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SPECIAL ISSUE: SALT LINKAGE

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LINKING SALT TO ETHIOPIA OR UNLINKING IT FROM DETENTE?

In the first place, linkage of the SALT talks to other aspects of international relations is a sign of weakness. Where a nation is strong and its position is wholly defensible, it never tries to link one piece of negotiation to another but instead denies that linkage exists. This was the case when we offended the Russians by such bold human rights actions as writing to Sakharov. We said then that SALT and human rights were entirely separate; it was the Russians who had no other answers but to plead the linkage of human rights to detente.

But when our position is weak, in the sense that we have no immediate answer to Russian actions, as in Ethiopia, we are forced to escalate into some other dimension of threats and it is precisely this threat of escalation that we call "linkage." In this instance, we linked Ethiopia with the possibility that SALT might not succeed.

Since it has long been a cliché of international politics that SALT is of interest to both sides, linkage to SALT has all the credibility of saying that we are prepared to cut off our nose to spite our face. Since signs of weakness are rarely helpful in international politics, observers can deduce from this first axiom the conclusion that SALT linkage ought to be avoided.

In the second place, the precise formulations of linkage usually depend on the political role of the formulator. The State Department, as befits a negotiator, is always denying linkage and trying to get on with the job. But, the National Security Adviser is always invoking linkage so as to use SALT to achieve his other goals. To protect his flanks, he normally argues that he did not invent linkage but is only taking notice of its inevitability. Thus Brzezinski:

"We are not imposing linkages but linkages may be imposed by unwarranted exploitation of local conflict for larger international purposes."

But of course he did not offer the opinion that linkage "might be imposed" by the earlier Administration exploitation of human rights imbalances between the systems.

Meanwhile, Presidents typically invoke linkage by observing that their role as Chief Executive of getting signed treaties ratified will be complicated by Soviet actions. Soviet actions, Presidents are wont to say, are inevitably "going to have a spillover effect in Congress and in the nation as a whole." In sum, with SALT linkage, one takes one's stand where one takes one's seat.

Third, linkage is self-fulfilling. Everybody knows it. The National Security Adviser certainly knows it. This is why national security advisers give public vent to the linkage charge, rather than just telling the Russians privately. In this way, the medium becomes the message, and the message is that the National Security Adviser is ready to whip up self-fulfilling sentiment against SALT unless the linked-to-affair is resolved satisfactorily. Meanwhile, the President is also setting himself up, whether he knows it or not, for the Senate to take his prophecy as self-fulfilling. In time, they will seize the proffered opening to assure the President that he was right—he lost their SALT votes for precisely the reasons he feared he would, "Ethiopia."

The unthinking quality of the linkage view is reflected in the readiness to link not only SALT ratification, but even the conduct of the negotiations. The linkers behave like Santayana's definition of the fanatic—"a man who redoubles his efforts as he loses sight of his goals."

Fourth, the Soviets have their own notions about SALT linkage—they think it is—and they think it ought to be—linked to detente. Thus on February 13, 1978, *Pravda* quoted Brezhnev as saying that

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SOURCE MATERIAL PROVIDED SO THAT MEMBERS CAN DECIDE

An ongoing debate is raging inside the Administration on whether, when, and how to link SALT to Soviet actions in Africa. Soviet spokesmen in Moscow are expressing their own views. The issue involves one of FAS's most important issues: disarmament.

Therefore, despite its political quality, we believe members should read the positions being expressed and reflect on them. The Council statement can, if necessary, be amended, but it will, at least, provide a focus for member

discussion.

The President's Charleston speech was given first in time; we have printed excerpts from it last because it caused no stir. It was the change in tone of the President's Wake Forest speech, and related comments by Zbigniew Brzezinski that produced in order, the Moscow article by Georgi Arbatov and the speech by Leonid I. Brezhnev. Excerpts from these documents are printed in order. Let us know what you think.

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international relations were at a "crossroad leading either to the growth of trust and cooperation or to the growth of mutual fears and suspicions and to stockpiling of weapons." "Detente," *Pravda* said, "provides the possibility of choosing the path of peace...The problem of limiting strategic arms has a special position in resolving this task."

This Soviet notion about SALT linkage, which is shared by many American liberals, led the Russians to be especially outraged when Carter wrote Sakharov. At that time, *Pravda* said: "Detente presupposed mutual respect for the sovereignty laws and customs of states."

These four axioms of SALT can be used to deduce a theorem that might assist the Administration to see its way through the forest of linked trees.

In the first place, SALT is and ought to be, an overriding shared imperative of both major powers. It should not be used to try to influence other matters. And it cannot be used effectively to influence other matters.

But there is a linkage solution to the dilemma. If necessary, the Administration should propose to cut linkage, rather than strengthen linkage, and the linkage it should cut is the linkage of SALT to detente. It is credible to say that detente, which is relaxation of tension, cannot be achieved during upsurges of tension. Thus Ethiopia is, indeed, an inevitable complicater of detente.

So the Administration could speak as follows: "We do not intend to link SALT to other foreign policy issues. But if you raise tensions around the world, we will be unable to fulfill your hopes that SALT will be linked to detente. We will in any case, try to get any suitable SALT treaty ratified, because SALT is something we want in any case. But your actions in Ethiopia are making it impossible for us to portray such a SALT agreement as part of a new beginning in our overall relationship."

In this case linkage would not be a role-playing cop-out, or a sign of weakness. Nor would it have an apples and oranges quality. It would instead be based on a tautology: that detente is the opposition of increases in tension. And it would hit the Russians where they hurt—in their assumption that they can buy, with SALT agreements, a bonus good will and a bonus improved relations that might not be otherwise warranted.

Indeed, this cut in linkage would be very useful to the Administration, if the SALT vote lineup is close. The conservatives often care less about the details of a treaty than about the implications of the treaty for the way in which the U.S. intends to view and treat the Russians subsequently. If SALT were freed from the detente baggage that the conservatives assume it will have, they would breathe a sigh of relief. Their fears of domestic loss of vigilance would decline. And the dissonance they see between our being friendly with Russians in one area, and competing in another, would vanish.

In short, Mr. Carter, stop linking SALT to Ethiopia. But if you do get into trouble in the treaty

ratification process, propose that the treaty be signed and ratified in a business-like, rather than in an overly friendly, spirit, without bear hugs or summits. Liberals and conservatives alike will salute this treatment of SALT as the special responsibility to mankind that it indeed is. And the Russians will view this simple possibility of a cool ratification as a real and credible threat to what they hope to achieve at SALT. Most important, you'll succeed in arms limitations; you'll have avoided throwing the baby out with the bath. □

—Reviewed and approved by the FAS Council

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EXCERPTS FROM CARTER'S SPEECH ON DEFENSE POLICY AND SOVIET TIES

Following are excerpts from a speech on United States defense policy toward the Soviet Union given by President Carter on March 17, 1978 at Wake Forest University in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Let me deal at the beginning with some myths.

One myth is that this country somehow is pulling back from protecting its interests and its friends around the world. That is not the case, as will be explained in this speech and demonstrated in our actions as a nation.

Another myth is that our defense budget is too burdensome and consumes an undue portion of our Federal revenues. National defense is, of course, a large and important item of expenditures; but it represents only about 5 percent of our gross national product and consumes approximately one-fourth of our current Federal budget.

It also is a mistake to believe that our country's defense spending is mainly for intercontinental missiles or nuclear weapons. About 10 percent of our defense budget goes to strategic forces for nuclear deterrence. More than 50 percent of it is simply to pay and support the men and women in our Armed Forces.

Finally, some believe that because we possess nuclear weapons of great destructive power, we need do nothing more to guarantee our security. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Our potential adversaries have now built up massive forces armed with conventional weapons—tanks, aircraft, infantry and mechanized units. Those forces could be used for political blackmail and could threaten our vital interests—unless we and our allies and friends have our own conventional military strength as a counterbalance.

Changes Over Two Decades

Let us review how national security issues have changed over the past decade or two.

The world has grown both more complex and more interdependent. There is now division among the Communist powers; the old colonial empires have fallen, and many new nations have risen in their place; old ideological labels have lost some of their meanings.

There have also been changes in the military balance among nations. Over the past 20 years the military forces of the Soviets have grown substantially—both in absolute numbers and in relation to our own. There also has been an ominous inclination of the part of the Soviet Union to use its military power to intervene in local conflicts with advisers, with equipment and with full logistical support and encouragement for mercenaries from other Communist countries, as we can observe today in Africa.

This increase in Soviet military power has been going on for a long time. Discounting inflation, since 1960 Soviet military spending has doubled, rising steadily by 3 to 4 percent every year, while our military budget is actually lower than it was in 1960.

The Soviets, who traditionally were not a significant naval power, now rank No. 2 in the world in naval forces.

In its balanced strategic nuclear capability the United States retains important advantages, but over the past decade the steady Soviet buildup has achieved functional equivalence in strategic forces with the United States.

These changes demand that we maintain adequate responses—diplomatic, economic and military.

We have recently completed a major reassessment of our national defense strategy and out of this process have come

some overall principles designed to preserve our national security during the years ahead.

We will match, together with our allies and friends, any threatening power through a combination of military forces, political efforts and economic programs. We will not allow any other nation to gain military superiority over us.

We shall seek the cooperation of the Soviet Union and other nations in reducing areas of tension. We do not desire to intervene militarily in the domestic affairs of other countries or to aggravate regional conflicts, and we shall oppose intervention by others.

While assuring our military capabilities, we shall seek security through dependable, verifiable arms-control agreements where possible.

We shall use our great economic, technological and diplomatic advantages to defend our interests and to promote our values. We are prepared, for instance, to cooperate with the Soviet Union toward common social, scientific and economic goals—but if they fail to demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and continents, then popular support in the United States for such cooperation will erode.

Modernization and Revitalization

These principles mean that, even as we search for agreement on arms control, we will modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces. We shall implement our policy in three ways:

By maintaining strategic nuclear balance;

By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

LINKAGE AS A SIGN OF WEAKNESS

Excerpts from a Washington Post story of March 6, 1978, by Murrey Marder entitled " 'Linkage' Rift Exposes a Split at Heart of Detente Strategy":

The record of trying to apply "linkage" on SALT is one of failure.

Two years ago, in a memorable exchange in the Kremlin with Brezhnev, Kissinger sought a trade progress toward a new nuclear arms pact for a withdrawal of Soviet-supported Cuban troops from another African nation, Angola.

Before the talks began, Brezhnev was asked by a newsman if Angola would be among the subjects he and Kissinger would discuss, as Kissinger had forecast.

"I have no questions about Angola," responded Brezhnev. Angola is not my country."

"It will certainly be discussed," quickly interposed Kissinger.

"The agenda," Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said dryly, "is always adopted by mutual agreement."

"Then I will discuss it," Kissinger retorted.

"You'll discuss it with Sonnenfeldt," scoffed Brezhnev, referring to Kissinger aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt. "That will insure complete agreement," Brezhnev glibed, because "I've never seen him (Kissinger) have a disagreement with Sonnenfeldt."

Kissinger told reporters later, "I knew I had no bargaining cards."

By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East and other regions of the world.

Our first and most fundamental concern is to prevent nuclear war. The horrors of nuclear conflict, and our desire to reduce the world's arsenals of fearsome nuclear weapons, do not free us from the need to analyze the situation objectively, and to make sensible choices about our purposes and means.

Our strategic forces must be—and must be known to be—a match for the capabilities of the Soviets. They must never be able to use their nuclear forces to threaten, coerce or blackmail us or our friends.

Our continuing major effort in the SALT talks now under way in Geneva are one means toward the goal of strategic nuclear stability. We and the Soviets already have reached agreement on some basic points, although still others remain to be resolved.

We are not looking for a one-sided advantage, but before I sign a SALT agreement on behalf of the United States, I will make sure that it preserves the strategic balance, that we can independently verify Soviet compliance, and that we will be at least as strong relative to the Soviet Union as we would be without an agreement.

But in addition to the limits and reductions of a SALT II agreement, we must take other steps to protect the strategic balance. During the next decade improvements in Soviet missiles can make our land-based missile forces increasingly vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. Such an attack would amount to national suicide for the Soviet Union, but, however remote, it is a threat against which we must constantly be on guard.

Cruise Missiles

We have a superb submarine fleet which is relatively invulnerable to attack, and we have under construction new Trident submarines and missiles which will give our submarine ballistic-missile force even greater range and security. I have ordered rapid development and deployment of cruise missiles to reinforce the strategic value of our bombers. We are working on the M-X intercontinental ballistic missile to give us more options to respond to Soviet strategic deployments. If it becomes necessary to guarantee the clear invulnerability of our strategic deterrent, I shall not hesitate to take actions for full-scale development and deployment of these systems. □

A SOVIET VIEW OF LINKAGE

The Arbatov article of March 29, 1978 from which the following is excerpted has received considerable attention following, among other things, a State Department commentary that it was a "serious, thoughtful commentary" which they were "studying carefully."

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have now reached a distinctive landmark. Certainly a number of essential problems and many technical details still remain open. But the possibility of reaching agreement on them, as well as the very fate of the agreement, seem today to depend not so much on the skill of those engaged in the talks as on the principled decision of the U.S. Government—whether the agreement will be concluded at all. One cannot shake off the impression that Washington has again entered a period of vacillation (kolebaniya) precisely on this vital question; again, since one chance of reaching an agreement has already been missed because of such vacillations (this has

been admitted by some representatives of the former administration who recall, not without regret, the peripeteia of the 1976 electoral campaign, when the attempts to appease the rightwing by sacrificing the agreement not only failed to insure victory for the Republicans, but also contributed to their defeat).

How are these new vacillations to be explained?

A number of leading figures of the administration have recently made statements on this subject, making the fate of the agreement dependent on developments in the area of the Horn of Africa. Such a "linkage" (uvyazka) met with criticism even in the United States. It was pointed out in particular that it was completely irrelevant in this case, since the matter in question was an agreement in which both sides were equally interested, and not a peculiar bonus for the Soviet Union. Certainly, some American figures put the question more flexibly, maintaining that the government does not link an agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the events in Africa, but only warn that they would affect the political atmosphere, rendering the ratification of the future agreement even more difficult or even impossible. But this does not stand up to criticism.

But of course no one would begin to dispute the importance of the general political situation. However, it is also obvious that the course taken by a government is no passive object, but an important instrument for shaping this situation. And if the conflict in the African Horn was instrumental in charging international tension, then surely it was caused by Somalia's aggression against Ethiopia. However, Somalia would scarcely have ventured to carry out such aggression had it had no grounds to count on U.S. support. Probably even the United States was associating this adventure with certain calculations. But is it logical to try to take revenge for unsound calculations, making it more difficult to solve questions in which America is no less interested than the Soviet Union?

Naturally the events in Africa are far from the only question the United States is citing as the cause of the deterioration in the atmosphere of Soviet-American relations. There are other questions, too, both real and false, blown up by propaganda (such as the notorious question of the alleged violations of "human rights" tolerated by the Soviet Union). Without delving deeper into the substance of each of these matters, we would merely like to recall that in undertaking the large and laborious work of improving Soviet-American relations the two sides could not but understand from the very beginning that they are separated both by radical ideological and social differences and by their approaches to many international questions. (Let us recall at least the fact that at that very moment the aggression in Vietnam was in full swing and that the Mideast situation was also most dangerous). All this had to influence the political atmosphere. What could be done? Was one to wait until all the political storms had abated, until the differences were solved in some unknown way, and nothing clouded the atmosphere? Had the USSR and the United States taken such a position, the two countries would undoubtedly have remained to this very day on the brink of a "cold war", which would merely have become even more dangerous.

Detente became possible precisely because another approach was chosen—to seek, even in complicated circumstances, paths toward some arrangement on the main, decisive problems of the two powers' mutual relations. This path has proved to be successful. A number

of important agreements were concluded, and this was of great significance for the further development of relations between the USSR and the United States, for the normalization of the entire international situation.

But let us revert to the SALT agreement. Even if we attribute the U.S. vacillations (kilebaniya) on this matter to the political atmosphere, nevertheless the main role in its deterioration is played by the continuing arms race and by the freezing of military detente itself—this central question in USSR—U.S. relations; that is, by problems directly connected with strategic arms. These problems—or, more precisely, the direction taken by the debates around them, which are now taking place in the United States—are complicating the situation to a considerable extent.

The deliberations are centered on the same old argument about the “Soviet threat,” which for decades has been used to further the arms race. It is openly claimed that this “threat” is allegedly engendered by...the Soviet policy of *securing military supremacy*. The groundlessness of this version is obvious. Both at the strategic level, and in the area of the so-called “central contraposition” (protivostoyaniye)—a parity has been established in Europe, an approximate equality, and this has been acknowledged time and again even in official statements of the U.S. leadership. As can be seen, the crux of the matter lies elsewhere completely—in the unwillingness to reconcile oneself to this equality, in the stubborn aspiration of the U.S. imperialist circles to achieve military supremacy. From this arises the dissatisfaction with the future agreement, the heightened concern that it could cement the correlation of strategic forces to the disadvantage of the United States.

At the same time, frequent attempts are made to present the agreement as the source of those dangers that are actually engendered by the very existence of enormous amounts of mass destruction weapons. Naturally it is not easy to reconcile oneself to the idea that oneself, one's family, one's country would be vulnerable—in the event of war—to a nuclear strike, bringing with it death and monstrous destruction. Perhaps it is particularly difficult for the Americans to become accustomed to this, when, for centuries they have been living beyond two oceans with a feeling of complete security and, if one thinks of the postwar years, with the conviction of their own strategic supremacy (and they lived, to tell the truth, without being embarrassed in any way by the fact that such “security,” such supremacy was becoming an enormous danger to other people).

The real dangers lie not in agreement on a limitation of strategic arms, not in the mutual concessions that one must make in order to reach a mutually acceptable compromise—they lie in the arms race itself. They lie in the fact that the world is living on mountains of mass destruction weapons and that the process of their production is not slowing down. Scientific-technical progress is opening up possibilities for creating increasingly dangerous arms, and the United States is exploiting these possibilities, becoming the outrider for ever more rounds of this race. Under these conditions no one can have absolute security. In the meantime there are more tasks on the agenda—to reduce the scale of the threat, to avert the danger of war, to prevent new rounds of the arms race. These aims are extremely important, since they mark the only realistic road to consolidating peace and safeguarding international security. And the Soviet-American agreement now being worked out would signify a great step on this road.

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS ON LINKAGE

Nixon Administration

“The central fact is the interrelationship of international events. We did not invent the interrelationship; it is not a negotiating tactic. It is a fact of life. This Administration recognizes that international developments are entwined in many complex ways: Political issues relate to strategic questions, political events in one area of the world may have far-reaching effect on political developments in other parts of the globe.”

State of the World Message, 1970

Carter Administration

“It is only a matter of realistic judgement to conclude that if tensions were to rise because of the unwarranted intrusion of Soviet power into a purely local conflict, then that will inevitably complicate the context not only of the negotiating process itself, but of any ratification that would follow the successful conclusion of the negotiations.”

Zbigniew Brzezinski speaking with reporters at the White House on March 1, 1978

There are quite a few people in the U.S. Congress who understand these truths very well. But there are others there also. That is why one can expect even if this agreement is concluded, its ratification by Congress will require an involved struggle. It is quite probable that one of the causes of the hesitation manifested by the U.S. administration is precisely the fact that it has not yet solved the question of whether it is now prepared to enter such a struggle.

It can be presumed that this is the foundation of the calculations made by the opponents of the agreement—by complicating the situation in Congress they are trying not only to make the ratification more difficult, but also to increase the government's hesitation, thus dragging out the talks themselves indefinitely. However, here the same question arises: Why, indeed, does the administration not take advantage of possibilities it undoubtedly has at its disposal to influence the situation? Surely these possibilities are particularly significant in precisely those instances involving the limiting of strategic armaments. In the discussions now being conducted beyond the ocean, no one can answer the critics of the agreement with greater authority or disperse the existing doubts and clearly and accurately portray the true state of affairs than the American Government.

And it is hard to suppose that this is not being done (or being done all too rarely) by oversight, or through someone's negligence. It is rather a matter of ambivalence in the administration's policy, beginning with the fact that it is attempting to combine the arms limitation negotiations with the creation of new and dangerous types of weapons and with increasing demands for military allocations. One would think that it is precisely this ambivalence that is forcing the administration to remain silent on certain occasions, to enter into dangerous compromises with its critics in various matters, and at times to play into their

hands. The impression is being created that such a line is also linked with attempts to utilize the situation in the United States, and also the increased attacks on the future agreement, to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union during the negotiations and to "haggle" for unilateral concessions. Such an approach can hardly be considered a far-sighted one.

It seems that even the Bible says: There is a time for casting away stones, and a time for gathering them in. In the course of preparing any agreement there is also a time for voicing doubts, for diplomatic maneuvers. And there also comes a time when it is finally necessary to decide: Should the agreement be reached, or should it not.

The entire logic of the development of events leads us to conclude that such a moment is indeed drawing near. Its responsibility is determined by the fact that it will not be a question of just another agreement that is to be decided. It is actually a question of choosing the path for years to come. It can be either an agreement that can be the starting point for further progress in the direction of limiting and reducing arms and of developing mutually advantageous, peaceful cooperation, or it can be a rejection of an arrangement, which would mean a break-down of the Soviet-American dialog on key questions of the two powers' security, of international security, and a marked deterioration in the general atmosphere in USSR-U.S. relations.

The time has come to match (*soizmeryat*) the agreement that is being worked out with exactly this choice. In expressing certain pretensions with regard to the agreement, one should particularly reflect on whether matters would be improved, were this agreement not to exist at all and this, actually, refers to the concern, rather widespread in the United States, over the vulnerability of intercontinental ground-based missiles, about the difficulties of controlling the implementation of the agreement and so forth. Such an approach would also help to better appraise (*otsenit*) the agreement as a whole. Recently, Senator R. Clark convincingly pointed out the grave consequences of a breakdown in the agreement—new and absolutely unlimited rounds of the arms race, the growth of military spending, the spreading of nuclear arms, the destabilization of the strategic situation, and increased tension in political relations. And, as a result of all this—the increasing threat of war.

In this connection let us once again recall President J. Carter's Wake Forest speech. This speech reiterates assurances to the effect that "the main concern" of the United States remains the prevention of a nuclear war, that America would strive to bring the SALT negotiations to a successful end and that it would not seek unilateral advantages. Yet the main emphasis in this speech is placed on strident promises to strengthen the military might of the United States, develop (*razvertyvat*) new weapons systems, referring to the "Soviet threat" and the USSR's "sinister intentions."

How are these remarks to be interpreted? As a shift in political accents? As a return to the "policy of strength?" As attempts to obtain military superiority, a policy which invariably failed throughout the entire postwar period? How can one reconcile this with "concern" for preventing war? Today the danger of war is engendered precisely by the arms race. Let us not forget that certain new trends are now evident in the development of military technology. The specialists are still arguing about

them. Yet one thing is evident: The arms race will become even more dangerous because the new types and systems of weapons will shake even the relative stability that exists today. The next 15-20 years could, in this sense, seriously differ from the preceding period.

Of course, one can impose new rounds in the arms race on the other side. This has happened more than once, and the Soviet Union proved that it can neither be intimidated nor forced to retreat when confronted with such actions. Yet, Washington, too, should stop and consider all the consequences of such a policy, and how it will affect both the interests of the United States and those of all mankind.

The time is truly coming for crucial decisions in Soviet-American relations. The course elaborated by the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses remains the immutable foundation of Soviet foreign policy. This course also includes an improvement in Soviet-American relations and an enhancement of the positive changes in these relations that made themselves felt in the first half of the seventies. All this was again clearly noted at the recent session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, during the deliberations on the results of the trip of the Supreme Soviet to the United States. Taking the floor at this session, Comrade L.I. Brezhnev stressed that a period has come in the development of Soviet-American relations which necessitates the exertion of new efforts to impart dynamism and a more constructive character to these relations.

The direction which the development of relations between the two countries will take does not depend on the Soviet Union alone. The immediate future must show whether Washington, in effect, adheres to the tenets that have been repeatedly proclaimed recently by the American leadership: tenets for strengthening peace, limiting and reducing arms and for promoting cooperation with the USSR. □

BREZHNEV CRITICIZES U.S. SALT ROLE

Following are excerpts from a speech given by Leonid I. Brezhnev on April 7, 1978, to sailors of the Pacific fleet in Vladivostok. These excerpts are from the English version distributed by Tass, the official Soviet press agency.

Moreover, a tendency is being shown to link in some way the advance at the talks and the destiny of the agreement in general with other political problems in the hope of bringing pressure on the Soviet Union.

Such a line of the United States was manifested soon after the Vladivostok meeting. As a result of this, the work on the agreement was then practically stalled and even set back in a number of aspects.

Great efforts have been required to bring the talks back on track of the Vladivostok arrangements. But this has been finally done. Principled solutions of some outstanding problems have been found and a range of provisions of the agreement still to be worked upon was, on the whole, considerably narrowed. This was insured largely due to the Soviet Union's patient and constructive stand.

It is understandable, however, that outstanding questions cannot be solved without the United States making steps to meet us halfway. But, frankly speaking, we do not see such steps of late. One gets the impression that some people in the United States are not averse to interpreting our readiness to conclude an agreement as a chance to secure unilateral advantages for the U.S.A. This is the only way to explain the continued attempts at the talks to erode somehow, for

instance, the understanding reached on limitations on cruise missiles or to impose unjustified limitations on Soviet missiles while leaving for the United States freedom of action for modernizing and creating new types of practically all components of strategic arms.

We resolutely reject any attempts to impose unacceptable terms of agreement on us. We said and we are saying now that the Soviet Union stands for the earliest achievement of agreement, but only a kind of agreement that would be strictly in keeping with the principle of equality and equal security and that would embody in a real way this basic principle. We do not demand that the agreement give us any advantages at the expense of the other side, but we expect the other side to make a similar approach. There can be no other solution.

CARTER SPEAKS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

The following are excerpts of remarks made by President Carter on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, delivered on July 21, 1977, in Charleston, South Carolina.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have learned that our countries and our peoples, in spite of great resources, are not all powerful. We have learned that this world, no matter how technology has shrunk its distances is nevertheless too large and too varied to come under the sway of either one or two super powers. And—what is perhaps most important—we have, for our part, learned all of this in a spirit not of increasing resignation but of increasing maturity.

I mention these familiar changes because I think that to understand today's Soviet-American relationship we must place it in perspective, both historically and in terms of the overall global scene.

The whole history of Soviet-American relations teaches us that we will be misled if we base our long-range policies on the mood of the moment, whether that mood is euphoric or grim. All of us can remember times when relations seemed especially dangerous and times when they seemed bright. We have crossed those peaks and valleys before. And we can see that, on balance, the trend in the last third of a century has been positive.

The profound differences in what our two governments believe about freedom and power and the inner lives of human beings are likely to remain, and so are other elements of competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. That competition is real and deeply rooted in the history and values of our respective societies. But it is also true that our two countries share many important overlapping interests. Our job is to explore those interests and use them to enlarge the areas of cooperation between us, on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

As we negotiate with the Soviet Union, we will be guided by a vision of a gentler, freer, more bountiful world. But we will have no illusions about the nature of the world as it really is. The basis for complete mutual trust does not yet exist. Therefore the agreements we reach must be anchored on each side in enlightened self-interest. That is why we search for areas of agreement where our real interests and those of the Soviets coincide.

We want to see the Soviets further engaged in the growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with human problems—not only because they can be of real help,

but also because we both should have a greater stake in the creation of a constructive and peaceful world order.

When I took office—exactly six months ago yesterday—many Americans were growing disillusioned with detente—and, by extension, with the whole course of our relations with the Soviet Union. World respect for the essential rightness of our foreign policy had been shaken by the events of a decade. At the same time, we were beginning to regain our sense of confidence and purpose as a nation.

In this situation, I decided that it was time for honest discussions about international issues with the American people. I felt it was urgent to restore the moral bearings of American foreign policy. And I felt that it was important to put the U.S.-Soviet relationship, in particular, on a more reciprocal, realistic, and ultimately more productive basis for both nations. It is not a question of a "hard" policy or a "soft" policy, but of a clear-eyed recognition of how most effectively to protect our security and to create the kind of international order I have just described. This is our goal.

We have looked at the problems in Soviet-American relations freshly, and have sought to deal with them boldly and constructively with proposals intended to produce concrete results:

In the talks on strategic arms limitations, we advanced a comprehensive proposal for genuine reduction, limitations, and a freeze on new technology which would maintain balanced strategic strength.

We have urged a complete end to all nuclear tests and these negotiations are now underway. Agreement here could be a milestone in U.S.-Soviet relations.

We are working together toward a ban on chemical and biological warfare and the elimination of inventories of these destructive materials.

We have proposed to curb the sales and transfer of conventional weapons to other countries.

We are attempting to halt the threatening proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the world.

We have undertaken serious negotiations on arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

We have encouraged the Soviets to join us in signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which would ban the introduction of nuclear weapons into the southern part of the Western Hemisphere.

We have begun regular consultations with Soviet leaders as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to promote peace in the Middle East.

We and our allies are negotiating together with the Soviet Union and its allies to reduce the level of forces in Europe.

We have renewed the 1972 agreement for cooperation in science and technology and a similar agreement for cooperation in outer space.

We are seeking ways to cooperate in improving world health and in relieving world hunger.

In the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, confirming and then building on Vladivostok accords, we need to make steady progress toward our long-term goals of genuine reductions and strict limitations, while maintaining the basic strategic balance. We have outlined proposals incorporating significant elements of arms control: deep reductions in the arsenals of both sides, freezing of deployments and technology, and restraining certain elements in the strategic posture of both sides that threaten to destabilize the balance which now exists.

The Vladivostok negotiations of 1974 left some issues unresolved and subject to honest differences of

interpretation. Meanwhile, new developments in technology have created new concerns.

The Soviets are worried about our cruise missiles. We are concerned about the security of our deterrent. Our cruise missiles are aimed at compensating for the growing threat to our deterrent capability represented by the buildup of Soviet strategic offensive weapons forces. If these threats can be controlled, we are prepared to limit our own strategic programs.

But if an agreement cannot be reached, there should be no doubt that the United States can and will do what it must to protect its security and insure the adequacy of its strategic posture.

Our new proposals go beyond those that have been made before. Building on past agreements we are trying to reduce substantially the existing number of nuclear weapons.

In many areas we are in fact addressing for the first time the tough, complex core of longstanding problems. We are trying, for the first time, to reach agreements that will not be overturned by the next technological breakthrough. We are trying, in a word, for genuine accommodation.

Not one of these proposals involves a sacrifice of security. All of them are meant to increase the security of *both* sides. Our view is that a SALT agreement which just reflects the lowest common denominator that can be agreed upon will only create an illusion of progress and, eventually, a backlash against the entire arms control process. Our view is that genuine progress in SALT will not merely stabilize competition in weapons, but can also provide a basis for improvement in political relations.

When I say that these efforts are intended to relax tensions, I am not speaking only of military security. I mean as well the concern among our own citizens that comes from the knowledge that the leaders of our two countries have the capacity to destroy human society through misunderstandings or mistakes. If we can relax this tension by reducing the nuclear threat, not only will we make the world a safer place, but we will also free ourselves to concentrate on constructive action to give the world a better life.

We have made some progress toward our goals. But, to be frank, we also hear some negative comments from the Soviet side about SALT and about our more general relations. If these comments are based on a misconception of our motives, we will redouble our efforts to make them clear; but if they are merely designed as propaganda to put

pressure on us, let no one doubt that we will persevere.

What matters ultimately is whether we can create a relationship of cooperation that will be rooted in the national interest of both sides. We shape our own policies to accommodate the changing world, and we hope the Soviets will do the same. Together we can give this change a positive direction. □

NEGOTIATORS OPPOSE LINKAGE

Paul C. Warnke, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at Columbia University on April 3, 1978:

"There's another criticism which has begun to be voiced: that we should not be continuing to negotiate a strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union when the Soviet Union engages in activities of which we disapprove, such as its current activities in the Horn of Africa. But this criticism, as I see it, lacks any real logic and misconceives the nature and purpose of arms control agreements. A SALT II Treaty or any other arms control agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States certainly should not be a reward for Soviet good behavior. We should enter into any arms control agreement if—and only if—it advances American security interests when viewed on its own merits. If it does so, then I'd ask why we should deprive ourselves of its benefits because the Soviet Union fails to meet our ideal of international conduct. And if an agreement does not advance our interests on its own merits, we should not accept it no matter how benignly the Soviet Union may conduct itself internationally."

Secretary of State Vance at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2, 1978:

"There is not linkage between SALT negotiations and the situation in Ethiopia..."

"I believe very strongly that it is in our national interest to proceed with the SALT talks. I think that substantial progress has been made in the SALT talks during the last few months. I think that it is in our national interest to achieve a sound SALT agreement which will protect our national interests and the interests of our allies. I think this is possible to accomplish."

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