could direct under a second hat that permitted such testimony. Moreover OST would have a greater staff.

Its duties were spelled out in the message to Congress: "proper coordination of Federal science and technology functions." In particular: "to advise and assist the President . . . with respect to":

- (1) Major policies, plans and programs of science and technology of the various agencies of the Federal Government, giving appropriate emphasis to the relationship of science and technology to national security and foreign policy, and measures for furthering science and technology in the Nation.
- (2) Assessment of selected scientific and technical developments and programs in relation to their impact on national policies.
- (3) Review, integration, and coordination of major Federal activities in science and technology, giving due consideration to the effects of such activities on non-Federal resources and institutions.
- (4) Assuring that good and close relations exist with the Nation's scientific and engineering communities so as to further in every appropriate way their participation in strengthening science and technology in the United States and the free world.

Undoubtedly the longest participant in White House science advising at the staff level was David Z. Beckler, whose tenure in White House roles of this kind extended over 20 years and included serving all six Presidential Science Advisers. He sees the Killian and Kistiakowsky period as the "honeymoon period."

One testimonial to the honeymoon came when President Eisenhower, a month before he died, was visited by James Killian. Killian reports:

" . . . then, as I was leaving, he said, 'Jim, tell me about my scientists.' And then he ran down the names of the whole group that he had come to know as individuals,

JACKSON SUBCOMMITTEE SUPPORTED OST AND PSAC

"Like any other Presidential staff aide, the director of the science unit would have the job of making sure that the President is never isolated from the full flavor of debate and controversy on important issues in dispute. He would be expected to see that many channels of scientific advice are open to the President, and to make sure that all significant points of view on major problems reach his chief. . . . One of the great strengths of existing science arrangements at the Presidential level is their flexibility. The President's science advisers make effective use of ad hoc consultant panels."

Science Organization and the President's Office.

"Organizing for National Security: Science Organization and the President's Office"; Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery;

Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 1961

The Jackson Subcommittee was prophetic, in urging that PSAC and OST be given statutory underpinning; it was the later reliance only on a re-organization order that permitted President Nixon to dismantle both so easily.

and wanted to know where they were and how they were; and finally he said, 'Jim, you know in my experience in Washington that group seemed, more than almost any other with which I worked, to be there more for the good of the country than for themselves.'" (Reference 4, pg. 220)

As the Kennedy Administration progressed, however, a strong Special Assistant for National Security (McGeorge Bundy) began to steal some of the Science Adviser's thunder on military questions and, indirectly, on other issues. Beckler concluded:

"After President Kennedy appointed McGeorge Bundy as Special Assistant for National Security, the Science Adviser found it more difficult—although still possible—to reach him directly on national security affairs. This situation was intensified in the Johnson and Nixon Administrations to the extent that the Science Adviser's lack of direct access to the President on national security matters prevented him from bringing his special viewpoint to bear directly on major policy issues in the prosecution of the Vietnam war. This weakening of direct communication with the President was partly due to the emergence of a sizable NSC staff concerned with detailed national security policy formulation as contrasted with the very small NSC coordinating staff of the Eisenhower Administration.

Similarly, the President's Science Advisory Committee was restricted in its ability to deal with the full range of national security issues. After initial efforts which led to the establishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the consummation of a nuclear test ban, the committee no longer had active panels dealing with arms control issues (with the ex-

—Continued on page 4

Continued from page 3

ception of biological warfare). By the end of 1972, most of the PSAC panels on military technology had been transferred to the Office of Science and Technology.

Since the President's direct involvement with science and technology issues related mostly to national security matters, the Science Adviser's lack of direct communication with the President in these areas greatly weakened his ability to bring other issues to the President. As a consequence of this lack of direct contact with their Science Advisers, Presidents Johnson and Nixon were largely unaware of the activities and effective performance of the OST and PSAC."

Although science advisers continued to have "substantial influence on the military and space programs" something was increasingly missing; attendance of science advisers at National Security Council meetings became rare.

Beckler then describes the problems faced by OST and PSAC in its later years. Despite the fact that no leak was ever traced to either of these organizations' staff or consultants, suspicions were rife of latent disloyalty when PSAC scientists—even ex-PSAC scientists—were opposing favored policies. Past science advisers opposed the ABM; an existing PSAC member had the temerity to oppose the SST as a private citizen—and won. (FAS gave its first annual public service award to Richard Garwin for this act of independence, courage, and effectiveness.) In particular, PSAC suffered from "increased political activism within the scientific community itself. Former PSAC members were visible on the board of the Federation of American Scientists which launched a potent lobby against controversial Presidential proposals such as the ABM." Some ex-PSAC members supported opposition Presidential candidates. (For more detail on Beckler's survey see Reference 3.)

Finally, a few months after the 1972 election, on January 26, 1973, Nixon threw the scientists out. This had been rumored for a few days before. On the basis of the rumor and a tip, the FAS Director called, received permission to attend the White House briefing, and began circulating the FAS protest immediately after the announcement.

The hearings of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (now Science and Technology) nicely reveal the rising concern. In its first hearings, six months after the White House action, it heard Administration defenders of the policy.

Dr. John C. Sawhill, Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, defended the reorganization by saying that the underlying goal was to reorient the Executive Office "to focus on its original mission as a staff to the President for top level policy formulation and for monitoring policy execution." (Ref. 1, pg. 104.) He talked of NSF as having "grown in size and stature," having added applied research such as the RANN program (Research Applied to National Needs), and having ties through its NSF staff and National Science Board to a wide community of scientists and engineers.

The NSF Director supported the policy, of course; a

1962—OST CREATED

The National Science Foundation has proved to be an effective instrument for administering sizable programs in support of basic research and education in the sciences and has set an example for other agencies through the administration of its own programs. However, the Foundation, being at the same organizational level as other agencies, cannot satisfactorily coordinate Federal science policies or evaluate programs of other agencies.

—March 29, 1962, White House Message to Congress creating OST

1973 — OST (AND PSAC) DISMANTLED

The research and development capability of the various executive departments and agencies, civilian as well as defense, has been upgraded. The National Science Foundation has broadened from its earlier concentration on basic research support to take on a significant role in applied research as well. It has matured in its ability to play a coordinating and evaluative role within the Government and between the public and private sectors.

—January 26, 1973, White House message to Congress eliminating OST and PSAC

year later, his views continued to be supportive of the change as shown on the opposite page.

William O. Baker, President of Bell Telephone Laboratories, also supported the policy. He was Chairman of a group of 40 "Scientists for Nixon"; this group was considered to have as much influence with President Nixon as any scientific group even after the election for which it was formed. In July 1973, Dr. Baker defended President Nixon's decision. Where Administration defenders of this policy had focused on the added efficiency of a smaller White House Office with the scientists elsewhere, or on the President's right to run his office as he wished, or—as in Dr. Stever's case—on the size of the National Science Foundation, Dr. Baker explained a deeper rationale for the decision.

He said that science and engineering had "outgrown conception and planning by elite specialists." He thought the national objectives had changed from what he called "performance systems in science and engineering" (radars, ICBMs, space vehicles, etc.) to a need for "economic systems of science and engineering."

Because of this he felt that "quite a different strategy of research and development is necessary, one that is close really to what has been developed in private industry." Dr. Baker urged that "new policies seek the commitment, preferably on a free will, free market basis, of the half million population of research and development experts in our country."

There was no other support. Of the two other witnesses, Dr. Edward David said: "While science has not been downgraded in my view, the direct influence of scientists on societal affairs has." And William D. Carey, now Executive Director of AAAS, said, "I think the decision

to dismantle it and farm out its functions was an impulsive and mistaken decision."

By June, 1974, a year later, the Committee was growing uneasy. In its "tentative findings," it said:

"After study of the results of the first phase of the Committee's inquiry, there is a pervasive feeling of uncertainty in almost every aspect of the policy, planning and organizational science situation.

"For one thing, the Committee has little reason to believe that the Director of the National Science Foundation in his role as science adviser to the President has greater access to the President than did his immediate predecessors. Secondly, the information which has thus far been made public by the Science Adviser and by the Science and Technology Policy Office, while suggesting internal progress, provides no clue as to the effectiveness of the current arrangement. Thirdly, the Committee is unaware of any concrete policies, programs or plans which have been formulated in a coherent way and promulgated as a guide to the conduct of general Federal support of science and technology." (pg. 37, Reference 4.)

The Committee had heard from Dr. Russell C. Drew, Director of the Science and Technology Policy Office which services the NSF Director in his Science Adviser role, but it concluded:

"Dr. Drew's statement contained no new information. There is nothing in the printed record concerning what staff he had on board at the time of the hearing, or even where the office was located. We do not know what former OST personnel transferred to NSF, nor do we know what unfinished OST business NSF may have inherited." (pg. 7, Reference 4.)

By June, also, the National Academy had produced the Killian report. Testifying in support of it, Dr. Killian noted the old problem of NSF conflict of interest. Could a "line organization" look "over the shoulder of other departments of Government"? (Ref. 1, pg. 77.) In fact, in 1960, the first Director of NSF, Dr. Alan T. Waterman, was still pointing out emphatically that he had never used the latent authority in NSF legislation because NSF was unsuitable for overall review of National science policy:

"The National Science Foundation Act makes the foundation responsible for the evaluation of scientific research programs undertaken by agencies of the federal government and for a correlation of the foundation's scientific research programs with those undertaken by individuals and by public and private research groups. The foundation has consistently pointed out, however, that it is unrealistic to expect one federal agency to render judgment on the overall performance of another agency or department." (Reference 4, pg. 158.)

Killian emphasized the importance of having a body in the White House that scientists can feel understands "their particular problems." He also urged as a corollary that there be a "long-range research and analysis" effort made somewhere in the Executive Office of the President that would go forward on an interdisciplinary basis.

POSITION OF H. GUY STEVER, NSF DIRECTOR

"The issue is how best to incorporate our scientific expertise and judgment into the governmental decision-making process. On this honest men may certainly disagree. I believe, however, that the present strategy does offer certain advantages."

"At the time the reorganization plan affecting science policy was proposed, the President noted that it was particularly intended to promote more effective management of the executive branch and of its agencies and functions. It was emphasized that, aside from the question of fiscal economy, the plan has "one logically consistent" objective, namely, streamlining the Executive Office and transferring major responsibilities that could better be performed elsewhere."

"In his testimony on the plan, Dr. Sawhill spelled out the strengthening of department agency capabilities in science and technology, as the federal government has increasingly been called upon to address civilian problems with a high scientific or technological component. Implicit in this has been a growing assumption of responsibility for scientific decisionmaking at the agency level, along with an increase in the resources for this. The reorganization plan may be seen as formal recognition of this increased role and capability at the agency level."

"Rather than downgrading science, I would submit that the reorganization plan indicated that science is here to stay—an integral part of federal agency programs and decisionmaking in the civilian area. While the Administration has played an important part in redefining this role, it is basically the result of a period of rapid change in our society and its institutions."

"To the extent that there is a need for coordination of science policy *qua* science in the federal government, for a summation of the overall picture in terms of scientific judgments, the NSF would seem an appropriate place for this responsibility. It is the one federal agency that deals with the entire range of science disciplines and with applied national problems falling between or outside other agency jurisdictions. It has developed a staff of scientists and administrators with expertise throughout the science spectrum and a wide-ranging network of ties to academic, industrial, and local government communities."

"I would venture the speculation, however, that the major questions of policy organization in the future will not concern science as such. What we must try to find are effective means of arriving at wise decisions that involve a whole host of alternative costs and benefits affecting the entire fabric of society."

Later in this June 26, 1974 letter to the Committee Stever noted that the dual role meant that his days are "quite fully arranged" but that he was "able to perform these two functions." (Ref. 1, II, pg. 100.)

In his testimony before the Senate Special Subcommittee on the NSF on October 8, 1974, he said of the Council on Science and Technology, "In many ways this is a return to the earlier mode of science advice which did not take full advantage of the strengths of the mission agencies including NSF."

UNANIMITY IN FAVOR OF A COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The support for a Council on Science and Technology went far beyond the Killian Report. In testimony before the House Committee on Science and Technology in July 1974 a great deal of support was heard for such a Council and against the present two-hat arrangement.

George B. Kistiakowsky, Eisenhower's Science Adviser, said:

"The present situation, in which the director of the National Science Foundation (NSF) is called the science advisor, has little in common with presidential science advising." (pg. 181)

Earlier, in April 1974, he had proposed the Council on Science and Technology in *Science* magazine.

Jerome B. Wiesner, Kennedy's Science Adviser, agreed with Dr. Kistiakowsky. The Killian Committee had provided a "satisfactory" basis for resolving the problem, and he actually preferred a three-man Council to a single Science Adviser. (pg. 191-193.)

Donald F. Hornig, Johnson's Science Adviser, referred to the "surprising unanimity" among the four science advisers testifying and said he had proposed a "Council of Scientific and Technical Advisers" in 1969. (pg. 199.)

Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, Science Adviser to Nixon, said that the Killian recommendation was a "sound basis" for resolving the problem. He also referred to a report which is evidently being kept private, if not secret, which was done by PSAC under his and Dr. David's tenure. The panel was chaired by Patrick Haggerty, Chairman of Texas Instruments, and it evidently also proposed the Council on Science and Technology.

Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, testified that the ruling Council of the Academy had given the Killian Committee proposal a careful review and "strong endorsement." (pg. 64.) He noted that the Academy had had no advance warning when President Nixon dismantled PSAC and OST. Concerning the present situation he allowed that "one has the suspicion that Dr. Stever spends a large fraction of his time being Science Adviser and the Deputy Director is now running the National Science Foundation."

Speaking for a Task Force of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), Professor Jurgen Schmandt said:

"Whatever the final solution to this question will be, one thing seems quite clear to us: A reunified science policy advisory function at the Presidential level, addressing itself to both civilian and military R&D cannot possibly be performed out of the NSF." (pg. 110.) Personally, he saw "many advantages" of the Council type of arrangement.

The Comptroller General, Mr. Elmer Statts, allowed himself the following characteristically uncontroversial view:

"While too little time has elapsed for adequate evaluation of the new arrangement, in my judgment, many seem to believe that it is not a satisfactory one for the reasons presented in support of the establishment of

the Science Adviser in 1951 and the Office of Science and Technology in 1962." (pg. 139.)

Personally, he preferred a single White House science adviser to a Council, however, and thought the single adviser should be confirmed by the Senate.

The Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, Don K. Price, was in "substantial agreement" with the Killian Report and the AAAS Task Force. (pg. 156.)

Dr. Robert Seamans, Jr., then President of the National Academy of Engineering and now Administrator of the Energy Resource and Development Administration, told the House Committee on Science and Astronautics that his personal inclinations ran toward a "Council on Science and Technology, possibly modeled after the Council of Economic Advisers or the Council on Environmental Quality." (Reference 1, part II, pg. 19.) He wanted a "strong activist Chairman," "a very senior policy research staff" and statutory reporting requirements to Congress and the public. He considered that these functions—over and above that of advising a President—made the Council justifiable independent of the extent to which the Council had close liaison with the President. (pg. 41.)

Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., Science Adviser to President Nixon, had worked in the most difficult environment of all the Science Advisers. Not unnaturally, he saw most clearly the weakness of an advisory apparatus that was only advisory. He wanted, therefore, a White House level entity

"capable of monitoring the performance of the science-for-policy mechanism throughout the Government and of working on a coequal basis with other elements of the Executive Office involved in policymaking and execution." (pg. 122.)

He did not want the scientists "tugging at the sleeves" of Executive Branch officials, nor relying upon "personal relationships" with the President or others for their influence. He proposed an Office of Research and Engineering Management which would have the authority to review the entire science budget before it was reviewed by OMB and then to negotiate it with OMB. Thus it would "authorize" the budget before appropriation in analogy with Congressional Committee organization.

REFERENCE MATERIAL ON SCIENCE ADVISORY ISSUE

1. Hearings of Committee on Science and Astronautics, House of Representatives: *Federal Policy, Plans and Organization for Science and Technology*, Parts I and II.
2. "Science Advice in the White House," Detlev W. Bronk, *Science* magazine, October 11, 1974.
3. "The Precarious Life of Science in the White House," David Z. Beckler, *Daedalus*, Summer, 1974.
4. Interim Staff Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics; *Federal Policy, Plans and Organization for Science and Technology*, June, 1974.

COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY APPROVED BY SENATE

On October 10, 1974, S.32 was passed unanimously by the Senate; it had been guided through the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare by Senator Edward Kennedy.

Calling for a three man Council with Chairman, the members would have to be confirmed by the Senate and chosen:

"from among individuals who, by reason of their training, experience, and attainments, are exceptionally qualified to analyze and interpret scientific and technological developments; to appraise and recommend programs, policies and activities of the Federal Government in the light of the policy declared in section 2; and are sensitive to the economic, social, esthetic, and cultural needs and interests of the Nation."

The Council was to determine the desired level of Federal investment in science and technology in conjunction with the Council on Economic Advisers. It would determine priorities for allocating Federal funds in the major expenditure areas. As part of the process of recommending its conclusions to the President and Congress, it would prepare an annual "Science and Technology Report."

The bill died when the House failed to act in the few weeks remaining but was reintroduced as S. 32 on Jan. 15.

DIRECTOR'S STATEMENT AT ANNUAL COUNCIL MEETING

The National Science Foundation Director is betraying the legitimate, long-standing, and virtually unanimous desire of the scientific community to have its representatives in the White House by adopting on this issue a totally unwarranted stance of neutrality. His assessment that the situation is "adequate" and "working" can only be made by one who has completely different standards of what represents adequacy, than those who represented the scientific community in the White House for the last 15 years. But even if Dr. Stever sincerely considers the present situation adequate, how can he consider that he is representing the scientific community while failing to urge upon the President the solution that has been so constantly urged upon the President from virtually all responsible scientific quarters.

The same White House point of view that encouraged President Nixon to dismantle the science advisory apparatus and later to give the NSF Director, belatedly, the title "science adviser" (not "Presidential" science adviser) still walks the White House. The Administration badly needs, in this area as in others, to make a fresh start. Dr. Stever should be helping it do so, rather than hindering it, by offering to give up the title he was so grudgingly given as Science Adviser in favor of a Council of Science and Technology that would free him to give full time to the National Science Foundation Directorship.

Jeremy J. Stone

SHAME ON THE SECRET SERVICE NOT TO SPEAK OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

On November 26, 1974, FAS wrote the Secret Service, at the White House, advising that FAS was considering picketing the White House on the date of the FAS annual meeting, December 27. In the politest terms possible, it explained that we represented 6,500 scientists and 36 Nobel Prize winners and were concerned that the President had not put the scientists back in the White House. Since FAS had never before been driven to this extremity, could the Secret Service advise what one was required to do to secure the right to such a peaceful demonstration?

There was no answer and we decided, in any case, upon a press conference which was successfully held. At 11:00 A.M. of the day in question, we received a call from the National Park Service which—the meeting being on—we did not return. A few days later, another call from the Park Service advised us that 48 hours notice was required before demonstrations!

We pointed out that it was not cricket to answer our letter the day of the planned demonstration only to tell us that 48 hours notice was required. The Park Service advised us that the Secret Service had given them the letter on the 23rd or 24th of December. Most of the delay was therefore due to it.

The Secret Service may simply have been protecting the President from bad publicity. The day before it released the letter to the Park Service, the President had temporarily neutralized our complaint about scientists in the White House by announcing publicly that he had turned the matter over to Vice President Rockefeller for a study.

HATS OFF TO STATE'S INR

The Intelligence and Research Bureau of the Department of State had a brilliant and unorthodox solution to an intelligence problem on May 10. One of its members had been instructed to prepare a memorandum on the positions taken by the arms control community during the period 1969-72 including, in particular, those of FAS. State presumably wants to know whether FAS, and others outside the Government, are applying a different standard to recent arms control achievements of the Administration than to earlier achievements.

You may ask: did INR break into our office, rifle our files, send a plant to look for a job, or a stooge to wander in idly asking, perhaps, for membership information? None of these. It called us up and asked us for the information! We promptly invited the INR representative to visit and spent a happy hour discussing FAS's philosophy toward arms control and exposing any and all statements we made during that period.

While the rest of the American intelligence community is fighting off attacks, INR, at least, seems to have come home to America.

CARE IN CHARACTERIZING SCIENTISTS

A report in Science Magazine of January 10, 1975, gave FAS more space than any of its press conference had ever received there—only to denounce it. The press conference concerned NIH.

The article is rather more a column than a news report with all the license columnists permit themselves. For example, it flatly stated that FAS had seized upon the firing of NIH's Director "as an opportunity to get publicity."

But the objection we want to air here concerns the portrayal of scientists in general. The column revealed a kind of "non-scientist chauvinism" in claiming that "scientists seem to have a knack for putting [these problems] in ways that sound self-serving." Now it may be true that all human groups sound self-serving when they discuss issues of concern to them. But it seems simply an anti-scientist smear to charge this especially to scientists. Had the sentence referred to women, Jews or blacks, it would have been edited out as a sign of male-chauvinism, anti-semitism or anti-black feeling. But, with regard to scientists, stereotypes of this kind are increasingly frequent in the works of columnist science writers. For example, this article also quoted, approvingly, the notion that FAS complaints were "evidence of the arrogance of scientists." A later article suggested that scientists at NIH were "forever complaining."

In fact, professionals of all kinds are constantly trying to fend off interference from non-professionals in the use of their skills—and is that arrogance in any case?

It is all too easy to make a scientist or anyone else sound like a fool if one is permitted the license given columnists. It only takes a little overstatement. To take another example from an earlier article:

"The same scientists who so vigorously insist that you cannot buy results also declare that unless more money

is pumped into biomedical research there will be no progress and this country will lose its preeminence in the field. They seem to be asking to have it both ways." Maybe so, maybe not. If it had read:

"The same scientists who so vigorously insist that you cannot buy result *on demand* also declare that unless more money is pumped into biomedical research there will be *insufficient progress to maintain our preeminence.*" (changes in italics.)

it would have seemed quite sensible. We ask more "Care in Characterization."

NOMINATIONS FOR COUNCIL SUBMITTED

The nominations Committee, chaired by Arthur Rosenfeld, submitted these nine nominees for the six positions for Council members in the April election: William Bevan, psychologist; Fred Bergsten, economist; Thomas Bryant, M.D.; Morton Halperin, political scientist; Daniel Koshland, biochemist; Leonard Rodberg, physicist; George Silver, professor of public health; Victor Rabinowitz, specialist in International Development and Frank Von Hippel, physicist.

Vice Chairman Anfinsen having declined to serve as Chairman, the nominating committee has asked Philip Morrison to serve an additional one-year term as Chairman while a new Vice Chairman is serving an initial term. For Vice Chairman, the nominating committee has proposed two nominees: Jerome Frank of Johns Hopkins, psychiatrist, noted for his work on problems of war and peace, and Leon Cooper of Brown University, Nobel Prize winner in physics.

Persons wishing to nominate additional candidates should send petitions (with 10 FAS member names for Council member suggestions and 20 FAS member names for either of the higher offices).

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300
307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002
February 1975, Vol. 3, No. 2

- I wish to renew membership for calendar year 1975.
 I wish to join FAS and receive both newsletters as a full member.
 Enclosed is my check for 1975 calendar year dues. (I am not a natural or social scientist, lawyer, doctor or engineer, but wish to become a non-voting associate member.)
 \$20 \$50 \$100 \$500 \$10
 Member Supporting Patron Life Under \$10,000
 Subscription only: I do not wish to become a member but would like a subscription to:
 FAS Public Interest Report — \$15 for calendar year
 FAS Professional Bulletin — \$15 for calendar year
 Please note that members receive both newsletters and other benefits for \$20 dues.
 Enclosed is my tax deductible contribution of _____ to the FAS Fund for its permanent home on Capitol Hill.

NAME AND TITLE _____
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