

# F. A. S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

Formerly the FAS Newsletter

THIS ISSUE:

WARNKE DEBATE AND  
ARMS CONTROL

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## THE WARNKE NOMINATION: HOW IT WENT

On March 9, after a confirmation struggle worthy of a Capitol Hill novel, Paul C. Warnke was made an Ambassador by a vote of 58-40 and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by a vote of 70-28.

The unsung hero in the affair was almost certainly Senator Alan Cranston (D-California), the Senate Whip (i.e., Assistant Majority Leader). He had early rounded up such a large majority for Warnke that the opposition was largely resigned to an outcome that, in fact, might not have otherwise occurred.

Two little noticed but important outcomes of the struggle may live on longer than anything else. The first was the decision of the Armed Services Committee to poach on Foreign Relations Committee preserves by holding its own hearings. Afterward, on March 8, Senate Armed Services Chairman John Stennis referred (S. 3646) to this precedent as strengthening the committee system since, although his Committee had held testimony and reprinted its hearings (with individual and collective views), it had not actually voted and put out a committee report. But the net effect was to persuade many observers that Armed Services could, in effect, proceed to obstruct the appointment to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of arms control enthusiasts in future, by holding or threatening to hold hearings. (Besides the Director, five other ACDA positions require confirmation).

### Byrd Warns Administration

The second important result was the statement of the Majority Leader, Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia), on March 9 (S. 3775) that he hoped the Administration would not lobby or apply pressure when and if the Senate has to consider a SALT II Treaty. This may leave the Senate to the mercy of conflicting — especially right-wing — mail and telephone campaigns.

After the election, newspapers speculated that the President would choose for Secretary of Defense either James Schlesinger, Harold Brown, or Paul Warnke. Cynics argued that both Schlesinger's name and Warnke's name had been floated to keep hawks and doves, respectively, in line. When Harold Brown was chosen, speculation moved on to suggesting Warnke for Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Enormous pressure was put on him to accept; he seems to have declined not once but twice. And, from the start, he was offered both the post of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Ambassadorial-rank position of Chief Negotiator at the SALT talks.

Warnke was the first choice of the arms control community for this assignment. Part of the reason for the pressure put upon him was the difficulty the Administration thought it would have in finding an acceptable sub-

stitute. Highly influential arms control supporters such as Senator Hubert Humphrey urged the White House to pursue Warnke relentlessly. Others warned that various front-running substitute candidates such as Henry Owen were unacceptable. (Owen was resented, among other things, for having been, years ago, a key mover and shaker in the efforts to promote the multilateral force — a force of nuclear-armed surface ships manned jointly by nationals of various NATO countries.)

Meanwhile, the right wing of the Democratic Party, represented by the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, was becoming restive as it appeared, increasingly, that President Carter was a closet dove rather than a closet hawk. Only a handful of positions had gone to its favorites (3 out of 50, it charged), while enough representatives of the liberal wing had gotten plum positions to persuade the *Wall Street Journal* to call the Administration "McGovernite." Senator Henry Jackson's camp felt it had been patient long enough and decided to make an issue of Warnke's nomination.

### Coalition Circulates Poor Memorandum

The Coalition for a Democratic Majority had early prepared a memorandum accusing Warnke of unilateral disarmament. This memorandum was amateurish, snide, and somewhat dishonestly prepared. One excerpt, using 13 ellipses, managed to turn a proposal for unilateral initiatives (with six-month time limits) into unilateral disarmament, by eliminating any reference to the time limits. A staff member of the Republican Policy Committee, Robert Wolthuis, circulated it to the republican members of both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee on White House stationery. (Asked why, he advised FAS that he was using up his White House "bucksheets" and confirmed that he had no knowledge of the authorship of the memo.) Others circulated it to hawkish democrats. Later Senator Nunn (D-Georgia) asked a military witness what he thought of one of the quotations in the memorandum and received the expected denunciation; the spark was struck.

Senators Nunn and Jackson urged the Armed Services Committee to have its own hearings, despite the fact that the jurisdiction over the confirmation fell to Foreign Relations. Under (then applicable) Senate rules, joint consideration of a nominee's confirmation (as with a bill) required unanimous consent or, failing that, a majority vote on the Senate floor after the nomination is reported favorably by the committee of primary jurisdiction. It was evident that unanimous consent would not be available and that the process of referral would probably not succeed. The Armed Services Committee hawks threatened

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simply to invite Mr. Warnke as a voluntary witness, believing he could hardly refuse.

The Foreign Relations Committee declined to protect Mr. Warnke against what was clearly a new and important precedent. Some members then left the matter to the Chairman while others evidently felt that Mr. Warnke's own interests were best served by venting the concern about him through a second appearance. Armed Services Committee Chairman John C. Stennis made a statement in the *Record* on February 4 which said that Armed Services Committee hearings had been agreed to by "all those who were interested" but did not indicate whether he was talking about his committee or Senator Sparkman. Aides were confused as to what was happening. When Mr. Stennis asked Mr. Warnke in a phone call whether he was willing to appear, Mr. Warnke apparently said, "Whatever the Senate desires." Mr. Stennis then put out a release saying that Mr. Warnke had voluntarily agreed to the hearings and, in this way, the Senate rules were bypassed.

In two days of intense and hostile examination, Warnke acquitted himself so well that the *Washington Post* called the hearings a personal "tour de force" and some of his most committed opponents called him "brilliant", "articulate", and an "attractive" man. The conservative opponents (Goldwater, Garn, and Helms) based their opposition on the direction they felt the Administration was moving. Basically, they feel that the Administration is prepared to concede to the Russians a degree of strategic superiority that is dangerous either in being or in perception.

The democratic hawks, especially Jackson and Nunn, were estranged by what they felt was a reluctance of Warnke to admit changes in position or emphasis, primarily with regard to the significance of numerical imbalances in weapons. Neither had any complaint about the positions Mr. Warnke espoused at the hearings, or about his expressed readiness to take seriously the scenarios they viewed with concern. Rather, they moved on to questioning the sincerity and the permanence of the positions adopted.

### Post Breaks Story on Mailing

On March 4, the *Washington Post* broke the story that 500,000 letters had gone out in a mass mailing against Warnke engineered by Richard Viguerie, a leading and highly successful manipulator of direct mail for conservative causes; responses were flooding the Senate.

On March 6, a *Washington Star* editorial analyzed the solicitation letters and referred to this campaign as "moonshine" which revealed what "passes for argument these days in the anti-Warnke lobby."

Meanwhile, the pro-Warnke forces were circulating a list of about 80 eminent establishment figures who had endorsed Warnke as a "man of integrity, character and high ability." They included McGeorge Bundy, William Colby, Leonard Woodcock, and others. Clifford and McNamara had earlier endorsed Warnke and former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was doing some quiet lobbying for him.

### The Role of Paul Nitze

During the Foreign Relations Committee Hearings, Mr. Paul Nitze, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, had expressed readiness to appear if invited. Senator Danforth, a temporary member of the Committee, had pressed several times not only to invite Mr. Nitze but to

have him sit in a joint panel with Mr. Warnke. The Committee declined to invite Nitze and he arrived, instead, as a representative of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority. Aroused by Mr. Warnke's testimony of the day before, he announced that he urged rejection of Warnke's nomination for *both* positions rather than only one.

After grilling Warnke for two days, the Armed Services Committee decided to have open hearings with two witnesses for, and two against, in two balanced panels. The Administration declined to send up any champions and the Committee went forward with only its two opponents. Nitze was, again, the star opponent. However, he confounded the critics by stating candidly three or four times that Warnke's past statements would not complicate Warnke's life as a negotiator.

Senator Tower asked Paul Nitze to give examples of  
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- Alvin Weinberg (Physics)
- Robert H. Williams (Energy Policy)
- \*Nobel Laureates

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the inconsistency of logic, or lack of clarity, that Nitze had charged. Earlier, during the two days of examination, Paul Warnke had said, among other things, that he would take the Soviet defense program seriously and that he thought agreements which could not be verified were worse than no agreements at all. Nitze's response referred to these observations in a way that seemed both revealingly vague and a clear distortion of Warnke's position:

"He takes a position, as I understand it, of saying that we should have forces which are not inferior to those of the Soviet Union, in very clear terms. He says we cannot afford to let the Soviet Union have superiority. "He also says that we must negotiate an arms con-

### **NITZE RAN THE GAUNTLET IN 1963**

In 1963, during confirmation hearings to become Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze was confronted by hostile comments from the Armed Services Committee on the grounds that, three years before, he had put forward the possibility of placing the power to control the Strategic Air Command under the General Assembly of the U.N., subject to these conditions:

- a) that we and our allies will assume continuing responsibility for manning, maintaining, and improving these systems;
- b) that U.N. inspectors would be invited to inspect and satisfy themselves that these are the only nuclear systems we are maintaining;
- c) that a U.N. order to use them will be honored only in the event some nation has initiated the use of nuclear weapons other than on or over its own territory in self-defense against military aggression."

In the face of general Committee disapproval, Mr. Nitze advised it that he had put forward the idea in a speech that had been labeled one of puffing forward "grand fallacies." Senator Robert Byrd had expressed a general feeling when he said, at that time:

"I don't want to impugn your sincerity but I have a feeling you were a bit more enthusiastic about the proposals than you have stated today."

An FAS review of this speech reveals that — except for this zany proposal — it was mostly a sober review of impending difficulties for any American counterforce policy. The speech advanced the desirability of restricting ourselves, by and large, to a policy of emphasizing deterrence. It had indeed been prefaced with the jocular remark that Nitze would follow that definition of the economist which was "adroitly to pass over the minor inconsistencies, the better to press on to the grand fallacy." But he most emphatically was not attacking as fallacies the ideas he put forward!

As if to complete the analogy with the grilling the Committee gave Paul Warnke, Nitze was later advised by Senator Strom Thurmond that the Georgia press had characterized him as:

"... a Paul Warnke who got religion through negotiating with the Russians."

His response — which was virtually identical to a theme of Paul Warnke's during the hearing — was, in effect, that his position had not changed but that conditions had. □

trol agreement which would contribute to that end to bring that about. He also says that the agreement must be wholly verifiable, wholly ambiguous. He also, at other points, says that if the Soviet Union intends their civil defense program to be for purpose that I would think any civil defense program is for, that then we should get that settled too, that there should be an agreement with respect to the civil defense program.

"I don't see how that is consistent with an agreement based upon the Vladivostok accord nor do I believe it is within the realm of what is currently negotiable."

In short, Nitze moved to characterize Warnke's willingness to take Soviet civil defense seriously — which he, himself, has taken far more seriously — as a contradiction of the Vladivostok Agreement and as an indication of a readiness to consider agreements on matters non-verifiable. This constitutes two red herrings, since the non-verifiableness is not evident, nor is the requirement of resolving the problem with an arms control agreement. Thus it went.

Warnke was mainly harassed on the issues of strategic superiority. His writings were gone over with a fine tooth comb. The main furor was over a sentence which read:

"Under these circumstances, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman and Senator Cooper, that the continuation of the missile numbers game is in fact a mindless exercise, that there is no purpose in either side's achieving a numerical superiority, which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential."

Jackson had demanded that Warnke show where, in his previous writings, he had foreshadowed the views expressed in the Armed Services Committee Hearings; in a 37-page answer to the nine questions at issue, Warnke had quoted the above sentence without the last comma, as follows:

"a numerical superiority which is not translatable into either any sort of military capability or any sort of political potential has no purpose."

Warnke responded that the original had been oral testimony and that, in effect, the comma should not have been in the original. □

### **ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY SEES ASW CONTEST**

With regard to anti-submarine warfare, ARPA sees our present capabilities against current Soviet submarines being neutralized in the future by the very quiet submarines they are building, and will build, and by the range of these submarines. Its goal is to be able not only to detect quiet submarines at long ranges but to localize and track them in real time. This would be done either by monitoring the acoustic energy they radiate or by observing the hydro-dynamic disturbances which their motion may induce. For sound detection, the problem is to screen out the noise created by several thousand maritime merchant ships crossing the world's oceans.

One ARPA project has improved the ability of submarines to communicate from very long range with low probability of intercept.

Another ARPA project has achieved the first successful recognition of continuous sentences, rather than isolated words, with a machine. It secured better than 90% semantic (meaning) sentence accuracy on a vocabulary of 1,000 words. □

## THE ROLE OF GRIT

There are a number of models with which to view the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. One common approach is to assume that the two superpowers are, in reality, analogous to individuals in a state of overblown, wholly unjustified, hostility.

An eminent psychologist, Charles E. Osgood, has long advocated a solution to just such dilemmas. One participant should make a small initiative, well within the confines of his own security requirements, and seeks its reciprocation; thereafter, still larger unilateral initiatives can be made and a process of psychological de-escalation pursued. This strategy he calls GRIT (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction).

Obviously, there is much to be said for this approach, and unilateral initiatives, looking toward reciprocation, are a staple of international diplomacy in particular, and human relations in general.

What about their pitfalls? If the initiative is not reciprocated, the hostility will seem to have been confirmed by the snub. For this reason, diplomats prepare their initiatives carefully. It is with this thought that Paul Warnke noted, during his confirmation hearings, that while negotiations were underway, initiatives might best be talked out in advance.

Indeed, the hostility of Armed Services Committee hawks to initiatives springs precisely from their perception that past initiatives have *not* been reciprocated. They point, for example, to the fact that we stopped building ICBM's in the mid-sixties but the Soviet Union did not stop at the same number.

### Initiatives May Not Be Reciprocated

An initiative may not be reciprocated for many reasons. It may not be noticed in the welter of signals between the two sides. It may be noticed but not taken seriously. It may be taken seriously, but considered as a hostile public relations gesture (e.g., President Eisenhower's proposal for Open Skies — coming from an open society to a society that felt it depended for security upon secrecy). It may be noticed and responded to, but the reciprocation may not be noticed, taken seriously, or considered appropriate, by those on the initiating side.

To take a concrete example, President Carter has indicated that he might slow down our mobile missile, MX, if the Soviet Union would defer its own. This is an initiative. Will the Russians consider this proposal only a public relations gesture, since it could well have been made, if serious, at the SALT talks? (Or, more likely, will they take his public statement as a binding kind of commitment)? If they do take it seriously, will we know that they are responding — perhaps they had no immediate intention of going mobile? If we do learn that they did defer their mobile mission, will all national security interests consider that the swap was a good deal, even though this is what we asked for?

Some will say that the purpose for MX was not to match the SS-20 but, instead, to defend against the likelihood that fixed Soviet land-based missiles would otherwise destroy our (fixed) land-based missiles. Thus even a designated and confirmably reciprocated response might not be sufficient for our body politic, which is not, after all, of a single mind.

The experience with the interim agreement has persuaded

many observers that agreements have to be very carefully worked out indeed. In that agreement, the United States put forward a unilateral declaration interpreting a provision of the Treaty. The Russians did not agree to the unilateral declaration and did not abide by it; legally they were wholly within their rights. But this sort of thing suggests that initiatives, even formal declarations, must usually be negotiated to final agreement if they are to be dependable.

Underlying these technical problems of designing and communicating initiatives, and the diplomatic problems of avoiding snubs, there are also more fundamental limits to applying the GRIT model.

For one thing, on both sides there are groups who profit from, or feel more comfortable with, a certain degree of tension. The reasons can be venal: profits here or perquisites there. Or they can reflect a degree of distrust so great that it considers detente to be no more than a dangerous dropping of the guard. In these cases, GRIT can go only so far. Its very progress may be self-limiting.

Furthermore, with nations, as with individuals, familiarity and closer relations may only expose a measure of incompatibility and dislike. Thus having enjoyed some degree of relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union, a new Administration felt free to express a general American sense of distaste with Soviet human rights procedures.

It is true that such residual feelings ought not to lead to armaments production but, in fact, little is required to keep nations on their guard. The United States had war plans against the British, it is said, until 1935, which was more than a century after the War of 1812, and long after Great Britain posed a threat to us. And here both nations spoke a common language with common cultural and legal traditions.

In short, GRIT has an important role to play. The Administration seems to be conscious of it. How far one can and should go, however, in the direction of undiscussed unilateral initiatives remains — in the light of two complicated internal political situations — to be seen. □

## NUNN-BARTLETT FEAR COUP DE MAIN

In a report to the Senate on the "New Soviet Threat," Senators Nunn (D-Georgia) and Bartlett (R-Oklahoma) raise the specter of a Soviet attack in Western Europe without that warning which, in the main, NATO both assumes and requires. This Soviet capability to launch an attack "from virtually a standing start" would, it is felt, preclude Allied reinforcement and provide little time for necessary political consultations. The Department of Defense was criticized for assuming three weeks' warning time.

The source of the concern lies in a 25% increase in the 400,000 men in the Soviet Army forces stationed in Eastern Europe, an increase attributed to the introduction of a major Soviet force presence in Czechoslovakia following the invasion, and to an expansion in personnel authorized for both armored and mortarized rifle divisions. Other related improvements were the introduction of the new and more numerous tanks, modernization of armored personnel carriers with mechanized infantry combat vehicles, shifts from towed to self-propelled artillery, and improvements in air defense and tank defense capabilities. FAS will discuss this issue next month. □

## CANDIDATES FOR 1977 ELECTION: BALLOT ON REVERSE PAGE

**Jerome D. Frank:** 67, Professor Emeritus, Psychiatry, at Johns Hopkins. Ph.D. in Psychology, 1934, Harvard; M.D. cum laude, 1939. Psychiatrist-in-charge, psych. out-patient dept., Johns Hopkins, 1951-54; director, clinic services, Henry Phipps Phys. Clinic, 1961-63; acting chief dept. psychiatry, 1960-61, 62-63; staff mem., Center Study Dem. Institutions, 1966. Member of advisory committees, NIMH, 1951-55, 57-58, 59-61, 68-69, 74—; member, social sci. adv. bd., U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1970-73; Bd. of Directors, SANE and Council for a Livable World, 1958-59; 1971. Recipient Emil A. Gutheil award, Assn. Advancement Psychotherapy, 1970; Kurt Lewin Meml. award, Soc. for psych. study social issues, 1972. Fellow in numerous psychiatric associations. Jerome Frank is widely recognized for his work on problems of war and peace.

### CANDIDATES FOR COUNCIL:

**Bruce Ames:** 48, Professor of biochemistry at the University of California at Berkeley. Bruce Ames was Chief of the section on microbial genetics at NIH, 1958-68. He was the recipient of: the Eli Lilly Award, American Chemical Society, 1964; Flemming Award, 1966. He's a member of the American Society of Biological Chemists, American Society of Microbiology, Environmental Mutagen Society, Genetics Society, AAAS, and NAS, and has published on: histidine biosynthesis and its control, operon regulation, mutagenesis, and the detection of environmental mutagens and carcinogens. A member of the FAS Executive Committee, Dr. Ames is widely known for his work on the Ames test for detecting carcinogenicity via tests for mutagenicity of substances applied to single-celled organisms.

**James R. Arnold:** 54, Professor of Chemistry and former Chairman of Department, UC of San Diego, Manhattan Project, 1943-46. Dr. Arnold's professional work has centered around radiocarbon dating, developing the liquid scintillation spectrometer, and cosmic-ray products in meteorites. Formerly a member of the Space Science Board of NAS, he is a member of its Committee on Science and Public Policy. Dr. Arnold was a member of the original atomic scientific group at Columbia; served on the Council of the Atomic Scientists in Chicago in the forties; and was a member of the FAS National Council in the early sixties.

**Nina Byers:** 47, Professor of Physics, UCLA. Formerly a Fellow of Somerville College, Oxford and a Member of the Institute of Advanced study, Dr. Byers has been an elected member of the FAS National Council (1972-76), a long-time FAS member and activist, a member of the AAAS electorate nominating committee and a Councilor-at-large of the American Physical Society. Her professional work has been in theoretical elementary particle physics, on phenomenology in particle physics and on the theory of superconductors. She has worked for CERN, the Centre-D'Etudes Nucleaires, Saclay, Argonne National Laboratory, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, and Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.

**Thomas Eisner:** 48, Professor of Biology at Cornell, author of many technical papers and three books, and holder of such awards as Newcomb-Cleveland (AAAS) and Founder's Memorial Award (Entomological Society). A former member of the Board of Directors of Zero Popula-

tion Growth (ZPG) and the National Audubon Society, Dr. Eisner has also been active in the human rights movement through Amnesty International and FAS. He has been particularly effective in the case of biologist Sergei Kovalev.

**Anthony Ralston:** 47, Professor and Chairman, Department of Computer Science, State University of New York at Buffalo. Ph.D., Mathematics. Chairman of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), Committee on Computers and Public Policy; formerly President of ACM and of the American Federation of Information Processing Societies (AFIPS). Dr. Ralston has been active, in particular, in persuading ACM to support the free circulation of scientists in general and resolutions supporting specific dissident scientists in particular.

**Arthur H. Rosenfeld:** 50, Head of Energy and Resources Program at the University of California at Berkeley. Ph.D., Univ. of Chicago, 1954; Univ. of Calif. since 1955. Chairman, Dept. of Computer Science, 1966-67; Director, Particle Data Center, beginning in 1962. FAS Activities: Chairman, Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 1954-55; has served several terms as Chairman, Berkeley Chapter; National Council Member; and on FAS Visa/Passport Committee. Dr. Rosenfeld heads one of the most important academic centers for energy and environment and has long been one of FAS' most active and involved members.

**Joseph L. Sax:** 42, Professor, University of Michigan Law School, specializing in environmental law. Author of "Defending the Environment" and "Water Law, Planning and Policy." Principal architect of the Hart-McGovern bill permitting citizen class actions on the substance of environmental issues — versions of this bill are passed or pending in many state legislatures. Chairman, Committee on Public Lands and Waters of the American Bar Association, 1969-71. Professor Sax holds many advisory and consultant positions to the U.S. Congress, to environmental groups and publications, and public interest law firms. Professor Sax is widely considered America's foremost specialist on environmental law.

**Carl Sagan:** 42, Professor of Astronomy and Space Sciences at Cornell and Director, Laboratory for Planetary Studies, and Associate Director of the Center for Radiophysics and Space Research. Dr. Sagan's principal research is in the physics and chemistry of the planets and in exobiology. He holds the NASA Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement and the international astronautics prize (Prix Galabert) — for his studies of Mars with the Mariner 9 spacecraft. Author of hundreds of articles and associated with dozens of books, he was listed in 1974 by Time magazine as one of "200 hundred rising American leaders." Dr. Sagan has also been active in the education of the disadvantaged.

**Sidney G. Winter:** 41, Professor of Economics and Professor in the School of Organization and Management, Yale University. Formerly a staff member of the Council of Economic Advisers and a research economist at the RAND Corporation, Dr. Winter has held fellowships from Brookings and Ford. In the sixties, he produced what is perhaps the most sophisticated treatment of post-nuclear attack economic viability in assessing at what levels of nuclear war, nations might or might not eventually recover. He is a specialist on the Theory of the Firm. □

# FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS — 1977 BALLOT

Nine candidates appear for the six Council positions in accordance with the requirement that at least 50% more candidates stand for election than there are positions available. **ALL BALLOTS MUST BE MARKED FOR AT LEAST THREE COUNCIL CANDIDATES, AND NO MORE THAN SIX.**

*Vice Chairman*

- Frank
- Other

*Council Delegates*

(Vote for at least three)

- |                                  |                                    |
|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ames    | <input type="checkbox"/> Rosenfeld |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Arnold  | <input type="checkbox"/> Sagan     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Byers   | <input type="checkbox"/> Sax       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Eisner  | <input type="checkbox"/> Winter    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ralston |                                    |

Your vote cannot be counted unless you are a member whose dues have been paid for calendar year 1977. All members have been billed — once in the fall and once in February. If you have not renewed thus far, you may do so with your ballot.

Along with the election ballot, it is our custom to stimulate criticism, comments and suggestions about the last year's activities and newsletters, as well as proposals for the coming one's. Send these in separate letters or notes with your name and address; you may attach them, however, to this ballot.

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## FAS DIRECTOR STONE TESTIFIES ON LAND-BASED MISSILE VULNERABILITY

On March 16, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee invited William Colby, former CIA Director, General Daniel Graham, former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, and Jeremy J. Stone, FAS Director, to sit as a panel to discuss the "National Security Implications of Current Strategic Options" in general and Soviet intentions and capabilities in particular. What follows is the first part of Stone's testimony addressing a crucial current option: deployment of the MK-12A hard-target killing warhead.

Today, the central issue in the strategic arms race is the increasing vulnerability of the land-based missiles on each side to the land-based missiles of the other. From every point of view, this development is viewed with alarm.

For the hawks, the problem is the possibility that the Soviet land-based missile force — once MIRVed and modernized — will have the capability to destroy our 1,054 land-based missiles with only a portion of its 1,600 land-based missiles. This is the core substantive concern underlying the present-day use by hawks of the phrase, "Soviet strategic superiority."

For the doves, the problem centers on the implications of having both sides simultaneously possess the ability to destroy the land-based missiles of the other with a portion of its own. In this case, each side might perceive a considerable improvement in the outcome of a war if its strategic forces struck first, rather than second. During an escalating violent struggle in Europe, for example, these incentives might lead to a mounting, reciprocal, and self-fulfilling, anticipation that each was going to attack the land-based missiles of the other with its own vulnerable land-based force. ICBM firings, which would not otherwise have occurred, might then be induced by fear and fatalism. Indeed, the very fact of land-based missile vulnerability may be inducing both sides to prime their forces to fire on 30-minute, or lesser warnings, which could lead to ill-considered, or even inadvertent, firings.\*

For the Administration, a further problem lies in the costs of unilateral resolutions of this issue. The increasing vulnerability of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles may tempt the Administration to buy the mobile missile MX at a cost that may involve \$30 billion — and to deploy it in hundreds of twenty-mile covered trenches, or to hide it among 10,000 semi-hardened shelters in a gigantic shell game. A further (non-financial) cost arises from the fact that MIRVed mobile missiles undermine hopes for arms control by complicating problems of verification while pushing Vladivostok limits upward.

Perhaps the only costless solution to this problem lies in arms limitation agreements that would prevent the Soviet Union from completing the modernization and MIRVing of its land-based force. In return, we would forego high degrees of counterforce capability which few believe necessary except, at most, as a response to Soviet

counterforce capability. Indeed, the most senior proponent of U.S. counterforce capability advised this very Subcommittee in December, 1974 that this was precisely U.S. policy. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger told you, on September 11, 1974:

"We have no desire to develop a unilateral counterforce capability against the Soviet Union. [Deleted]. What we wish to avoid is the Soviet Union having a counterforce capability against the United States without our being able to have a comparable capability. I continue to be hopeful that the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] will permit both sides to restrain themselves." — p. 3 (Briefing on Counterforce Attacks).

In the light of all this, it will come as a rude shock to most Senators, hawks or doves, that the United States seems about to foreclose this possible negotiation by the deployment of the MK-12A warhead (and the NS-20 guidance system) for the Minuteman III missile.

This can be illustrated by the following graph [drawn from page 125 of the official Annual Defense Department Report for Fiscal 1978, this graph was shown on pg. 3 of the March Newsletter.] The graph shows the emerging hard-target kill capability of the two sides projected over coming years. (Hard-target kill capability refers to the ability of the two sides to destroy targets specially hardened against nuclear attack which include, in particular, the hardened missile silos of the other side.)

As the graph reveals, the United States deployment during fiscal 1978 will produce a five-year lead in this crucial and strategically most relevant category. What the graph does not show is the magnitude of the hard-target kill capability on either side because — in its unclassified form — the graph is unlabeled.

But the Russians will have no difficulty, as I have no difficulty today, estimating the rough impact of this development. Using newspaper reports of 350 kiloton warheads with .1 mile accuracy, they will conclude that the United States is providing 1650 of its warheads (on 550 Minuteman III missiles) with a hard-target capability that could, on paper, provide each warhead with a high kill probability against each of the approximate 1600 hardened Soviet land-based missiles. In short, the deployment is providing us with what must surely look to the Russians (as it does to me) with a significant counterforce capability. As a result, notwithstanding the larger Soviet throwweight, its total strategic force is in greater peril than our own and this situation bids fair to continue.

These developments have been foreseen in broad outline for some years. In a background statement in 1972 justifying the Interim Agreement, former Secretary Kissinger said:

"The Soviet Union has 85% of its throwweight in the most vulnerable target, that is to say, its land-based missile.

"The United States has only about 25% of its throwweight in its most vulnerable targets, i.e., our land-based missiles.

"In the 1980's, the greater flexibility of our force and the greater vulnerability of their force is very

—Continued on page 8

\*I believe the Defense Department is now considering the possibility of "abort" mechanisms on missiles which would permit missile firings to be aborted after launch; this could only encourage premature and ill-considered firings and strikes me as a bizarre and dangerous effort to solve a serious problem with a technological gimmick.

Continued from page 7

likely to bring about a situation in which the threat to their forces is likely to be much greater than the threat to our total force regardless of what the weight of the individual warhead is."

—Henry A. Kissinger,  
December 3, 1974 backgrounder

This quotation further illustrates the dilemma facing the Russians, since the Soviet land-based force is fairly characterized at present as their primary deterrent while our land-based force is second in significance, in our thinking, to our Polaris force.

I want to emphasize that there are a number of other valid universes of discourse in which these strategic developments can be discussed. Perhaps from the perspective of the high-ranking political official — President or Soviet General Secretary — it can be argued with considerable force that deterrence of nuclear war will, nevertheless, be about as great as it can be. Perhaps none of these developments, even if accepted at face value, is about to delude political officials that ICBM's should be used, even if considerable fighting is going on in Europe, because of the number and variety of strategic forces maintained on each side.

Furthermore, from the perspective of the professional missileer, it can be argued that these technological developments should not be taken at face value for another reason since, when other operational considerations (reliability, residual uncertainties, variations in hardness, etc.) are taken into consideration — as they should be — the land-based missile forces will remain useful deterrents for a long time indeed.

But, in between these two perspectives, one must consider the perspective of the bargaining table. Our negotiators will confront Soviet experts burdened with their own worst case assessments. Soviet experts can therefore be expected to ignore a number of valid uncertainties and to have a healthy respect for American technological ability to make missiles work, and American ingenuity in devising war plans.

Second, our negotiators must find some discernable stopping point between the hard-target capability that we and they have, on the one hand, and that to which we and they might verifiably agree to limit ourselves.

These are important major difficulties. My conclusion is that the MK-12A warhead is eliminating any room for negotiating maneuver. I do not, in saying this, mean to imply that Soviet developments are not equally important; in their way, in limiting the options available for negotiation. I simply point to the Rumsfeld graph in showing that it is *our* about-to-emerge five-year lead that will likely push the competition in hard-target kill capability beyond negotiable restraint. Why not bargain?

In short, the point I wish to emphasize today is simple and obvious. If we are going to move to achieve such a substantial measure of counterforce capability against Soviet missiles, will we be able to persuade the Soviet Union to halt its parallel capability in negotiations over the coming months? I do not see how we can.

The situation is embarrassingly similar to that which occurred in 1970. The United States had then a five-year lead in the development of MIRV. We were ready to deploy, and the Russians were far behind. We knew that deployment would make further negotiations over MIRV highly difficult and that Soviet MIRV would imperil our land-based forces as it now increasingly threatens to do. But we failed to take the advice of Mr. Paul C. Warnke, among others, to negotiate; today many, including former Secretary Kissinger, are fairly open in expressing their regret that this matter was not more thoroughly investigated. ("I would say, in retrospect that I wish I had thought through the implication of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did." op. cit.). In sum, we seem to be about to make, almost precisely, the same mistake twice.

I am by no means certain: (a) that it is logistically possible to delay this program; or (b) that any arms control agreement could be designed to balance hard-target kill capability on each side; or (c) that the Russians might agree to halt a program of MIRV and modernization which has been steadily underway for years and in which they have invested several tens of billions of dollars.

But the matter deserves immediate congressional attention in the context of emerging strategic trends on both sides. In the light of the forthcoming talks in Moscow, it may not be overly dramatic to suggest that the next few weeks may provide the last clear chance to avoid a new round of arms destabilization. □

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