

# F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

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EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT  
MOVEMENT

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## EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT MOVEMENT REALLY WANTS UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT

*Wherein the author journeys to London to seek out the goals and style behind the mushrooming British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the intellectual foundations of the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) movement and, in the end, finds both. A week which began with a historic three-day CND meeting ends, by happenstance, with Reagan's disarmament proposal, and a last interview with the only person in Britain who seems to be able to explain to the author, END's vision of an alternative future for a denuclearized Western Europe — one about which FAS members will feel a certain ambivalence. In between, a dozen other points of view are encountered.*

*It is felt that FAS members will best understand and digest the issues involved if the newsletter takes the simple form of a trip report. Each will see what FAS' representative saw. In the end, FAS members are asked to answer certain questions with a view to advising the FAS leadership on their reactions to these events bearing, as closely as they do, on the survival not only of Europe but of our own nation and much of the planet.*

### THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 11: REFLECTIONS ON THE WEEK BEFORE

Leaving Kennedy Airport on the morning of the 12th, I began cramming, which the previous week had not permitted.

Whatever the British disarmament movement was doing, the U.S. movement was obviously beginning to form, and it was taking up time.

The 11th of November (Veterans Day) had been the day of U.S. convocations on nuclear war; my contribution had been to speak at the Princeton Institute for Advanced Study and then at Princeton University. Audiences of the kind that appeared had not been seen since I entered this business 20 years before under the pressure of the Berlin Blockade, atmospheric nuclear testing, and fallout shelter controversies.

The week before it was possible to calibrate this precisely. Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota had decided to hold its convocation a week earlier. I had seen there, on November 4, a more enthusiastic crowd than the one which heard me give a similar speech precisely 10 years before. Carleton had a leading arms control activist, Barry M. (Michael) Casper, and he was seen fully activated, preparing slides to be distributed at convocations all around the country.

Before the speech, he gathered some colleagues from the University of Minnesota and, in his parlor, we negotiated an FAS Nuclear War Education Project which, in due course, will be distributing nationally information on the teaching and training of arms control specialists. The Min-

nesota activists who agreed to chair the project (John Harris and Eric Markusen) made me feel that a two-decade spell of disinterest in these matters by graduate students was over, at least for a few years.

During the week also, FAS had found surprisingly strong interest in distributing at all the convocations its simple petition, to wit:

"Our nation ought not base its policies or its weapon programs on the belief that it can limit, survive, or win a nuclear war."

Interest had been sufficiently high that we had struggled during the week to get it introduced in legislation, the better to focus the campaign. After painful negotiations with two Senate offices who wanted it reduced to the embarrassingly banal:


Resolved: The goal of U.S. policy should be to prevent nuclear war.

we had found Senator Hatfield's office ready and willing to cooperate — just in time to mailgram the introduction of Senate Concurrent Resolution 44 to all the convocation organizers (or FAS "Correspondents") involved.

None of this had left much time for background reading on British activities. All I really knew was that London, like Bonn and Brussels, had had an enormous demonstration against cruise missiles.

Attitudes toward nuclear weapons were clearly changing throughout the world — but not always in the same direction. In Japan only 6,000 persons had turned out to protest the arrival of the aircraft carrier Midway (presumably carrying nuclear weapons) despite organizer expectations of 100,000! The New York Times of November 5 had carried an op-ed piece documenting this decline in the well-known Japanese "nuclear allergy" and arguing that "36 years might be just too long for any allergy to remain active".

But in Europe it was obviously different. An allergy was



Barry M. (Michael) Casper  
U.S. Disarmament Activist

growing. On November 11, the Greek Government had said:

"The removal of the nuclear warheads will be one of our first demands in the negotiations on the American bases..."

The material I was now reading showed similar pressures in Britain. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) had been formed in 1958 and had, like our own disarmament movement, declined after the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, and related improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations. Now protest was on the rise, dating its revival from two impulses:

a) the British Government decision that it would replace, in due course, the four Polaris submarines with four or five new Trident submarines at a cost of about \$10 billion, and

b) the British Government decision to permit American cruise missiles to be installed in two British bases as part of the basing of these missiles in Germany, Holland, Belgium and Italy also.

But there were other reasons which, taken together, had produced a critical mass of protest unexpected, I later learned, even by the organizing activists: the failure of SALT, the impending failure of detente; the rise of a new consciousness among the twenty-year-olds; and even the fact that the right (Conservative Party) was in power in England which meant that the left (Labor Party) was in opposition and could, without direct responsibility for on-going policies, encourage a much more sweeping attack from the left than it would have permitted while in office. Indeed, it had voted, articles said, to abandon British nuclear arms. (This turned out later to be quite misleading.)

### FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13: CND CONFERENCE OPENS

En route to the CND conference which was being held in the district of the original "Jack the Ripper", a taxi driver asked if I had seen a "quite frightening" TV special the night before. It had explained that, after a nuclear war, meat should be eaten right away before the bacteria had gotten to it!

On the whole, however, he wanted to keep Britain's nuclear defenses. He thought most people rather uninterested in the subject. The last mammoth demonstration had been "made" by the appearance of Michael Foot, the Labor Party leader — and the one high official of the Labor Party most committed to unilateral British disarmament.

By mischance arriving quite early, I interviewed the only two delegates on the scene. One was a young Scottish solicitor from the Isle of Skye and the other an unemployed 27-year-old British worker, Nick Carroll.

As far as they were concerned, the arms race was "fear breeding fear". But with them, as with all subsequent interviews at CND, there was more (much more) vocal apprehension about U.S. policy than Soviet policy. It was said of both Brezhnev and Reagan that: "They would try to keep nuclear war limited to Europe." But Brezhnev's quotes on the suicidal quality of nuclear war were applauded, while Reagan's on the possibility of limited nuclear war

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were denounced.

More surprisingly, they felt the Soviets had "more to fear" than the West. But that each of the two states were "potentially as bad as the other", Nick Carroll worked with the Labor Party but he was disappointed with Labor because he was not at all sure that the Party would "carry through" on its promise to disarm unilaterally, if it were elected.

While we talked, the organizers of the conference arrived and began unloading 50 kinds of pamphlets and books to be sold, several tens of different kinds of badges and decals, and photographs of the last demonstration. Lines began forming as some of the 900 delegates arrived.

One well-dressed, and clean-shaven, delegate said he was a member of the "Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) a union of about 500,000 which FAS had learned about in its report on the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) with which ASTMS was affiliated. He said the CND policy of "no nukes", "no U.S. bases" and, indeed, a withdrawal from NATO, was a goal "in the short run" to get out of the target zone. In the longer run, the goal was to take the lead in unilateral European steps toward getting rid of nuclear weapons. CND now had 35,000 to 40,000 members paying dues of 8 pounds (\$15.60) a year, hence a budget of about half a million dollars. In his own Sheffield, there were 50 national members (i.e., ones paying these dues) but 1,000 local members (paying 1 pound).

He said CND was now a threat to the establishment and so it expected a smear that it was "ultra left, communist-led and supported by Moscow gold". But although there were some communist party members in elected CND positions, none of these charges was accurate.

One of his associates said he was:

"afraid Reagan might be dumb enough to press the button since he was crazy enough to talk of invading Cuba".

Reagan's syntax troubled them and another on-looker said:

"Can't even speak on his own — how can he be trusted in the ultimate crisis".

The Sheffield delegate said that "only an invasion of Poland would change CND prospects". Asked if Poland had not, really, *already* been invaded, the group compared



Nick Carroll  
Unemployed Worker

In background CND delegates are examining photographs of their successful demonstration on October 24.

the situation in Poland to their view that, if the British asked the U.S. to remove its bases, the U.S. would seek to "destablize" the British Government. It was "all the same".

In general, the U.S. was "talking about all-out first-strike superiority" and it was safer out of NATO and without nuclear weapons than with them. Britain, they felt, had been turned into, in effect, an "American aircraft carrier".

One of the much rarer older men, a bank teller, remembered the marches from Aldermaston (Britain's nuclear weapon laboratory) in which he had participated twenty years before. But he said the last demonstration was much bigger: "... never seen anything like it".

At the CND Plenary, the delegates were told that 120 amendments to the position of CND had been submitted and that history showed that they had never been able to get through more than 15, so they had eight times too many and would only be able to vote on some "composites".

The plenary broke up into "workshops", and I decided to attend the session on non-violent direct action in the company of a mathematics instructor whose Ph.D. was in relativity. He explained that this session was important because:

"...we have had large demonstrations and some political influence but have stopped not a single weapon so some think we should move on to something more. But others think this would lose us support".

"Something more" meant "stopping trains with nuclear weapons on board" or "cutting fences" — but the latter destroyed property and therefore was argued not to be "non-violent".


The workshop had 150 attendees, was intensely democratic (as were all the meetings) and somewhat philosophical ("Was a hunger strike direct action since — although it was "acceptance of personal responsibility" — it was not "illegal"? "Did the symbolic become direct action only when law is violated?")

The draft under discussion was:

"CND supports regional and local groups in undertaking *considered non-violent* direct actions in pursuit of the British campaign (and would be willing to organize and lead such direct action should the occasion arise). This is particularly urgent in view of continued government *rejection of popular demand* to stop the Trident program and reject the basing of Cruise Missiles in this country. In particular, Conference supports the peace camps at Greenham Common or elsewhere and actions against *Operation Hard Rock* next Autumn. (underlining in original)

The parenthetical phrase above was added from the floor by a vote of 72-52, and the resultant "composite" carried overwhelmingly.

Speakers said they had learned from U.S. experience that "affinity groups" could function without leaders and hence without danger of a leadership decapitating arrest and that large coordinated movements could be based on



*Monseignor Bruce Kent*

*CND Secretary-General on left with CND delegate. Kent (52) is a Roman Catholic priest and former British Army tank commander.*

local autonomy of many small groups. (One wondered if a non-violent technology was spreading throughout the world).

Others warned that local groups can't achieve anything. Only political power, and hence the election of the Labor Party, would succeed. Moreover, CND represented only that one-third of the electorate that wanted the nuclear weapons out.

To get the other third, they would need to mind their manners. Most seemed to feel that direct action was better left to smaller groups, because of the nature of direct action and because it meant that CND as a whole could not be smeared by the illegality associated with direct action.

There was talk of "fasts to the 40-day limit", of a new group called NAT (Non-Violent Action Training) in which one member had learned more in a week than he already knew. Some wanted to concentrate on "open days" on American bases, and there was much talk of the woman's peace camp at Greenham Common — one of the two sites at which the American cruise missiles were to be emplaced.

The "Women for Life on Earth" had left Cardiff on the 27th of August, walked 125 miles without, they felt, getting sufficient media coverage; even chaining themselves to the fence at Greenham Common and demanding televised debate had not succeeded in getting them either arrested or publicized. But after they turned a few days of chaining into a "peace camp" of indefinite duration, this *had* produced some attention. Subsequently, at the above meeting, CND decided to encourage such camps at all American bases.

The tone of the direct action workshop was a bemusing combination of peace group rhetoric and militancy, with some saying we should focus on the slogan, "Greenham Common will never be actuated," and others talking of the time "we took" Trafalgar Square. Some even spoke of the need for "our own rapid deployment force". The CND membership is also convinced (as one explained it privately) that "anyone with an American accent is probably CIA". FAS attendance at this workshop had to be quietly defended by Monseignor Bruce Kent, who is the current General Secretary of the CND.

#### **SATURDAY: THE CND MEETING PLENARY**

On arrival, Saturday morning, tried hopelessly to get a grasp of the different left-wing newspapers being hawked at the doors. The Communist Party "Morning Star" was

reporting on the Party's decision to attack the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But there was also the Trotskyite "Spartacist" saying it was the true party, and that the goal was to "smash NATO and defend the Soviet Union" — its salesman denounced the Communist Party for having had a headline "Defend Britain" which he considered too parochial.

Also on sale was the Socialist Challenge (Trotskyite also). It supported CND and had a long article urging "Build Youth CND". (It was also supporting Solidarity in Poland.) And there was the "New Worker" representing the "New Communist Party" which wants detente and feels CND is good but "not enough".

The Plenary hall was full and John Cox, a long-time high-level CND activist and Communist Party Member, is speaking at too great length for one delegate, who promptly interrupts him from the floor. He copes by apologizing to those delegates who wanted him to mention things on their behalf, particularly to women delegates, and subsidies. Lord Hugh Jenkins is the current chairman of CND and he presides over such ticklish questions as: raising the age limit of youth CND from 21 to 25 (eventually defeated the next day); complaints that workshops are squeezing out debate on composite resolutions; and complaints that there must be "hustings" for the candidates to be elected (i.e., time for hearing from them and grilling them).

Monseignor Kent is warmly applauded and gives his annual report. He says wryly that "none of the 6 million pounds which NATO Secretary General Luns has accused the Russians of providing to the European Peace Movement has yet reached CND" and calls this charge "a lie". It is quite evident from his detailed report that, at least as far as CND is concerned, he is right and Luns is wrong. The CND has only about a dozen poorly paid workers averaging 22 years of age. It received about \$200,000 from sales of publications (100,000) and badges (a quarter of a million). And it was receiving the \$16 dues of 30,000 members. (It is evident that the CND campaign is growing faster than it can be controlled and a past treasurer suggests an annual audit to help defuse the "Moscow gold" charge).

Kent said the number of Communists on the Board of CND was "grossly exaggerated" by critics, as was their ignoring the fact that CND had complained about SS-20s and Afghanistan. But the complaints about SS-20s are not



*John Cox, left, and Lord Hugh Jenkins on right*

such as to induce waiting for the Soviets to do something about SS-20s. Instead, he repeated his view — widely quoted and requoted among his supporters — that:

“A unilateralist is a multilateralist who actually means it”.

Indeed, it is startling for a U.S.-trained ear to hear the enthusiasm with which “unilateral” disarmament is greeted in CND. American arms controllers have gotten used to considering the charge of “unilateral disarmament” as a smear from the right; the hawks call each and every disarmament scheme they consider unfair “unilateral disarmament”. To hear speakers get up and say, as a number later did, that what was needed in Britain was “unilateral” disarmament and not that hokey multinational stuff provides an American arms controller with a kind of culture shock.

When Lord Jenkins falters at one point, an irreverent voice is heard shouting “wind him up”. Not long after, the “hustings” begins for a new Chairman. The first candidate to replace Lord Jenkins is a 38-year-old from the Labor Party named Joan Ruddock. She speaks very articulately and smoothly, admitting that she was “mostly fairly recently involved and in getting local groups restarted”. She ends her speech with references to having women better recognized in the movement and sits down.

The other candidate, Mr. John Cox, mentions his long and deep experience (3 or 4 days a week over “sufficient years”) but, as one observer explains to me, he plays the “good guy” to such extent that it hampers his effectiveness; indeed, he hardly says anything in his speech in his own favor.

He is immediately grilled from the balcony on why his biography refers to his role as liaison to Liberal-CND when this is not his party? It was a delicate reference from one of his long-time antagonists who is, indirectly, trying to raise the question of his Communist Party membership.

He responds, evenly, that the question really is whether his membership in the Communist Party would affect the Campaign. Many members now hiss to express their indifference to such issues, as if someone here had been smeared as a “left-winger” in front of a College audience. He urges them not to hiss and says that this is, after all, a serious issue. His answer is:

“Don’t think that if you put communists off, you will defuse the anti-communist smear campaign.”



Joan Ruddock  
Incoming CND Chairperson

This produces strong applause. But, after questioning of both candidates, it seems crystal clear that Ms. Ruddock’s simple clarity, her sex, her (Labor) Party affiliation (as opposed to Cox’s) and her general greater attractiveness as a Chairman will win her the election. (Indeed, she did win by an unannounced margin of 3-1).

Ms. Ruddock granted FAS an interview immediately after the hustings. A former graduate student in genetics, she now worked on civil rights in a “Citizens Advice Bureau”. She explained that removal from NATO was CND policy, but not “first priority”, in contrast to the unilateral denuclearization of Britain. Would she want the nuclear weapons removed from Germany also? “Yes, indeed”. Could any danger result from this? “No, only good”. What were the dangers associated with CND policy? The danger was “backlash in Great Britain, there were already small fascist elements”. But she said any danger of “Soviet tanks in Dover” was one she could not imagine.

I raised here, as subsequently in other conversations, the scenario of German nuclear rearmament — after Western withdrawal, because of its becoming alarmed subsequently at Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, or at threats against it. Would this trigger Soviet efforts to resolve the “German problem” once and for all, by unifying Germany on Soviet terms through pressure, or even force, after the peace movements drove out American nuclear weapons (and hence, I postulated, American conventional forces).

Ms. Ruddock, who had never been to Russia, did not think a German bomb would increase the likelihood of war, except in the sense that proliferation was bad. She felt there was

“not much to indicate that Germany would have any reason to attack Russia”,

and therefore not much ground for Russian fears. She admitted that her generation was “keen to see Germany outside of its historical context” as a kind of “reprieve” and that it did not dwell on the German role in the last two World Wars. (In general, it is remarkable that there is so little anti-German sentiment in Britain; as one establishment observer put it, “We are more concerned about our rivalry with the French”) As for Russian aggression against a denuclearized West Germany, she found it hard to imagine a Soviet take-over of a sophisticated and highly developed state such as West Germany; the Eastern European states absorbed after World War II “needed protection against the West Germans, had large Communist movements, and little democratic structure and so were in a different category”.

Indeed, Ms. Ruddock’s main concern was that America might resist the British request to have American bases removed. Did she fear an “occupying army”? “No, but America might stall and try to bring down the British Government”.

#### A Fantastic Coincidence

Leaving the meeting, I decided to try to find the famous Soviet-exiled scientist Zhores Medvedev to get his views on all this. Zhores had been working in London at the National Institute for Medical Research since he was exiled

from the Soviet Union for his dissident activities in the sixties. Once incarcerated in a Soviet psychiatric ward, from which he drew his work "A Question of Madness" (Knopf 1971), he had since written four other books including one about the oppression of Soviet Science (*Soviet Science*) and another about a Soviet nuclear accident (*Nuclear Disaster in the Urals*). His twin brother, Roy Medvedev, continues his dissident writing from Moscow in a lonely effort to turn Soviet communism into democratic socialism (*On Socialist Democracy*, Knopf, 1974). Roy has been called the last true believer in Marxism in all of Soviet Russia.

On my way to find someone who would have Zhores' (unlisted) phone number, and to my absolute astonishment, I ran into him within two blocks of my hotel while seeking a short cut to the subway. He had been visiting a free Polish bookstore around the corner which was carrying Roy's work, and he was celebrating his own birthday (and Roy's, or course) and his wife's birthday as well!

Over tea, he advised that the Soviet press seemed more relaxed about Reagan since it had begun to feel that Reagan was not a competent adversary. I asked him whether he thought that nuclear war could arise from instability in Central Europe following unilateral nuclear withdrawal on the Western side. To my surprise, he thought not! He felt that Soviet fears of West German revanchism had declined in the last decade or two and that the Politburo saw West Germany as "small and not dangerous". He even argued that the Russians would be less worried about the cruise missiles in Germany if the "one-key" deployment was controlled by the Germans rather than by the Americans.

Asked if Roy agreed (Roy is, after all, the historian), he said "yes". He said he would send me, next morning, the galleys of a New Left Review article in which he had collaborated with Roy (by telephone) to assert these conclusions. He did feel that anti-German feeling had contributed to the Czechoslovak invasion. But East Germany was quite compliant. There might be trouble in Roumania, but it would not lead to war. The Poles were a special case. In general, Eastern Europe was now quite dependent upon the Soviet Union, partly because it could no longer hack it on the world market; in effect, Eastern European economies had been dragged down by the Soviet occupation to the point where this was so.

On the other hand, he agreed that expectations of the unilateral disarmament movement that Eastern European states and even the Soviet Union might follow its lead were totally wrong. E. P. Thompson, the most famous spokesman of the movement, was simply naive in thinking, as he had until quite recently, that the Soviet public might provide rallies like the ones being produced in Europe.

That evening, reading the week-end issue of the International Herald Tribune, I found, by coincidence, an article on the CND movement in general, and E. P. Thompson in particular. It called Thompson, a historian, the "guru" of the movement and said he had "spent many years in a faction of the tiny British Communist Party before leaving in disgust and joining the Labor Party in 1956" [ed. note: the year of denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev, when many



*Zhores Medvedev  
Exiled Russian biochemist and author.*

communists left the Party throughout the world.] Thompson was quoted as saying:

"It is not necessary to say that one likes anything about the Soviet Union to contest the view that it is an expansionist power. Since the war, not an inch of territory in Europe has been gained by the USSR and several satellites, like Albania and Yugoslavia, have been lost. Afghanistan was a client state before the invasion".

The paper was ominously full of relevant material (as was, indeed, the case for the British press all week). On the Op-Ed page was an article "Pacifism on Move in Italy" which began by saying:

"The Italian Communist Party, surprisingly cool for the last couple of years to anti-war demonstrations, is now supporting them with its full strength" and it ended by advising the U.S. Administration:

"Perhaps it is time to talk less about the military buildup and more about the consequences of an alternative American policy, conveying a message to the more restless Europeans: Be careful people you are going to be left on your own".

And in the center of the page was a very sophisticated article by an old friend, and a respected non-political analyst of world affairs, William Pfaff. Titled "NATO's Death is Now Thinkable", it began:

"NATO is in more serious danger from Washington these days, than from Moscow. Ignorance, bad temper and prejudice are driving the Western allies apart. Before this ends, if it ends, NATO could be finished as an effective alliance".

Pfaff urged that NATO be "rethought". Things were obviously in much greater disrepair in NATO than Americans might think.

#### **SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 15: CND CONFERENCE ENDS**

The next morning, on Sunday, there was more of the same. A poll from the Observer was being quoted which provided a public majority against American bases or cruise missiles in Britain (although there was also a majority in favor of staying in NATO.) A column by Lord George-Brown in the Sunday Express was warning, "How would you feel if the Americans *did* get out of Europe?".

Back at the last day of the CND conference I found a rare empty seat in the large auditorium which happened to be next to the ASTMS member interviewed earlier. He turned out to be a just-elected Member of the National Executive Committee of CND and a former high official of the National Union of Students. A research officer (i.e., legislative aide) to a member of the European Parliament, he was the Sheffield CND Chairman.

It turned out that the 20 elected members of the National Council were "...mainly Labor Party, with a couple of Liberal Party, three or four Communist Party, and quite a few Christians (representatives of Churches)". CND had a "strong little group" in the Social Democratic Alliance (the newly evolving party in Britain which has broken off from the Labor Party in response to this leftward drift). And CND even had a small group, he said, within the Conservative Party.

Interviewing him, as the proceedings wore on, and taking his opinions as ever more representative (as I realized his popularity within CND), I asked him if he did not feel any apprehension about being disarmed in a world in which the Soviet Union was not. Not at all. He felt:

"the Soviet side seems keen to remove its own nuclear weapons and has made all kinds of initiatives recently. The feeling I get from Soviet delegations is a genuine feeling for peace."

Asked about the nuclear threats made by Moscow to Britain in 1957, he had never heard about them and said: "That presumes we were right in Suez". When this was denied, he said: "Well, we had interests there above our station, we have become a lackey of the U.S. Government". Well, was he worried about West Germany becoming "finlandized" if nuclear weapons were withdrawn? "No, because West Germany was much stronger in its economy than was the case in Finland"! And most significantly, he said: "The U.S. wouldn't stand by while a large industrialized country went under".

Evidently, CND members, most of which are in their twenties, cannot imagine a world in which the U.S. did not dominate — and could not defend — Europe, even while they move to dismantle the nuclear defenses.



Mick Elliot

Respected CND delegate and Sheffield CND Chairman on left with an associate on right.

## BACK TO THE HOTEL

Leaving the conference, struck up a subway conversation with a pretty 19-year-old unemployed girl who said she took CND quite seriously. Turning on the TV to see if the local Connors-McEnroe match was on, I saw Ronald Reagan delivering his earlier State of the Union Address, and intoning the fact that only the defense budget was going to get an increase. This was followed immediately by a shot of MIT's Kosta Tsipis saying that, "after all, the arms race was best for the military on both sides". I reflected that "a plague on both your houses" seems most appropriate when one is not, after all, living in one of the two houses. Perhaps this explains part of the anti-American feeling.

Earlier, in America, FAS had received a letter from Andrei Sakharov about his impending hunger strike. Having heard from Zhores that this matter was not in the British press, I spent a few hours trying to get this matter into the London Times. And, in the meantime, I reached E. P. Thompson by phone who said his goal was "more semi-autonomy within the bloc and not necessarily to have a withdrawal from NATO". He was not planning to be in London during my visit but suggested a number of others to talk to.

That evening I began reading what the E. P. Thompson point of view was. In answer to a British Civil Defense pamphlet "Protect and Survive", he had put together (with one Dan Smith) a Penguin special paperback called "Protest and Survive". It carried among other things the April 28, 1980 "Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament" (See pg. 10). First drafts of this proclamation were done by E. P. Thompson, and a completely new draft then produced with suggestions from throughout Europe, after which it was released at a meeting with French, British, West German and Italian supporters present.

In effect, the END movement was an effort to secure piecemeal unilateral disarmament under the rubric of an all-European nuclear disarmament movement. Because it was putatively all-European, it would provide a framework and a theme. But because it was expected to be done piecemeal, it could overlook such niceties as whether the Soviet bloc would join in. This was stated precisely by another of its leaders, Ken Coates:

"The paradox is that if President Ceausescu still wants a nuclear-free Balkan Zone, or if President Kekkonen still aspires to a denuclearized Baltic, then both are more likely to succeed within the framework of an all-European Campaign than they would be in separate localized interstate agreements. This is not at all to argue that denuclearization might not come about piecemeal: of course this is quite possible, even probable. But it will only come about when vast pressures of public opinion have come into being; and these pressures must and will develop, albeit unevenly, over the continent as a whole."

As E. P. Thompson put it:

"The Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament,

which is already gaining active support in many parts of Western Europe, as well as a more cautious attention in some parts of Eastern Europe, has as an objective the creation of an expanding zone freed from nuclear weapons and bases. It aims to expel these weapons from the soil and waters of both East and West Europe, and to press the missiles, in the first place back to the Urals and to the Atlantic Ocean”.

The strength of this movement was unmistakable. Incredibly — from the standpoint of an American disarmament advocate — unilateral disarmament was more seductive in Europe than multilateral negotiations. Just as American arms controllers had long argued that negotiated arms control, directed against the arms race, was better than unilateral military moves directed at staying ahead of the Russians, so the European disarmament movement was going further, and arguing that the mere presence of the American nuclear weapons was more dangerous than the Russians.

#### MONDAY, NOVEMBER 16TH: A VISIT TO END HEADQUARTERS

The morning radio announced that a Trident missile had gone off course and had to be destroyed; this also got six inches on the front page of the London Times! (On return to America, it was found that the same event got *two* inches on page 21 of the New York Times.) Anything to do with nuclear weapons was getting full treatment in Britain.

The Times also carried a front page interview entitled “Schmidt says he is worried by disarray among U.S. leaders”, in which Chancellor Schmidt wonders how Britons would feel:

“if you put some 90 or 100 American missiles on British soil, capable of striking the European part of the Soviet Union, weapons over which neither the British government nor the British nation have any jurisdiction. At the same time, you were on the receiving end of these Soviet threats. I wonder whether you would be as calm as you want Germans to be...”

Somewhere between 100,000 and 500,000 had attended a Madrid demonstration against the imminent incorporation of Spain into NATO, principally organized and financed by the Socialist Party (PSOE) and the Communist Party and trade union. The Guardian reported that “many of the young people were clearly anti-American”.

Flora Lewis reported from Paris that “Some people fear there is more danger of America bravura sparking a war than of Soviet attack” and concluded that “Washington will have to keep two bargaining partners in mind at the table — the Russians and West European public opinion.” What a week!

I proceeded to the American Embassy; it's science counselor had heard, indirectly, of my coming to London and had called Washington and invited me to drop in. (A British Admiral to whom I had written had referred my letter to Whitehall, which had asked the Embassy for guidance.) After I exchanged ideas with the science adviser and the press counselor, the latter arranged for an interview with the State Department representative and gave me a number of requested speeches. On emerging from the

interview, I ran into two high-ranking American generals working on NATO; they were evidently trying to cope with the CND decision, the day before, to authorize peace camps (as at Greenham Common) at all the American bases. Advising them, from my limited experience, that they seemed in big trouble, I found them too preoccupied with such perspectives as “Moscow gold” and the U.S. standing still in the arms race, to feel that my point of view was getting across.

BBC sent a car to facilitate an interview on Sakharov's hunger strike on its popular “World at One” program; it was then just getting reports from Moscow from Mrs. Bonner about the matter. The same car then took us to the headquarters of END in time to have lunch with its staff: Ben Thompson (son of E. P. Thompson) and Meg Beresford.


Because FAS is engaged in a campaign to get political officials here and in the Soviet Union to visit each other's country, I asked Ben Thompson whether his father Edward had ever been to Moscow; he said he thought not. Ms. Beresford said that END was funded rather thinly with three staffers moving on to four. A good part of the funding had come from the U.S. through peace foundations (such as the Fund for Peace) that support specific projects by giving, in turn, through the British Conflict Educational Library Trust (CELT).

END, I saw, was housed in two crowded rooms on the fourth floor of a building owned by the Peace Pledge Union (PPU) — a peace group which, its staff explained proudly, had opposed World War II. (The analogy was chilling since British peace pledges are considered by many to have encouraged Hitler; END would do well to move elsewhere).

Ms. Beresford, a pacifist, believes that a:

“European nuclear freeze zone will give some breathing space for the superpowers to negotiate about”

She did not see how disarmament could bring on a nuclear war and when I pressed with possible scenarios, she



BBC “World At One”





Ben Thompson  
END Staffer

responded, "So you are not for disarmament". In any case, she said she had not considered the questions I was asking and that I should talk to a theoretician of the movement like Dan Smith. It was obvious that she was as surprised to find an arms controller who thought that unilateral disarmament could conceivably lead to World War, as I was surprised to find one that saw *no* dangers in unilateral disarmament.

That evening, reading END's material, I paid special attention to Alva Myrdal's "Dynamics of European Nuclear Disarmament" (Bertrand Russell Press, 1981) to which Ms. Beresford had referred as the only developed "plan" for European nuclear disarmament.

I had never before realized how anti-American and unfair Mrs. Myrdal's rhetoric is. Over and over again, she argues that America is just using Europe. There is virtually no reference to the fact that European states asked for, and acquiesced in, American forces with a view to defending Western Europe and that they successfully defended West Berlin in the sixties. That the British and the French wanted their own deterrent (against what, if not the Russians?) is unexplained. Look at this:

"The two blocs are an artificial schism, because the European countries do not have any inherently deeper affinity with either of the two superpowers of today.

And worse, an additional and irrefutable truth is that Europe has without its own volition been chosen, by a kind of mutual albeit usually tacit, agreement between the two superpowers, to become the battlefield in a potential major war of their making. . . .

In *clara verba*: Europe is to be sacrificed, the European industries and farmlands destroyed, the European peoples bleeding to death or doomed to perish in painful and mutilating disease. All this in order to save the homelands of the two big and trigger-happy nations from experiencing such fate as it meted out for the so much more innocent ones."

"It is high time that the superpowers should begin to hear from the intended victims."

"If the reality were correctly perceived — that is:

that the real aim of the superpowers is to crush each other — we would all understand that for any 'superpower duel' between them there is no need to involve Europe.

Some argue that the U.S. will be less able to 'defend and protect' Europe if it has no nuclear weapons stationed there. But surely, U.S. capability does not depend on land deployment of its missiles! Those which are sea-launchable from submarines are so much more invulnerable. They assure a capability to strike even inside Soviet territory." (Italics in original)


In sum, there is no problem of defense as far as Mrs. Myrdal is concerned, and when this problem is referred to — only once in an 80 page paper — "defend and protect" is put in quotation marks. For the rest, Europe is simply being used.

Her solution is for each of the nuclear have-not nations to ask of the nuclear-armed nations for a confirmation of a pledge of non-attack, including "wartime freedom from being attacked with, or being utilized for temporary stationing or even for passage over their territory of any kind of atomic war-heads."

There is a single reference to the fact that "the freedom to take unilateral action to win freedom from nuclear weapons is not only politically but probably also practically non-existent in the Warsaw Pact countries". But no conclusion is drawn from this except the irrelevance of trying to get Eastern Europe to take action comparable to that she is urging on the Western side.

She compares NATO's decision to deploy Eurostrategic weapons (without offering to negotiate with the Soviet Union first) with the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan (without offering "any negotiation about possible joint policies of non-intervention").

In the end, she urges that "European nuclear disarmament be viewed as a *gradual process*, not a programmatic, all-inclusive one time decision to launch once and for all a European nuclear weapon free zone as a fully-fledged structure. . . ." "It would be counter-productive to wait for formal agreements". In sum, throw the weapons out any way one can and don't wait for or worry about balance or agreements.



Meg Beresford  
Head of END's small staff.

## APPEAL FOR EUROPEAN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Launched on 28 April 1980

We are entering the most dangerous decade in human history. A third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely. Economic and social difficulties in advanced industrial countries, crisis, militarism and war in the third world compound the political tensions that fuel a demented arms race. In Europe, the main geographical stage for the East-West confrontation, new generations of ever more deadly nuclear weapons are appearing.

For at least twenty-five years, the forces of both the North Atlantic and the Warsaw alliance have each had sufficient nuclear weapons to annihilate their opponents, and at the same time to endanger the very basis of civilized life. But with each passing year, competition in nuclear armaments has multiplied their numbers, increasing the probability of some devastating accident or miscalculation.

As each side tries to prove its readiness to use nuclear weapons, in order to prevent their use by the other side, new, more 'usable' nuclear weapons are designed and the idea of 'limited' nuclear war is made to sound more and more plausible. So much so that this paradoxical process can logically only lead to the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Neither of the major powers is now in any moral position to influence smaller countries to forgo the acquisition of nuclear armament. The increasing spread of nuclear reactors and the growth of the industry that installs them, reinforce the likelihood of world-wide proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby multiplying the risks of nuclear exchanges.

Over the years, public opinion has pressed for nuclear disarmament and detente between the contending military blocs. This pressure has failed. An increasing proportion of world resources is expended on weapons, even though mutual extermination is already amply guaranteed. This economic burden, in both East and West, contributes to growing social and political strain, setting in motion a vicious circle in which the arms race feeds upon the instability of the world economy and vice versa: a deathly dialectic.

We are now in great danger. Generations have been born beneath the shadow of nuclear war, and have become habituated to the threat. Concern has given way to apathy. Meanwhile, in a world living always under menace, fear extends through both halves of the European continent. The powers of the military and of internal security forces are enlarged, limitations are placed upon free exchanges of ideas and between persons, and civil rights of independent-minded individuals are threatened, in the West as well as the East.

We do not wish to apportion guilt between the political and military leaders of East and West. Guilt lies squarely upon both parties. Both parties have adopted menacing postures and committed aggressive actions in different parts of the world.

The remedy lies in our own hands. We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases,

and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two super-powers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory. In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of SS 20 medium-range missiles and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Western Europe. We also urge the ratification of the SALT II agreement, as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

At the same time, we must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East or West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange.

We appeal to our friends in Europe, of every faith and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. We envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and co-ordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges, between universities, churches, women's organizations, trade unions, youth organizations, professional groups and individuals, take place with the object of promoting a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

We must commence to act as if a united, neutral and pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal, not to 'East' or 'West', but to each other, and we must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.

It will be the responsibility of the people of each nation to agitate for the expulsion of nuclear weapons and bases from European soil and territorial waters, and to decide upon its own means and strategy, concerning its own territory. These will differ from one country to another, and we do not suggest that any single strategy should be imposed. But this must be part of a trans-continental movement in which every kind of exchange takes place.

We must resist any attempt by the statesmen of East or West to manipulate this movement to their own advantage. We offer no advantage to either NATO or the Warsaw alliance. Our objectives must be to free Europe from confrontation, to enforce detente between the United States and the Soviet Union, and, ultimately, to dissolve both great power alliances.

In appealing to fellow-Europeans, we are not turning our backs on the world. In working for the peace of Europe we are working for the peace of the world. Twice in this century Europe has disgraced its claims to civilization by engendering world war. This time we must repay our debts to the world by engendering peace.

This appeal will achieve nothing if it is not supported by determined and inventive action, to win more people to support it. We need to mount an irresistible pressure for a Europe free of nuclear weapons.

We do not wish to impose any uniformity on the movement nor to pre-empt the consultations and decisions of those many organizations already exercising their influence for disarmament and peace. But the situation is urgent. The dangers steadily advance. We invite your support for this common objective, and we shall welcome both your help and advice. □

**TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17TH:  
A VISIT TO CHATHAM HOUSE**

The morning's Guardian reported that the Centre-Left Dutch coalition government would not meet its December deadline for deciding whether to take 48 cruise missiles; Prime Minister Dries Van Agt said his government was looking for ways to reduce the Dutch nuclear role in NATO.

Material requested at 5 P.M. Monday from the House of Commons arrived, miraculously as promised, by the very next morning. It showed only too clearly that the Labor Party was unified only in supporting the unilateral renunciation of the Trident system for replacing Polaris. Dennis Healey, Deputy Leader, was saying flatly, "The only answer is multilateral disarmament".

Britain has an equivalent to the New York's Council on Foreign Relations in The Royal Institute of International Affairs, and I met with the head of its Policy Studies program at its headquarters in Chatham House. A prolific writer, Lawrence Freedman, 33 years of age, had just come out with two books, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, and *Britain and Nuclear Weapons*, and a useful monograph, "Arms Control in Europe", (Chatham House Paper #11).

He was much against battlefield nuclear weapons but supportive of the need for the cruise missiles which, he felt, Western Europe needed to have for some "distinctive approach" to match Soviet long-range theatre forces. He feared that NATO might be left with the "worst of both worlds", with the neutron bomb but *not* the cruise missile.

I asked him about a statement, much quoted in Europe, by Admiral Gene La Rocque of the U.S. Center for Defense Information, viz.

"We fought World War I in Europe. We fought World War II in Europe. And if you dummies will let us, we will fight World War III in Europe."\*

He thought the statement "disgraceful" (as do I) since America was invited, urged and begged to participate in the earlier two wars and took all risks then available. As for the post-war period, Mr. Freedman observed that

"Western European objectives have always been to tie America in so that we didn't have to wait two years for them to arrive".

(And in permitting itself to be "tied in", American has mortgaged its entire survival to the vagaries of Central European outbreaks of violence, and the near certainty of nuclear escalation thereafter.) Why would an American pander to European paranoia? Mr. Freedman thought La Rocque an "old fashioned isolationist" who just wanted U.S. forces to be sent home.\*\*

Mr. Freedman thought E. P. Thompson was "peddling an illusion, viz. that a movement based on protest can be anything but one-sided". Freedman had just returned from Poland and found that "nobody wanted to talk about missiles". Solidarity members had observed that "this was the last thing anybody wanted to talk about, thank God". (Obviously, security questions are so sensitive that they would, with high probability, bring in the Soviet tanks). In any case, "mobility made a mess of



*Admiral Gene R. La Rocque, Ret.  
Center for Defense Information*

nuclear free zones"; the SS-20 could attack all of Western Europe from behind the Urals.

He felt that END was based on a "reasonable scepticism" about arms control but that, ironically, unilateralism "makes it impossible to take unilateral action" and forces "the multilateralist to be even more multilateral", i.e., useful unilateral rearrangements of forces would be harder to make.

Europe, he said, had been very quiet during the American SALT debate and now, "its the opposite". He felt American hawks "had a lot to answer for" in a). killing the SALT treaty, and b). undermining confidence in mutual assured destruction and thus "undermining the old order without replacing it with a new order". In effect, the hawks had "nothing to close the window of vulnerability they had opened". Still more ironically, Europeans had "picked up the American echo of the Soviet counterforce threat" and were more alarmed at U.S. efforts to match Soviet counterforce targeting than with the Soviet efforts themselves.

His approach toward debate was constructive. He felt this was a "positive opportunity to get people interested" in these questions and that one ought not be patronizing about their questions; indeed, it was a "good time for reappraisal of what NATO is about". He disagreed with END that unilateral action in the West would improve the atmosphere in Eastern Europe — traditionally detente meant repression in the Soviet bloc.

Mr. Freedman saw us "entering a period of political change" in which our goal should be to "keep nuclear weapons out of it".

"The worst thing that could happen is to have nuclear

\*Admiral La Rocque told FAS that the quotation was accurate except that the word "dummies" was inserted by a European activist subsequently. The same speech supported the assertion by saying "there is a growing feeling in the US that a nuclear war could be limited to Europe." (I know of no evidence for this assessment of opinion.) La Rocque himself believes it would be "next to impossible" to limit nuclear war to Europe!

\*\*The charge of isolationism was apparently first raised by Morton Kondracke in the New Republic who—noting that the Admiral wanted all U.S. forces out of Europe, Japan and Korea by the year 2,000—called his Groningen remarks "as misleading as they were mischievous" and designed to stimulate "traditional European suspicion about American reliability."

weapons at the heart of all debate over nuclear weapons."

Politically, he felt Labor would never again have a majority in the House of Commons (as a consequence of the splitting off of the Social Democratic Alliance). And in Germany, he saw a reaction building against the "moral certainty of the disarmers". Of the END four key leaders (E.P. Thompson, Ken Coates, Mary Kaldor, and Ken Smith), he urged me to talk to Mr. Smith, as did a number of others.

That evening, reading his monograph, I found this paragraph:

"A nuclear-free zone is unlikely to extend very far east, and the amount by which it does so is unlikely to make much difference to Soviet nuclear options. By contrast, the amount of Western Europe covered by a zone soon has an impact on NATO nuclear options because of the lack of depth. Soviet weapons could soon move back to the front: U.S. weapons would have to cross the Atlantic. If all US nuclear weapons were banished, then a crucial strategic link would be broken in circumstances in which broader political links would also be under strain. West Europeans would have indicated a preference for no nuclear defense, while the Americans would probably be relieved at no longer being obliged to provide one. West Europeans would have either to appease Soviet nuclear strength or to turn to France to counter it, since Britain would probably have relinquished its own nuclear capabilities in the process. All this would be unlikely to encourage a sense of lasting security."

The Medvedev galleys had arrived. I saw that these brothers were indeed responding "critically yet with positive solidarity" to E. P. Thompson's END movement. Rejecting the notion of "peace forces" within the Soviet Union arising in the pattern suggested by Thompson, they did, however, assert:

"If we confine the arena of possible nuclear war to Europe, then the likelihood of a sudden blitzkrieg by either NATO or the Warsaw Pact seems zero. In our opinion there are no longer any border disputes, 'Danzig Corridors' or revanchist tendencies capable of producing the kind of crises that paved the way to the past two world wars."

In their view, "defense had become the permanent obsession of the Soviet leadership" and the cruise missile "reawakens all the fears and feelings of technological inferiority of the past; hence the pitch of Soviet reaction to it." They note that the cruise missile "could be used without the consent of the European Allies". (The allies apparently did not want the two-key system so often used, although this apparently was offered by the United States.)

The Medvedevs concluded by saying:

"There is no longer a single genuinely European problem which cannot be solved by non-military means, and the call for Cold War mobilization has never sounded more irrational and atavistic. Millions of citizens of Western Europe are coming to realize that they have little to gain from entrusting their fate to the

military establishment of a superpower which does not have either a competent government or a consistent and balanced international policy. The peace movements in Europe are already a powerful pressure for moderation; it is they who can halt the prospect of a dangerous new round in the arms race, threatening to all mankind."

### WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 18TH

The newspapers all are now ever more openly talking of President Reagan's "zero option" proposal, to be made this day. The German Social Democrats are maneuvering to avoid an April vote at the Party convention which might embarrass Helmut Schmidt in his earlier statement, "I stand or I fall" with the NATO decision on cruise missiles.

At the British Ministry of Defense, a blackboarded sign reads:

"The State of Alert is black. But Staff must remain extra vigilant because of the possibility of further bomb incidents."

A high official provides background on British thinking.

Later, across the street, at the Foreign Office, Mr. Roy Dean comments on the debate. As Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit and with a handful of staffers, he provides basic information to the Foreign Office task forces on various aspects of arms control. It seems to be a combination of our Arms Control Agency press office and the Congressional Research Service applied to arms control.

He is very down on CND, which he believes is "blatantly misrepresenting the Government position" and using themes from Brezhnev's speeches to do so. "If the Soviets say anything often enough, many people believe it, many people." The unilateralist tide was quite strong. He had seen Michael Foot give a speech in which Foot said Britain should "negotiate where possible and, indeed, it would be foolish not to negotiate" but where Mr. Foot was shouted down. Mr. Dean admits that the "zero level" option is "virtually impossible" to negotiate.

That afternoon, at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Deputy Director, retired Colonel Jonathan Alford, confirms that "in hindsight, the anxiety about SS-20s and modernization was really about strategic parity" and heightened by the breakdown in detente. People "who should have known better" said this SS-20 modernization meant the USSR wanted to dominate Europe. Chancellor Schmidt, who called for something to be done in a famous speech to IISS in 1977, did not then realize that the effort to balance Soviet strategic forces might be seen as "decoupling" — providing a theater balance which would persuade onlookers that the U.S. was *not* planning to become involved.

He agrees that, for NATO, the cruise missile has been a "self-inflicted wound", but at the time it seemed like a fairly simple matter. (Disarmament activists also confirm that they did not expect to be able to produce the present uproar.)

Interestingly, Colonel Alford was not at all sure that the Russians wanted the Americans out of Europe. The U.S. forces would then be free to act elsewhere and would not



*Mr. Roy Dean  
Foreign Office*

be restraining Germany. In the American absence, Western Europe might be forced back to some kind of Multilateral Force (MLF) in which it provided a joint deterrent for Germany.

CND, he felt, was just an expression of a radical view — a movement of fundamental protest, a counterculture that becomes a permanent non-parliamentary opposition.

After Colonel Alford, I met with Brigadier General Kenneth Hunt. Brigadier Hunt was an official of IISS when I joined it in 1964, and we talked with the intimacy of old acquaintances; he is a precise, objective and careful political observer, not only of weapons but of who stands where. Talking to him, I realized how much less oppressive it is to speak with members of the British defense community than with our own. In Britain there are used to a broad spectrum of political view — as Americans are not, since there really is nothing in America to the left of liberalism. Hence from the British perspective FAS ideas about disarmament are wholly moderate and, indeed, centrist, well worth talking about, and in no way “suspect”.

Brigadier Hunt is now serving as the senior “Specialist Adviser” to the Select Committee on Defense of the House of Commons (in effect, he is the Chief of Staff of the British Senate Armed Services Committee). An “agnostic on cruise missiles originally”, he has come to believe that it is necessary to push the decision through for political reasons. He confirms that it was the Europeans who wanted them — not the Americans. And now he is working hard to persuade the American Administration of the need for flexibility and arms negotiations to make it possible for European governments to hold the line. He does not, I find, believe that the “zero option” proposal is negotiable.

That evening, I examined the origins of the SS-20 crisis. In perspective, the problem is that the Soviet Union is in Europe and the U.S. is not. From this it follows that there will always be a Soviet conventional advantage and, hence, in narrow military terms, if a threat of invasion is expected, a need to shore up deterrence with some kind of nuclear threat.

In the fifties, the military threat was massive retaliation and the Soviet answer was about 600 intermediate range SS-4s and SS-5s. In principle, the U.S. might have tried to

release Europe from nuclear bondage in a lightning stroke if war seemed about to break out. Looked at this way, the Soviet modernization program of replacing SS-4s and 5s with mobile SS-20s did not, from a technical point of view, cause trouble by increasing numbers of warheads or by increasing destructive potential (where indeed declined). What it did was to free the Soviet IRBMs from the threat of U.S. attack. (This is why Brigadier Hunt had put such emphasis on the untargetability of SS-20s). The SS-20s finally achieved what DeGaulle had predicted so many years ago (“decoupling”), a situation in which there was not even a theoretical offensive answer on the Western side.

Of course, the Soviets achieved this result in a day and age when, with so many weapons around, it hardly seemed to matter. But, in principle, at least, this is why SS-20 modernization (really mobility) and U.S.-Soviet parity made some believe a U.S. intermediate range force was necessary.

Thus, Chancellor Schmidt had first advised the North Atlantic Council in May, 1977 that:

“... the SALT process may lead to the paralyzation of the Soviet and American central strategic forces and that the strategic nuclear component will become increasingly regarded as an instrument of last resort, to serve the national interest and protect the survival of those who possess these weapons of last resort.” (i.e., not Germany).

And in October of the same year, he told the IISS in a famous speech, that:

“... when the Salt negotiations opened we Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons on the one hand, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons on the other, or if we did, we did not articulate it clearly enough. Today we need to recognize clearly the connection between SALT and MBFR (Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks) and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

At the same meeting in May I said that there were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One



*Brigadier Kenneth Hunt  
Select Committee of Defense, House of Commons*

would be for the Western Alliance to undertake a massive build-up of forces and weapons systems; the other for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level." . . .

In sum, West German insecurity about its position in an age of parity had triggered a process of trying to match Soviet IRBMs — even though they had been there for decades — and that was now boomeranging to the disadvantage of Helmut Schmidt's government in an outbreak of Western European pacifism, neutralism and nationalism.

#### THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19TH:

#### THE HOUSE OF COMMONS & END'S DAN SMITH

I went, in the morning, to the House of Commons to meet with the Defense spokesman of the Labor Party, Mr. Bryn-Mor John of Wales. He said the Labor Party was for staying in NATO by 6 or 7 to 1. It was all against Trident, and it was against cruise missiles and U.S. bases by 2 to 1. But the latter margins were just short of the exact two-thirds necessary to make these positions obligatory on the party itself. Under the "byzantine" rules of the Labor Party, measures passed as these were, by a fraction of a percent *less* than  $\frac{2}{3}$ rd, were just "expressions of opinion". He added that, "in defense policy, in the Labor Party, we know what we're against but we don't know what we are for."

In general, people in Britain were "bewildered and have lost confidence in the States". He was supportive of the "zero-level" proposal which President Reagan had put out the day before. The Russians "ought to accept it", and if they did not, it would "call into question their sincerity" and put "CND in a dilemma".

At 2:30, I had a brief interview with Lord Solly Zuckerman, long-time science adviser to various British governments. He seemed highly sceptical that the goals of either CND or the zero-option arms control plan would be achieved. On one point he was willing to be quoted:


"Unless Washington shows genuine flexibility, the position in Europe cannot be held."

I called CND headquarters to get its reaction to the zero-option proposal and got Monseignor Bruce Kent on the phone. He said:

"With sadness, this is primarily a public relations gesture designed to defuse public concern in Europe and to put the Soviets in a bad public light. I hope the Soviets will not respond in kind and will talk in terms of here and now. But what we want from the U.S. is the removal of weapons here and now. We would hope that they would say we are going to remove F-111s or withdraw Poseidon from European waters."

Was he encouraged at all by the statement as a possible response to his 150,000 person demonstration in London?

"Yes, this would never have happened were it not for the demonstration so that is very encouraging. Then President Reagan was using a very different style of speech concerning "demonstration firings". Still his was an Administration that was going ahead with



*Mr. Bryn-Mor John M.P.  
Defense Spokesman, Labor Party*

MX, Trident, and was not ratifying SALT II, all of which belied the significance of the speech."

#### MR. SMITH

Later, at 4:00, we met with Dan Smith in the cafeteria of Birnbeck College, and this was, for me, the most important interview of the entire week. So far, I had sympathy for the dedication and ultimate goals of the CND and the END — insofar as they were against nuclear weapons — but their unilateralist tactics were either supported by anti-American feelings (sometimes vicious ones) or by no serious explanations or both. Mr. Smith had been described to me — by more than one of his London-based opponents — as the most honest of the "gang of four" of END.

In the first place, he is for changing the nature of the defense of European countries so as to make it "strong without threatening" and "as far as possible, not suicidal". This would probably be done on a territorial basis, but we "don't now know what is possible and are not sure what is desirable". This was certainly honest enough.

He agreed that "nuclear freeze was not nuclear safe", as Lawrence Freedman would put it, and also that, "realistically", the nuclear-free zone which would come about through END protests would involve only non-Soviet controlled countries.

How then would Western Europe defend itself against Russian pressures? His answer was to avow a form of finlandization! In the first place, he felt that Finland had "done well considering its geographical location". In some ways, they had done better than Mexicanization or Canadianization — in those cases, he felt, the countries neighboring the great power had suffered economic penetration *as well as* foreign policy domination. In a larger sense, Western Europe would have to live with the fact that, in geography, it had a large and powerful Soviet neighbor and its foreign policy was, to that extent, constrained.

But a "war of conquest" by this Soviet nation was "extraordinarily unlikely" and hence the territorial defense required of Western Europe did not have to be one that could withstand highly motivated desires to invade.



Dan Smith  
An intellectual leader of END

Less would be enough.

I noted that Sweden had given back the Soviet submarine but that, one speculated, Great Britain might not have done so. The Soviet Union bargained over the return even of several overflying flyers much less over the equipment. Was the difference between giving it back or not, the kind of "lower posture" he had in mind as the cost of a more sensible non-nuclear defense? He said "yes". He says his opponents sometimes inaccurately say that if you scratch the surface of Dan Smith, you will find a Gaullist. But he agreed with me that this was inaccurate — for one thing, because he was looking toward having Western Europe adopt a more compliant, and less independent, posture. In effect, he seemed just to prefer the risks of Soviet political pressures to the risks of a spiraling arms race with nuclear weapons all about.

Asked what the dangers of his policy were, he first mentioned the "steam running out" of the movement, next that the U.S. might become more bellicose to the USSR, and third that there might be hostility between the U.S. and Western Europe, with the U.S. reacting with anger and bewilderment.

Of the Soviets, he saw the danger that they might fear the END policy lest it encourage Eastern European liberalization or force a change in internal priorities (i.e., as when the post-revolutionary "steel-eaters" had to give up on big steel). As a consequence, the Russians could increase pressure on Eastern Europe, or even invade Western Europe. (He noted that when the pressure to remove American troops was highest in America, Brezhnev had helped to prevent this by announcing the opening of MBFR talks just before the Mansfield amendment — looking toward a unilateral American withdrawal — was to be voted upon in the Senate). Also, he said a potential right-wing backlash in West Germany was a problem.

In sum, he felt that "END is more of an idea than anything else", and this idea was:

- 1). The vision of a nuclear-free Europe, and
- 2). The coordination of disarmament movements in different countries.

END was a movement of non-alignment and one that recognized that the Soviet Union was a European power ("there is no way out of that").

I have no doubt but that this is the best explication of the thinking of CND and END which presently exists and is, really, what FAS sought to uncover throughout the week visit. Mr. Smith, 30 years old, is not only one of the four leaders of END in Britain but also a former general secretary of CND (1974-75) and a current member of its national council. He has been called by Lawrence Freedman, "the most capable of left-wing critics of British defense policy", and his book, *The Defense of the Realm in the 1980s* (Croom Helm, 1980) is quite interesting.

#### SUMMARY ON RETURNING HOME

Notwithstanding the view of so many Europeans engaged in disarmament, and of some isolated Americans, most FAS members will believe that the current American role in Western Europe was not less moral than U.S. responses in World War I and World War II. The Soviet occupation of and repression in, Eastern Europe, the threats to Berlin, and the general style of Soviet diplomacy gave alarm not only in America but also in Western Europe. We did not have to subvert governments to have our forces kept in Western Europe. At considerable cost, and ever greater risk, we have linked our own security to that of Western Europe. While this was certainly felt to be in our enlightened interests, it was an even more basic, and deeply felt, interest on the part of the rest of the NATO alliance. And it was a role that helped the neutral states as well.

Nevertheless, a new generation of Europeans, largely in their twenties, are coming to believe that the nature of the nuclear defense we are putting up is more dangerous than the Russian threat they perceive. Whether or not their view will prevail in the coming years is unclear. In England, for example, their success with the Labor Party may only have contributed to the Party's split and loss of voters. Conceivably the major contemporary triumph of CND & END will turn out to have been their current great success in moving America toward disarmament talks.

But at the very least, these attitudes are likely to prevail *someday*. If the Russians do not threaten Western Europe, or behave with violence in Eastern Europe, an ever-larger fraction of the body European politic will indeed come to share Mr. Smith's view. After all, new generations can be expected to view nuclear weapons only with ever-greater horror. The instinct to want them removed is a natural one, notwithstanding such logical observations as "nuclear free is not nuclear safe." Eventually a heightened risk of conventional struggle may come to appear to Europeans as preferable to nuclear deterrence even though, heretofore, their view has been to link themselves ever more closely to nuclear threats with a view to deterring another conventional World War.

In the end, it is an abnormal situation to have American forces and 6,000 tactical nuclear weapons lying about Western Europe. The question is when and how it will be safe to bring them home — in this century, or in the next for sure.

One conclusion seems inescapable. Long before the

nuclear weapons are eliminated from the superpowers they will be eliminated from the territory of lesser powers. In this sense, the problem discussed in this newsletter has, as a disarmament problem, clear first priorities. If the membership agree, we will begin to devote correspondingly more

attention to the movement for disarmament in Europe. And we invite all members to provide their reactions to, and comments, on the issues raised herein. □

—JEREMY J. STONE

**QUESTIONS FOR MEMBERS**

In order to get a preliminary reading on FAS opinion, on a sample of the many important questions raised by the disarmament movement in Europe, we ask interested members to return this short questionnaire; comments at length by letter are encouraged.

1). British unilateral disarmament, including both its deterrent and U.S. bases, is, in the present international context:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Desirable
- \_\_\_\_\_ Undesirable
- \_\_\_\_\_ Irrelevant

2). END's process of seeking a "nuclear-free zone" through the independent agitation and protest of different groups is, in the current international context:

- \_\_\_\_\_ Desirable      \_\_\_\_\_ Undesirable

3). Notwithstanding the above, the agitation toward disarmament provided by CND and END is sufficiently useful in requiring the Administration to focus on arms control, and/or other reasons, that it should be viewed favorably.

- \_\_\_\_\_ True      \_\_\_\_\_ False

4). In the end, America can only defend a Western Europe that wants to be defended and, accordingly, Americans should watch events there closely, but let the Europeans determine their own fate.

- \_\_\_\_\_ True      \_\_\_\_\_ False

5). All things considered, if our Allies will permit it, it is sufficiently safer to bring home the nuclear weapons that we should do so notwithstanding the possible effects on deterrence of Soviet conventional attack (or on deterrence of Soviet political pressures).

- \_\_\_\_\_ True      \_\_\_\_\_ False

6). The right questions to ask about CND & END, and my general conclusions, are:

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Name: \_\_\_\_\_ (please print)

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