

F. A. S. NEWSLETTER

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS
David L. Hill, Chairman

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ATOMIC LOG JAM BREAKING?

Those who keep watch on the long-locked log jam in international negotiations on atomic control and disarmament were impressed by signs of movement in the tangled mass in the past month. US policy certainly was shifting, its new proposal for international atomic pooling clearly breaking out into previously open water. Few informed observers saw the Eisenhower proposal, even if brought to actuality, as a guarantee of a general break-up, but it was movement -- and without movement log jams don't break.

Noted too, however, was the stubborn Soviet restatement

of its position and a firming US military commitment to atomic weapons, more in number, more in kind, more in proportion to the pre-atomic, conventional variety. Nonetheless, it is a hard fact that this week, for the first time in many moons, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington is closeted with the US Secretary of State arranging negotiations relative to a possible mutual agreement in the field of atomic energy. Whether all of this adds up to a loosening, or only to a settling of the log-jam, the coming weeks may tell. To labor the metaphor -- there never was greater need for a good man with a peavey.

U.S. INCREASES A-WEAPON RELIANCE

The long-promised "new look" in military strategy for the US and its allies appears to consist largely in even greater emphasis on atomic weapons. As announced by Adm. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US armed forces will be heavier in air power and all-around atomic strength and lighter on the use of men (*Washington Post*, Dec. 15). According to Radford, A-weapons have now "virtually achieved conventional status within our armed forces."

The shift apparently arises out of a number of factors:

(1) the assumption that signs of reducing tension imply that there will be no major war in the near future, (2) the need to reduce military obligations in both money and manpower, (3) the availability of ample fissionables and a diversified military atomic technology, (4) authorization to the military to plan in terms of use of atomic weapons in any engagement, whether "brush-fire" or full-scale. The military need not, therefore, maintain two forces in being -- one conventional, the other atomic. Implicit is the conclusion that any future war involving the US will be an atomic war, whether or not it begins as one. By substituting atomic artillery and land- and sea-based A-bomb carriers for conventional heavily manpowered forces, it is believed that the same or more military security can be bought for fewer dollars. In Alsop terminology, this is "More Bang for a Buck."

These decisions obviously have important bearing on questions of disarmament, atomic control, and peace. They have been criticized in various quarters: on the one hand, as vulnerable to attack on grounds of the morality of atomic vs. conventional warfare, as encouraging aggression by a seemingly more isolationist policy, as increasing the probability of civilian extermination because of the difficulty of restricting atomic warfare to artillery and "baby" fission bombs in the face of the availability of the more decisive big bombs and H-bombs. On the other hand, it is argued that the cataclysmic effects of atomic warfare are now so well recognized that they in themselves form a powerful deterrent to war, and that a clear declaration of US intention to use atomic weapons in any conflict, regardless of size, would lessen the chances of disagreement erupting into military action.

U.S., USSR TO DISCUSS ATOMIC COOPERATION

The Eisenhower proposal for an international pool of fissionable materials, and international efforts to develop atomic knowledge constructively, apparently will be discussed by the US and the USSR in two different series of conferences. It was first agreed that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary of State Dulles would confer at the Big Four Foreign Ministers' conference, scheduled to begin Jan. 25 in Berlin. Subsequently, it was decided to hold closed-door preliminary discussions in Washington with the Soviet government represented by Ambassador to the US Giorgi M. Zarubin. These discussions are to begin Jan. 11.

The speed with which arrangements are proceeding appears to be the result of strong representations by US Ambassador Bohlen to Molotov in Moscow. The US has emphasized that the discussions must be of a private nature to avoid their use for propaganda purposes, and to preclude any adverse effects on the talks of premature news reports. It has been made clear that the discussions will not be limited to President Eisenhower's proposal of Dec. 8, but may extend to methods for atomic control and disarmament.

The Soviet Union still insists that the necessary first step is an absolute ban on atomic weapons, and the US has freshly reiterated that such a ban is wholly unacceptable to it unless accompanied by effective guarantees. Both countries have insisted on inspection as essential to control, but it is not at all clear that their views on mechanisms are any closer than heretofore. On this point may stand or fall the success of efforts to achieve broad agreement on armaments. It need not, as the President has pointed out, block limited arrangements on constructive atomic development, if the post-Stalin Kremlin really wants accommodation and easing of tensions.



Courtesy of the Washington Post, 1954

The FAS is a national organization of scientists and engineers concerned with the impact of science on national and world affairs. This *Newsletter* is designed primarily to inform the membership and stimulate discussion of relevant issues. The facts and opinions contained do not reflect official FAS policies unless specifically so indicated. The *Newsletter* is edited by members of the FAS Washington Chapter.

EISENHOWER PROPOSAL STIRS HOPE - -

THE PROPOSAL

"I THEREFORE MAKE THE FOLLOWING PROPOSALS:

"THE GOVERNMENTS PRINCIPALLY INVOLVED, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY ELEMENTARY PRUDENCE, TO BEGIN NOW AND CONTINUE TO MAKE JOINT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THEIR STOCKPILES OF NORMAL URANIUM AND FISSIONABLE MATERIALS TO AN INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT SUCH AN AGENCY WOULD BE SET UP UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS . . .

"OF THOSE 'PRINCIPALLY INVOLVED' THE SOVIET UNION MUST, OF COURSE, BE ONE . . ."

- - to the United Nations General Assembly
December 8, 1953

"AS WE MAINTAIN OUR MILITARY STRENGTH DURING THE COMING YEAR AND DRAW CLOSER THE BONDS WITH OUR ALLIES, WE SHALL BE IN AN IMPROVED POSITION TO DISCUSS OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH THE SOVIET UNION. INDEED WE SHALL BE GLAD TO DO SO WHENEVER THERE IS A REASONABLE PROSPECT OF CONSTRUCTIVE RESULTS. IN THIS SPIRIT THE ATOMIC ENERGY PROPOSALS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE RECENTLY PRESENTED TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. A TRULY CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET REACTION WILL MAKE POSSIBLE A NEW START TOWARD AN ERA OF PEACE, AND AWAY FROM THE FATAL ROAD TOWARD ATOMIC WAR."

- - to Congress, on the State of the Union
January 7, 1954

SOVIET REACTION

Soviet reaction to the proposal came in two phases, the unofficial automatic rejection by propaganda organs, and the later official reply based on fuller consideration of the implications and potentialities of the proposal.

FIRST Leading Soviet foreign affairs commentator Boris Leontyev, who has frequently been chosen to deliver important commentaries and to answer declarations of Western statesmen, charged: "Eisenhower threatened atomic war and made a eulogy of this policy of force . . . It is clear that the US does not want to bring about an international [relaxing of strained relations]. The warmongering speech of President Eisenhower and the attitude adopted at the United Nations by the US delegation proves this sufficiently."

AND THEN The calm of the US government in not responding in kind was justified on Dec. 21 when, in an unusually amicable note, the Soviet government said: "As to President Eisenhower's statement on the confidential or diplomatic talks concerning his proposal, the Soviet Government, following consistently its peaceloving policy, expresses its readiness to take part in such negotiations. . . . The Soviet Government bases its attitude on the idea that during such talks the following proposal of the Soviet Union will be considered at the same time: The states taking part in the agreement, guided by their wish for reducing international tension, undertake solemn and unconditional pledges not to use atomic, hydrogen or other weapons of mass extermination.

"The achieving of an international agreement on this question could be an important step on the road to the complete withdrawal from the armaments of states of all atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass extermination -- together with the establishment of a strict international control which would insure the fulfillment of the agreement on the ban of the use of atomic energy for military ends."

SHIFT NOTED Sharp observers noted that this wording, and the argument preceding it, represented a shift of Soviet opinion. Ceding Walter Lippman on Dec. 24, "Until this latest statement, the Soviet Government was demanding 'the unconditional banning' of the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic weapons. It has been insisting that the only acceptable approach to any international agreement on atomic weapons is absolute prohibition. Now for the first time, the Soviet Union has suggested that, at least as an interim 'step' towards the ultimate

aim of a complete ban, it would consider a conditional prohibition limited to the use of atomic weapons. In this latest statement there is a recognition that these weapons may be legitimate if they are used only to deter, and retaliate against, the use of atomic weapons."

INTERNATIONAL REACTION

Immediate and enthusiastic advocacy of the proposal came from many nations outside the Iron Curtain. Mme. Pandit, President of the UN General Assembly, said shortly after President Eisenhower's address, "The proposal was of the highest importance and deserves the careful consideration of all the governments of the world." Said *Le Monde*, influential French paper, "In some 30 minutes President Eisenhower, by his sensational discourse, renewed the prestige of the United States and consolidated the world leadership of his country," -- an unusual tribute from this conservative paper's regular Washington correspondent, who has been particularly critical of the US and the Eisenhower administration.

Carlyle Morgan (*Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 10) reported that "one well-informed Briton told this correspondent 'the recent state of European thought about this [the atomic weapons threat] can honestly be said to be one of near despair.' For him the Eisenhower speech meant . . . the appearance of two rays of hope: one was the hope that it might lead to a small beginning in dealing with the atom and in building American-Soviet goodwill; the other . . . was that America was at last reasserting the leadership the free world needs."

Danish Foreign Minister Hans Christian Hansen called the statement of President Eisenhower "far-sighted and realistic." Greek Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos declared the President "brings hope that a new era in the relations between men and nations will ensue."

HOME REACTION

At home, reactions to the proposal mushroomed on all sides. Some, a minority, were adverse but most were enthusiastically favorable. The FAS gave quick support, its officers believing that scientists are particularly well-equipped to appreciate the proposal's implications and potentialities. Copies of the President's UN speech were distributed widely by the Washington Office, which pointed out that the impetus provided by the President's dramatic appearance before the UN General Assembly might be lost if the objectives to be gained and the practical problems involved in establishing any sort of international atomic agency were not crystallized in the public mind. Statements in

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STARTS NEW ATOMIC POLICY DEBATE

DISARMAMENT

The Eisenhower proposal specifically sought to side-step the knotty issue of atomic control and disarmament in favor of what might be a less controversial area for joint action. Nonetheless, both among friends and critics of the proposal, it has stirred fresh discussion of broader, longer-range approaches to halting and rolling back the armaments build-up.

NEWMAN COMMENTS James R. Newman, general counsel to the Senate Atomic Energy Committee which drafted the McMahon Act, applauds the Eisenhower speech in a letter to the Washington Post on Jan. 9. Finding it encouraging and representing "the second time since 1946 the United States has taken the lead in presenting a plan for atomic energy control," he nonetheless cautions, "One may indeed be permitted to doubt that the proposal to establish an international atomic stockpile is adequate to present needs. It is a constructive suggestion as regards the non-military aspects of nuclear energy; it has no bearing, however, on the use of atomic weapons. And if we are to negotiate fruitfully we cannot avoid this overriding issue."

"It is clear the US in preparing for this fateful debate must rethink its position. The President has opened the way for reexamination not only by his conciliatory tone, but by the plain implication that the US does not feel itself bound in future negotiations to adhere rigidly to the 1946 'Majority Plan.' We are no longer obliged, therefore, to insist on the provisions regarding the use of the veto and the execution of the control plan in stages; we need not grapple with the vexed problem of the strategic allocation of power reactors so as to achieve an atomic balance of power. We can, in short, eliminate provisions made obsolete by the happenings of the last 7 years and address ourselves to the essentials of armaments control in light of present circumstances."

REDUCED OBJECTIVE Newman believes that "The fundamental objective of a prudent control plan must be an agreed level of atomic and conventional armaments, and of armed forces, a level which would not permit the surprise unleashing of a major attack, not to say the waging of a major war. Proof that this level has been established and is being maintained should be furnished by an inspection system directed to key points of national activity, which would inevitably reflect clandestine preparations for war."

Such a limited inspection system to detect gross changes in mobilization level rather than the details of atomic production Newman does not see as posing insurmountable difficulties. After all, he argues, "What is sought is a practical alarm system which would give weeks or months of warning of a planned attack, rather than minutes or hours. This was one of the original concepts of the Acheson-Lilienthal plan, a concept now almost forgotten. This type of warning constitutes one of the main benefits we hope to derive from the rearming of Europe. Gen. Gruenther has observed that while the NATO forces could not possibly prevent the overrunning of Western Europe, the Russians would be required to undertake total mobilization in order to do so. Thus precious time would be gained, and a sudden, totally unheralded attack would be impossible. It is on this crucial point that the nations of the world now seek reassurance."

CAVERS COMMENTS Associate Dean David F. Cavers, of the Harvard Law School, writing in The Reporter for Jan. 19, also regards the President's plan as hopeful while stressing that it must be followed up by new US proposals on disarmament. Pointing to the enormous difficulties which would impede any attempt at early reduction of armaments, Cavers suggests beginning by halting the race where it is now. This, he says, "could be accomplished by a standstill agreement, freezing armaments -- atomic and conventional -- at their present levels."

INSPECTION NEED ALTERED Encouraged by the Russian's apparent concession that the problem of arms control has to be faced as a whole, Cavers points out: "The recognition that controls must include all armaments

drastically changes the character of the long-debated inspection problem. Inspection became an acute issue when controls were to be imposed for atomic armaments alone. Inspectors could certainly not police atomic arms and plants without discovering other military installations . . .

"Under a standstill agreement, the tasks of a UN inspectorate would be first to take inventory of the state of armament and then to make sure that the working balance now existing is not upset. The technical problems involved would be great but not overwhelming. . . . Under such an agreement, controls could be applied largely at the level of big-scale production; a detailed knowledge of secret devices and processes would not be absolutely essential. . . .

"The psychological lift that must have been experienced by all the peoples the President's message reached could be followed by a reaction which would undo the good that the speech has done. The limitations of the atomic power pool will soon be widely understood: The Soviets will certainly be at pains to advertise them. To satisfy a world that wants peace even more than it wants atomic power, the US will have to enter the private sessions of the UN Disarmament Commission with new proposals about arms as well as its new plan for a pool of atomic materials for peaceful uses."

NUCLEAR POWER

The President's proposal for a world atom pool dramatically emphasized the accelerating transition from desperate and exclusive US preoccupation with the military aspects of the atom to more hopeful anticipation of peaceful benefits. According to William L. Laurence (N. Y. Times, Jan. 4), recent atomic events have "catapulted [us] into the industrial phase of the Atomic Age" and "galvanized our AEC authorities into action."

Underlying this change, certainly in part, is a looming abundance of fissionables. According to the President, we now have an enormous stockpile of atomic weapons, which "exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells" used in World War II. Presumably, our atomic arsenal is now sufficiently plentiful to permit some diversion of fissionable material for nuclear power purposes.

A E - ACT CHANGES The effect of the President's plan on proposed changes in the Atomic Energy Act is not easily estimated. It has certainly heightened the interest and increased the priority of the whole subject, and colored with international implications what previously seemed a largely internal issue. This may make easier those changes in the Act which, in the domestic context, were effectively attacked as a "give-away." According to the Washington Post (Jan. 3), Chairman Cole of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy plans soon to begin hearings on AEC-proposed legislative changes. The basic provisions of a bill which Cole expects to introduce in the Congress in about six weeks will allow private companies to build nuclear reactors under AEC supervision.

Reportedly, the main obstacle Cole sees in the announced AEC policy of providing reasonable incentives to private enterprise is the question of patent rights (see NL 53-10). Cole expressed confidence that some suitable arrangement could be effected that would give inventors in the field increased inducements without undue enrichment of the big companies that have been on the inside of the program. According to the Washington Post article mentioned above, protests that the AEC program throws the door open to profiteering will probably slow down but not halt the move for increased participation by private industry in nuclear power development.

INFO EXCHANGE Parenthetically, on a Canadian radio program, Cole expressed himself in favor of changes in the Act which would allow NATO military leaders to receive information on the use and effects of atomic weapons. He voiced his doubts, however, that his committee would approve of legislation making possible the sharing with America's allies of information on the production of fissionable material or atomic weapons.

MORE ON MONMOUTH

The Ft. Monmouth hearings by the one-man subcommittee headed by Sen. Joseph McCarthy (R, Wis.) continued during December but with reduced headlines. Since about the end of the year, there have been press reports that Administration leaders are increasingly concerned over the subject matter and the mode of conduct of the McCarthy investigations. It is thus problematical whether the Monmouth-type probes will spread to other military-scientific laboratories, as had been hinted by McCarthy.

SINGLE CURRENT EMPLOYEE HEARD

The first of 10 days of open "Monmouth" hearings in Washington, Dec. 8, found Aaron H. Coleman on the witness stand.

Of the 41 individuals involved in the recent Ft. Monmouth security suspensions, he was the only one called before an open committee hearing. Vigorously denying espionage, Coleman said, according to the *N. Y. Times*, that his only "offense" consisted of "not having kept the documents under 3-combination lock and not having downgraded declassified information." Sen. McCarthy is reported by the *Times* to have said that it was a matter of debate within the Justice Department as to whether taking secret documents home where they would be available "to anyone with a key to the apartment" was not equivalent to turning them over to the enemy. Conceding that the subcommittee's case against Coleman would require bolstering at points, McCarthy stated that he would seek an indictment against Coleman for espionage as well as perjury.

RETREAT FROM FT. MONMOUTH

The following day, McCarthy admitted he had "no real hope" of proving espionage in the cases developed by the subcommittee. He

said, "We don't expect to come up with any more than contempt or perjury. It is not our function to develop cases of espionage."

On the remaining days, 22 witnesses were called, none of them present or even recent Ft. Monmouth employees. Their common denominator was their refusal to answer committee questions on membership in the Communist Party and their repeated use of the 5th Amendment to avoid answering specific questions. In contrast, none of the recently suspended Ft. Monmouth employees had invoked the protection of the 5th Amendment either in closed or open hearings.

EVALUATION

In addition to the comment by the FAS Council (see NL, Dec. 7), concern over the conduct of the investigation and its effects has appeared in various places. Walter Millis, in the Dec. 8 *N. Y. Herald-Tribune*, declares that the investigation is a "process of witch-hunting, bigotry, cowardice, race prejudice and sheer incompetence which have turned one of our top-level military-scientific operations into a mare's nest of exasperation, fear and futility."

At the recent AAAS meetings in Boston, Prof. Mark deWolf Howe of Harvard Law School said: "The congressional investigators degrade without trial; punish without conviction; discredit the individual through evidence based on suspicion and establish not only his 'guilt' but that of the individual by which he is employed. The misuse of power by these committees is a threat, not only to teachers and students, but to the whole of society." Reviews of the entire investigation have appeared in the January issues of *Physics Today* and the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, and in the *January 5 Reporter*.

PROJECT LINCOLN

Indications that McCarthy was expanding his field of action came Dec. 12 when the *Boston Post* disclosed that Francis Carr, executive staff director of the subcommittee, confirmed Project Lincoln was among defense establishments in

the Boston area being investigated for subversives. Drew Pearson reported (Jan. 2) that "a Project Lincoln spokesman has asked for an appointment with President Eisenhower. He will warn the President that if McCarthy is allowed to make another 3-ring circus out of this investigation the entire project will be endangered."

Griffis Air Force Base in Rome, N.Y. is another possible target. On Dec. 14, McCarthy announced that at least 12 employees had been suspended on "security and loyalty charges" after the staff of his subcommittee began investigating Communist infiltration there. The commanding officer of the base, Brig. Gen. Doubleday, said however, "This is a continuing proposition. Any suspensions would have nothing to do with the McCarthy investigation."

FUTURE

Whether these hints will be followed up remains in doubt. On Dec. 29, the *Washington Post* reported that Republican leaders in Congress were quietly discussing a plan to end "1-man investigations" by tightening the reins on issuance of committee subpoenas and on the holding of hearings. It was also reported that a dozen bills are now pending in both houses of Congress to make major changes in the conduct of committee hearings. Sen. McCarthy is reported now under strong pressure from the Administration to "get on the team" and leave Red-hunting to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Although the Senator denied a shift away from Red-hunting, his announced plans on Jan. 9 were to investigate "alleged fraud, corruption and mismanagement of funds" in Alaska. He noted that preliminary reports do not indicate that the issue of Reds or subversion will arise. Washington observers observe that appropriations for the subcommittee's work will shortly come before Congress.

SECURITY PROGRAM RELEASES MUDDLED

In his State of the Union message, the President noted that "more than 2200" had been separated from the government under the "standards" of the new federal security program. In October it had been announced the number was 1456 in the first 4 months of the new program. The reliability and real meaning of these figures is not clear. The President on Dec. 16 had said the 1456 "security risks" were discharged for a number of reasons, and not all of them have the words "subversive" or "disloyal" on their records. Rep. St. George (R, N.Y.) indicated that 10% or less involved questions of loyalty and Rep. Walter (D, Pa.) said he had been informed that only 7 "at most" were communists or members of "proscribed organizations." This information was cited by Murrey Marder in the *Washington Post* (Jan. 9) who had earlier shown that the material released by individual

government departments was not consistent with a simple, uniform characterization of the 1456. This lack of authoritative accounting presents each federal employee who wishes to leave government service with the possibility that his doing so now may leave him with a needlessly vulnerable reputation.

NEW MEASURES?

Eisenhower's proposal that convicted subversives be made to forfeit US citizenship would affect relatively few people. Since 1948, there have been only 105 indictments under the Smith Act, and as of this date, only 61 convictions. More important proposed action for this session of Congress includes the two Brownell recommendations: to legalize admission of wiretapping evidence in Federal Court trials involving espionage, sedition, sabotage and treason, and to force witnesses to testify, in spite of the 5th Amendment, by granting them immunity from criminal prosecution that might result from their testimony. Both of these measures are coming under increasing attack, as posing a severe threat to our civil liberties.



Courtesy of the Washington Post, 1953

PASSPORT PROGRESS

Although the appeal of decisions of the State Department Passport Division had been provided for in regulations issued more than a year ago, only last month did the Department act. Martin Kamen, radiochemist at Washington University, St. Louis, had been repeatedly frustrated in his attempts to travel abroad. His attorney filed suit Dec. 17 in a Washington, D.C., Federal Court, asking that Sec. Dulles and Ruth Shipley (head of the Passport Division) be ordered to make a decision on Kamen's passport application. Five days later the Appeals Board was appointed, the Passport Division having finally decided against Kamen.

15-MONTH DELAY Kamen's case is important in that it will be the first on record in which the final decision is not made by the head of the Passport Division and in which the applicant is represented by counsel in a formal hearing at which the usual rules of evidence apply. Provision for the Appeals Board was originally made in Sept. 1952, in response to court action by the American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of a writer, Anne Bauer, whose passport had been revoked without explanation. A special Federal Court ruled that Miss Bauer's constitutional guarantee of due process had been infringed and that the State Dept. must revise its passport procedures. It was following this that Dean Acheson, then Sec. of State, issued the new regulations in which the Appeals Board was created, but left the actual appointment of the Board to his successor.

KAMEN TO BE HEARD SOON Chairman of the new 7-man Board is Thruston B. Morton, Asst. Sec. of State for Congressional Relations. The Board, by regulation, is composed of officers of the department. Its rules of procedure have been approved by Dulles and appear in the Federal Register for Jan. 9. In addition to Kamen's appeal, which is expected to be heard in the near future, there are known to be a number of other cases which are likely to be carried soon to the Board. The FAS Passport Committee (G. Chew, U. of Ill., chairman) has already expressed its views to Mr. Morton and will attempt to keep track of important developments and report to the membership.

Dulles' appointment of the Board climaxes a year of persistent efforts by many unsuccessful passport applicants to get the 1952 regulations recognized. The Passport Division for a time thwarted the intent of the new rules simply by failing to reach a final decision in difficult and controversial cases. For practical purposes, delay on a passport application can obviously be equivalent to a denial, but delay is not subject to appeal and thus no case could be brought to the point where a hearing before the Appeals Board was in order. Kamen broke this deadlock with his legal action to force the Passport Division to reach a final decision.

Evidently, most passport applicants have neither the time nor the resources to take legal action in forcing a decision from the Passport Division. It is to be hoped, therefore, that the spirit as well as the letter of the 1952 regulations will henceforth be observed.

QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

The questionnaire distributed in Members' Bulletin No. 11 (Sept. 28, 1953) brought in a great deal of information on the opinions of FAS members on atomic power and strategy and on disarmament. The results guided the actions of the Council in November. It should be noted that the poll was conducted before President Eisenhower's UN atomic-pool speech.

ATOMIC POWER Atomic power problems were scored as of major concern for FAS by 65% of those replying, with only two scoring it as of no concern. Declassification of information (88%) and exchange of classified information with other countries (77%) were most widely endorsed as aspects deserving special FAS attention, with questions of private ownership, patent policy and export regulations drawing less than majority support.

On the necessity for amendment of the Atomic Energy Act, most members judge needed changes to lie between major and minor in importance and want them "early" to "eventually," i.e., the average (non-existent) FAS member entertains the idea of change but is willing to wait a while to decide how far it should

go. Meanwhile, overwhelmingly (95%) FAS members want less information classified and more information exchanged with other countries. A small majority (60%) wants more federal support for atomic power development and only a scattered few want less. But FAS members also predominantly (75%) want more private participation in atomic power development with slightly more than half willing to turn over atomic plants to private ownership.

ATOMIC STRATEGY AND DISARMAMENT On atomic strategy and disarmament, 96% of respondents believe problems related to the atomic arms race to be of major concern to FAS. Better than 80% recommend for FAS attention the problems of candor in official information for the public, and of international atomic control. Favored for FAS activity by only 50 to 55% are easing of international tension, general disarmament, a new commission, and civilian defense. Considerations of military strategy are seen as a legitimate FAS province by about only 30%.

Expressing opinions without necessarily urging them for FAS policy, members replying come close to unanimity in asserting that more information on atomic strategy problems should be made publicly available, and that greater effort should be expended by US diplomacy to reduce international tension. When polled in September, members were nearly unanimous in feeling that changes in official US policy on international control of atomic weapons were required, approximately 2/3rds calling the needed changes major or fundamental, 1/3rd calling them minor.

The question of international ownership of atomic facilities finds FAS members divided -- few believing it essential but 40% seeing it as "desirable," 30% as "unnecessary" and 20% as "an obstacle." A very great majority would like to see more effort expended on new methods of military defense of concentrated population centers, and a similar majority judges that fundamental or major changes in US military strategy are required, although relatively few answered this question.

MASE POLL The FAS Mohawk chapter reports early results of its membership poll of Dec. 16. MASE members strongly favor Eisenhower's atomic proposal, oppose outlawing nuclear weapons or signing non-aggression pact (but not sure), and are split on whether US should be firmer or milder with Russia. They favor a stronger US defense, including dispersal, but rank civil defense low on list of needed MASE activities. They prefer the hazards of atomic war to Russian domination, and tend to feel scientists' efforts can help prevent or delay another war. * * * Stanford Chapter concludes from a November poll that FAS should "make public the scientists' viewpoint on matters specifically affecting scientists in their work when a clear majority of such viewpoint exists," and also publicize facts on atomic weapon control, atomic power development and national defense.

LOS ALAMOS & PHILLY A recent luncheon under the auspices of local FAS members, attended by 170, was addressed by Sen. Anderson (D, N.M.) on foreign policy and national defense in the H-bomb era. Both of the state's Congressmen were in the audience. * * * The Philadelphia Branch met January 4 to start activity on the planned UN-UNESCO studies.

- MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION** -- Dues: Regular - \$5 (with income below \$2500 - \$3); Supporting - \$10; Patron - \$25. New membership and an introductory subscription to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists - \$7.50 (with income below \$2500 - \$5.50).
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A-POOL PLAN -- REACTIONS (Cont. from Page 2). support of the proposal were released by Chairman Hill on Dec. 8, by the Committee on Disarmament and Atomic Control on Dec. 13 (see box), and by the Mohawk Chapter on Dec. 17.

CONGRESSIONAL Since any major US steps required to implement the proposal would have to be approved by Congress, the reactions of members of this body to the proposal are of significance. Some were critical and not too perceptive. Sen. McCarran (D, Nev.) declared that there was "too much of an impression of fear, and not enough program" in the President's address. He added, "It looked to me like it was a cover-up for something that happened at Bermuda." Indications of possible difficulties in Congress for any bills to implement the proposal were voiced by Rep. Durham (D, N.C.), who warned that it will be "a long time before Congress will take the responsibility of authorizing US participation in an international atomic agency," and said, "It will not be easy to convince Congress that it is not some form of a foreign give-away program."

The majority of congressional comments, however, were more favorable, the general impression being one of essential approval of at least the general idea if it can be developed in such manner as to avoid undue risks. Chairman Cole (R, N.Y.) of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee urged Americans to unite behind the plan, and promised to do "everything within my power" to win congressional approval of the proposal.

ATOMIC NOTABLES Bernard Baruch termed the speech "a highly necessary expression of the concern over the status of atomic and nuclear matters. It was properly addressed to all mankind in the interest of civilization." Gordon Dean, former AEC chairman, hailed the proposal as "thoroughly workable" and having the advantage of offering a practical means of bringing the US and the USSR together on a sensitive matter.

David Lilienthal, first AEC chairman, also supported the proposal but urged on Dec. 27 that the US move to put it into effect immediately without waiting for Russia to join if she proves hesitant. Similarly, Sen. Humphrey (D, Minn.) suggested that the US accomplish its objective by joining in the European Nuclear Research Center at Geneva (CERN -- see NL 53-7). Lilienthal's suggestion was attacked by Walter Lippman (Dec. 31), who pointed out that such steps ignore the very essence of the proposal -- to achieve at least limited US-USSR agreement as a possible prelude to a wider entente. Lippman saw the chasm between the US and USSR deepened if the US moved ahead alone.

ADVERSE CRITICISMS Adverse criticisms have come from several sources, on both liberal and conservative sides. For instance, the *New Republic* (Jan. 4) condemns the proposal for by-passing existing proposals for atomic control, saying that it implies "silent abandonment of the UN Majority

Plan for the control of atomic weapons." However, FAS Chairman Hill regarded this as a strong point in his Dec. 8 press statement: "By officially discarding older formulas which have led to deadlock, . . . [the President] has galvanized the attention of the world and provided a new fluidity which renews hope."

From entirely different political quarters came the charge that the proposal is an international atomic give-away. Quoth a *N.Y. Daily News* editorial (Dec. 10): "Medford Evans, longtime US Atomic Energy Commission security operative, says most of our atomic scientists are Socialist- or Communist-minded -- which in this case means a lot of them would be delighted to make it easy for Russia to grab the world atomic stockpile."

"The FAS, whose members have long been concerned with the dangers of a continued atomic armaments race and the necessity of finding some way to avoid the final catastrophe of H-bomb war, endorse these suggestions made by the President as timely steps toward greater international cooperation, which is sorely needed to reduce the atomic threat.

"Technical developments of destructive power, as the President has clearly stated, have been so rapid that mankind faces almost certain disaster unless political attitudes and institutions rapidly catch up. Despite their very different ideologies and aims, both sides stand to gain by recognizing this unprecedented situation and modifying their ambitions to the extent necessary for sound agreement. The forthcoming four-power conference presents a welcome opportunity to prove the possibilities of agreement on some measure of guaranteed disarmament. . . ."

-- FAS Comm. on Disarmament & Atomic Control, Dec. 13, '53

MASE, the Mohawk Association of Scientists and Engineers, has formed a committee to study the problem of the reduction of urban vulnerability to atomic attack and what the organization can do in this field. The action was inspired by a luncheon discussion of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* issue on civil defense (Sept. 1953). The FAS chapter members were impressed by the Project East River conclusion that reducing the concentration of people in cities was the only real defense against atomic bombs, and they were shocked by the present lack of attention to this problem which needs continued national and local effort over a period of years. The committee (R. S. Rochlin, RD #2, Sacandaga Rd., Schenectady 2, N.Y., chairman) intends to study the local situation in the Albany-Schenectady-Troy area as well as ways of getting more action on a national scale.

FAS COUNCIL next meets January 30 in New York, Columbia University Faculty Club, beginning at 4 PM. Observers welcome.

READER'S DIGEST (Jan. '54) has a lead article by Lester Velie, describing our over-zealous handling of visas and effects of the McCarran Act. We are shown to be losing friends.

F A S NEWSLETTER

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